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LECTURE 1: OCTOBER 14, 1897
One thing I wish to say to you before beginning with the examination
and explanation of the Constitution, is that I must assume that each of you
has some time or other in your life read the history of England and the
history of the United States. If you have done neither, the sooner you do so
the better. This I must assume in order to complete in the short time of
space allotted to me, that you have at least a general knowledge of your
country, as well as of the country from which our institutions and laws
have been derived.
You well understand that there is little or no scope for originality in
anything that I can present to you as to our Constitution. The whole thing
seems to have been fully covered by treatises and judicial opinions. These
later must be our guides in ascertaining what that instrument means. The
decisions here alluded to are of course principally those of the Supreme
Court of the United States. No other judicial tribunal can speak with the
same authority as it can. Now, do not understand me to say that every
possible question has been determined. From the very nature of things, as
our civilization advances and broadens, new phases of questions supposed
to have been settled will arise and often present difficulties of a very
serious character.
All that I mean to say is that most every position relating to the powers
of the federal government have been defined in their scope, so that all that
remains to be done is to apply the rules to new phases of old questions.
The man who knows nothing of the form of government under which he
lives does not deserve to enjoy its blessings and privileges. He is derelict
in his duty as a citizen, and of all other persons the lawyer is least
excusable.
I have often been astounded to meet with lawyers who have actually
never read the Constitution of the United States, although it can be read
within the time that is wasted at a street corner some afternoon discussing
the last game of baseball or the last prize fight. They may have examined
particular clauses, but have never read the entire instrument so as to
comprehend in a general way the system of government ordained by it.
They have a vague, loose idea of what may and what may not be done
under the Constitution, and they have not a knowledge which comes from
an actual examination or a serious thought. Good lawyers have been heard
to accord powers to the general government which everyone knows that it
does not possess, and deny powers that it has and must have if it is to exist
at all.
Now, I beg you that that this may not be said of any member of this
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law class that he allow this week to pass without reading the Constitution.
Some knowledge of the principles underlying the government under which
we live ought to be possessed by every person who owes duties to that
government, or upon whom its laws operate, or who depends upon it for
protection of his life, liberty, and property. Freedom and free institutions
cannot long be entertained by a people who do not understand the nature of
the government under which they live.
It is a peculiar fact that many of our graduates of universities are better
informed about the history and laws of ancient nations than they are of the
government under which they live. Gentlemen go to Europe carrying with
them diplomas of the highest excellence in literature and ancient history
and of the classics who cannot explain to a foreigner of some education any
of the principles upon which our system of republican government rests. If
they are asked why Congress does not pass a general divorce law operating
throughout the entire United States, or fix a uniform punishment for the
crime of murder, these gentlemen of such high attainment could not tell, if
their lives depended on it, why Congress had no power to enact such
legislation.
Now, it is essential to a clear understanding of our Constitution to
know something of the circumstances under which those who framed it
were placed. There are words in our Constitution which are susceptible of
different constructions, but their meanings are ascertained by knowing the
circumstances which then existed and the laws and customs which went
before. We ought to know what principles of government existed at the
time and before that time, what right of life, liberty, or property existed and
which went before the time when the colonies achieved their independence.
Every lawyer knows that the meaning of a rule of law is best ascertained by
taking the history of the rule, back through the line of legislation and
adjudications, up to the time when it was first enacted.
So, you see, we will have to look at the history of the mother country.
Many men do not like the phrase “the mother country,” because they regard
it to be, and always to have been, hostile to this country. In a sense, they
are right. They treated our forefathers very badly during the time preceding
the war for independence, as well as during that war, and even down to the
war of ‘61, in a manner such as we do not always recollect with pleasure.
She has not always treated the daughter as a loving mother ought to treat
her children, but it must be said with frankness that the child has not always
been as dutiful as it ought to have been.
It will not serve a good purpose here to enter upon inquiries whether in
all the crises the one country or the other has been most in the wrong.
What most concerns us is that more than at any time in past history of these
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two great nations, they stand closer together than they ever did before, and
it is to be hoped that nothing will occur to disunite them. We will be asked
at all times to take the part of our own country, and so we ought to. The
man who does not love his country is worse than a heathen. But the fact is
that most of this country was once under the domination of England.
The English and the Americans speak the same language and have in a
large degree the same customs and laws. And they are the leaders of the
Anglo-Saxon people of the world and what destiny awaits the Anglo-Saxon
race if they are united upon any matter affecting the prosperity of nations.
Their will can be made paramount. And moreover, they are the custodians
of the principles of liberty, which must prevail to the end, that men shall
enjoy that freedom of speech and action which is essential to the security of
life, liberty, and property.
The mother country was once the strongest. And although she may yet
claim to be the strongest, yet one of her greatest men, now dead—I allude
to Mr. Gladstone—said quite a number of years ago:
There can hardly be a doubt as between America and England of
the future, that the daughter at some not very distant time, whether
fairer or less fair, will be stronger than the mother, and it is with
particular interest that I think of what change in the world the
destinies may yet have in store for these two nations born to
command.1
Now, I direct your attention to this first, because it is important that we
know what went before the Revolutionary period when our forefathers
established our Constitution. What models had they? What did experience
tell as to the operation of particular principles of government? Now, it is
common knowledge that, at the time when our forefathers were driven into
the rebellion, the English government consisted of three departments, or
branches of government, representing in theory the monarchical,
aristocratic, and public or democratic elements, and I shall not make any
statements of the early history of England out of which they arose. That
belongs to the study of the history of England.
Suffice it to say that long before the establishment of our Constitution,
the rights of the people, the King, and of Parliament were clearly defined.

1

W.E. Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, 127 N. AM. REV. 179, 181 (1878) (“The England
and the America of the present are probably the two strongest nations of the world. But
there can hardly be a doubt, as between the America and the England of the future, that the
daughter, at some no very distant time, will, whether fairer or less fair, be unquestionably
yet stronger than the mother.”).
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It is true now, as it was essentially true at the close of the last century, that
the King or Queen reigned, and that while in theory the House of Lords
possessed as much power as the House of Commons, the real power by
which England was then controlled resided in the House of Commons. In
form, the King appointed the ministers and through them the operations of
the departments were conducted, but in fact those ministers were
designated by the House of Commons.
Now, let me explain to you what a “Vote in the House of Commons
for a Want of Confidence” is. You often see this phrase in the newspapers.
You, of course, know who the present Prime Minister of England is: Lord
Salisbury, who has somewhat in the English system of government the
position occupied by the President of the United States.2 He is the
responsible head of the executive branch of the government, and that
gracious lady, called the Queen of England, whether at her estate in
Scotland, or on the Isle of Wight, or near London, although greatly
respected by all her people, has very little to do in point of fact with the
ruling of the English people. And if she attempted to lay her hand on the
operation of the government of England, if she would say this, that, or the
other thing shall be law, this, that, or the other thing shall or shall not be
done, Lord Salisbury would resign his position and tell her to find
somebody else to accept the position of Prime Minister of England. And
she would not find anybody else that had any manhood or self-respect in
him among the public men of England that would take that position.
This is all preliminary to the description of a vote of confidence in the
House of Commons. Now, what does that mean? The House of Commons
is composed of men that are elected and are supposed to represent the will
of the people of England. Now today, great events are transpiring in
different parts of the world that are to affect not only one country, but the
whole civilized world. The map of the world is being reformed, so to
speak. Great things are now going on in Asia. The old decayed empire
seems about to be divided up in some way. Russia is going free from
Europe and is making for land on the Pacific Coast, and she is supposed to
have large influence with the governing power in China. Germany is
looking in that way, so is France, and a great many people are inquiring as
to what Lord Salisbury intends to do as far as the English interests are
concerned. Does he intend to stand still till Russia gets it all? Way over in
2 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, was Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom from 1885–86, 1886–92, and 1895–1902. History: Past Prime Ministers,
GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-prime-ministers/robert-gascoynececil (last visited May 19, 2013).
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the center of Africa there is a scene of dispute between England and
France, and Englishmen are inquiring, what is Lord Salisbury going to do?
Is he going to let the Frenchmen stand there, or is England going to control
the Sudan and the navigation of the Nile?
Now, suppose any measure arose in the House of Commons involving
one or the other of the plans of Lord Salisbury, and one of the Members of
this House should condemn Lord Salisbury and Lord Salisbury’s purpose,
and this condemnation took the form of some measure and a vote taken
upon it, and the House of Commons votes to sustain that measure and
condemn Lord Salisbury. That is a vote of a want of confidence.
What is the result? What would occur? Why, if a vote of want of
confidence occur one night, by the next day at noon Lord Salisbury would
have hunted up the Queen and tendered the resignation of himself and his
ministry. What would the Queen do? I read to you that the ministers were
appointed by the House of Commons, although not by vote. The Queen
would send for the leader of the majority in that context. He is presumed to
represent the will of the people of England, and she tells him to form a new
ministry. Well, he will go to a Member of the House of Lords and say, “I
want you to administer Naval Affairs,” and so on. He would form the
cabinet and would become Prime Minister, practically the President of
England, and he would stay in as long as the House of Commons supported
him.
I ought not to pass this point without contrasting the difference
between that form of government and ours. We have a President of the
United States, elected for four years. No vote of want of confidence of
either Senate or House can turn him out. He has his cabinet and no one of
them can be disturbed by any act of Congress, except by impeachment, no
matter what vote of censure be made, either by Senate or House. It cannot
disturb the cabinet. And therefore, in that instance, the application and
management of the English government responds more quickly to the
prevailing sentiment of the people than ours, but it is not for that reason any
better or stronger than ours.
You will find gentlemen across the waters, especially in France, who
will speak contemptuously of our form of government. They say it is a
mode which cannot last. All the powers are in the possession of the party
in power and seeds of dissolution are sown at each election. But this fact is
in the very illustration that I have given. In that you have proof of the
wisdom and forethought of the men who framed our Constitution and our
government.
We are free. There is security of life, liberty, and property here. It is
the only government on the face of the Earth where man and man are equal
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before the law, and with all that large liberty we are stable and strong.
There will be government after government overturned and overturned in
England and in France, perhaps, and in Germany and elsewhere, by the
passions and combinations of the people, while this government is strong
and steadfast, because in our fundamental law we have placed checks upon
ourselves. We recognize the fact that we need to be restrained.
What I have said justifies the statement that England is governed by a
cabinet. This system works a close union between the executive and
legislative departments of the English government.
I will stop here long enough to say that England has not got a
Constitution. There are a series of statutes and customs and judicial
decisions, all put together, which constitute the English Constitution. But
this country is the only one on the face of the Earth that has a written
fundamental law that is above Presidents and Congresses, and even above
the people who made it, whereas what is called the English Constitution
may be unmade any day by Parliament by a statute.
Now, that system works a close union between the legislative and the
executive departments, so that an English writer referring to it says this
close union of the executive and legislative powers is effected by means of
a body of men from the legislative branch, selected to be the executive
power, a committee, a hinge which joins these two powers of government.
In its origin, it belongs to one; in its functions, it belongs to the other. It is
an absorption, a fusion of the two.3
Now, I told you before that when a vote of want of confidence was
taken, the Lord Premier would resign. But he may say, “The House of
Commons does not represent the real will of the people, and I will dissolve
Parliament, and appeal to the people in this measure.” Now there is an
election, and if the people sustain the vote of the House of Commons, that
is the end of it. Lord Salisbury would have to resign.
Mr. Gladstone said if we wish really to understand the manner in
which the Queen’s government is carried on, we must prepare to examine
with a sharper contrast the power of the American President. His ministers
are the servants of his office. The intelligence which carries on the

3 WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 50 (2d ed. 1873) (“The English
system, therefore, is not an absorption of the executive power by the legislative power; it is
a fusion of the two. Either the Cabinet legislates and acts, or else it can dissolve. It is a
creature, but it has the power of destroying its creators. It is an executive which can
annihilate the legislature, as well as an executive which is the nominee of the legislature. It
was made, but it can unmake; it was derivative in its origin, but it is destructive in its
action.”).
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government has its main seat in him. The responsibility for failures falls
upon him, and it is around his head that success sheds its glow.4
The American government consists of three powers distinct from each
other: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The English
government is likewise so described, but in the English government there is
found a fourth power entering into and sharing the work of the other three,
and charged with the duty of holding them in harmony. This is the
ministry.
Yet, it is not a distinct power. This fourth power is parasitical and
lives no separate existence. One portion is formed in fact from the House
of Lords, the other from the House of Commons. These form the council
of the Queen, and upon them rests all responsibility. It is a hinge that
connects the King or Queen and the House of Lords or House of
Commons. Upon it is concentrated the whole strain of the government. In
every free state and in every republic, someone must be responsible, and
the question is who shall it be. In the British Constitution, it is the ministry
and the ministry exclusively.
Now, this may be further illustrated by one or two points to which I
will call your attention very briefly. You will observe from what has
already been shown that the House of Commons can in some way or other
place its hands upon every department of the British government. The
principle underlying our government is a separation of the branches of the
government. Now they have got those three departments in England, but
they are interwoven and connected. The House of Lords is even the
Supreme Court of England. Now what might happen in England?
I once asked a great English judge, now dead. He expressed a hope
that someday they would have in his country a court like the Supreme
Court of the United States, which could speak finally without there being
any power of revision. Their highest court there is the House of Lords. I
said to him—it was during the lifetime of Mr. Gladstone—I asked that
great judge what the courts of England could do if Parliament were to pass
an act authorizing the sale of Mr. Gladstone’s estate for cash to the highest

4 Gladstone, supra note 1, at 193–94 (“But if we wish really to understand the
manner in which the queen’s Government over the British Empire is carried on, we must
now prepare to examine into sharper contrasts than any which our path has yet brought into
view. The power of the American Executive resides in the person of the actual President,
and passes from him to his successor. His ministers, grouped around him, are the servants,
not only of his office, but of his mind. The intelligence which carries on the Government
has its main seat in him. The responsibility of failures is understood to fall on him; and it is
round his head that success sheds its halo.”).
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bidder and putting the proceeds into the treasury of England. I asked him,
could that act be declared void? “No,” said he, “the judges in the highest
court of England would have to respect that statute, because the highest
power of the English people is represented in Parliament. No court in
England would dare say that that statute was void.” Said he, “How is it in
your country?” “Well,” said I, “in America every man’s right of property
is protected by the fundamental law that is over every power in the country.
The government of the United States and the states combined could not lay
their hands on my property and take it for public use without paying me for
it.” And that any court could step between the legislature and me and
protect my property. An act such as I spoke of would not stand a minute in
any court in America, be it ever so humble. This illustrates the difference
between the two systems of government.
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LECTURE 2: OCTOBER 21, 1897
The subject of my talk the last evening was mainly in a general way to
bring to your minds some knowledge of the fundamental characteristics or
features of the English form of government, in order that you might see
what was before the men who framed our present form of government
when the Constitution was established. Something in addition now to what
was said on that evening on that line.
The Anglo-Saxon policy, as it obtained in ancient England, was local
or self-government. We hear a great deal about local government in this
country—home rule. It is a very old idea in England, not exactly as we
have it. That was shown in the political and territorial conventions, in
which the body of the inhabitants has a voice in managing their own
affairs, although subsequently the freedom of localities was undermined or
impaired and the power of the ruling class instilled in its place. Yet, as
early as 1485, there were essential checks upon royal and governmental
authority.5
Probably I am doing you a service as I pass along to say to you that
Hallam’s Constitutional History of England is a very valuable book for you
to read.6 You will call it dry. It is dry to anybody except a lawyer. If you
do not read it too rapidly, but read it slowly, you will see that we have no
book that will take its place.
Now, what were some of the principles that were established before
this government of ours was organized? The King could not levy any new
tax upon his people, except by the grant of Parliament. Queen Victoria
today cannot levy any tax by her mere fiat, her word. It has got to be done
by Parliament, and she, of course, assents to its action upon the subject.
This Parliament way back yonder, many years before our government
was established, consisted of two Houses, in one of which were Bishops
and persons called “hereditary peers.” And then there was the House of
Commons, the lower or “common” house as it was called. Now, the assent
and approval of Parliament was necessary for every new law, whether of a
general or temporary nature.
Now, there was another principle that we understand today, because it
pervades all of our system, federal and state. No man could be committed
5 On August 22, 1485, Henry VII seized the crown of England from Richard III and
founded the Tudor dynasty, which began the transition from a feudal to a bureaucratic
government. See 1 HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM
THE ACCESSION OF HENRY VII TO THE DEATH OF GEORGE II 10–14 (Paris, Chapelet 1827).
6 See id.
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to prison, but by a legal warrant specifying his offense, and by a usage
nearly tantamount to constitutional right he must be speedily brought to
trial. The Queen of England cannot take up or detain the meanest subject at
her mere will or pleasure. It is one of the privileges that no man shall be
restrained of his liberty but by the law of the land.
You hear the phrase “Magna Charta.” Do all of you know what
Magna Charta means? You certainly do not know what it means unless
you have read some history of England. Way back in the year 1215, now
nearly 700 years, the barons of England and some of the bishops met and
demanded certain things to be done by the King of England. They made
that demand of King John. They compelled him to give his assent to
Magna Charta, the great charter. That was the basis of the liberties which
the people of England enjoy today.
That is another illustration, which often happens in the history of the
human race when great results are attained, when the mighty in the land,
the strong and the powerful, rise and resist aggression upon their rights.
This was an illustration of the willingness of the mighty in the land, in
England—not the poor and humble and the oppressed, but the mighty—to
resist the King because he was oppressing them. And when they wrung
Magna Charta from King John, they wrung something from him that was of
benefit to every human being of every condition of society in England.
Now, the same views that were expressed by this charter were once
expressed by the celebrated author Thomas Erskine in defending Hallam’s
book.7 This was a lawyer, and it is true in the history of all the AngloSaxon race, and many other races, that it is the lawyer that has stepped
forward and has put himself in the way of arbitrary power to defend the
rights of man. And this lawyer, once an officer in the Navy of England, but
studying law after he had had that service, was in his lifetime known as the
most celebrated author of England.
There he stood in the presence of all the Judges of the King’s Bench,
stating to them that if a man were to commit a capital offense in the face of
all the judges of England, their united authority could not put him on his
trial. They could file no complaint against him, even upon the records of
the Supreme Criminal Court, but could only commit him for safe custody,
which is equally competent to every Justice of the Peace. The grand jury
alone could arraign him, and in their discretion might likewise discharge
him by throwing out the bill, and the names of all your lordships as

7

R v. Shipley, (1784) 99 Eng. Rep. 774 (P.C.) 781–82. Erskine revised Hallam’s
Constitutional History.
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witnesses on the back of it.
The fact of guilt or innocence on a criminal charge was to be
determined in a public court, and in the county where the offense was
alleged to have occurred. Public court, not a Star Chamber—whenever that
occurred, it occurred only by tramping the laws of England underfoot. And
not tried by one man, or two men, or three men, but by a jury of twelve
men, from whose unanimous verdict no appeal could be made. Civil rights,
so far as they depended upon the subject of fact, were subject to the same
mode of decision.
We have preserved in our fundamental law this right of trial by jury.
The officers and servants of the Crown, violating the personal liberty or
other rights of the subject, might be sued in an action for damages to be
assessed by a jury, or in some cases were liable to criminal process. In
other words, the King, moving along the streets of England, might tell his
subjects to arrest that man and put him in jail. Well, that man who
imprisoned him could be sued, and it would be no justification for him to
say that he did it by order of the Crown. The courts would answer that the
King had no authority to give such directions.
Now, these principles were at the very foundation of the liberties of
England when our fathers emigrated from that country. The people were
free, in the best sense of the word. In these principles, the men and women
who had fled from persecution in England had been trained.
This continent, you will remember, was effectively discovered in
1492. I say “effectively discovered,” for while the evidence is abundant
that the shores of New England were visited by Norsemen as early as the
eleventh century—the indications are that this is true, but they did not
remain long—no European population was landed upon our shores until
after the discovery of Columbus, now nearly 500 years ago. And one of
the curious features about the fame of great discoverers, and other men, is
that there is definite doubt today where Columbus is buried. They are quite
sure that he is buried down here in Havana. They say that before they
evacuate Havana they will take his remains to Spain. But people over in
San Domingo say that there is no doubt that he is buried there. But perhaps
it is not of great importance where he is buried. I don’t suppose they will
find anything remaining of him now, except the fame and memory of his
achievement.
Now, in the beginning of the seventeenth century the Pilgrims landed,
and thenceforth there was a tide of immigration to the shores of America
that made it apparent to the mother country that the American Colonies
were destined to become an important part of the British Empire.
I cross over the first century of the life of the colonies, because that
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period is covered by histories which I assume you have read or will
consult. The people of the New England Colonies early discovered the
necessity of union among themselves for their protection against hostile
Indians and against the Dutch in New York. It is a curious commentary
upon that saying that both of the candidates for the Governor of New York
today are proving that they are descended from the Dutch.8
The men who came over on the Mayflower had learned what arbitrary
power was and what liberty was. They recognized the fact that real lasting
freedom consisted not so much in the absence of actual oppression, as in
the existence of constitutional checks upon the power of government.
Referring to the planting of the seeds of voluntary government here, it was
said recently by a very distinguished gentleman that it is like a grain of
mustard seed, which when it is sown in the earth eats less than all the seeds
that feed in the earth, but when it is sown it groweth up and becometh
greater than all the others, shooting out great branches so that the fowls of
the air may lodge under the shadow of it.9 Now, before these Pilgrims left
the deck of that famous ship, they signed articles which were to be the basis
of their system of government.10
Now, just before they landed, they kept a journal in which entries were
made in brief form as to what occurred from day to day. An entry of
December 20, 1621 contained six words, but they were of momentous
character. The people who had turned their backs upon their native lands,
their friends, their kindred, and what were deemed the pleasures and the
enjoyments and the comforts of civilized life, and put themselves into this
little vessel and braved the dangers of the Atlantic Ocean, came to this wild

8 In the 1898 election, the Republican candidate for Governor of New York was
Theodore Roosevelt and the Democratic candidate was Augustus Van Wyck. Timeline: Life
of
Theodore
Roosevelt,
THEODORE
ROOSEVELT
ASS’N,
http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org/life/timeline.htm (last visited May 19, 2013).
9 2 LYON G. TYLER, THE LETTERS AND TIMES OF THE TYLERS 537 (Da Capo Press,
1978) (1885) (“On the soil of Virginia, there at Jamestown, twenty miles from Sherwood
Forest, the first permanent English settlement had been made in the continent of America.
That settlement had been the mustard seed from which the great tree of the Union had
sprung, with its huge branches stretching through so many climes, and till now the lodging
place of the birds of brotherly love.”). Tyler and Harlan allude to the parable of the mustard
seed. Mark 4:30–32 (King James) (“And he said, Whereunto shall we liken the kingdom of
God? or with what comparison shall we compare it? It is like a grain of mustard seed,
which, when it is sown in the earth, is less than all the seeds that be in the earth: But when it
is sown, it groweth up, and becometh greater than all herbs, and shooteth out great branches;
so that the fowls of the air may lodge under the shadow of it.”); Luke 13:18–19; Matthew
13:31–32.
10 MAYFLOWER COMPACT of 1620.
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land in order that they might worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their consciences, and have a government or an organization that
paid some regard to the natural rights of man. What was that entry, just six
words? “On the Sabbath day we rested.”11
Well, I say, that tells a great deal. And it contains a principle which
we might well take into our minds today, for if in the experience of the last
two or three hundred years you point me to any people anywhere on the
earth which have no Sabbath, I will point you to a people that have the
seeds of destruction in their social organization. It is not everyone in our
own country that respects the Sabbath day—which ought to be respected—
but generally it is. You cannot go into any city in America today, even in
the largest, and go down its thoroughfares on Sunday, without you see
evidence everywhere of respect for that holy day. Places of business
closed, people at their churches, or at any rate they are resting in the largest
sense of the word. I know there are some who would like to introduce into
this country of ours some of the European notions of the Sabbath day.
Whether they are to succeed in that is yet to be seen.
“On Monday,” the diary reads, “we sounded a harbor and found it a
very good harbor for our shipping. And we marched also into the land”—
and the Anglo-Saxon is apt to do that if you give him a chance—“and
found divers corn fields and little running brooks and places very good for
situation. We returned to our ship again with good news to the rest of our
people, which did much comfort to their hearts.”12
Now, the important thing to observe about this, aside from what I have
said, is that these people did not come here with the expectation of
founding a nation independent of the mother country, but they came as
loyal subjects of England to found an English colony. Now, the first law
which was ever entered by the Plymouth Colony on its records was the one
recognizing the right of trial by jury. Here are the very words: “It was

11 EDWARD WINSLOW & WILLIAM BRADFORD, MOURT’S RELATION OR JOURNAL OF THE
PLANTATION AT PLYMOUTH 59 (Henry Martyn Dexter ed., Boston, J.K Wiggin 1865) (1622)
(“[A]nd here wee made our Randevous all that day, being Saturday, 10. of December, on the
Sabboth day, wee rested, and on Munday, we sounded the Harbour . . . .”). Sunday,
December 10, 1621 on the Julian calendar became December 20, 1621 on the Gregorian
calendar. See Al Van Helden, The Gregorian Calendar, THE GALILEO PROJECT (1995),
http://galileo.rice.edu/chron/gregorian.html.
12 WINSLOW & BRADFORD, supra note 11, at 59 (“[A]nd on Munday, we sounded the
Harbour, and found it a very good Harbour for our shipping, we marched also into the Land,
and found divers corne fields, and little running brookes, a place very good for situation, so
we returned to our Ship againe with good newes to the rest of our people, which did much
comfort their hearts.”).
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ordained on the 21st day of December, 1623, in the court then held, that all
criminal nature, and all matters of trespass and debts between man and man
should be tried by a verdict of twelve honest men to be impaneled in a
jury.”13
Now, as early as 1631, the project for a confederation among the New
England colonies was discussed. There has been much discussion as to the
colony which first originated this project of union. John Quincy Adams
claimed this honor for the Plymouth Colony.14 Others claimed it for
Connecticut. In 1643, the colonies of Plymouth, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts established a colony.15 Each colony, however, retained its
distinct and separate jurisdiction and control over its domestic affairs and
laws. It was an organization which had union upon its face, general
welfare in words, and a form of combination, but it was not a government
that could reach out and enforce its own authority.
You will see when examining this part of our early history that while
to the government of the United Colonies of New England was entrusted
sovereign power in some of its matters, there was wanting that essential,
the power in some peaceful mode to enforce its authority. A government
that has not the necessary power to enforce its authority is necessarily a
government that cannot last long. You will observe also that that
government was committed to one legislative body.16 You will see when
we get along what were the notions upon that subject of the men that
established the Constitution.
What do you think would be the condition of this country if all the
13 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH IN NEW ENGLAND: LAWS 1623 TO
1682, at 3 (David Pulsifer ed., AMS Press 1968) (1861) (“It was ordained 17 day of
[December] Ano 1623 by [the Court] then held that all Criminall facts, and also all [matters]
of trespasses and debts betweene man [and] man should [be tried] by the verdict of twelve
Honest men to be Impanelled by Authority in forme of a Jury upon their oaths.”).
14 John Quincy Adams, The New England Confederacy of 1643, in 9 COLLECTIONS OF
THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 211 (3d Ser., Boston, Charles C. Little & James
Brown, 1846) (“The New England confederation originated in the Plymouth colony, and
was probably suggested to them by the example which they had witnessed, and under which
they had lived several years, in the United Netherlands.”).
15 See THE CONFEDERATION OF THE COLONIES OF NEW ENGLAND, 19 MAY, 1643,
reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND UNIFIED CONSTITUTIONS: A COLLECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCUMENTS FOR USE OF STUDENTS 50 (Arthur Percival Newton ed., 1923). The United
Colonies of New England, or New England Confederation, existed from 1643 to 1684 and
consisted of the colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Plymouth, and New Haven.
16 The New England Confederation was primarily a mutual defense agreement. The
Articles of Confederation provided for a governing body of eight Commissioners, two from
each member colony. One of the Commissioners served as President of the Confederation,
and action required the vote of six Commissioners. See id at 52–54.
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legislative power of this government was committed to one house and
legislature? Suppose we had alone a Senate of the United States, or
suppose we had alone a House of Representatives to make laws. Well,
observe also that there was absent from this system a feature that we have
now got in the existence—which is vital to the stability of any free
government—a judicial department for all the country covered by the
authority of that government.
The passage of the Stamp Act caused the feeling for union. Our
forefathers did not care anything about the little stamp required by that act.
They did care about the principles that were involved in it, because they
had no say-so in the legislature whatsoever. Then came the Congress of
1765 and after awhile the Articles of Confederation, under which the
Revolutionary patriots lived during the struggle for independence. But
before these articles were formed every effort was made to come to an
agreement with the mother country.
The forms of government were not uniform in all the colonies. New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Georgia for a long
period had what are called provisional governments. Then there were
proprietary governments, and of that class were Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and Delaware. There were charter governments, and to that class belonged
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
Notwithstanding the difference in the forms of government, the people
throughout them all were firmly agreed upon certain leading principles.
Upon what principle of justice could Englishmen claim the safeguards
established in England for the security to life, liberty, and property, and
deny the same rights to Englishmen resident in the American colony? And
there was no time in the history of the colonies when the people did not
demand the same rights that were accorded to Englishmen residing in
England.
The Declaration of Rights was formulated by the Continental Congress
of 1774.17 It is in substance the platform, so to speak, upon which the
colonies went before the civilized world into the Revolutionary War. And
they formulated a bill of rights, if I may so describe it. One of them is that
the foundation of English liberty and of all free governments is a right in
the people to participate in their legislative council. And as the English
Colonies were not represented in the British Parliament, they were entitled

17 DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1774),
reprinted in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 63 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1904).
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to the free and exclusive legislation in their colonies in all cases of taxation
and internal policy. The colonies were under the control of the Continental
Congress when the war began. It began in fact in 1775, though the
Declaration was not until July, 1776.
The Bill of Rights promulgated by Virginia prior to the Declaration of
Independence, adopted June 12, 1776 by a convention that met at
Williamsburg, in that commonwealth.18
We all speak—and quite
naturally—of the Declaration of Independence and regard it—and
properly—as our political Bible.
But in my judgment equal admiration and praise is due to the Virginia
Bill of Rights. It embodies all the ideas that were established after several
hundred years of trial for the vindication of the inalienable rights of man,
and in no document (I state this without qualification) to be found in all the
history of the Anglo-Saxon race have those ideas been more clearly
expressed than in the Virginia Bill of Rights. There is scarcely a word in it
that was not necessary. It contains sixteen propositions, every one of
which embodies a vital political truth which ought to be cherished by every
free man, and it was the work of one man. That is, one man was the author
of it.
You have all been to Mount Vernon, the home of Washington. Just
adjoining it, below it, is a plantation on which there is a residence called
Gunston Hall. There lived in the building—the one that is there now—a
planter, not educated as a lawyer as far as anybody has ever heard, having
no ambition for political life, living there practically in the wilderness on
his plantation. The only education probably he had—and that of course
was first-class—was from some of those men who came over at that time
from Scotland and Ireland, and private tutors along the Potomac.
At any rate, this gentleman did not, as far as we know, go to any
college or university, but was simply a planter, but a student and a reader.
And as a result of his reflection and study, he was able to pen this
document. It is early observable from the history of that day that he was
looked upon with great respect and reverence by all who knew him. And it
was said of him that there was such majesty in his appearance that
whenever he appeared in any public assembly in Virginia, no matter what it
was, instantly, as by common consent, everybody recognized him as the
first man there, unless George Washington was present.

18 VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 1606–1863, at 206 (Howard W. Preston ed., New York, G. P. Putnam’s
Sons 1886).
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He went to this convention. The very day after he arrived at
Williamsburg, he was put on the committee to frame this Bill of Rights.
There is no doubt about his authorship of it. The original is in existence in
the city of Richmond, and wholly in his handwriting.19
Now, I repeat that no man of the present day—I do not care how great
a scholar he is—no scholar or statesman can take that document today and
better it by leaving out one word, or putting in another word, or changing a
word. And in its sixteen propositions, you will not find absent a single idea
that we today regard as essential to freedom in this country. And this came
from a man of large fortune, what some would call an aristocrat of that day.
He had five thousand acres of land in his plantation here on the Potomac,
four or five hundred men in his employ, a large estate for that day.

19

Harlan refers to George Mason (1725–92). See id.
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LECTURE 3: OCTOBER 23, 1897
Do you remember, what is the first thing in the Constitution?
The Preamble.
What is the object of the Preamble?
Its object is to state what was the existing evil and what was intended
to be remedied by it.
Will you read the Preamble?
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.20
Do you discover in that any evidence of the grant of power?
No. It is a declaration of purposes for which the Constitution is
ordained.
In that phrase, “We the People of the United States,” who do they
represent? Who are the people of the United States? Does it mean the
same thing as if it had said, “We the states”?
The power which ordained and establishes the Constitution was the
people of the United States.
In what way do the people of the United States do this? Did the people
of all the original thirteen states meet in a mass meeting?
No, by representation in convention assembled.
But those men in convention did not ordain and establish the
Constitution. They agreed on the instrument. Now, they submitted it to
somebody. To whom did they submit it?
To the people of the different states.
How was the action taken?
The people of the several states acting separately within their state
accepted this Constitution, and then when it was accepted, it was voiced
not by the people of the individual states, but the voice of the people of the
United States.
There is a peculiar force in these words, “We the people of the United
States.” Now, if you go back to the Articles of Confederation under which
the people in the colonies lived before this Constitution was adopted, you
will find these words: “Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union
20

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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between the States of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland and
Providence
Plantations,
Connecticut,
New-York,
New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, SouthCarolina and Georgia.”21 They were Articles of Confederation of the
states, and what occurred appears on the very face of that instrument.
Article I. The stile of this Confederacy shall be “The United States
of America.”
Article II. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is
not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States,
in Congress assembled.
Article III. The said states hereby severally enter into a firm
league of friendship with each other—you do not find the word
“league” in the present Constitution—for their common defence.22
While the purpose was to create a perpetual union between the States,
there was no power invested or put in the Congress of the Confederation
that would enable it to assert the authority in which the people of all these
states were interested. It was in substance a partnership between states,
with a right in each state to leave that union whenever it saw proper, to say,
“I am tired of this league.”
More than that, if a state got an order from the old Confederation to
furnish a given amount of money to the common treasury of the common
government, there was no authority to compel it to pay that money. There
was no authority in the Congress convened under the Articles of
Confederation to lay a tax on anybody or anything. It could not raise a
dollar of money.
It was a government which could declare everything and could do
nothing. It was a government which could appoint Mr. John Adams, for
instance, as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Government of Great Britain,
but it was not a government which had power to raise money to pay the
expenses of Mr. Adams while in London. It could borrow if anybody
chose to lend, but it could not raise a tax.
Each of these states reserved their complete sovereignty under the old
Articles of Confederation. And you will now and then meet with a man
who says that the only sovereign in this country is the state. You will meet
with a man who talks as if he had been asleep half a century, and has

21
22

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, pmbl.
Id. arts. I–III.
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known nothing of what has intervened in the meantime. And he will tell
you that the United States are not a sovereign, that the only sovereign in
this country is the state in which he lives. And he will probably say that in
the event of any conflict between an act of Congress, for instance, and an
act of the State, he will say that the act of the State is the law of him, and
not the act of Congress, even if it be consistent with the Constitution of the
United States.
Well, do you say, “I will obey my State, no matter what the nature
deserves; no matter what the authority of the Constitution may say?” And
he will say that he is under an obligation to respect the law of the State,
although it may be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States.
When a man talks in that way in these days, it shows how profoundly
ignorant a man may be without making much effort.
Every judge of every court in this country, federal and state, takes an
oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the laws of
Congress that are consistent with it. He is not bound to support an act of
Congress that is unconstitutional. But an act of Congress that is
constitutional, that is within the limits of the Constitution, he does swear to
support.
If you turn to this Constitution, you will find that it says this
Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof
are the supreme law of the land.23 Just stop there. There might be some
chance for contention.
Every member of every state legislature in this country takes an oath to
support this Constitution as the supreme law of the land. Every justice of
the peace in the United States, between the two oceans, takes an oath to
support this Constitution as the supreme law of the land.24 What, therefore,
is to be thought of a man sitting on the bench of a state court, for instance,
who has an oath upon his seal to support the Constitution of the United
States as the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or the
law of any state to contrary notwithstanding, who will say that he will
enforce this law of the state and respect it, even if he believes it in
opposition to the Constitution of the United States?

23

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
24 Id. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of
the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution . . . .”).
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We ought to take care in the study of this instrument that we are not
misled by either one of two classes of men in this country. And there are
some of both kinds.
There are some who believe that it is competent for the government of
the United States, through Congress, to do anything, pass any law which
appertains to the general welfare. Who think that the government, by the
Congress of the United States, is competent to govern anything that may be
acquired by legislation at all. Who shut their eyes to the idea that there are
states in this country. And who forget that the government created by this
instrument is not a government of all powers, but limited to the extent of
powers to be exercised. That class of man is a dangerous man, if in public
life.
Still, there is another class of men, equally dangerous. There are those
who look upon the government of the United States, and who subordinate
all the interest of the United States to the whim of the notion of the state in
which they live.
These are two extremes. The framers of this instrument have not
intended to create a government in which would be settled all the powers of
legislation. Still less, that they ever intended to minimize or destroy the
powers of the state. This Constitution, as you will find when you look at it
closely, proceeds with the idea that there are certain matters that concern all
the states, and all the people of all the states, equally, which are to be
handled by the government of this instrument; and that there are others, of
a purely local state character, with which this government has nothing to
do. [The government] for national purposes [is] limited in its powers to
those purposes, and state government with full control over domestic
matters.
Now, on the face of this Preamble, the phrase, “We the People of the
United States,” gives the key to this instrument, in part.25 This is a
government not created in the form of a law. It is not a government created
by the states in their corporate capacity, but a government that applies the
office to the will of the people of the United States. When this Constitution
went into operation, it represented the will of the people of all of the states,
acting within their states when they accepted the Constitution; but when it
became the law of the United States, it spoke the will of all the people of
the United States.
The fact that it did so was one of the objections to its adoption. Patrick
Henry called upon Mr. Madison and others and said, “By what authority do
25

Id. pmbl.

2013]

JUSTICE HARLAN: LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

35

you say, ‘We the People of the United States?’”26 It was replied that, “We
say ‘We the People of the United States’ because it is the people of the
United States when we accept the Constitution. We are not speaking the
will of the states, but the will of the people of the United States.”27
What did they mean by it? What object did they have in view? Why
did they want this Constitution? In order to form a more perfect union.
We had a union already, but we want a more perfect union. We want
one that can sustain itself. We want a union that can speak by authority.
We want a union that is strong enough to maintain itself against all powers
that can be brought against it.
And the wisdom of it was illustrated very shortly after the government
of the United States. After the government was incorporated, Washington
was President, Hamilton Secretary of the Treasury. The first Congress
passes what was then called an excise law, which was a very distasteful one
to some of the good people of Western Pennsylvania.28
Thereupon arose a rebellion. It is known in the history of those times
as the Whisky Rebellion.29 They said they would not obey that law, that
Congress had no right to pass it. Nobody should come there to enforce that
26 Patrick Henry, Speech at the Convention of Virginia (June 4, 1788), in 2 THE
DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, ON THE 17TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1787, at 47 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington
1828) [hereinafter 2 THE DEBATES] (“[W]hat right had they to say, We, the people? My
political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to
ask, [W]ho authorized them to speak the language of, We, the people, instead of, We, the
states?”).
27 James Madison, Speech at the Convention of Virginia (June 6, 1788), reprinted in 2
THE DEBATES, supra note 26, at 95 (“Should all the states adopt it, it will be then a
government established by the thirteen states of America, not through the intervention of the
legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular respect, the distinction between the
existing and proposed governments is very material. The existing system has been derived
from the dependent derivative authority of the legislatures of the states; whereas this is
derived from the superior power of the people.”).
28 Excise Act of 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199 (1791) (“An act repealing, after the last day
of June next, the duties heretofore laid upon Distilled Spirits, imported from abroad, and
laying others in their stead; and also upon Spirits distilled within the United States, and for
appropriating the same.”).
29 See generally WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION (2006) (discussing
the political factors leading up to the Whiskey Rebellion); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE
WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986)
(analyzing the Whiskey Rebellion in terms of the greater ongoing “inter-regional
confrontation”); Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s Decision to Crush the
Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIST. 567 (1972) (evaluating how the Executive decided to use
the militia to crush the rebellion).
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law. And they held public meetings. And they said in substance, “Now if
any federal officer comes here to enforce that law, we will make it hot for
him.” And they did. The officers created under that law who went there to
enforce it, in some instances were run out of the country, in some instances
were put in danger of their lives, so that they could not enforce it.
Well, there it was. There the issue was squarely presented. “Have we
got a government that can enforce the laws of that government?” was the
question propounded by every statesman. “Has Congress the power to pass
this law?” And nobody doubted that. If Congress has got the power to
pass this law, and it is in force, the executive branch of the government is
under a duty to enforce it. They have sent their agents there to enforce it.
Now, the issue is presented, who is the strongest? Is the government
of the United States to bow down to these mobs of western Pennsylvania?
Mr. Washington, of course, had the wisdom to see that if at the very
beginning of the government that was tolerated, there was an end of the
government and the Constitution was a failure.
Well, what did Washington do? He called upon the Governor of
Pennsylvania to put down that mob so that the laws of the United States
could be enforced. But the Governor, perhaps expecting to be a candidate
for re-election, did not do it. He said he could not do it.
Well, if that was the nature of it, why serious consequences were going
to follow. But that wasn’t the end of it. There was power given by
Congress in other legislation to call forth the militia of the United States
when necessary to enforce the laws. And Washington called upon the
states of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania for the militia. And he got
it. And he put them under the command of Whitehorse Harry Lee of the
Revolution. And they started for western Pennsylvania. And Washington
himself went part of the way. And when the troops from the United States
got inside the rebels’ lines, the rebels disappeared.
Washington gave them to understand, and they knew he meant what he
said, “I have sworn to support the Constitution and I cannot under my oath
see you defy the laws of the United States, and you must quit your
nonsense and obey these laws.”30 And they were obeyed.

30 Proclamation of August 7, 1794, 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2796–98 (1796) (“I, George
Washington, President of the United States, do hereby command all persons being
insurgents as aforesaid, and all others whom it may concern, on or before the first day of
September next, to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes. And I do
moreover warn all persons whomsoever against aiding, abetting, or comforting the
perpetrators of the aforesaid treasonable acts; and do require all officers and other citizens,
according to their respective duties and the laws of the land, to exert their utmost endeavors
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That was the result of a Constitution brought into existence, not by
states, but by the people of the United States, creating a government that
gave the power not only to live, but the means with which to protect its
existence.
About forty years after that, there was a little trouble in South
Carolina.31 Another internal revenue law was passed,32 and South Carolina
said, “We don’t recognize your power to pass this law. We won’t permit
this act of Congress to be exercised within the limits of the state of South
Carolina.” And the South Carolina legislature passed an act of nullification
which, in substance, said “This statute shall not be enforced in the state of
South Carolina.”33 And they were backed by that man of marvelous ability,
John C. Calhoun, in that belief.
But there happened to be in the White House at that time another man
who had all the courage and promptness of Washington, and his name was
Andrew Jackson. He had taken an oath to support this Constitution, and he
issued his proclamation, addressed primarily to the people of South
Carolina, saying that this law, as long as it is upon the statute books, is to
be enforced.34 I have got behind me all the authority of the Constitution,
the whole power of this country. I have got the army of the United States
and the militia of the United States. Don’t you stand in the way of the
authority of the United States. This Constitution and laws made in

to prevent and suppress such dangerous proceedings.”).
31 Harlan refers to the Nullification Crisis. In 1828, Congress enacted a high tariff on
manufactured goods. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 270 (1828). Many states,
including South Carolina, opposed the tariff. When President Andrew Jackson took office
in March 1829, they expected him to reduce the tariff. On July 14, 1832, Jackson signed the
Tariff of 1832, which reduced the tariff on some goods. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, 4
Stat. 583 (1832). Led by Vice President John C. Calhoun, South Carolina created a
Nullification Convention on October 20, 1832, which passed the Nullification Ordinance
declaring the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional and unenforceable. South Carolina
Ordinance of Nullification (1832), reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1776–1861, at 268 (William MacDonald ed., 1924)
[hereinafter SELECT DOCUMENTS]. On December 28, 1832, Calhoun resigned as Vice
President and became a Senator from South Carolina. Calhoun and Senator Henry Clay
negotiated a compromise tariff act, which Congress passed on March 2, 1833. Act of March
2, 1833, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 629 (1833). On March 14, 1833, the Nullification Convention
repealed the Nullification Ordinance. See 2 WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE LIFE OF JOHN
CALDWELL CALHOUN 29–31 (1917).
32 Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 227, 4 Stat. 583 (1832).
33 South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification (1832), reprinted in SELECT
DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 268.
34 Andrew Jackson, President of the U.S., Proclamation to the People of South
Carolina (Dec. 10, 1832), reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 273–83.
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pursuance of it are supreme, the law being there yet. We do not intend to
submit for a moment to the thought that it is within the power of any one
state of the union the power to defy the laws of the Constitution. And this
law shall be enforced. And every man who stands in the way of its
enforcement will be punished according to the law.35
And the promptness of Andrew Jackson caused that rebellion to
disappear without bloodshed. And it was because he had a government by
this Constitution that spoke in the name—upon authority of—the people of
the United States. And they illustrated those words, “In order to form a
more perfect union.” Not a union on paper, not a union in words, but a
union in fact and law, and a union behind which stood the whole power of
the people of the United States.
Now, another object was “to establish justice.” What did that mean?
The people said, we will put in form a government that can establish
justice, a government that does not rest on justice is not a government. We
will create a government now that can, within certain limits, establish
justice between all the people of the country.
“To insure domestic tranquility.” Well, how does it do that? How
does this government do that? We will see when we go a little further
along a clause under which, if necessity requires it, or if the Governor or
legislature of a state requires it, the government of the United States may
put the whole power of this union behind the governor or legislature of this
state to keep the peace.36 There is power under this Constitution to prevent
the people of two states from being at war with each other. New York and
Pennsylvania may quarrel as much as they choose on paper, but if New
York and Pennsylvania should set about with their organized militia to
make war against each other, this union established by the Constitution of
the United States could step in between them.
In order to “provide for the common defense.” If Texas should be
invaded by a foreign power, Texas does not have to stand alone, upon its
own resources. Texas, after it came into the union, became a part of the
United States of America, a part of the union, so that under this
Constitution an assault by a foreign power upon any one state of this union
is an assault upon all, and the common government of it will go for its
defense. If we want to fortify all the seaport towns of this country between

35

Andrew Jackson, Proclamation of January 16, 1833, reprinted in 3 A COMPILATION
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1173, 1173–1195 (New York, Bureau of
Nat’l Literature 1897).
36 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

OF THE

2013]

JUSTICE HARLAN: LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

39

the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as I hope they will be one of these days,
there is a power in the United States to do it at the expense of all.
“To promote the general welfare.” There are certain things that
concern the people of all the states that can be handled only by the
government of all the states. We the people of the United States ordain and
establish a government which can take care of the general welfare of the
United States, not the welfare of each locality, and not that the government
of the United States is to interfere with the local and domestic affairs of the
country, but there are things which cannot be handled by any one state, and
if any one state should handle it, it might do it against the wishes of another
state government, and as to matters of that sort, that relate to the whole
country equally, we have put up this government for the purpose of caring
for this. The recital of that general object in this preamble is a recital
simply of one of the objects for which the Constitution was formed.
“To secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” Did
any government ever have before it a nobler object than that?
You put these subjects together. “To form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity.” These are objects that might well have
exercised the care and aroused the interests of the men in this country, and
they constitute the foundation upon which this government rests, to secure
those ends and objects this Constitution is ordained and ordained for the
United States of America.
There was once in the Supreme Court of the United States, and
probably the greatest judicial contest this country has ever witnessed
looking at the consequences of it, that arose out of the words “We the
people of the United States.” Along in the fifties, a case for into the
Supreme Court of the United States which involved the question whether or
not the colored man, African in descent, could be or was a citizen of the
United States. He brought a suit in federal court, and as the jurisdiction of
the federal court depended upon the citizenship of the party, the inquiry
was, could this colored man be a citizen of the United States.
That is the case of Dred Scott and Stanton.37 Chief Justice Taney
wrote the opinion for the majority, and in that opinion he said that that class
of people did not constitute a part of the political unit designated in the

37

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Constitution as the people of the United States.38 He said that according to
the prevailing opinion of the people of this country at the time that
Constitution was adopted, the black man of African descent had no rights,
no political rights, which the white race was bound to respect.39
Well, immediately there arose in this country an excitement which it
had not seen in all its history before outside the Revolution. Taney was
denounced throughout the whole of the North, with very few exceptions. It
was charged upon him that he said that the black man had no rights that the
white man was bound to respect. Well, he didn’t say that. He did say that
according to his understanding of the history of the period when the
Constitution was adopted that that was the prevailing opinion at that time,
and that the men who adopted that Constitution did not intend by the phrase
“We the people of the United States” to include the colored man of African
descent.
There was an excitement at that time that you at this day can scarcely
understand. It broke up political parties. It destroyed the political parties
of that day. The judges of the courts were abused. Out of this came the
Republican Party of today. [Applause]. I am not talking about politics, but
about the Constitution of the United States. And that excitement
inaugurated in the fifties continued down to the campaign of 1860. Out of
which came the great contest of that year, and Mr. Lincoln, as candidate of
the Republican Party, being elected as President of the United States. That
was followed by the Civil War of 1861.
Well, now, I am not going to discuss that war, but only say that one of
the results of that war was the extirpation from our social organization, etc.,
in respect of which that controversy arose, and now there cannot be any
dispute as to who constitute the people of the United States who ordained
and established the Constitution. Now it is a constitution, not a league. It
is an instrument that constitutes. It is an instrument that creates. It is an
instrument that builds up from the very bottom.
The Articles of Confederation were not of constitution, but this is.
38

Id. at 423 (“And these rights are of a character and would lead to consequences
which make it absolutely certain that the African race were not included under the name of
citizens of a State, and were not in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution
when these privileges and immunities were provided for the protection of the citizen in other
States.”).
39 Id. at 407 (“They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
benefit.”).
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This constitutes a government, and the only one on Earth that rests on the
consent of the governed. A government and the only one on the Earth
where the heads of it and all the branches of it are governed by a written
instrument that says, thus far you may go and no farther, that says to one
branch of the government, you may handle this subject, to another, you
may handle these subjects, to another branch, you may do this. But it says
to all that the law for you and for every human being in this country is this
written instrument, which is a power of attorney from the people of the
United States to this government. The men who talk about this being an
unlimited government; a vast centralized government.
This government thus ordained and established has its orbit prescribed
by this fundamental law. It cannot go beyond it. It has got no power. And
every other power remains to the government of the respective states with
the people of the states, and therefore the true friends of a national
government of this country are those who claim for that national
government the powers that are granted for it, when such belong to it, and
who at the same time recognize it as the just powers of the state. And the
truest state’s rights man in this country is the man who, while claiming for
his state the rights that belong to it, still that gives to the United States
government all that this instrument gives to it.
You will find cranks everywhere. They do no harm. They keep the
atmosphere stirred, but so far up to this time there has never been a crisis in
which the sober common sense of the people has not been equal to the
emergency and of maintaining to the government all its just powers but
standing by the just rights of the states. Now, so much for the preamble to
this instrument. That is the outline, we the people in order to accomplish
these ends, put this government on its feet. Well, what is this government?
Article I. Article I says, “All legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives.”40 What is that power? The power to make
laws. The legislature does not declare what the laws are. The courts do
that, the judiciary.
“All legislative powers.” There is no word plainer than the word
“legislative.” Now, a man reading that sometimes, if he had large ideas
about Congress, he would emphasize the word “all,” and he would give in
an undertone some of the words following. If it stopped with the word
“all” it could be said that a government had been created that could
legislate on all things.
40

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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“All legislative powers herein granted.” In a subsequent article,
powers which are granted are enumerated.41 Therefore, reading the two
articles together, it means that no legislative powers are granted to the
government of the United States, except those herein enumerated. And
they shall be vested, not in a commission, not in a cabinet, not in a court,
but they shall be vested—not may be—in a Congress of the United States, a
sort of adjunct, and invest that with legislative power, because the absolute
command of this instrument is that the legislative power herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives.

41

Id. art. I, § 8.
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LECTURE 4: OCTOBER 30, 1897
We gave our attention at the last meeting to the preamble of the
Constitution of the United States. After the meeting, one of the students
asked me whether the preamble was a part of the Constitution of the United
States. Well, plainly it is just as much a part, as a preamble to a statute is a
part of the statute.
The purpose of the preamble to a statute is to state the evils which it
was proposed to remedy by the statute, as well as the object for which the
statute was enacted. So, the preamble to the Constitution states what was
the evil pre-existing and what was the remedy to be applied. It is to be
inferred from the preamble that in the judgment of the men who framed the
Constitution we needed a more perfect union. It was necessary to establish
justice. It was necessary to insure domestic tranquility. It was necessary to
have a government that would provide effectively for the common defense,
a government that would also promote the general welfare, and a
government that would secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity.
Now, in order to accomplish those objects the People of the United
States ordained and established the Constitution of the United States of
America. That preamble does not contain any grant of power. That is,
Congress may not say that we do this or we do that by virtue of any power
granted by the preamble to the Constitution. That, you ought not to forget,
is not a grant of power, but simply states the objects for which the
government was established.
Now, one thing in addition to what was said at the last meeting as to
this preamble. I called your attention to its opening words, “We the People
of the United States do ordain and establish this Constitution.” “The
People” were not mentioned in the Articles of Confederation. Those
Articles of Confederation read thus: “Articles of Confederation and
perpetual Union between the states of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay
Rhodeisland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, NewJersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina,
South-Carolina and Georgia.”42 They were articles of confederation
between the states in their corporate capacity. This Constitution is an
instrument brought into existence and established by the People of the
United States, and right on the face of the two instruments, at the very
outset, you will find words that distinguish the present form of government
42

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, pmbl.
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from the government which existed under the Articles of Confederation.
Now, I had gone so far as to call your attention to Article I of the
Constitution. Let me say to you, that before the adoption of this
Constitution, the suggestion was made by [Montesquieu] in his Spirit of
Laws, that liberty could be best preserved by a government that had three
departments with their powers divided.43 But nowhere on the Earth at that
time had that suggestion been carried into effect, nor is there any
government existing anywhere in the world today in which that principle is
carried into effect in the same way as it is in this country.
There are three departments of government in England: the legislative,
the executive, the judicial. The executive department is represented by the
Queen, the legislative by Parliament, the judicial by the courts, but they are
not separate and distinct as they are here. The Cabinet of Great Britain
today rules Great Britain. The Premier of the British Government today is
a member of the House of Lords.44 I believe, probably with one other
exception, all other members of that Cabinet are members of the House of
Parliament. So that there are representatives of the legislative branch of the
government administering the executive functions of the British
government.
The House of Lords today, which is a part of the legislative branch of
the British government, is the ultimate court of last resort in Great Britain,
so that cases go from the other courts of Great Britain to the House of
Lords. Every member of the House of Lords, whether a lawyer or not, has
the technical legal right to participate in the determination of cases that
come before them, but practically, only those members who are lawyers
attend upon the judicial cases, except those that are specially designated as
members of the law bureau of the House of Lords. Now, when you come
to our government, it as peculiar as contrasted with other governments in
that particular.
I had next to call your attention to Article I. If you will turn, if you
please, to that Article, Section 1, that we may get a bird’s-eye view of it, if
43

1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book XI, ch. 6 (Neill H. Alford,
Jr. et al. eds., Legal Classics Library 1984) (1751); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 517 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray
& Co. 1833) (“Every government must include within its scope, at least if it is to possess
suitable stability and energy, the exercise of the three great powers, upon which all
governments are supposed to rest, viz. the executive, the legislative, and the judicial
powers.”).
44 In 1898, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was Robert Arthur Talbot
Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury. History: Past Prime Ministers, supra note 2.
He was the last Prime Minister to head his administration from the House of Lords. Id.
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I may so express it, of our form of government. Now, understand that all
the powers of government belong either to the legislative branch, the
judicial branch, or the executive. You cannot think of any power of
government that is not one or the other.
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”45
May Congress invest any other branch of the government with
legislative power? Could the Congress of the United States invest the
Supreme Court of the United States with the power to legislate? The
legislative power is the power which makes laws. Could Congress invest
the Supreme Court of the United States with the power to make a law?
Why, clearly not. First, this government has no power except what is
granted. With that, everybody agrees. Then, this article says, all legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
and that Congress shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Congress cannot organize any other body in this country and invest it with
legislative power, because this says all legislative power herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, and that shall consist of
a Senate and House of Representatives. Could Congress establish a third
branch of the legislative power of the government, call it, if you choose, a
House of Lords? No. Why? Because this instrument says it shall be
vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, and that excludes
everybody else in this country from exercising legislative power.
Will you turn to your copy of the Constitution, to Article II, Section 1,
and read that section:
“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. He shall hold his Office during the term of four years,
and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same Term be elected,
as follows . . . .”46
Now, could this executive power be vested in anybody else other than
the President?
No, sir.
Well, why?
Because the Constitution says it shall be vested in a President of the
United States.
Now, what do you understand is the executive power? What does it
45
46

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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mean, the President of the United States shall exercise the executive power
of the United States? It rests with him to see that the law is executed. The
President does not make a law. He has no more power to make a law than
you have, but he has power to execute it, to see that it is executed, not
perhaps in every way, but in the way prescribed by law.
We have read the article which shows the branches of the government
in which are vested legislative and executive powers of the country. What
is the other power of the government of the United States that is provided
by the Constitution?
The judicial power.
Article III, if you please. Read the first section.
“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish . . . .”47
What do you understand is the judicial power of the United States?
The power of interpreting the laws.
Well, yes, that is true so far as it goes. But do not disputes often arise
that do not involve a construction of the acts of Congress which must be
determined? Suppose, for instance, A holds a note of B, and the citizenship
of the parties is in different states, and the suit is brought in a court of the
United States, the amount being sufficient, and a question arises in that
case of general commercial law. It does not depend upon any act of
Congress. There is no act of Congress upon the subject, but there is a
dispute between A and B. Now, the judicial power of the United States
extends to that case.
The judicial power means the power which is called into existence to
determine disputes between individuals or between individuals and
corporations, sometimes between states, and that power is vital to the
existence of society. Suppose there were no tribunal in which the dispute
between A and B could be settled. A claims a piece of land that is in
possession of B, and B says, “This is my land.” Well, B is not going to get
out of it simply because A claims it. How is A to get it? He must bring
suit. If his citizenship is in one state and B’s is in another where the land
is, when the value is sufficient, a court of the United States may decide that
dispute. We will see after a while when we get along in the regular order to
what class of cases the judicial power of the United States extends, but if it
is a case of which a court of the United States may take cognizance, then it
is a case in which a tribunal has the power to interpret it.
47

Id. art. III, § 1.
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Now, observe also that it is not all judicial power that is invested in
courts of the United States. It is the judicial power of the United States that
is invested in a Supreme Court and in the inferior courts that the Congress
may establish. The power means the power that courts may exercise in
cases to which the power of those courts extend. It is not every case about
which the courts of the United States can render a judgment. It is only a
certain class of cases, and what those cases are we will know and
understand better when we come to study the article about the judiciary.
Now, will you turn to Article VI of the Constitution, commencing with
that clause, “This Constitution.” And before you read, let me recall to all
of you gentlemen of the class the thought heretofore expressed as to the
supremacy of the government of the United States and its tribunals, not in
respect to all matters, but in respect to the matters committed to that
government.
You will now and then come across a man who will tell you that the
Constitution of my state is my law. I will obey my state, and I will stand
by my state whatever the government of the United States may say. When
my state speaks, that is the law for me. My allegiance is due to it, and my
allegiance to my state is above my allegiance to the United States.
Now, how far that is true will depend upon what the question is, what
the subject is. If it is a matter that belongs by the Constitution to the
government of the United States to determine, and not the state, then our
allegiance is to the government of the United States in that matter and not
to the states. Now see whether that is not absolutely so from the clause
which the gentleman will read.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.48
It is not every law of the Congress of the United States or statute of the
Congress of the United States that is the supreme law of the land. Now and
then the Congress of the United States passes a statute which the courts say
is not law, which the courts say transcends the power which Congress has,
and therefore that which purports to be an act of Congress is not a law.
Nothing can be a law in this country which is in violation of the
Constitution of the United States.
48

Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Does not that law so say? “This Constitution and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,” that is, the acts of
Congress which do not transcend the Constitution, that are within the range
of the power which Congress of the United States has. Those laws, not
laws that violate the Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority
of the United States, shall be what? Shall be the law of the United States or
to the People of the United States if my state says so? No. “Shall be the
supreme Law of the land.”
What do you mean by “the land”? Why, it is the whole of the United
States, and the law, not in part, but the supreme law of the land. Supreme
above everything else. But that is not all. “And the Judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding.” If, therefore, turning to the Constitution of a
state you find anything in there that is contrary to the Constitution of the
United States, that is not law, and no judge is bound to respect it as law, for
this instrument, which is the supreme law of the land, says it shall be
respected, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Now, can anything be plainer than that? Is not that as plain as that two
and two make four? And have we not a right to say, in good humor of
course, at this day when a man says that the Constitution of his state is
above the Constitution of the United States, that he is a fair candidate for
the lunatic asylum? But that is not all. Turn to the closing paragraph of
Article VI of the Constitution and read that.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.49
Do you discover in that clause any authority in a Senator or
Representative of a state legislature to make a mental reservation, or a
judge of a state court to make a mental reservation when he takes an oath to
support the Constitution that he will not support that Constitution if his
state tells him to the contrary?
No sir.

49

Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
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No, it is absolutely without qualification or condition. Let me repeat,
as probably the strongest way in which I can bring out the purpose of the
framers of this instrument, to establish a national government for national
purposes, which was supreme within the limits of those purposes, which
could enforce its authority with all the power granted to it by the
instrument. The strongest mode in which I can put that question to you is
when I tell you what perhaps I have told before, that every justice of the
peace in every state in this union, before he enters upon the discharge of his
duties, takes an oath to support this Constitution of the United States, and
when he takes an oath to support the Constitution of the United States he
takes an oath to regard that Constitution as the supreme law of the land,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any state notwithstanding, and
therein lies the peculiarity of our form of government.
I remember once when lecturing before some law students in the City
of Chicago, I observed a gentleman sitting on my right, and he attended
several days in succession, dressed, as I believed at the time, in the garb of
a minister of the gospel, and at the close he introduced himself to me, that
he was an Englishman, a member of the established church, and assigned
on duty in this country in one of the churches in the city of Chicago, and he
said to me, “Did I understand you to say that it was within the power of a
justice of the peace in this country to declare an act of Congress of the
United States void and unconstitutional?” “Well,” says I, “if you so
understood me, you understood me exactly as I meant to say.” “Well,” he
says, “that is extraordinary, for,” says he, “in my country no court can say
that an act of Parliament is void.” “I understand that perfectly well. You
have got no written Constitution in your country. You have got what you
call a Constitution, but it exists in customs and usages and traditions and
acts of Parliament, and your Parliament can in ten lines wipe out all the
guarantees of life, liberty, and property. If your Parliament were to attempt
to do that your people would turn them out in order to maintain what they
regard the fundamental rights, but as a matter of law your Parliament can
do it. But in this country there is no supreme power except in the
Constitution of the United States. That instrument is the written power of
attorney from the People of the United States to every branch of the
government, and it is the law for all. The President can no more violate
that Constitution than I can; the Congress of the United States can no more
violate the Constitution than I can, and an act of Congress passed by the
unanimous vote of both houses and sustained by the President is not worth
the paper upon which it is written if it is in violation of the Constitution of
the United States. While I would not advise a justice of the peace to
declare an act of Congress void and unconstitutional, he has the right to do
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so, and if he has clear convictions he ought to do so. An appeal will lie
from his decision to some other court and finally get to the Supreme Court
of the United States.”
And now thus you see the legislative, the executive, the judicial power
of the United States is put into three coordinate branches. Each can say to
the other, you shall not interfere with the exercise of my authority, and
when the dispute comes it gets into a court of justice the way it is provided
for, and decided by the judicial branch of government, which decides
disputes.
There is no reason under our form of government for any riot, rout, or
breach of the peace about a dispute in reference to one’s property or in
reference to his personal rights. If the dispute involves no federal question,
it can be decided by the judiciary of the state. If it involves a federal
question, a right under the Constitution of the United States, it can
ultimately get to the Supreme Court of the United States and there be
determined.
It is not possible under our system for any man to be deprived of a
right given to him by this Constitution without his being able to have that
determined by the federal judiciary. It may involve only ten dollars. It
may involve only a man’s homestead worth but a few hundred dollars. The
Supreme Court of a state may decide it against the man and arrest him upon
an act of the legislature of the state, but if the man whose house is taken,
whose property is taken, whose personal rights are invaded has just
grounds to say that this is done in violation of rights secured to him by the
Constitution of the United States, he can under existing legislation we have
had since the foundation of the government take a writ of error from the
highest court of the state to the Supreme Court of the United States to have
it determined.
He will say, I have got this right secured to me by the Constitution of
the United States, and if he has, and the Supreme Court of the United States
says that it is such a right, it can protect that right. That court, composed
only of nine judges in the midst of a population of seventy millions of
people, can say that this man, living in the farthest confine of the state of
Texas, is protected in this, that, or the other right, and it is done. The whole
power of seventy millions of people are behind him to see that that right is
protected, and when they have so declared and decided it is the duty of the
President of the United States, if the executive power has to be called into
question, to stand by that decision and enforce it.
These gentlemen across the waters talk with contempt of this form of
government that we have got here, and speak of this crude democracy that
we have got in this country and does not understand the law, but the more
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they look into it and understand it, the more they will find, the more you
will find, that nowhere else on the Earth is there the like protection of life,
liberty, and property that exists in this country against whatever power.
Let me carry you back to Article I and examine the words of the
Constitution as we find them there. “All legislative powers herein
granted.” Those herein granted, we will see a little further on, shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives.
There is a legislative power invested in the Congress of two branches,
a Senate and House of Representatives. Well, the question probably will
come into your minds, why have two branches of the legislature? Why
have two branches of Congress? What is the use of two branches? Why
not have only one?
We have learned by experience, by history, that of all forms of
despotism that ever existed on the Earth, the worst despotism is the
despotism of a mere majority. In form they have got in England today two
branches of Parliament, but in fact, for most purposes, they have got only
one. The House of Commons controls England today. When the House of
Commons shows its teeth, to express it familiarly, the House of Lords may
not be scared at the first showing, but if the House of Commons repeats it a
second or third time, the House of Lords trembles and they fall in with the
will as expressed in that one House of Commons.
In our country we have got no form of government that can be turned
upside down every few weeks if the people choose to do so. We have got a
House of Representatives that expresses the will of the people immediately,
it may be said, but we have also got a Senate. We have got a Senate which
represents, not the popular will in the ordinary sense of those words, but the
dignity and the equality of states.
Delaware said, and other small states said, we will not go into this
government if we are to go in there at the mercy of a majority of the states.
We want our equality as a state preserved and recognized. We do not know
today what would have become of this country but for that feature. There
are some men even in this day, flippant in tongue, who say Delaware is a
nuisance, Rhode Island is a nuisance. What an outrage, they say, that the
little state of Delaware and the little state of Rhode Island, and the little
state of Maryland should have an equal voice in the Senate of the United
States with the imperial state of New York.
Well, there are many sides to that question. What we want in this
country, and we have got it in this Constitution, is a check upon hasty
legislation. What would become of us if we were at the mercy of the great
and powerful states? What would become of our institutions and our
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liberty if every question that affected life, liberty, and property in this
country was to be turned by the majority vote?
Go to the great city of New York. Why, some men have said that it
was more European than American. A good deal of truth in it. The
contests in great states of this country have turned upon the votes of great
cities, and those great cities have a majority of men, or enormous
percentage of men, not born and reared under our institutions, not born and
reared under the institutions of other countries like England that understand
what life, liberty, and property mean, but born under despotisms, who have
been in the habit all their lives of bowing to titles and powers that did not
know what liberty was, and who come to this country mistaking liberty for
license and license for liberty.
Now, the men who framed this Constitution thought that the liberties
of this people depended in the long run on the preservation of the states of
this union as much as upon the preservation of the union, and I say here
what I have often said before to students of this school, that the truest
friend of national rights in this country is the man who respects the just
rights of the states, and the truest friend of the states is the man who
respects the just rights of the nation.
This Senate was organized and made a part of the legislative branch of
the government. It represented the dignity and equality of the states, and
by their long term of office the Senators would stand between the
excitement and confusion of the moment of the House of Representatives
just fresh from the people. It is easy to be seen upon studying the history of
the Congress of the United States, that time and again in its history the
Senate has stood as a breakwater against the passions and temper and the
excitement of the period, and held off the conclusion of matters presented
to Congress for determination until it could be turned over in the mind of
the people, and be discussed on the stump and in the paper, and in either
branch of Congress until the whole subject has been fully aired and
considered until the conclusion is reached.
Now, there are evils, of course, arising out of it, but these are not evils
chargeable to the existence of a separate branch, each independent. The
House of Lords is not entirely independent of the House of Commons by
usage, but the Senate is independent of the House of Representatives.
Now, the suggestion has been often made that the present mode of
electing Senators is mischievous and ought to be changed. Well, that is
simply a suggestion as to the mode of selection of Senators and does not
change the fact that we ought to have two branches of the national
legislature.
It has occurred undoubtedly from the present mode of electing
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Senators that men have been enabled to manipulate a small legislative body
and get seats in the Senate of the United States who ought not to be there,
and when they are, are mere bags of money with no qualifications for the
place, ought never to have been there, but as I repeat that is an objection to
the mode of the selection and not to the fact that we have a Senate and
House of Representatives, two distinct branches of the legislature, having
power independent of each other, and enabled to regard fully the rights of
the people.
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LECTURE 5: NOVEMBER 6, 1897
We had reached at our last meeting an examination of Section 1 of
Article I of the Constitution, relating to legislative powers of the
government of the United States, and I asked you to remember particularly
the fact that not all legislative powers were granted, but only the legislative
powers herein granted—granted in the Constitution—that were vested in a
Congress of the United States.
Now, some additional observations. A hundred years ago the question
was very much debated among the statesmen of the world as to whether it
was wise or unwise to invest the powers of the government in a single
legislative assembly, and those who were of opinion that a single
legislative assembly was the wisest were not without distinction—some of
them.
That was the state of things in Pennsylvania before the adoption of the
present Constitution, and I believe it was the case in Georgia in its early
history, and among the great men of the world who thought that was a wise
thing, to put the whole assembly in one legislative body, were such men as
Lincoln, and that was the view even of Benjamin Franklin.50 That was the
view of Mackintosh, the English historian, a rare genius, and of very large
learning, and that was the view of those who established the French
Constitution in 1791, but the history of that government under that
Constitution demonstrated the unwisdom of that course.51 We find the
question very largely discussed by Chancellor Kent in Volume I of his
Commentaries at page 280. He represents the view that is given in our
Constitution, and that was the view too of John Adams.52
Now, whatever might have been thought of it at that time, nothing is
more certain than that there is today a concurrence of opinion among the
50 Benjamin Franklin, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the
Constitution of Pennsylvania (1789), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 56
(Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1907). In 1789, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Vermont had
unicameral legislatures. Georgia adopted a bicameral legislature in 1789, Pennsylvania
adopted a bicameral legislature in 1790, and Vermont adopted a bicameral legislature in
1836. Roger Kersh et al., “More a Distinction of Words Than Things”: The Evolution of
Separated Powers in the American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 22–23 (1998).
51 JAMES MACKINTOSH, VINDICIAE GALLICAE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 22 (Donald Winch ed., Liberty Fund Inc. 2006) (1791).
52 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *222 (Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (“The division of the legislature into two separate
and independent branches, is founded on such obvious principles of good policy, and is so
strongly recommended by the unequivocal language of experience, that it has obtained the
general approbation of the people of this country.”).
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statesmen of this country that the existing system is the best one, the safest
one for the liberty of the country. As I said to you last Saturday night,
there was not a single state in the Union which today did not have two
houses of the legislature, two branches, and if the question was submitted
to the people of the United States today, “Shall we change our system so as
to put the legislative in one body?,” I do not think there is a single state in
the Union would agree to it.53 I doubt whether there is in the country today
any statesman who does not recognize the wisdom of the present system.
Now, there are many various rules as to the mode of filling these two
legislative branches. Nobody suggests the alteration, I believe, of the mode
of selecting members of Congress, except as to qualifications of people
who may vote for members of the lower house of Congress. And men will
suggest, but there are very few, however, that the principle of the equality
of the states in the Senate is wrong. Some of them say it is all wrong that a
little state should have as much power as a large one, and some suggest that
the present mode of electing Senators is not the best one. Well, all those
are aside of the question now before us. Nobody suggests, that I know of,
that the Senate be abolished. They suggest that it be modified and the
mode of electing Senators changed, but not the abolition of the Senate
itself.
You may ask yourself, why would not it be safe to have the whole
legislative power of the government of the United States invested in one
body? What is the necessity of having two bodies? Well, in the first place,
you may know and do know from experience that now and then there
spreads over the country, I do not know why or how, schemes for the
supposed amelioration of the present condition of men. Proposals of
legislation to do this and do that, and they apparently have possession of
the popular mind for the time, and if those questions were to come up for
decision in a single legislative body, why, it would take that legislative
body by storm, as we say. A man who is not prudent outside of the House
of Representatives would not be apt to be prudent when he got inside of it.
The presence of the Senate of the United States is a security, some
security against the hasty action on the part of the House of
Representatives.
And the existence of two bodies prevents the
accomplishment of private ends. And many things would pass the House
of Representatives that do not now pass if they supposed that was the end
of it, so far as the legislative branch of the government was concerned, but
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they put to themselves the question, Will that go through the Senate? What
will the Senate say about it? It has heretofore spoken on that subject. If we
pass it, it will be useless. It will be a loss of time. And when men vote on
a measure in the House of Representatives they are aware of the fact that it
has to undergo the scrutiny of another body of men, and those who are not
candidates for re-election as soon as they get here.
About the time that a Member of the House of Representatives gets
warm in his seat, before he has learned the ways of legislation, before he
knows anything at all about committee business, before he has learned how
he is to get the ear of the Speaker so as to be heard, why the time has rolled
around that he will be a candidate for re-election, and he is thinking about
the next election. A Senator is elected for six years, and he has, therefore, a
sense of security. He is in a condition where he may say, I am not going to
be carried off my feet by this excitement; it won’t last; this thing would not
do, and we will amend that bill, and the Senate does amend it and sends it
back and the House does not agree to the amendment. Then they have a
committee of conference and they finally agree upon something.
We sometimes hear an outcry about the Senate. Say it is an old fogy
body; they care nothing about the popular will. Well, the longer we live in
this country of freedom, the more we will find it necessary to put checks
upon ourselves, to put some restrictions upon our faculties and capacities
for legislation, and the existence of these two legislative bodies, each
independent, results in there being checks upon hasty legislation.
Now, all this is apart from those considerations that you often hear
presented about the wrong sort of men we are electing to the Senate of the
United States, the mode of electing. Well now I quite agree that they could
be improved. I do not know as I express anybody’s views but my own, that
there are some evils in the existing mode of electing Senators.
This is becoming a vast nation—seventy million of people now—and
it will probably be two hundred million in the lifetime of the youngest man
here; we do not know. They are coming to us from every part of the world,
and we do not know where we will be after a while. One of the results of
such a condition of things undoubtedly is the aggregation of enormous
power here, of enormous wealth, which will make itself felt, does make
itself felt; does sometimes put into the Senate of the United Statesmen who
have no business there; have not the first qualification to be a Senator; got
nothing to recommend them; that they are tools of somebody.
That evil could be remedied in part if the system was adopted which is
pursued in some of the states, political parties making their nomination for
Senators so that when a man is put up as a candidate by a political party for
the Senate of the United States he has got to show himself; the people have
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an opportunity to see him. It is not so easy for vast combinations to
manipulate the elections of a large state so as to control the election of a
hundred and more candidates, whereas it may be possible for them to
control the votes of small legislative assemblies when they elect a Senator;
send a man here to represent them instead of to represent the country at
large.
But all this is apart from the question. Can we do without a Senate of
the United States? Can we do without the House of Representatives? In
England they have got two branches of the legislature. The one is almost
omnipotent: the House of Commons. The general tendency of the
legislation in the House of Commons is toward larger liberty and against
castes and titles, but while men in England have regretted the condition of
the House of Lords there, nobody there desires, that I ever heard of, to
abolish the House of Lords unless they put some other body in place of it.
I have heard English statesmen express the earnest hope and wish, that
they had in England a Senate like the Senate of the United States or a
second branch of the legislature that was thoroughly independent of the
other, that has as much right under the Constitution as the other branch to
legislate. The House of Commons now and then gets mad because the
House of Lords does not follow in its wake, and they scare their House of
Lords, but the House of Representatives cannot scare the Senate, nor the
Senate scare the House of Representatives in this country. They are both
entitled under the Constitution to think for themselves.
Well you may say that may delay the legislation that ought to go
through. Well I am not aware that this country has ever suffered from the
want of legislation. We may rest assured that when the time comes and
there is an absolute overwhelming necessity for united action on the part of
the two branches of Congress it will come. And because the House may
think today it has go to pass this measure, and the Senate differs with them,
and Congress adjourns without any legislation upon the subject, it does not
follow that the country is hurt by it, but it does follow, and that is
important, that the country has time to think about this matter; have it
discussed in the newspapers for and against so that ultimately sound and
safe conclusions may be reached, and for those conclusions we are
indebted to the fact that we have two branches, two independent branches
of the legislature.
Now we come to look at the personnel of those two branches. First,
the House of Representatives. Of what is that composed? In popular
parlance that is called Congress, but the Congress, technically speaking,
represents both branches. “The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the
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several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications
requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.”54
Why chosen every second year? Why not every year? Why for the
plain reason that if they were chosen every year we would have no time to
attend to anything except the election of members of Congress. But why
not every five years? Well now every five years would be too far off in a
sense in view of the object they have in view, and that was to have one
branch of Congress which may be said to be immediately from the people
and often returning to the people, so that when a man is elected to the
House of Representatives he is said to come fresh from the people. He
knows the will of the people; he knows what the people want. Got a fresh
body of people every two years, come right up from their constituents, full
of the ideas that their people want. That is the most numerous branch of
the legislature representing immediately the popular will. They are elected
by the people of the several states.
Well, who are the people of the several states? For the purposes of the
election they are defined in the next clause. “And the electors.” Now that
means a great deal more than it appears on its face, and in my judgment
more than the framers of the Constitution ever dreamed of. It was a very
important question as to who could vote for the members of the lower
house of Congress. Shall Congress prescribe the qualifications of members
of the House of Representatives? They say, they are Representatives of the
Congress of the United States. Why should not the Constitution prescribe
the qualification of the electors?
Well it was said in reply to that, you have got a great many states to
deal with, and they all have their peculiarities about the qualification of
voters. Some people may vote in one state and the like may not be able to
vote in another state, and if you put in the qualification of the electors you
will run counter to the notions of the people of some of the states.
Therefore, all things to consider, the wisest thing will be to let every man
vote in a state who is qualified by the laws of that state to vote for the
Members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. That was a
rule that applied to all the country alike. It left to each state to say who
should vote for a Member of Congress. Now whoever can vote for the
members of the most numerous branch of the legislature of the state can in
that state vote for a Member of Congress.
A territory out West here is made into a state. It has got 75,000 or
54
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100,000 people to start with; it wants to build up; the state wants to have its
lands occupied; instead of having one Member of the lower house of
Congress, we want to have half a dozen or a dozen, and to do that we must
have a population, and in order to have a population we must encourage the
people to come here and settle. Well now what happens?
In nearly every western state up to a few years ago, and it may be in
some of them even to this day, that a man may land at the City of New
York, fresh from Europe; he does not know a word of our Constitution or
language; he cannot read a single word in the Constitution; he cannot speak
a word of our language; he has gone out to those western states, and they
have provided by their Constitution and laws, most of them in their early
stages, that any man may vote for a member of the lower house of the state
legislature as soon as he has declared his intention to become a citizen of
that state.
It is competent for the state under this Constitution to admit a man to
the right to vote for a member of their state legislature within thirty days
after he has landed on our shores, and many of them did it; many a man,
fresh from Europe, has in the western states gone to the polls when a
Member of Congress was elected, when he had not been here for six
months, and voted for a member of the lower branch of the legislature of
that state and for a Member of the House of Representatives to come here
and make laws for the whole of the United States, and that is simply
because he is qualified in the state in which he lives to vote for a member
of its state legislature, and being thus qualified he is entitled to vote for a
Member of the lower house of Congress. And that may occur today.
I do not believe that was contemplated or thought of by the men who
framed the Constitution. The idea that a man shall vote for a Member of
the lower house of Congress to make laws for the whole United States
without being a citizen is a law that ought not to be tolerated; it ought to be
remedied; we have made our citizenship too cheap; we have not guarded
the elective franchise in this country for members of the national legislature
as it ought to have been guarded. The policy of this country today is
largely controlled by the big cities, where are gathered people from every
country on the Earth, and people who do not understand the spirit of
American institutions; people that have come to manhood under other
institutions; and who have come to this country with the idea that real
freedom meant not liberty regulated by law but license. There is not much
danger to the future of this country, in my judgment, outside of the large
cities of the country that dominate the states, whose votes turn the vote of
the state, and in turning the votes of a few states have decided the politics
of this country for years to come.
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Now in my humble judgment, though I may be old-fashioned, but in
my judgment no man ought to have the power to control the destiny of this
country at the ballot-box unless he be a citizen of the United States. Let me
read these words again to see that I do not misinterpret them. “And the
electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of
the most numerous branch of the state legislature.” Whoever, therefore, in
any state is entitled by the constitution of laws of that state to vote for a
member of the most numerous branch of the legislature of that state is, by
virtue of that fact, entitled to vote for a Member of the lower house of
Congress.
As to the qualifications of a Representative, “No person shall be a
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years,
and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”55
Now let us take that clause. A man to be eligible to the lower house of
Congress must have attained the age of twenty-five years. Well why
twenty-five years? Why not twenty-one?
Well, they proceeded upon the idea that a man at the age of twenty-one
did not know quite as much as he ought to know; that he had not
experience in public affairs quite enough, and that he ought to be at least
twenty-five to have the experience, and that it would be no harm if he were
young, if he had a few years after he reached his majority, and knew
something about work, and about the country in which he lived.
Now when must he be twenty-five years of age? When he is elected;
when he is voted for, when the certificate is given, or when he takes his
seat? Well it suffices if he is twenty-five years of age when he takes his
seat.
A gentleman is now living in Kentucky who was elected to the
Congress of the United States some ten months, eight or ten months, before
he was twenty-five years of age.56 He was not twenty-five years of age
when the Congress met of which he was a member. He did not apply for
admission at the beginning of Congress. He waited until he was twentyfive and was then sworn in. I do not know if any question was made at that
time about his age.
I think that a fair interpretation of the instrument is, that when the poll
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closed on the day of election, it means that the man ought then to be
twenty-five years of age when he is voted for, but there is room for the
other construction. It has never been judicially decided. It might have
been judicially decided if that gentleman had demanded his pay for the
whole of the term for which he was elected, but he did not do that, I
believe, so there was no opportunity to raise a question.
“And seven years a citizen of the United States.” Now under the
clause just before, a great many men coming to the poll vote for members
of Congress that were not citizens of the United States, but the men elected
must be a citizen of the United States. Not necessarily a native citizen of
the United States, but that he must be seven years a citizen of the United
States.
That seven years was prescribed so as to make it quite sure that the
man who has become a citizen of the United States had seven years of
experience in that capacity, and that additional guarantee that he has in that
time become weaned from his own country, and was in a position where he
could give all his thoughts, all of his time, all of his influence to the country
of which he had become a citizen.
And he should, when he is elected, be an inhabitant of the state where
he is chosen. Now there comes in an interesting thought, that is: May the
people in the City of New York elect as a member from that district a man
residing in the city of Buffalo? Yes. It is only required that he shall, when
elected, be an inhabitant of the state in which he shall be chosen. An
inhabitant of the state, not of the district, in which he shall be chosen.
I do not remember that there has been any instance, unless it be once
or twice in the City of New York, where a man has been chosen who was
not an inhabitant of the district in which he was chosen. There are always a
large number of men in each Congressional district of this country who are
willing to serve the people in that capacity, and they would never submit to
an outsider from that district being a candidate or being elected, and yet it
is much to be desired that local custom and rule could be broken through
sometimes.
Occasionally there is a man in public life who goes down before the
popular storm among his own constituents, and who is retired to private
life, and the country loses his services merely because he was unwilling to
surrender his honest convictions to the prevailing temper in his district, and
the boss at home has turned him down. He has probably been here at
Washington and he has startled that boss with proof of the idea that that
man has got a conscience; that he respects his oath; he respects himself in
his own convictions; that he cannot be driven this way and that way as he
may get orders from the boss at home.
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Well now a man of that spirit is an instrument that is a very ugly one
for a boss, and the boss at home will see to it that he does not come back.
He must have a man here in Congress that will do his bidding, and that man
is left out at the next election. Well now if the people of some other
district, recognizing the ability of the man, shall say, represent us, you live
in the same state with us, we will elect you, we will send you to Congress.
Now the English are better off in that regard than we are. The English
people would have lost the services of Mr. Gladstone during the larger part
of his life if he could only have gotten into the House of Commons from
the district in which he lived. When his most distinguished services were
performed, he was elected to the House of Commons by a district in
Scotland.
His most famous campaign was in the district embracing Edinburgh,
Scotland. They wanted him, and the people of his own locality did not
want him. Well at the last election the leader of the Liberal Party in the
House of Commons was defeated in the district in which he lived, but his
party did not wish to lose his services, and somebody gave way for a time,
and that district elected him.57
There are many men today that have been lost to the country
practically; the country lost their services simply because the temper of the
times in their particular district was against them. Had some other district
picked them up and sent them back to the Congress we should have had
them.
Representatives and Direct Taxes. Come now to see how many men
can get into the House of Representatives; what representation each state is
entitled to.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding
to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed,

57 In 1867, the Second Reform Act broke Gladstone’s South Lancashire constituency
into South East Lancashire and South West Lancashire. Representations of the People Act,
1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 102, sch. D, 117 (Eng.). In 1868, Gladstone stood for both South
West Lancashire and Greenwich, losing in South West Lancashire and winning in
Greenwich. Gladstone never represented Edinburgh. Mr. Gladstone’s Defeat in
Lancashire—His Election for Greenwich, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1868, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=F70F17FC3B541B7493C5AB178AD95F4C8684F9.
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three fifths of all other Persons.58
I will postpone at this time any comments upon the words “direct
taxes” and will speak of that at another time.
Now, that clause was the subject of serious debate and concern. The
whole population of the United States is represented in the United States,
and each state has representatives according to its numbers. Well, what
numbers? How do you get at it? Who is to be included and who is to be
excluded?
Now, it is to be determined by adding to the whole number of free
persons—the census will show how many free persons—that is, it means
persons who are not owned by anybody. When this Constitution was
adopted there were persons in many of the states that were in a sense
chattels, slaves, and were owned.
“Including those bound to service for a term of years.” In a sense a
slave, in a sense not free, but you are to count them. Who are you to
exclude in the computation?
“Excluding Indians not taxed.” That is, in some of the states there
were Indians that were not taxed because they were not a part of the people
of the United States. Exclude them.
“Three-fifths of all other persons” are to be included. Who are they?
The word “slave” is not in this Constitution, although we had slaves when
the Constitution was adopted. The “other persons” there were slaves. That
is what is meant.
The people from the North said, well why should slaves be included at
all? They cannot vote. They are not free. You of the South hold them in
slavery. Why should you have a representation based on them? It is not
just because they cannot vote. They have no wish you are bound to
respect, so they ought to be excluded altogether.
Well from the men of the South. They are property, but they are
persons also in some sense. We cannot kill a slave willfully and
maliciously without being guilty of murder. We can be punished for the
murder of a slave as well as we can for the murder of a white man. They
are persons in other senses, and all things considered, it is but just we
should have some representation on their account.
Well finally they reached a compromise, and stated to the people of the
United States, after counting how many people you have in your state, you
may include three-fifths of all other persons. Now I have been talking to
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you for a moment about the Constitution as it was when it was adopted, and
not the Constitution as it now is. Now turn, if you please, to Article 14 of
the Amendment to the Constitution.
“Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State.”59 The old Constitution read, “counting the whole
number of free persons and three-fifths of all other persons.” Now you are
to count the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not
taxed. Therefore, one of the results of that amendment was that after the
war and slavery was abolished, the South got the benefit of the colored
people in their representation in Congress, that is they got an increased
representation.
But look now to the succeeding clause.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.60
In other words, if any state abridged the right to vote to any of its
people of the male persuasion, they should to that extent lose in the basis of
representation. The object of that was to remove from the state that had
formerly held slavery any temptation in any way by any device to affect the
right of the colored man to vote. In that way they secured to him the right
to vote. I suppose that they would lose to that extent in the basis of
representation, leaving out some of those words.
“But when the right to vote at any election shall be denied to any of the
male inhabitant of such state of twenty-one years of age and citizens of the
United States are in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion
or other crime, the basis of the representation shall be reduced in
proportion” &c. Therefore, if a state denies the right, as they might as far
as the Constitution of the United States is concerned, if the state restrict the
right to vote to people who can read and write, and therefore denied the
59
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right to vote of people who could not read and write, to that extent they
would lose in the representation. And that is right. If he cannot vote,
therefore he is not represented in the political representation of the state.
Now let us got along a little farther. You will see in that other clause it
provides for an enumeration of the people, and the number of people that
there shall be in each representative district. Of course, that is changed
now. “The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty
Thousand.”61 Now in some of the districts I believe it is seventy five
thousand.
Now “[t]he House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and
other Officers, and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.”62 Well you
think it is very extraordinary that it was necessary to state in this
Constitution that the House of Representatives should have the privilege of
choosing their speaker. You would ask yourself the question, if the House
did not choose the Speaker, who would? Why should that be put in?
Well, the meaning of it is this; that in England the Speaker of the
House of Commons today is chosen with the consent of Her Majesty, the
Queen. She does not refuse her consent; she would not do it in this day,
but she could, and in law and in theory the House of Commons cannot
choose now its speaker except with the consent of the Queen.
Well this was put in to let it be understood that no such power rested
anywhere in this government as to put a veto on the House of
Representatives in choosing their speaker. The President of the United
States has no more to do with the choosing of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives than the Emperor of Germany has. If he should attempt to
interfere in any way he would be regarded as impertinent. The House of
Representatives is its own master in that respect.
And it was to place beyond all controversy any suggestion to come
from whatever source that any power in this country legislative, executive,
or judicial could control the representatives of the people from choosing
their own Speaker. They can put him in, and they can put him out, but he
is now getting so large that a gentleman here at my elbow suggests that the
Speaker is now a Czar.
Well I do not say that, but he is a great power in the government today.
No one other than the President exercises the power that he does. He
organizes all committees of the House. That House is so large that a man is
lost for a time unless he has exceptional ability, if he be not put upon a
61
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good committee.
Perhaps that is necessary; perhaps it is necessary in the enormous
amount of business to be transacted there, that he should have this power,
but great as you see, gentlemen, his power to be, and is, he cannot stay
there except with the consent of the Representatives. They can turn him
out. If any day the Speaker of the House of Representatives should become
distasteful to that body, they could turn him out and put somebody else in
his place, and that is another illustration of the power for conservative
results, for the safety of the people is put in the hands of each
Representative. It is not possible under this Constitution in view of the
distribution among the several branches, it is not possible for any man,
whatever his position, to set the tyrant or despot over this country, or any
part of it, for any given length of time.
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LECTURE 6: NOVEMBER 13, 1897
The Supreme Court of the United States has no jurisdiction except that
conferred by the Constitution of the United States and acts of Congress.
No case could get there at all about a contested election in the House of
Representatives in any way that would decide that question conclusively.
If A contests B’s seat as a member of the House of Representatives, it
belongs alone to the House of Representatives to settle that question. No
matter how they may settle it, they may settle it wrongly; it may be
perfectly clear on the very face of the case that the House of
Representatives has decided that question upon purely partisan, political
grounds, there is no authority of the government, including the judiciary,
that could interfere with that matter.
The House of Representatives is the judge of the election and
qualification of its members; the Senate is the judge of the election and
qualification of its members. If the House of Representatives should by a
resolution, however wrong, however against law, declare the seat of A
vacant, that is the end of the matter. You cannot appeal to any power on
the subject. Neither the President, nor the courts, because the Constitution
says each House shall be the judge of the election and qualifications of its
own members.63
Now there is one way in which the question as to whether a Member
was validly elected might get before the courts. Suppose a man were
elected, that is, received a majority of the votes before he was twenty-five
years of age for a Member of Congress. He didn’t take his seat
immediately. He waited until he was twenty-five years old and then took
his seat, and he would come on a particular day, on the day those matters
are usually attended to, and ask for his pay. He might claim pay from the
beginning of the Session, although he was not sworn in until two or three
months afterwards.
The officer of the House having charge of those matters would say, “I
cannot pay you. You were not qualified to take your seat on the first day of
the Session. You could not have taken your seat lawfully, even if the
House had admitted you. Therefore, I won’t pay you only from the day
you took your seat, from the day you were twenty-five years of age.”
Well how would the man get his pay? Well he would have to bring
suit against the proper officers, and then the court might decide the
question of law as to whether he was competent to be elected at the time he
63
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was elected, and they might decide he was, and therefore he ought to be
paid, but that would not give him his seat as a matter of law. The court
could not by any means compel the House of Representatives to admit a
man.
Who would process go against? If directed to the Speaker, he would
say: “I am not the House of Representatives. I am only the Speaker.”
Would you put the process on the whole two hundred or three hundred men
of the House? You could no more do that than you could put a process
upon all the members to compel them to vote on any measure.
And this was done wisely by the framers of the Constitution. I say
wisely, speaking as a general rule, and yet there are regulations that might
be made upon that subject that would be conducive to the ends of justice.
It has too often occurred in the history of the House of Representatives that
the committees to whom were referred the claims of contesting members to
seats have decided those questions upon purely partisan grounds. If a
majority of the House want Mr. A admitted, why the committee would
report generally in his favor, and he would be admitted. The members
would close their ears to the fact, at least so it has been stated and so I
believe is the case.
There is a mode in England which might very well be introduced in
this country. There is a provision there by which if a man is returned to his
seat in the House of Commons in violation of law, there is a statute that is a
man has been elected by fraud or by perjury, the election shall be void, and
he shall not be entitled to take his seat, and it is in the power of a single
voter to bring a suit in the courts to determine whether he can lawfully take
his seat, and that judgment is final under the law of England, but we have
no tribunal in this country to determine questions of that sort as against
either branch of Congress.
Now the last clause of the Constitution referred to was that one which
declared that the House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and
other officers, and I called your attention to the fact that as self-evident as
that seems to us, as natural as that seems to us, there was a reason for it,
arising out of the history of the government of England, where in strict law
the House of Commons cannot choose anybody as Speaker to whom the
Queen should object. He is chosen with the consent of the Queen. She
does not withhold her consent in these modern days; she would not do it no
matter who is elected, but in point of law she has to give her consent before
he becomes the Speaker, and this was inserted to prevent the possibility of
such a thing happening in this country.
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Now we come to the third section as to the organization of the Senate
of the United States. Read Section 3 of Article I,—first clause—of the
Constitution. “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years;
and each Senator shall have one Vote.”64
Now what would you say as to the power of any state to pass a statute
providing for the election of Senators by popular vote?
I should say that would be a good thing.
What would you say as to the power of the state to pass such a law?
They would have the power, I think, under the Constitution.
Well, how can that be? Look at that clause again, speaking of the
Senate, not may be composed, but shall be composed of two Senators from
each state, chosen by the legislature thereof for six years. Now, if it is to be
composed of persons from each state chosen by the legislature thereof, why
of course the state could not alter that because, as I have read to you
heretofore, this Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and the
legislature cannot change that. If a Senator should be elected by popular
vote, he would not be a Senator chosen by the legislature thereof.
There is a very strong conviction in this country that the Constitution
might very well be amended in that regard so as to give the people of any
state power, if they saw proper, to elect their Senators by popular vote
instead of by the legislature.65 There are a great many reasons in favor of
that in the light of what we have seen in this country.
As I have said to you heretofore, I believe there are aggregations of
power in this country in a few hands in particular localities far beyond
anything dreamed of by the men who framed the Constitution, and when
those aggregations of power want a particular man elected, or want a
particular man defeated, they have only to deal with the number of men
who constitute our legislature, they have the power very often to defeat a
very worthy man, or the power to elect somebody who has no particular
qualifications for the place, but will come here to represent them, and that
has occurred. I will not call names, and got no names in my mind when I
make the statement, but there is a wide belief that in the past twenty or
thirty years there have been men in the Senate of the United States that
were not there to represent the whole country, and didn’t represent the
whole country, but represented particular interests, were there for that
64
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purpose, put there for that purpose.
I remember not a great while ago reading in the papers what purported
to be the words of witnesses before a legislative committee, inquiring into
circumstances attending the election of a Senator from a particular state,
and there were men before that committee that stated without hesitation
that a particular railroad corporation had contributed money in their
election in different counties.66 What business has a railroad corporation to
contribute its funds; what business has it in its corporate capacity to be
bothering itself with the election of Senators? Of course when they did,
they had a purpose in doing it; certain interests they wanted guarded. They
wanted their man at the post of danger to watch for their interests.
I read only two or three years ago a statement by a distinguished
lawyer, still alive, living in the city of New York, who stated as of his own
knowledge that a particular corporation—railroad corporation I believe—
contributed fifty thousand dollars to one of the political parties in a certain
contest there. And nothing is more certain in these days than that these
aggregated interests are exercising a deleterious influence upon these
legislative bodies.
Here is a state, for instance, in which there is a boss on one side, and a
boss on the other, representing the two political parties. Some man jumps
up in the legislature and he proposes some legislation that will affect a
particular corporation. Well those men having the charge of affairs of this
corporation will go to one of these bosses and say, “We don’t want to go up
here to the legislature and bother with things of that sort. There will be talk
if we go there. Here is fifty thousand dollars. Now stop it. Take your own
way about it, but stop it,” and then go to the boss on the other side and give
him money and tell him to stop that legislation, and the two bosses notify
their henchmen in the legislature that the bill must not pass, and it gets into
a committee and the bosses having spoken and both agreeing on that, you
never hear of that bill any more—it is not passed. All those they want to
66
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pass, they will put in the hands of the bosses and they go through, even
against the protests of good men, and to the injury of the country.
Now it is things of that sort that are making the impression upon the
minds of this country that one of the remedies against it is not to have
Senators elected by the legislature but by popular vote, so that the political
parties will put up the right sort of men, a man that is not simply a moneybag, but a man that has got some sense, a man that has knowledge of public
affairs, not a man that lives in New York all the time, but claims a
residence somewhere else in order that he may be qualified for Senator, but
one of their own people whom they see, and they see him all over the state;
he appears before the people; they see what manner of man he is; they see
how he looks, how he talks, and the average judgment of the men in the
community in which a man lives is a pretty sound one.
We make a mistake if we imagine that nobody be a judge of good
sense unless he be an educated man or a professional man. The average
man knows something about the capacity of men who offer to serve them,
and the average judgment of the average community as to whether a man is
an honest man and will be an honest servant is better than that of men who
live in closets, and live in books, and never go out in the world and see the
people.
Therefore, I shall not be surprised if we do come to the conclusion,
when a state shall see proper, to elect the Senators by popular vote. If any
man has had anything to do with public life he will tell you that the average
judgment of a mixed crowd anywhere in this country, and where they hear
the question discussed, is a very sound one.
The people may be mistaken for a time. They may be carried away by
prejudices and excitement on a particular occasion. All that may occur,
just as we individually will get out of temper and make ourselves
ridiculous, but in due time they will see the right of the thing and do what is
right, and the great thing in our system of government here that does not
exist anywhere else, that of all our freedom our Fathers had the wisdom to
put checks upon us, checks upon hasty legislation, in the organization of
two branches of the legislature; checks upon mere majorities, which in
temper and passion may sweep away all the landmarks.
That cannot be done under our form of government, and one of the
best safeguards this Constitution provides is in this clause wherein it
establishes a second branch of the legislature to consist of two Senators
from each state. Little Delaware has got as much power in the Senate of
the United States as the great state of New York. Some think that ought
not to be. Why ought not it to be? If it were not that way, Delaware would
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not have assented to the Constitution. Other small states would not have
assented to it.
The object of that part of the Constitution was to preserve the dignity
and equality of the states. Did you ever stop to think what would be our
condition if we had no states; if state lines were wiped out and we had one
vast country here, all power concentrated in Congress, with no local
communities to determine their own local matters? Did you ever stop to
think what might be the condition of this country?
France has got that today. She has a republic in name, but she has got
no states. Her legislative department has complete legislative power, all
they want to exercise. That is not our condition. We have not got a vast
centralized government whose power on every subject reaches from one
end of the country to another.
The larger field upon which legislation will operate is outside of the
government of the United States. We have got no vast and centralized
government of the United States, and no power to go beyond certain things.
The states handle all other matters. They regulate the subject of marriage
and divorce and all police matters. And the object of this clause was to
preserve that system.
And while the House of Representatives, with members elected every
two years, coming fresh from the people, represent the people, here is a
branch of the legislature that represents the states, and each one of them
having an equal vote, so that this body was intended as a check upon the
more numerous branch of the legislature.
“[T]wo Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof.”67
Not for one year, but for six years to give the Senator some assurance that
he is not going to be displaced the next day or two. Let the Senator feel
when he takes his seat that he is safe there for six years anyway, and he
therefore is emboldened to think for himself, to think what is best for his
country, to be an honest man and not be always hunting about to find what
is the popular whim of the hour.
And whenever a measure is proposed in the House of Representatives,
that body is bound to think, will this pass the Senate? Will the Senate
agree to this without amendment? Put this in a shape now so that we will
not lose the time, not have this bill come back for amendment, and we have
got to take into account the Senate of the United States, a body of men who
are there for six years, and each Senator having one vote.
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Now, immediately after the first Senate was assembled, the
Constitution required that they should be divided as nearly as might be into
three classes. One class to serve for two years, one class for four years, and
the last class for six years. Now what was the meaning of that?
Why, there was great wisdom in it. It was to make it certain that at
every regular session of the Congress of the United States there should be a
Senate, two-thirds of whom had been there before; one-half of that twothirds had been there a given time, and the other half a less time, but both
had been there. They had become familiar with legislation. New, fresh
blood–one-third–comes in at every Congress. It gives permanency to the
body, and it gives the country whatever confidence would come from the
fact that two-thirds of that body at all times were men who had had some
experience in public affairs.
If vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of
the legislature of any state, the executive thereof can make temporary
appointments until the next meeting of the legislature. Congress meets the
first Monday in December. A Senator dies in January. Well, the governor
of that state, if the legislature is not in session, will make an appointment,
which will be good until the legislature meets.
Well, the legislature meets and they proceed to fill the vacancy, but
they do not do it. The session closes without the vacancy being filled.
Does the man who has been appointed by the governor go out, and is the
seat vacant? I believe the ruling of the Senate has been that it did. The
appointment only lasts until the meeting of the legislature.
“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age
of thirty Years.”68 Why thirty instead of twenty-five? It is upon the idea
that a man thirty years old knew more than a man of twenty-five, and
ordinarily he does, and that additional five years gave a little more
assurance of sound judgment and reflection, and as years are added to
every man’s life he becomes a wiser man. He learns to think twice before
he speaks, and as representing a state—one of the States of this Union—he
ought to be at least thirty years old.
“And nine Years a Citizen of the United States.”69 The idea was that
until he had been that long a citizen of the United States, we could not be
quite sure that he would not give up his citizenship and go back to his own
country. Every man loves his native land, and the man who does not is not
much of a man. We are not to be surprised that a man coming to us from
68
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Europe should think of his native country. We love our native land, and we
like to go back to the county where we were born—that county is dear to
us—and look at the schoolhouse in which we went to school. We like to
meet our schoolmates. Our affections and hearts go out to that place.
This Constitution proceeded upon the idea that the man from
Germany, or some other foreign country, would not cease to love his
country. But if he should come here and had been nine years a citizen of
the United States, why we could afford to trust him in the Senate of the
United States.
He must also when elected be an inhabitant of the state from which he
shall be chosen. There has been some evasion of that clause, particularly
within the last ten or fifteen years. Men sometimes claim to be an
inhabitant of a state and get into the Senate who pass very little time in the
state. They are elsewhere; they are doing business elsewhere and their
interests are mostly elsewhere. This means a real inhabitant of the state.
“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”70 Of
course, the question was one of much consideration as to how the Senate
was to be presided over, and a lucky suggestion was made that they had
better give the Vice-President something to do. Let the states stand there
with their equal number, and have a man to preside over them who does not
belong to any state, that is, does not represent any state, and keep order and
not vote only in case of necessity. It is an ugly situation for anybody to be
equally divided.
Now there is another provision that exists: “The Senate shall chuse
their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the
Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the
United States.”71 If the President should die, the Vice-President would act
as President, and the senators would elect one of their members as
President Pro Tempore.
Now, there are questions that aroused a great deal of discussion.
Suppose a President died; a Vice-President died; who became President?
Why, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Now, it often occurred that
the President was of different politics than the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate.
Now, that was an ugly state of things. If the people had elected a man
President and sustained the party to which he belonged, why that party
70
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should have the control of the White House. If the President and VicePresident should die, and a man of opposite politics came into authority,
the verdict of the people at the polls would be reversed.
Now, that has been remedied by a statute passed a few years ago, so
that now a political party in the minority has no interest to be subserved by
the death of the President or the death of the Vice-President, because now
if the President dies the Vice-President succeeds of the same party. If the
Vice-President dies, why the President pro tempore would not become
President. The Secretary of State becomes President. If he dies, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and so on each head of a department in the order
in which those departments were established.72
Now, it is absolutely certain when a political party triumphs at an
election that party shall have control of the government for four years. So
that a political party out of power and wanting to be in power has got no
interest in anybody dying. No contingency of that sort can arise.
“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”73
What do you mean by impeachment?
That is bringing some charge against the actions of the party in
violation of his authority.
Well, for what may an officer of the United States be impeached, and
which of them may be impeached?
The Senators and the Representatives may be impeached. The
President and Vice-President. All of the executive officers may be
impeached.
There is a little doubt as to whether a Senator can be impeached,
although the other part of your answer is correct.
“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”74 Exactly
what is the meaning of high crimes and misdemeanors the Constitution
does not determine.
The question has been raised as to whether a Senator is a civil officer.
He is elected by a State. A member of the House of Representatives is

72 The Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, provided that the
members of the Cabinet would succeed the President and Vice-President—according to the
order in which the cabinet departments were created—rather than the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives.
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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elected by his district, but he represents his state. It is in the power of
either body to take cognizance of it. If it come to the knowledge of the
House of Representatives that since the last adjournment a particular
member of the House had been guilty of larceny, it could not send him to
penitentiary or declare his seat vacant.
Impeachment is a proceeding in the form of a prosecution. The Senate
tries impeachments. The House files the articles of impeachment. The
House is the grand inquest of the nation to inquire. The Senate cannot
impeach anybody by itself. When the House files articles of impeachment
they present them to the Senate, and then the Senate is constituted a quasicourt. It hears evidence; it hears arguments; hears the articles and charges
made by the representatives of the people.
Now, where to try it. If the President of the United States is put on
trial, the Chief Justice presides. Only once has a President been tried and
that was Andrew Johnson. And you will know that no man shall be
convicted of impeachment except by two-thirds of the members present. It
puts it out of the power of a political party to put a man out upon a bare
majority.
Andrew Johnson was impeached by the House of Representatives for
alleged high crimes and misdemeanors, and he was tried by the Senate,
Chief Justice Chase presiding. There was a majority against him in the
Senate, but there were not two-thirds, and that happened which the framers
of the Constitution thought would probably happen, that there would be
some in that body that might not be influenced by party, and without
casting any reflections upon the motive of the men who voted in favor of
impeachment, looking from this time back to that, and reading the history
of that period, I am safe in saying that nine-tenths of the people of the
country are prepared to say that it was very fortunate for the stability of the
government that the articles of impeachment were not sustained, and they
were not sustained because there were members of the party who would not
be carried away by temporary excitement, but steadily held their ground.
Not that they cared a thing for Andrew Johnson. He was by no means
a particularly lovable man, but he was a firm man; he was a courageous
man; what he did was done no doubt in deference to his convictions on
political questions, but it was not a high crime or misdemeanor, these
Senators thought, and they stood their ground, and prevented that calamity
coming to the country of the conviction of a President of the United States.
I believe all the men belonging to the prevailing party who refused to
join in those articles of impeachment have been called away except one,
and one of them is still living and living in this city, and I think that those
who feel an interest in his reputation can point with pride to the fact that he
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had the courage, almost in a time of war, when it was difficult for man to
resist the tide of party feeling, that he had the courage to stand to his
convictions and vote against those articles of impeachment. I allude to the
Honorable John B. Henderson.75

75 John Brooks Henderson (November 16, 1826–April 12, 1913) was a United States
Senator from Missouri and a co-author of the Thirteenth Amendment. Henderson, John
Brooks,
BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY
OF
THE
U.S.
CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=h000483 (last visited May 25,
2013); Landmark Legislation: The Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments to the
Constitution,
U.S.
SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm
(last visited May 25, 2013). Henderson was appointed to the Senate on January 17, 1862, to
fill the vacancy caused by the expulsion of Senator Trusten Polk. Henderson, John Brooks,
supra. When President Johnson was impeached in 1868, Henderson and six other
Republican senators voted against impeachment and prevented his conviction. Ralph J.
Roske, The Seven Martyrs?, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 323, 323 (1959).
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LECTURE 7: NOVEMBER 20, 1897
We had reached Section 4 of Article I. There is no more important
provision in the Constitution than that, nor one about which there is a larger
amount of ignorance, or none about which more unmeaning or senseless
things are said.
Now, look at the words of that section. “The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof, but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators.”76
With the single exception as to the places of choosing Senators, here
the broad power is given to Congress at any time, in its own discretion, by
law, that is, by statute, to make or alter such regulations. That is, they may
make and alter regulations as to times and places and manner of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives, except as to the places of
choosing Senators.
Well, this is very broad. “The Manner of holding elections for
Representatives.” What may the Congress of the United States do in
reference to that?
The average man that never has read the Constitution of the United
States, and knows more about ward meetings than about the law of his
country, and you meet him on the street and he will turn up his nose at the
idea of the United States having anything to say whatever about an election
of Representatives in Congress. Why, he will tell you that that belongs to
the states, and the United States has nothing to do with it.
Well now, so it does belong to the states in the first instance; that is to
say, they may make regulations. Here is the express power given to
Congress to make regulations on that subject, or to alter regulations made
by the states, and why is it that the United States as represented in Congress
should not have something to say about the election of Representatives in
Congress?
We must not forget that a member of the House of Representatives is
not there simply as the representative of the people of his district. He
represents in a sense the whole country. He can make laws to bind the
whole country. Therefore the people of the state of Illinois, for instance, do
have an interest in the election of Representatives from the state of New
York, because the men who are sent here by the state of New York can
76
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assist in making laws to bind the whole United States.77
It is not to be entertained for a moment that any state of this union can
act as it pleases in the matter of sending Representatives to Congress
beyond the power of the United States. Why, it might be that laws of the
most important character would go through the House of Representatives
by the votes of a delegation from one state, with everybody in the country
knowing that that delegation was sent to Congress by the most transparent
frauds practiced under the sanction of laws of the state. And hence it is,
that a man who is returned by a state, as a member of the lower house of
Congress as its representative from that particular district, while entitled to
his seat prima facie upon the certificate that comes there, is not beyond the
control of the House. Congress may by its committee look into that
election, and if it finds for instance that the man was returned by
intimidation or corruption, they can declare his seat vacant.
Now, up to the present time, Congress has not done much in that
direction. Representatives in Congress are elected in the mode prescribed
by the several states. The state fixes the qualification of the voter. The
state provides the officers of election, and the state provides the mode of
making returns of those elected.
Yet, it may be done by Congress, and Congress can provide penalties
for frauds upon the election, for intimidation of voters for election of
Representatives in Congress. In other respects the laws of the state are
adopted; but because the laws of the states are adopted; because the
election is held under the immediate sanction of the laws of the state, it
does not therefore follow that the United States has nothing to do about the
validity of that election.
There is a case in the Supreme Court of the United States, reported in
127 United States, the McCoy case.78 That illustrates in a very striking
way what I am trying to put before you. An election was held in the state
of Indiana at a particular time for the election of Governor, LieutenantGovernor, members of the legislature, judges of the state, and members of
the lower house of Congress. And men would vote by ballot, and they
would vote in the mode prescribed by the state, and they would go to the
polls prescribed by the state, presided over by the officers of the state.
77

Cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“The political identity of the entire people of the Union is reinforced by the
proposition, which I take to be beyond dispute, that, though limited as to its objects, the
National Government is, and must be, controlled by the people without collateral
interference by the States.”).
78 In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888).

80

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

They were all on the same ticket.
The law of the state provided that at the close of the poll the officers of
the that election in each precinct should count the ballots and they would
put down on a piece of paper that AB, candidate for Governor, received so
many votes, D for Lieutenant-Governor, so many votes, and candidates for
judges received so many votes, etc. And the officers of the election at each
precinct would sign that, and their duty, under the state law, was to fold up
that paper and seal it so that nobody could see it, or tamper with it, and
send it to the proper officer at the county seat, where the ballots would all
be counted, and then on a particular day be returned to the Capital of the
State to be examined.
Now, it so happened that in a particular election held there that those
ballots which had been sealed up were tampered with. The seal was
broken, and this paper that contained the return of these elections, federal
and state, had been tampered with. The seal was broken and somebody had
altered the returns in regard to the election of the criminal judge in the city
of Indianapolis, and then sealed up the paper again. There was nothing in
the case justifying the suspicion that any other part of that paper had been
altered or tampered with, but Mr. McCoy was indicted in the federal courts,
and was charged with the crime of having tampered with those returns,
having broken those seals and altered the figures.
Well, he made the point in the federal court, and the question was
afterwards renewed upon writ of habeas corpus before me as Circuit Justice
for that Circuit.79 Says his attorneys, what has the federal court to do with
this case? What has the federal court to do with the alteration of returns in
reference to a state judge? That is not a federal matter; it belongs to the
courts of the state of Indiana; therefore, said his attorneys, these
proceedings in the federal court are void; the court is without jurisdiction to
deal with that matter.
Well, my view was, that that paper contained the returns of state and
federal officers and was the joint property of the United States and of the
state of Indiana; that both governments owned it. It was the evidence of the
return of election for federal as well as state officers, and the object of these
laws was to prevent by sealing up these papers the possibility of anybody
tampering with them, and I would not stop to inquire what was the motive
of the man who broke the seal and altered these returns; suffice it to say
that that paper contained a return of the election of members of Congress,
and the breaking of that seal was an offense against both the United States
79
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and the state, and the breaking of the seal gave an opportunity, although the
purpose may have been only to alter the returns as to the state officers, it
gave them an opportunity of altering the returns for the federal officers.
My view was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in this
case.
Now, can anybody’s enthusiasm for what he calls states’ rights be
outraged by the idea that the United States has the power, and ought to
have the power, to see to it that the election for members of Congress of the
United States, sending men here to make laws for the whole United States,
be fair and honest, shall represent the will of the people? Can anybody’s
sense of right be shocked by the idea that the United States ought to have
some control over the election for members of Congress of the United
States?
And they delegate to the Congress of the United States the power to
make and alter regulations in reference to the times, places and manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives, except in the one case
to which I have referred. I grant you that unless it should become
necessary, the Congress of the United States ought not, and need not,
exercise all the power it has on that subject, and all things considered it is
best and wisest to leave those matters to the regulation of the different
states in the belief that they mean to do what is right, and will do what is
right, but it is well for the whole country that every state in this union is
informed by this Constitution, that if the time comes and it is necessary for
its power to be exercised, that in order that the seventy million of people in
this country interested in the integrity of the national legislature may have
honest, fair elections, subserving the will of the people, the power is here
given to Congress to bring about that result.
Now, the next clause: “The Congress shall assemble at least once in
every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December,
unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.”80
You may think when you first read that, why was it necessary to put in
this Constitution the requirement that the Congress shall assemble at least
once every year? Well, that was a provision suggested by the experience of
England during many centuries, and the men who framed this Constitution
proceeded upon the idea which was a sound one, that the price of liberty is
eternal vigilance, and that the surest safeguard of the people was by a
constitutional provision to put it out of the power of anybody to infringe
upon that liberty.
80
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What happened in England? When a King had all the money he
wanted to carry on a war, he didn’t need Parliament. He would call
Parliament together and get what money he wanted, and then Parliament
would be paroled and he would not call it together. Sometimes as many as
ten years would be passed without Parliament being called together to
legislate for England. The King was running it his way and he didn’t want
to be checked by the act of Parliament. He had money enough for his
purpose, and that was all he wanted.
A great fight was made against that sort of thing, and in the end the
law was passed which requires Parliament to be assembled once in every
seven years.81 This Parliament now in existence may last seven years
without a new election. At the end of that time there must be a new
election.
Well, our Fathers thought that was too long a time, and said we will
put it out of the power of any harm coming to this country by the want of
any legislation by requiring that Congress shall assemble at least once
every year. The President has got nothing to say as to when they should
assemble.
Now, there are some who often say in jest, that the country is now safe
because Congress has adjourned.82 They get an idea that everything is in
danger when Congress is in session, because of the everlasting talk that is
done there, and because nothing is done, they say. Well, the opinion of
some is that there is too much done.
Now, I have an old-fashioned idea that it is well to assemble at least
once in each year and talk, let them talk. It does not cost much, except the
cost of printing the Congressional Record, but it gives an opportunity to
people to have their say, as we call it, and to advance new ideas, as they
deem them to be, and throw them out before the country. That does not do
any harm.
Many a man would be mischievous if you would try to shut him up all
the year round and not allow him to talk. He is quite certain, if his
81

The Triennial Act of 1641, also known as the Dissolution Act, provided that
Parliament must meet for at least one fifty-day session every three years. Triennial Act,
1641, 16 Car., c. 1 (Eng.), repealed by Triennial Act, 1664, 16 Cha. II c. 1 (Eng.). It was
intended to prevent the monarch from ruling without Parliament, as Charles I did during the
Long Parliament from 1629 to 1640. The Septennial Act of 1715 increased the maximum
length of a parliament from three years to seven. Septennial Act, 1715, 1 Geo. 1, c. 38
(Eng.) (current version at Fixed-term Parliaments Act, 2011, c. 14 (U.K.)).
82 See, e.g., Final Accounting in re Estate of A.B., 1 Tucker 247, 249 (N.Y. Sur. 1866)
(Tucker, J.) (quoting the saying, “no man’s life, liberty or property are safe while the
Legislature is in session”).
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opportunity of speech is interfered with, that something is wrong. Let him
talk and he is satisfied. They can have their say and air their views, and
that is not without its value.
This Congressional Record that we belittle so much, because we do
not read it, contains a vast amount of information. It is these speeches of
public men, these meetings of public bodies, that educates the popular
minds; that qualifies the average man to understand his government, and
know what is going on. He knows that he is a part of the country; that
there is a responsibility upon him as a voter, and this assembling of the
Congress of the United States every year prevents the possibility of
combinations behind the scenes among bad men to overthrow the
government.
There is no danger if we have publicity of our affairs. If a statement is
made as required by the Constitution of the expenditures out of the public
treasury, and if people are allowed to talk and express their views, why the
result is that at the end of every year substantially everybody in this country
is reasonably well informed as to what is going on; what is designed, and
what is intended—everything above-board, nothing concealed. Congress
assembling each year, they can prevent any mischievous designs being
entertained on the part of the President of the United States and his army of
office holders at his side. But so far we have met with no danger in that
regard.
Now, the next section is that “Each House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority
of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business . . . .”83 I have already
referred to the first branch of that section. The latter branch is “but a
smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to
compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under
such Penalties as each House may provide.”84
What was the necessity of saying a smaller number might adjourn
from day to day? Why, it was to prevent the possibility of there not being
in existence a lawful legislative body. Here is a statute which says,
Congress shall assemble on the first Monday in December.85 When the
first Monday in December comes, the Speaker takes his place in the chair,
and the roll is called. There are only forty members present out of over
three hundred, but there is the lawful House of Representatives. They
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cannot do business for they have not a quorum, but they can adjourn from
day to day, and may compel the attendance of absent members.
How compel them? Suppose a man is way in California; way up in the
Yosemite Valley, a lawful member of the House of Representatives, and
has not attended and refuses to attend. What may the House do, even this
small minority? It can order its Sergeant-at-Arms to go to the Yosemite
Valley and lay his hand on that man and bring him here. That is what it
can do. May compel him.86
Well, suppose, you say, he won’t come. Well, that Sergeant-at-Arms
can summon an officer to bring him forth. Got all the power a constable
has. That is done to prevent the breaking up on the legislative branch of
the government, and they many do that and impose a penalty on the party
for not attending as is his duty to the House of Representatives.
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour . . . .”87 Punish them, how? Why in a
way that may be consistent with our civilization. Put him in jail if he is
guilty of misbehavior. If a member of the House should stagger into that
body some day drunk, that is disorderly behavior. He can be fined by that
body, and punished for that disorderly behavior.
Is there a member of that body that is not a fit associate for honest
people? Is there a member of that body who has been guilty of some
conduct that ought to disgrace any man? Very well, that House has the
power by a vote of two-thirds to expel him. And no matter for what reason
they expel him; it may be wholly unnecessary; it may be a wrong one; it
may be one so unjust to the man, but if the House exercises its power and
expels him, that is the end of it. No court has authority over that House of
Representatives to compel them to receive AB as a member of its body.88
“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require Secrecy . . . .”89 How much of a journal? Not one that is to record
every word that is said, and everything that is done. It may keep its journal
in its own way, but it would not comply with the Constitution if it was not a
fair record of the proceedings.
86 See FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE, S. DOC.
NO. 101-28, at 214–24 (1992).
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
88 The Court eventually held that expulsion by a vote of two-thirds is the only way the
House of Representatives can exercise its power to determine the qualifications of its
members. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
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And why publish the same? Why in order that there may be nothing
secret from the people of the United States. This government, unlike any
other government on the face of the Earth, or that ever existed on the face
of the Earth, rests upon the consent of the governed, and in a government
of that sort, the safety lies in publicity attending all matters that concern the
states. Therefore, this journal is to be published, that the people may see
what their Representatives have done, and the people of a particular district
may see precisely what votes their Representative has cast, and see whether
or not he has represented their views, and whether or not he ought to be
returned.
“[A]nd the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any
question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
Journal.”90 That was suggested by a knowledge of human nature. I have
been myself often on the floor of the House as a motion was made and the
Speaker would put the motion, and you would suppose from the thundering
Yeas that the motion was sustained, but somebody would call for a
division. He would call for the Ayes and Noes, and the vote would be
taken and many a Representative who has said Yea before the roll was
called, voted Nay when the roll was called. He did not intend to allow
some man in a back district that wanted his seat to be able to say in the next
election, and prove it by the Journal, that he had voted in a particular way,
and therefore he would vote Nay. And the object of this provision was to
compel members of the House to deal openly and fairly with their
constituents; have no secrets in public affairs. If you do a thing let the
record show it. Do not be ashamed of it.
“The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for
their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
United States.”91 That is a provision of very great consequence. No
member today of the English Parliament receives any compensation from
the government of England for his services. The members of the House of
Lords, a great many of them, or most of them, are able to pay their own
way, and those who are hard up get their compensation in the honor which
they suppose comes from the titles which they enjoy, and which came from
somebody else, that they didn’t earn, but even members of the House of
Commons get no compensation. There are members of the House of
Commons today too poor to pay their own board bills in the city of
London, and they are assisted in the matter by private contributions among
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their constituents.
Now, we proceeded in this Constitution upon a different idea.
Suppose that was not the rule of the Constitution. It would be a good deal
more so than it is, that these public positions would be filled by those that
have been blessed with this world’s goods, and men who are capable of
serving their country would be kept out of public life altogether. The
country would be deprived of their services.
The fact is, stating it broadly, that three-fourths, I do not think I
overstate it when I say that the large majority of the statesmen that have
served in the Senate and House have lived well and died poor. While I say
lived well, I do not mean extravagant, but it took all that they received from
the Treasury to pay their expenses while in public life, and large numbers
of them died insolvent. They made no money while they were in public
life. They didn’t know how, a great many of them, to make money.
(Laughter). Now, I don’t mean to say that anybody has.
Well, why should not a man be paid because he is a servant of the
public? We compensate our Senators and Representatives in a moderate
degree, in order that they may give themselves to the service of the country,
and if that were not the rule, it would have occurred in the history of our
country that we would have lost the services of some of the greatest men
that have figured in all our history. And we pay them little enough. No
Senator, except upon the utmost economy, can get along in the city of
Washington, make ends meet at the close of each year, upon the salary he
gets. No Representative can do it, or very few can.
Well, you ask, if that is so, why do they remain in public life? I cannot
tell, except from the feeling of the ambition that is planted in the breast of
every man to live after he is dead and gone in the memory of his fellow
citizens. I can understand why a man may be willing to give his whole life,
and lead a life of poverty and self-denial, if by so doing he can make a
great name in his country.
That is true of our profession. There are very few lawyers that have
the gift of money making. There are very few lawyers that lay up large
estates, and when you find the lawyer who loves money better than he does
the practice of his profession, it is absolutely certain that he never makes a
great lawyer or a good lawyer.
Compensation here provided for by the Constitution, or the direction to
make compensation, is upon the idea that the public must not be deprived
of the services of worthy men not blessed with this world’s goods, who are
willing to serve their country, and if that were stricken out, and no mode
provided for the payment of Senators and Representatives for the time and
labor that they give for the benefit of the public, our nation would be in
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sorry condition, and the result inevitably would be that both of those
branches of Congress would fall into the hands of men who had more
money than they had character or brains.
“They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same . . . .”92 The object of that is to protect them from arrest, so that they
may be at their posts during the sessions of Congress to discharge their
duties to the public. Except, however, in cases of treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, for which they may be arrested, “and for any Speech
or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other
Place.”93
That does not mean that you may not criticize a speech made by a
Senator or Representative in debate. That does not mean that you many
not, in friendly conversation with him, tell him you disapprove of what he
has said in his speech in the House to which he belongs, but it means that
he shall not be held responsible to anybody for it.
And why is that? Suppose a member of the Senate or House, when he
arose in his place, was apprehensive that he might be sued by Tom, Dick,
or Harry for what he might say. Here is a claim that is preferred against the
United States, that is up for consideration in either House. There is the
evidence. The Senator or the Representative who speaks on it, having
examined it, says that claim is a fraud, and that man who has made that
affidavit is shown by other evidence in the case to have been guilty of
perjury in making that statement.
No matter what observation he may make upon the matter pending
before the House, has the right to make, you shan’t arrest him for it in the
court, or question him about it in any proceedings. That was intended to
give assurance to the Senator or Representative that the people did not wish
him to withhold his expression of views, to refrain from saying what he
ought honestly to say. They assured him by that provision, you shall be
untrammeled now. Speak out your mind; tell your honest conviction; say
what you choose about this public measure, for and against. You may do
so with impunity, that you shan’t be questioned in any other place about it.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority
of the United States, which shall have been created, or the
92
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Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time;
and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be
a member of either House during his Continuance in Office.94
Now, the first clause of that means this. Here is a proposition pending
in Congress to increase the salary of the Ambassador to England to twenty
thousand dollars a year, and it prevails and becomes a law. Now, that
Constitution says that no Senator or Representative shall be appointed to
that office during the term for which he was elected as Senator, because the
emoluments were increased during that time. If a Senator is thinking that
when he increases the emoluments of a particular office he may secure that
office from the President of the United States, he is mistaken, and
sometimes men of the very highest caliber are misled in that manner, not
thinking of this provision of the Constitution.
One of the most estimable Senators we have had for many years, Mr.
Ransom from North Carolina, was made Minister to the government of
Mexico, and he entered upon the discharge of his duties.95 When the first
pay day came around, the Comptroller of the Treasury says, I cannot pay, I
cannot pass this claim for the salary of Minister Ransom, because the
emoluments of that mission were increased during his term as Senator, and
the Constitution said he was ineligible to that place.96 So, he didn’t get the
emoluments. He had to be reappointed after his term as Senator expired
before he could lawfully hold the office.
The idea was that the Senators and Representatives must be in a
condition of impartiality when they passed upon measures of that sort, and
that removed the idea that they might reap profit by their own vote. Of
course, Senator Ransom never thought of such a thing at all when he voted.
He voted, as did all the other Senators, as they ought to have years ago, to
increase that compensation.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
Matt Whitaker Ransom, born October 8, 1826 and died October 8, 1904, was a
Confederate general during the American Civil War and was later elected as North
Carolina’s Democratic United States Senator from 1872 to 1895. Matt W. Ransom (1826–
1904), N.C. HIST. PROJECT, http://www.northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/751/entry
(last visited May 27, 2013). He then received an appointment as United States Minister to
Mexico and served from 1895 to 1897. See id.
96 Member of Congress—Appointment to Office, 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 211 (1895); see
also Not Minister to Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1895, at 1.
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LECTURE 8: DECEMBER 4, 1897
In consideration of Article I, I had passed over one matter without
giving you the reference to the authority upon a question of considerable
interest in these later days, and I want to go back to that for a moment.
Section 5 of Article I says that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business, and the question arose a few years ago
in Congress here as to what was a quorum to do business; what was a
quorum sufficient to pass a law? Now, let me suppose in round numbers
that there are three hundred members of the House of Representatives. One
hundred and fifty one of those members would constitute a majority. Well,
the House is in session, the Speaker in his place, there are a lot of members
in their places, and the question arises whether or not there is a quorum
there to do business, and they rise in their places. The Speaker will say,
“Those in favor of the passage of this resolution will rise to their feet.”
Well, he counts one hundred and fifty one men there standing. He sees
them all with his eye, and says there is a quorum present and we will
proceed to business. Well, a bill comes up. The half of one hundred and
fifty one is seventy-six. A little more than half. Seventy-six vote for the
law and seventy-five against it. Has that law passed the House? Yes.
There was, in any view of it, one hundred and fifty one men there, a
majority of the House to do business, and a majority of that number will be
sufficient to pass a law, or pass a resolution, or to enact a statute, as far as
that House can act.
Well now, let us suppose that the Speaker is required to count whether
there is a quorum there or not with which to proceed to business, and
seventy-six have been on their feet at his request, and he counts them.
Well, he knows that seventy-six is not in itself a quorum to do business.
But here are seventy-five men in their seats in the House. They do not rise.
If the Yeas and the Nays are called they do not answer. You cannot make a
man answer. Are they present under the Constitution to be counted as a
part of the quorum? If a resolution is voted on and seventy-six vote for it,
has it passed?
Well, the Speaker says, “Yes, there is a quorum here.” “How do you
know?” some man asks. “Why, I see them.” Some man will rise in his
place and say, “Mr. Speaker,” and he recognizes Mr. Jones of Missouri, I
suppose. “Do I understand that you have counted me as a part of this
House, as a part of the quorum to do business?” “Yes, I have counted
you.” “I wish to inform the Speaker that I am not here.” “But,” the
Speaker says, “you are here. I see you. You are Mr. Jones of Missouri, are
you not?” “Yes.” “You were elected from the First District at the last
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election?” “Yes.” “You were sworn in as a member of Congress from that
state?” “Yes.” “You are sitting in this seat here by virtue of your privilege
as a member of the House of Representatives?” “Yes.” “That is all I
want.” “But I am not here. I must not be counted.” “But you will be
counted,” says the Speaker, “You are here in this House. If you don’t want
to be counted you ought to have gotten out so that I could not see you, but
you are sitting in this seat by authority of law and because you are a
Representative from Missouri, and you are present in the place appointed
by law for the transaction of public business. Therefore I count you.” And
he counts seventy-five men and adds up. There are one hundred and fifty
one men, a majority of the House.
Now, I can see how a very serious question might arise. I can put an
extreme case. It is not so easy to answer. Let us suppose that in point of
fact there are one hundred and fifty one men in the House, and when they
call the Ayes and Noes, the Speaker has counted one hundred and fifty one
men there, a quorum, a majority of those elected, a quorum sufficient to
pass that resolution, and the roll is called and two men vote for the
resolution and one against it. All the balance keep their mouths shut.
Now, has that resolution passed? Well, perhaps it has. It is passed by
a majority of those voting, and there is a quorum there to do business. Well
now, I express upon this supposed case no decided opinion, but you will
find that question very interesting to study, and take, therefore, a minute of
the case of the United States against Ballin, where you will find that subject
considered by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the opinion
delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer. It is in 144 United States, page 1.97
Well now, there is another matter that I had pretty nearly passed over.
I had only suggested it at our last meeting. “All Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose
or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”98
Now, no decision of the Supreme Court of the United States has ever
laid down a rule by which you are to determine in every case what are bills
for raising revenue and what are not. At the last term of the Supreme Court
a question arose in a case whether a tax imposed upon the circulation of
notes of national banks was a bill for raising revenue.99 The point was
97 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 9 (1892) (holding that under Article I, Section
5, the presence of a majority of the members of the House of Representatives, according to a
valid rule, constitutes a quorum, and that the action of a majority of a quorum is legally
binding).
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
99 Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897) (Harlan, J.).
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attempted to be raised in the case in a suit, that a bill was never
constitutionally passed because it originated in the Senate, or because the
important part of it was adopted in the Senate. “Therefore,” the litigant
says, “it is not a part of the law of the land. It should have originated in the
House of Representatives.”
We held that that was not a bill for raising revenue under the meaning
of the Constitution. It was under an act passed for the purpose of
establishing a currency of the United States. And this thing of a tax upon
the banks was an incident to that object.
Now, ever since the foundation of the government there has been
discussion and contests among statesmen as to whether a tariff was a bill
for raising revenue. Well, undoubtedly, it is in a very large sense a bill for
raising revenue, although its purpose may be something else, or its purpose
in part may be something else. You have got to have these laws for raising
money with which to run the government. These may be called bills for
raising revenue.
When the Wilson bill was passed in the last administration of Mr.
Cleveland it got to the Senate, and it was there so mutilated that its father
didn’t know it.100 Several hundred amendments made to it. Whole sections
stricken out, and a new tariff substituted for it, which finally got through.
Well now, it has always been contended by some in the Senate, that
the business of the Senate was to take the bill as it came from the House,
substantially. They will admit the right of the Senate to amend, but they
say it must be an amendment, not a substitute, and when, therefore, that is
their argument, a tariff bill comes from the House complete in itself, and
the Senate has a scheme of its own and it substitutes a new bill for the
House bill, they say that is a new measure, that that is a bill raising revenue
and it cannot originate in the Senate.
Well now, you see from the very nature of things how very difficult it
is to determine a question of that sort. When do you make a new bill; what
is fairly said to be a new bill, and what is fairly said to be an amendment to
the bill which originated in the House? The question has never reached the
courts, and if it did, the probabilities are that the courts would have to have
a very gross case in order to determine.
Now, you may ask yourself, what is what is the use of that provision?
What does it matter where a bill originates for raising revenue? The
Constitution says it has got to go through both houses. It has got to receive
100

Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509; see also FESTUS P.
SUMMERS, WILLIAM L. WILSON AND TARIFF REFORM: A BIOGRAPHY 202 (1953).

92

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

a majority of the votes of both houses, and it has got to receive the approval
of the President. What does it matter whether it originates in the Senate or
House?
Well, the reason in the Constitution is not difficult to understand. It
came from England. It came from the struggles in England between the
King on one side and the immediate representatives of the people. There is
one branch of the legislature that it supposed to represent the people, and
that is the House of Commons, and the right of the House of Commons to
originate bills for revenue which impose taxes was the club which the
people through their representatives held in their hands so as to bring the
King and the Lords and titled people to accept and to adopt measures that
were essential to the liberties of the people, and the principle was settled
way back yonder in the history of England that no tax could be laid upon
the people of England except with the consent of Parliament, and that all
bills to impose taxes must originate in the House of Commons, because the
members of that body immediately came from the people. They represent
the persons who are to be taxed, and therefore no tax shall be laid except
with the consent of the House of Commons.
Often it occurred in the history of England, when a King wanted to
have this or the other thing, wanted to carry on a little war across the
Channel, or other ambitious schemes, he could not get along without
troops, and he could not have troops without he had money to clothe, feed,
and pay them, and he asked for the appropriation of money. Time and
again, the House of Commons said, we will give you this, provided such
things are done, such and such additional guarantees for the life, liberty,
and property of the people are assented to by you, and many of the best
privileges enjoyed by England today have been wrung from the Kings of
England by their rights to resist the imposition of any tax without their
consent.
Now, that was transferred to our Constitution here when it said, “All
bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives.”101 Why in the House instead of in the Senate? Because
the Senate represents more immediately the states, and the representatives
were fresh from the people, were closer to the people, and unless the House
originated the bill it could not be passed.
Now, there is a vast deal of learning upon that subject, and the
intelligent lawyer does not wish anything worth reading bearing upon great
questions of the sort to escape his attention, and therefore I suggest to you
101
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to take a note of 126 Massachusetts, page 557.102 Now, as I have had
occasion heretofore to say to you, they have a system in Massachusetts that
does not prevail in any other state, or in not more than one or two, to the
effect that when either branch of the legislature of Massachusetts has a bill
before it, and the question is raised, is this bill constitutional, or is this
section constitutional under the Constitution of Massachusetts, why that
branch of the legislature may submit the question to the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and they may examine it and
answer it.
Now, this is an opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts addressed to the Senate and House of Representatives,
wherein the question was propounded under the Constitution of
Massachusetts whether a bill appropriating money from the treasury of the
commonwealth is a money bill, which must by the Constitution originate in
the House of Representatives. Now there, the judges discuss in the light of
all the authorities as to what, under the Constitution of Massachusetts, is a
money bill.
Now, the learning there displayed what is a bill for raising revenue
under the Constitution of the United States. That is a very long and
elaborate opinion, signed by all the Justices of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, and my understanding is that the bill was prepared by a
present member of the Supreme Court of the United States, formerly a
member of the Massachusetts court, Mr. Justice Gray. Now, you will find
in that the whole history of this question of revenue bills in this country and
England. If there is any other authority on this subject I do not know,
outside of those referred to in that case.
Now, passing to the next clause of Section 7, “Every Bill which shall
have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it
become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States . . . .”103
Every member of the Senate and every member of the House of
Representatives may concur in passing a particular measure. That may
appear at large upon the journal of both bodies. Is it a law when you show
that alone? No. It shall be presented to the President of the United States.
That is an essential prerequisite.
If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who
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In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate and House of Representatives, 126 Mass.
557 (1878).
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.

94

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to
reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that
House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with
the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall
become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses
shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the
Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the
Journal of each House respectively.104
Therefore, when the President, if he vetoes a bill and it appears from
the Journal of the Senate and House, to state it generally, that each house
passed the bill by a two-thirds vote over his head, it does not by that
become a law, because it says that the bill “shall be determined by yeas and
Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the bill shall be
entered on the Journal of each House respectively.”105
“If any Bill shall not be returned by the President.” Those wise men
did not intend to leave it in the power of the President simply by keeping
his mouth shut to defeat the bill. On the contrary, they said:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the
Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless
the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
Case it shall not be a Law.106
Many and many statutes you will find in the records of the State
Department and published volumes have a minute at the bottom put there
by the Secretary of State, “This bill not having been returned by the
President to Congress within ten days is a law.” So that it is not in the
power of the President of the United States absolutely to defeat the will of
the bill, by silence.
Now, the first idea that will occur to you, the first question you will
put to yourself is, why give the President the power to vote a bill at all? If
the representatives of the people in the House of Representatives and the
representatives of the states in the Senate agree—have a majority of each
house—that such and such a thing ought to be a law of the United States,
why let the President say anything about it?
That question was propounded a great many years ago, and it was the
104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id.

2013]

JUSTICE HARLAN: LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

95

basis of many an argument made by wise and patriotic men against the
exercise of the veto power by the President. We now hear, we hear it at
this day, with a smile upon our faces, some speeches made say sixty years
ago in the Senate of the United States, or seventy years ago, by such men as
Henry Clay, arraigning Andrew Jackson as guilty of moral treason for
vetoing an act of Congress. Mr. Clay contending, with great show of
authority, and perhaps of reason at that time, that it was never contemplated
by the Constitution that the President of the United States should stand in
the way of the execution of the will of the people of the United States,
unless the law presented to him was in violation of the Constitution of the
United States.107
Well now, one answer to that is, that that is scarcely a sufficient
reason. That was not the whole reason, because there were the courts.
They could put their foot upon an unconstitutional law, and the framers of
the Constitution did not intend to narrow the veto power to the case in
which the law was invalid, and as there were no restrictions upon the
President, nobody could sit in judgment upon him. He could sign a bill or
not as he pleased, and for any reasons that suggested themselves to him as
proper. He was not bound to account to anybody.
It is a good legal veto of a law for the President to send a message to
the House in which the bill originated and say that “I have not signed this
bill because it does not meet my approval,” and give no other reason. That
is a legal veto. It is enough to stop that law, unless two-thirds go over it.
A great many thoughts now may occur to us for and against the
investiture in the President of the United States with power to veto an act of
Congress. Some have gone too far, doubtless some have vetoed very often
when it was not expected, and when the play was not worth the candle.
During Mr. Cleveland’s two terms he exercised the veto power in eight
years oftener than it had been exercised in all the past history of the
government.108 In some instances he felt called upon to veto a pension bill
that would give $8.00 or $10.00 a month to some widow whose husband
had died in the war.
Now, I refer to that not for the purpose of criticizing him, because it
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8 REG. DEB. 1265 (1832) (statement of Sen. Henry Clay).
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may have been that pension was granted under such circumstances as
would make a bad precedent. That is the ground upon which he put it, but
all things considered, it is one of the safest things of our future, in my
judgment, that that power of veto rests with the President of the United
States.
You say it sometimes defeats the will of the people. So it does, but
this Constitution says if two-thirds of you gentlemen in the House of
Representatives say this ought to be law, and two-thirds of you gentlemen
in the Senate of the United States say it ought to be law, it will be law
notwithstanding the veto of the President, but if you have not got that
majority in each house for the measure, why there is ground to say that
there may be doubt about it, and let the President’s veto delay it awhile.
We are never hurt in this country for want of legislation. A bill may
fail at one session, but the country will survive, and if a veto is wrong, if it
rests upon grounds that are insubstantial, the matter is to be examined at the
next election before the people. The newspapers discuss it, and at last the
popular mind will reach a judgment that is safe. I know it sounds harshly
in the minds of a class of people that get up at twelve or one o’clock in the
day for breakfast; those fellows that go yawning to breakfast at one o’clock
say, “Who are the people? What do they amount to? What do they know
about it?”
Well, it is quite sufficient to say, judging by the experience of the past,
that the popular mind of this country is pretty apt to reach a sound
conclusion in the end. Luckily for us, we have got a government that
cannot be swept off its feet as other governments are by the decision of one
branch of the legislature. We have a government that is a check upon
ourselves. The House of Representatives may go wild, but the Senate may
not go wild. They may both go wild, but the President of the United States
have a level head for the time being. Then the papers take up the question,
and the result is—that has been the experience in this country—that the
popular judgment at last has got it on a sound basis, and therefore no wise
man of this day proposes to take that veto power from the President of the
United States.
The question has often arisen as to whether a particular statute in the
statute book is a law of the United States. You go into a lawyer’s office
and find the statutes of the United States. You turn and look at the title
page, and it will say, Acts of Congress passed at a certain session of
Congress. It is published by the Public Printer under the superintendence
of the Secretary of State, and in that book are the acts that are said to have
been passed by Congress. You go to the State Department. You will find
there the original manuscript that came from Congress and which is signed
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by the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, and “Approved,
William McKinley,” and then taken to the State Department and placed in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and from that he publishes this
volume of the statutes of the United States, so that when you look into that
volume of the United States you have that which is prima facie a valid
statute of the United States.
Of course, if there is a statute which is unconstitutional, it is not a
statute of the United States, but it has been passed by Congress. Well now,
a man will say, “That statute is not to be deemed a statute of the United
States, because not passed in the mode prescribed by the Constitution.”
When the McKinley Tariff, as it is called, passed, it imposed certain
duties upon certain goods.109 And goods of that character were brought
into the Port of New York and other ports, and the proper officer imposed a
certain duty upon those goods prescribed by the McKinley Tariff. And the
importers said, “You have no right to tax this at all under this so-called
McKinley Tariff.” “Why?” says the man at the port, “That is not a valid
law of the United States. I am only bound by the tax existing under
previous tariff laws.” “Why is not that a law of the United States; got the
signature of the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and President, on file in the State Department, and
published by the State Department.” “Why,” said these importers, “turning
to that act I find here a certain provision or two. That provision, that
section, was never passed by either the Senate or the House of
Representatives.” “How do you know that?” “Why, I have looked into the
journals of the two houses. That section was not in the bill as passed. That
section never was offered or voted on by either house of Congress.
Congress of the United States never assented to that as part of the statute of
the United States, and therefore an act which contains that is not an act
passed by the Congress of the United States, and I prove it by referring to
reports of committees and the proceedings of the two houses. Therefore,”
he says, “the whole law is void.”
Now, in the case of Field against Clark, 143 United States, 649.110 I
have some little embarrassment in asking you to read the case because I
wrote the opinion, but as it is the only case covering that precise ground
that we have had in our court, and as it has received the unanimous opinion
of the court, I therefore refer you to it. Now, in that case this was said:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
109
110

Tariff Act (“McKinley Tariff”) of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 579.
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).

98

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled
bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one
that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which
pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President
has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the act, so authenticated, in is conformity with the
Constitution.
It is admitted that an enrolled act, thus authenticated, is
sufficient evidence itself—nothing to the contrary appearing upon
its face—that it passed Congress. But the contention is, that it
cannot be regarded as a law of the United States if the journal of
either house fails to show that it passed in the precise form in
which it was signed by the presiding officers of the two houses,
and approved by the President. It is said that, under any other
view, it becomes possible for the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate to impose upon
the people as a law a bill that was never passed by Congress. But
this possibility is too remote to be seriously considered in the
present inquiry. It suggests a deliberate conspiracy to which the
presiding officers, the committee on enrolled bills, and the clerks
of the two houses must necessarily be parties, all acting with a
common purpose to defeat an expression of the popular will in the
mode prescribed by the Constitution. Judicial action based upon
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such a suggestion is forbidden by the respect due to a coordinate
branch of the government. The evils that may result from the
recognition of the principle that an enrolled act, in the custody of
the Secretary of State, attested by the signatures of the presiding
officers of the two houses of Congress, and the approval of the
President, as conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress,
according to the forms of the Constitution, would be far less than
those that would certainly result from a rule making the validity of
Congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which the
journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate
officers charged with the duty of keeping them.111
Now, you will find in that opinion reference to a number of state
decisions.
Now, that brings me to Section 8, which I will only open tonight and
not go much at large in it. That section is one of the weightiest in the
Constitution, and we will proceed with it as deliberately as we may,
because most of the contests that have heretofore arisen in this country
have been about the powers of the Congress of the United States.
We have finished certain clauses only about the legislative; its
organization, its composition, its mode of proceeding, and now we come to
consider what are the powers of Congress. They are here defined, and yet
that is not the right word to use. They are enumerated. If a man puts to
you the question, can Congress legislate on this subject, naming it, well,
you ask yourself, what does the Constitution say on that subject? Let me
go to the instrument itself. You cannot say that Congress can legislate
upon that subject simply because it ought to do so; simply because you
think it would be best for the country if it did.
Let me repeat what I have heretofore said, that this Constitution is the
power of attorney from the people of the United States to the government
of the United States, to the Congress of the United States. Unless you can
find some clause in the Constitution of the United States, properly
construed, that authorizes the Congress of the United States to legislate
upon any named subject, then the conclusion must be that Congress cannot
legislate upon that subject, and if it does its act is a nullity. It is void.
What you call a statute of Congress in such a case is not law. It is not
simply voidable when declared by the courts, but it is void from the start,
and that every man is presumed to know when he reads it.
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“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . .”112 The
Congress under the old Articles of Confederation had the power to lay
taxes.113 It had the power to call upon the states to furnish money. If they
did not furnish it, the Congress was at the end of its rope. The power to lay
taxes would amount to nothing unless there was the power to collect.
“Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . .”114 If you will turn to the
Constitution, you will see after the word “Excises” a comma, and there
would be ground from the mere existence of that comma, perhaps from
grammar, to say that the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises” was without restriction to the objects for which these taxes
may be laid; that if the government of the United States chooses to impose
a tax it may do so, and nobody has a right to inquire into the purpose for
which it is imposed. But you will not find any act passed since the
Constitution that does not indicate the object for which it was passed.
Now, all agree that two words should be inserted there, just after
“excises,” to get at the meaning of the framers of the Constitution, so that it
will read, “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises, in order to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States.” Has Congress the power
to lay a tax to pay the debts of some charitable institution, or the debts of
some state? No. It is to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States. Does the United States owe a
debt? Well, if so, here is power in the Congress of the United States to lay
taxes to whatever amount may be necessary to pay that debt.115
To “provide for the common Defence.”116 What do we mean by the
common defense? Why, it is the defense that will be given to the whole
country. Whoever assails the United States knows from this instrument
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII (“All charges of war, and all other
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several States within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.”).
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
115 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 640 (1895) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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that there is behind the United States the power that is conferred upon
seventy million of people to bring to its support the whole property and
wealth of the country, in some form, in order to meet that common enemy.
The states, before this Constitution, had to depend each one upon its
own resources for its defense. Massachusetts was not bound by law to
come to the defense of Virginia, or Virginia to the defense of
Massachusetts. Not bound by law, but under this instrument every foot of
the soil of the United States is a part of the United States when the question
of the defense of that territory is involved. Therefore, if any foreign power
should invade this country, should invade Texas for instance, Texas could
meet the crisis with her own resources, if it was necessary for her defense,
but the President of the United States, if he saw that Texas was invaded,
would act upon the theory, not that the state of Texas was invaded, but that
the United States was invaded, and the whole power of the United States
would be behind him, although there might be nothing else except the
invasion of that one state, and the assault upon the territory of that single
state is an assault upon the whole United States, and there is no limit placed
upon it.
Shall it be one percent or two percent? The Constitution does not say.
That is left to the Congress of the United States to determine. Now, there
are some words here which have given occasion to some extravagant
notions by some of the statesmen of this country. In order “to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States.”117 Therefore, it is the view of some that the government of
the United States may lay a tax for any purpose which in any fair sense
involves the general welfare of the United States. Therefore, some argue
that the Congress of the United States can lay a tax for the purpose of
maintaining orphan asylums in every nook and cranny of this country.

117

Id.
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LECTURE 9: DECEMBER 11, 1897
We had commenced at our last meeting to consider the clause of the
Constitution which defines the powers of the Congress of the United States.
In many respects, that is the largest and most important part of our
Constitution, because it enumerates the powers possessed by that branch of
government from which emanates the laws of the United States.
Naturally, the first subject embraced by the clause enumerating the
powers of the Congress of the United States is the subject of taxation. It is
not too much to say that without that clause of the Constitution of the
United States, our government would be a rope of sand; it would not be
worth preserving; it could not be preserved. That is at the very basis of
every live government. If it has not the power to tax; if it has not the power
to raise money, why the remainder of its powers amount to nothing; they
are mere recommendation.
Without money, the government could not last a day. You have got to
pay the expenses of that government, and those expenses include a vast
number of items. You have got to pay the officers of that government; you
have got to pay the men who pass these laws; you have got to pay your
debts, the debts of the government, and the power to lay and collect taxes
to pay the debts of the United States is one of immense consequence every
way. You go to a bank tomorrow here in this city, and you propose to
borrow a thousand dollars. You may give as your sureties men worth half a
million, or you may deposit as collateral securities worth ten times over the
amount you propose to borrow. The bank will charge you certainly five,
and probably six percent interest. “Why, certainly,” they say, “We will
loan you the money,” and you give a note payable sixty or ninety days after
date at five percent or six percent interest.
Well, the government of the United States may wish to borrow five
hundred millions of dollars tomorrow under the authority of an act of
Congress. I put the amount large so as to make the illustration effective. I
will suppose that the government wants for use now five hundred millions
of dollars, and it is authorized by an act of Congress to issue the bonds of
the United States to that amount. Can it raise five hundred millions of
dollars? Yes. Could raise it in ten days after the bids were opened. And
could raise it in this country without going outside of it. Could raise it in
the markets of Europe. At what rate of interest? I have no doubt they
could borrow within thirty days from this day, and have in the Treasury,
five hundred millions of dollars on bonds of the United States, calling for
two and one-half percent interest.
Why would a moneyed man in London, if he had fifty millions to put
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out at interest, jump at the opportunity to take the bonds of the United
States at two and one-half or three percent? Well, he would do so, firstly,
because he knew that the honor and good faith of these United States had
never been doubted, and he had no right to doubt it; that this country, if it
made that obligation, would meet it according to its terms.
But what would be at the bottom of his contract? Why, he would be
told by a lawyer or a statesman of whom he inquired about the matter that
here was a government that had the power to lay and collect taxes to pay its
debts.
Under the old Articles of Confederation, Congress had not the power
to lay and collect taxes to pay the debts. Therefore, the man abroad would
say, “I don’t want the bonds of a government that cannot enforce the
collection of money enough to pay them,” and therefore it often occurred in
the history of the revolutionary period that our ministers abroad had not
money enough to pay their boarding bill while they were in Europe, except
out of their private estate. Our own government had not credit abroad upon
which to raise the money at that time, because it had no power to raise
money to pay its debts.
Here is the power to lay and collect taxes to pay our debts. Lay and
collect taxes, for what, or for whom? Why, it is to lay and collect taxes out
of imports and excises. Now, if there is any form to collect taxes that is not
embraced in one of those terms, I don’t know what it is. What may it lay
its taxes on? Why, anything and everything, would be one construction of
the instrument. There may be a quarrel as to the mode in which you will do
it, the form in which you will do it. It may be said that if you lay direct
taxes you must do it in a certain way, but the power to lay taxes without
limit as to amount is given by this Constitution.118 Therefore, there is not
one dollar’s worth of property in this country from one end of it to the other
that may not be in some form reached by the taxing power of the United
States, and made to contribute to the expenses of the government.
Under the old Articles of Confederation, when Congress wanted to
raise money they said, we will assess so much to Virginia, so much to
Maryland, so much to Massachusetts, so much to New York, and make a
requisition. Well, a state didn’t pay, and if it didn’t pay, that was the end of
it. There was no power to compel them to pay.
Is there power now to do it? Well now, if you will turn to the close of
that Section 8, you will see there a clause—it does not make four lines in
118

See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 618 (holding the federal income tax unconstitutional as an
unapportioned direct tax).
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this little pamphlet that I have here—that are tremendous in their
consequence. Congress shall have power “[t]o make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or any Department or Officer thereof.”119 Here is the power
given to lay and collect taxes. This clause that I have just read carries with
it the power to make whatever law is necessary for the laying and
collecting of taxes.
Therefore, the government of the United States does not have to ask
the consent of any state as to a tax law that may pass. When the law is
constitutional, the government of the United States does not have to ask the
consent of the state to pass it. It may lay a tax upon real estate across the
river here in Virginia, a direct tax for some of the purposes for which the
government of the United States was established. The United States do not
have to ask the consent of the sovereign of the state of Virginia. It may
pass a law imposing direct taxes upon all of the lands of the United States.
It may pass an internal law by which it taxes its business to raise money for
the United States, and when an internal collector is appointed he does not
have to ask his state whether they will consent to that or not. He does not
have to ask his state whether he shall levy a distress warrant for the purpose
of collecting the tax.
There are no state lines so far as the taxation of the United States are
concerned, and this government today is strong as it is because it is a
government which can reach its hand out, without the consent of the state,
upon every human being in the United States, and every square foot of land
in the United States, and every dollar of property in the United States, and
say, you shall contribute to the support of the government of the United
States. That is the reason we have got a government that is strong enough
to conquer rebellion, and strong enough to stand anything that may be in
opposition to it.
There is the power in this instrument to lay and collect taxes, pass all
laws necessary for the laying and collecting of taxes, for the purpose of
paying the debts, providing for the common defense, and the general
welfare of the United States. What do we mean by paying the debts of the
United States? What is a debt of the United States? Well, there is room for
argument there. That may mean a bonded debt of the United States, but it
is a little broader than that. The Supreme Court of the United States has
said: We may owe a debt that is sacred because of the moral obligation that
119
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underlies it.
A few years ago the Congress of the United States passed a law giving
a bounty to sugar makers.120 That is to say, they agreed to pay so much
money for every pound of sugar that might be grown in this country.121
And men set to work under the authority of that law and expended large
amounts of money providing machinery for the refinement of sugar. I do
not know how much was expended, but a very large sum. But in the course
of two or three years the wheel of political fortune turned around, and
gentlemen got in control of Congress, of both branches, that did not think
that law was right, and they repealed that bounty provision, I believe in the
McKinley Tariff.122
Well, what was the result? Enormous losses to the people who had,
upon the faith of the legislation, prepared themselves to refine sugar. Well,
this Congress, when they repealed that law, said it is but fair that we should
do something towards relieving these people that have acted upon this
legislation, and a certain amount of money was appropriated for them.123
Well, it got to the Comptroller of the Treasury here, and he in his
wisdom said that Congress had no power to pass a bounty law at all, that
Congress had no power to use the money of the United States in that way,
and therefore he said, “the Congress had no power to appropriate money to
make good those losses, and I won’t honor those claims. I repudiate them.
It was beyond the power of Congress.” Well then, the men who had the
claims brought a suit against the government of the United States, and it
finally came to the Supreme Court.
Now, here was the power to lay and collect taxes in order to pay the
debts of the United States. Was that a debt against the United States in the
sense of the Constitution? Well now, the Court said, we will not stop to
consider whether the Congress had the power to make that bounty law or
not. It did it, and it was approved by the President; people acted upon it;
there was a high moral obligation imposed upon the government of the
United States to make that good, and that was in the sense of the
Constitution. Congress had the right to induce these people to undergo
these expenditures, and there is a moral obligation upon us to meet this
debt, although not strictly a legal debt. In other words, that the
Constitution did not prohibit the United States from doing what was just
120

McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, §§ 231–35, 26 Stat. 567, 583–84.
Id.
122 The McKinley Tariff of 1890 created a sugar bounty, which was repealed by the
Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, § 182, 28 Stat. 509, 521.
123 Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 189, 28 Stat. 910, 933.
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and right in the distribution of the money collected by taxation.124
Now, in that connection, I wish to tell you that the decision did not at
all rest upon any interpretation of those words, “general welfare of the
United States.” A plausible argument is often made that Congress may lay
taxes in order to provide for the general welfare of the United States, and it
is argued that the general welfare is broad enough to include anything and
everything, and therefore the government of the United States has the
power to collect taxes for anything on the top of the Earth that Congress
may think appropriate.
Well, that statement is made without any judicial authority to support
it, and yet there is room for a very extraordinary view about that clause.
The Congress of the United States gave the credit of the United States to
bonds that were issued by the Chicago World Exposition. The credit of the
United States was behind that enterprise. Well now, point to the clause of
the Constitution that authorizes the money of the United States to be
pledged in the first instance for that purpose.
A great flood arises in the Mississippi River; the river gets out of its
banks and overflows a vast number of acres on the lower Mississippi;
thousands and thousands of square miles are overflowed by the water of the
Mississippi and plantations are destroyed; people floating about in houses,
sometimes in the top of trees waiting for someone to come and save them.
Thousands upon thousands of people made penniless and homeless;
immense distress all about through the country, and Congress appropriates
two, three, four hundred thousand dollars in order to relieve the men who
suffer from that calamity.125 Well now, where is the provision in the
Constitution of the United States which, in terms, authorizes that?
Parts of the country are afflicted with Yellow Fever to such an extent
that all the ordinary means of relieving people are out of the way and
cannot be furnished. No state can do it. States are powerless. The
government of the United States steps forward and spends money in that
direction.
In 1848, there was a famine in Ireland—a potato famine—so that the
Irish were reported to us to be starving for the want of food, and doubtless
they were. The government of the United States appropriated a sum of
money, I forget what, it was not very large, ten or twenty or fifty thousand
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United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 439 (1896).
Harlan is probably alluding to the flood of 1874, which prompted the creation of
the Mississippi River Commission in 1879. See Act of June 28, 1879, ch. 43, 21 Stat. 37
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 641 (2006)).
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dollars, and got a vessel and filled that vessel with all sorts of things
necessary to relieve the wants and the sufferings of the people of Ireland
from starving in that famine, and sent it over there and it did great good. 126
Where does anybody find in the Constitution of the United States a
provision that authorizes that?
Now, study it out at your leisure, where do you find the authority for
that? Everybody agrees that the Congress of the United States has got no
powers that cannot be found in this Constitution, either expressly or by
necessary implication. Let me repeat, where do you find the authority in
that Constitution for this sort of expenditure of the public money of the
United States?
Well, some say that here is the broad power given to lay and collect
taxes in order to provide for the general welfare of the United States. What
does that mean?
Well, I am inclined to think that we can answer that about as well as
the men who framed the Constitution intended that we should answer it.
They intended to leave it at large; they intended to leave a large discretion
in the Congress of the United States as to what they would do with the
money of the United States after it was collected, and the judiciary are very
slow to step between the Congress of the United States and the
accomplishment of those purposes, and will not ordinarily say that when
Congress says a tax should be laid for this and that purpose, the judiciary
do not interfere in that matter unless it is a palpable case of an infraction of
the Constitution of the United States. For the rule is fundamental both in
reference to state and federal constitutions that the judiciary shall not
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional unless it is plainly and palpably
so, and therefore if there is any way that is consistent with reason or the fair
use of language for a court to doubt whether a particular taxing law is
within the limits of the Constitution of the United States, why they will
resolve the question in favor of the power of the representatives of the
people to do this, and that is safe, that is right; the judiciary do not lay and
collect taxes.127 The responsibility of that is upon the representatives of the
people in the Senate and House of Representatives, and if the people stand
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Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 10, 9 Stat. 207. Congress ultimately authorized the
expenditure of up to $16,000 for the expenses of the Macedonian. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch.
166, 9 Stat. 284, 290.
127 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he rule is universal that a legislative enactment, Federal or state, is never to be
disregarded or held invalid unless it be, beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of
legislative power.”).
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by their representatives in a particular use of the public money, the
judiciary ought not to interfere unless they are compelled to do so by the
plainness of the case.
There is a still further reason why they should hesitate to do so. The
judiciary does not make laws, it declares them, and the safety of this
country today, the safety of our institutions today, lies mainly in the fact
that the judiciary of this land restricts the exercise of its powers to the
declaration of what the law is, and not assume unnecessarily to pass in
judgment upon the wisdom of legislation.128 Whenever we get to that
period in our institutions, when the judiciary, because they have got the
naked power to do so, shall sit in judgment upon mere questions of
expediency and policy, then the vengeance of parties in this country may be
turned against the judiciary, and say we will rid this country of the system
under which a particular body of men will assume to sit in judgment on the
wisdom and policy of the legislature.
Now, it is a little aside from this question to refer to another matter just
here, but I do so because it enables me to illustrate what was in the minds
of one of the class, I judge by a question he has propounded to me, and that
is suggested in an article in a recent magazine. I just read to you the clause
that says Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and
all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Well now, when you turn to the article relating to the executive branch
of the government of the United States, you will find there the power given
to the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, and there is of course the power for Congress to give effect to a
treaty of that sort. One of the gentlemen of your class asked me if I had
seen an article in the last Forum by a distinguished ex-jurist, in which he
argued that there was no power in the United States to annex territory by
treaty, and therefore he argued that this proposed treaty with Hawaii was
unconstitutional.129
Why, I said, good-naturedly, to the man who propounded that
question, that the man must have been asleep for a hundred years. What
128

See id. at 69 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (“Whether or not this be wise legislation it is
not the province of the court to inquire. Under our systems of government the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation.”).
129 Daniel Agnew, Unconstitutionality of the Hawaiian Treaty, 24 FORUM 461, 461
(1897),
available
at
http://books.google.com/ebooks/reader?id=_QLAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&pg=GBS.PA461.
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ground was there to say today that there was no power to acquire territory
by treaty. Suppose that was the law, where would we be today?
We acquired by the treaty of Louisiana, made by Mr. Jefferson, a very
large part of the northwestern territory, including Arkansas, Missouri, I
believe Iowa, Minnesota, running almost to the State of Washington, if it
did not include Oregon, I have forgotten the boundary now. Well,
Jefferson said, “I hadn’t the power to do that. I did it from necessity,” and
he wanted an amendment of the Constitution of the United States passed to
ratify what he had done, but his friends laughed at him.130
How did we get the present territory of New Mexico, except by treaty
with Mexico? How did we get the territory of Alaska except by treaty with
Russia? The old provision of the Constitution says, the President shall
have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties.131 Treaties for what? The Constitution does not say. They were
too wise to limit it. Therefore, it seems to me under this clause which I
have quoted, that it is beyond question that the government of the United
States may add to the territory by treaty, and that whatever law is necessary
in order to give that treaty effect is authorized by the concluding clause of
the section we are now considering.
We have got in this country for this national government all the power
given by this Constitution, subject, of course, to the limitations that may be
imposed by the Constitution itself. For instance, we have got a provision in
the Constitution of the United States to the effect, that no man shall be
compelled to criminate himself.132 Now, the government of the United
States could not make a treaty with Great Britain under which any man, a
British subject, or an American subject, in a court of the United States
relating to a matter of difference between this country and England, could
be compelled to criminate himself, and so many other provisions of law,
but within those limitations and subject to those restrictions, this
government can do all this Constitution allows, provided it does not
transcend any express power.
And that brings me to the questions again, what may you do under this
general welfare clause of Section 8? Can you lay a tax for everything? No.
You may lay a tax only for the objects for which this government was
130 See Thomas Jefferson, Proposal on Louisiana Constitutional Amendment (1803),
available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib013048.
131 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur . . . .”).
132 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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established and those objects are defined in this instrument. This Section 8,
in connection with other Articles, indicates what were the purposes for
which this government was established.
Now, to accomplish those ends you may pass all laws that are
necessary. Following that, and very naturally, is the power to borrow
money on the credit of the United States. We cannot borrow money on the
credit of any state, but we may borrow money on the credit of the United
States. How much? As much as we want. There is no limit. It would not
have been wise to have imposed a limit.
If the limit had been imposed at that day this union would not exist
today. We would not have had the country that we have now got, because
no man, when that Constitution was framed, ever supposed that an occasion
would ever arise for the government of the United States to be enforcing its
military authority over any part of the United States, or wanted to divide
the country, and they never would have dreamed of the possibility of such a
war as we had in 1861, when we had at one time more men than we could
count almost. When that war closed the debt of the United States
amounted to nearly three thousand millions of dollars.133 We had at one
time—I am a little slow to state figures, I make so many mistakes in stating
them—but we had an enormous number of men in the field in 1861.134
How did we support them? Why we supported them under that clause
of the Constitution of the United States—the power to borrow money on
the credit of the United States. That is what slew the Rebellion. It was not
that the soldiers of the Union Army were braver than the soldiers of the
Confederate Army. It was not that they could stand more than the
Confederate soldiers could stand, but we had more money. That gave us
more men.
We would not have had the men we had, but for the financial power of
the United States based upon that. When the bonds of the United States
were put upon the market, on the credit of the United States, people were
perfectly willing to put their money in those bonds, here and across the
water. And those few words, “to borrow Money on the credit of the United

133 At the end of 1865, the national debt was about $2.2 billion. The 19th Century,
BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT, http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/history/1800.htm (last
updated Oct. 8, 2008).
134 More than two million soldiers fought in the Civil War. The United States Army
enlisted about 1.5 million soldiers and the Confederate States Army enlisted about 800
thousand
soldiers.
American
Civil
War,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/19407/American-Civil-War/229879/The-costand-significance-of-the-Civil-War (last visited June 20, 2013).
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States,”135 are today in the eye of every government in the world, and they
know what it means. They know that the seventy million of people that are
here are materially increasing, backed by the power of the government that
is able to put the whole wealth of that seventy million of people behind the
government. They know that that is enough to make it no holiday matter if
those governments ever attempt to encroach upon the just rights of the
government of the United States.
If this country ever got into any trouble with any particular foreign
country, why we could sell our bonds in the financial markets of every
other foreign country, and the power to borrow money on the credit of the
United States, containing as much money as we have got, and as much
wealth as we have got, protects us from unnecessary attack at home and
abroad, and the people of this country know by hard experience, by the
long pension roll that we have got, by the number of widows and orphans
that we have got in the country as the result of a former struggle—every
part of the United States knows about it, that if there is any attempt to
destroy this country, all this power is behind the government of the United
States, and that they had better think twice before they attempt it.
That power did not belong to the Congress of the United States before
the adoption of the present Constitution, and the government that has not
that is a government without power; it is a government we cannot respect;
it cannot enjoy the respect of the balance of the world. The decision of the
Supreme Court in the case—which if you have not read I would advise you
to read—of McCulloch against the State of Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316,136
and along with it I would advise you to read Weston against the City of
Charleston, 2d Peters, 449.137
We are apt to think, and very rightly, that if it had not been for George
Washington, we would not have had the country we now have. We style
him “The Father of the Country,” and he was. I believe we owe more to
him for the adoption of the present form of government than any man of his
day. He was not trained in statesmanship, but he had what we may call
saving common sense. He was raised up, if there is such a thing as a
special providence, to save this country.138 So far as we now see and can
135

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
137 Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).
138 “Providence” was the central feature of Washington’s religious faith. See FRANK E.
GRIZZARD, JR., THE WAYS OF PROVIDENCE: RELIGION AND GEORGE WASHINGTON 5 (2005);
see also George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789) (“No People can be
bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand, which conducts the Affairs of men
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judge, there was no other man of that day that could have led our armies
and kept up their courage to the spirit of independence that he did.
Now, that is true of him as to the establishment of the government, and
this Constitution put into effect, and as it was, a new system had to be
adjusted to our institutions and expounded. Was it to fall into the hands of
a judge that looked upon it like a private instrument? Was it to fall into the
hands of judges that were jealous of the just power of the national
government, and who would construe it so strictly as that it would not
accomplish the purposes for which it was framed, or was it to fall into the
hands of judges that were as wise in judicial statesmanship as Washington
was in the field, who were able to look over the field and see the weakness
of the old form of government, and who were able to give this instrument
such a construction as would enable the government of the United States to
accomplish what was intended by the framers of the Constitution? Was it
to fall into the hands of judges who were ready always to look with
jealousy and hatred upon the national government, and say I owe no
allegiance but to my state; my state is sovereign; whatever my state tells me
I will do, I am bound to do no matter what the United States says, or the
government of the nation says? Or was it to fall into the hands of the
judges who respected the rights of the states but were willing to so construe
that instrument as to have it accomplish what the framers of the
Constitution intended?
Well, it so happened that a vacancy occurred in the Chief Justiceship
of the Supreme Court of the United States during the term of John Adams,
and just before he closed his term, John Marshall was made Chief Justice
of the United States. If that vacancy had not occurred just when it did, or
about when it did, John Marshall would not have been Chief Justice, but
another man would have been Chief Justice, who, honest as he was, was
not worthy to be thought of in the same connection with Marshall.
Marshall came to the Chief Justiceship when quite a young man—not
more than forty-six at the time. Now, I commend his opinion to you in 4
Wheaton,139 and I doubt—although he was abused in that day and
sometimes familiarly called by politicians “Jack” Marshall—whether there
is a single human being in the United States of the legal profession who is
of any standing as a lawyer today that would question a line of that opinion,
more than the People of the United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the
character of an independent nation, seems to have been distinguished by some token of
providential
agency.”)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/gw-inauguration/.
139 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
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certainly they will not dispute the principle that underlies it, and what is
that principle?
The State of Maryland sought to lay a tax upon one of the financial
securities of the United States, provided by the United States. The question
was whether it could do it. Well, if they could do it, what would be the
result? What would the securities of the United States be worth in the
market, and what would the credit be worth, if the securities which it
employed, or the instrumentalities which it employed to carry on the
government of the United States, were to be subject to taxation by the
states?
Why, easily the states might tax it out of existence, might paralyze the
government of the United States, and the principle in that decision,
whatever may be the objection to some of the words employed, the
principle of that decision is that this thing which the State of Maryland
proposed to tax is one of the instrumentalities employed by the government
in order to accomplish the ends of the government, and the Supreme Court
said, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, “What is the use in saying
that the Constitution and the laws of the United States shall be the supreme
law of the land, if the instrumentalities which it employs to carry on the
government can be taxed by the states.”140 And let me say of that decision,
I venture to say that if you will read the argument in that case, if you will
study that case and master it, take into your mind all the principles laid
down, you will understand the spirit and meaning of the Constitution
almost as much as if you were to read a whole textbook.
Now, before I leave the subject, let me express another view that may
come into somebody’s mind. What would be the result if some of the
states in the government of the United States could be taxed by the
government? Well, the question arose later on, and it was decided in exact
accordance with those principles, that this government of the United States
could no more tax the instrumentality of the states than the states could of
the United States.141
140

See id. at 391 (“There is a manifest repugnancy between the power of Maryland to
tax, and the power of Congress to preserve, this institution. A power to build up what
another may pull down at pleasure, is a power which may provoke a smile, but can do
nothing else.”).
141 See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 127 (1870) (“It is admitted that there
is no express provision in the Constitution that prohibits the general government from taxing
the means and instrumentalities of the States, nor is there any prohibiting the States from
taxing the means and instrumentalities of that government. In both cases the exemption
rests upon necessary implication, and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation; as any
government, whose means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of
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A state owns its government mansion, the house upon which its
legislative buildings stand. Can the government of the United States tax
that? No, it has been held it could not. This state pays the Governor a
given salary. Well, the United States can pass an internal revenue law and
it may make a man under that law pay a tax upon his income. Can it make
the Governor pay a tax upon the salary that he receives? No. Because if
you could tax the salary of the Governor of the state one cent to support the
government of the United States, you could tax it a hundred cents and tax it
out of existence, so that following out from that grand old decision, the
principle is now settled thoroughly, nobody disputes it. These two
governments are running side by side in this country. Each can attend to its
own operations, and neither has the right to interfere with the other.
That brings us to the fundamental thought which every young man in
this country ought to understand, that there are under our institutions state
rights and national rights; that the man who is so narrow in this day as to
think that he has got no duty to perform except the one which he owes his
state, and that his state can command him to do anything, no matter what it
is, that man is just as far wrong and just as wild as the man who says that
there are no state rights, and that we have got a vast centralized government
here that can do just as it pleases. The fact is, that our constitutional liberty
depends as much upon the preservation of the states as upon the
preservation of the national government, and that man is the best friend of
the states who recognizes the just rights of the federal government, and that
man is the truest friend of the national government who recognizes the just
rights of the state government.

another and distinct government, can exist only at the mercy of that government. Of what
avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion?”), overruled by Graves
v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
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LECTURE 10: DECEMBER 18, 1897
Now, I come to an important provision of the Constitution. We are in
the habit of saying that some provisions of the Constitution are more
important than others. They are more far reaching. They undoubtedly are,
some of them.
First in order in this enumeration of the powers of the government of
the United States was the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises, without which power this government would not be in
existence today, perhaps. Certainly would not be in existence today with
all its acknowledged authority, and with the power that it has. A
government that has not power to lay and collect taxes for its support is not
a government that can last. Naturally, therefore, that subject was first dealt
with when enumerating the powers granted the Congress of the United
States. That is at the very basis of our institutions.
Next to that, perhaps equally important, was the power to borrow
money on the credit of the United States, so that the government is not
driven always to lay the taxing hand upon the people for the whole amount
which may be needed. We may want today ten millions of dollars, or fifty
millions of dollars. Well now, if that had to be collected at once by
taxation upon the people of the United States, it would be a pretty serious
matter, but instead of that the government of the United States will borrow
the amount of money necessary, and then it soon lay taxes necessary to
meet the interest. By the time the principal fell due this country, instead of
having seventy millions of people, might have one hundred or two hundred
millions; instead of having a given amount of business, it might have
tenfold more, so that the principal could be easily paid off.
Next to those provisions come the clause I am to talk about tonight, the
power “to regulate commerce.” Congress shall have the power to regulate
commerce. All commerce? No, but “Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”142
What is the power to regulate commerce? That is not a power to bring
commerce into existence. Commerce existed before the government
existed. Commerce involves the idea of trade between people, intercourse
between people. Well now, that existed when the government was formed,
more or less modified, and the power here is to regulate commerce.
What do we mean by “to regulate commerce”? It is to prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed, and this commerce, not all
142

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce, but commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes. While it is well established by the history
of the period that at the time when our Constitution was adopted, that one
of the moving causes for displacing the old Articles of Confederation and
establishing the present government of the United States was the necessity
that existed for a government that would regulate this kind of commerce.143
What existed before this government was formed? Why, each state
was taking care of itself; each state was passing laws and making
regulations that would give its own people the benefit of all the commerce
of every sort that would come within its limits, without regard to the
convenience of others. The City of Newport, at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, was a very promising commercial city. It has had a fine
harbor; it has got a fine harbor today. A great deal of the commerce that
came from Europe entered this country at the Port of Newport before the
Constitution was adopted. The State of Rhode Island put taxes and imposts
on the commerce that came through the Port of Newport destined for states
behind Rhode Island among the thirteen.
It was, therefore, not
extraordinary that when it was proposed to adopt this Constitution, the
State of Rhode Island held back. It didn’t send delegates, and why?
Why, they could see under this Constitution that if it was adopted all
of the fruits of commerce with foreign nations that came into Rhode Island
through the Port of Newport would be lost, and therefore if you will turn to
the names of the men who signed the Constitution of the United States, you
will see there no delegate from Rhode Island.144 Rhode Island wanted to
keep all of that profit to itself, but the states behind it felt that it was unjust
that they should be paying tribute to the State of Rhode Island simply
because for the time being it was an independent principality or colony, nor
did they want taxes laid by New York upon goods that came into the Port
of New York, or taxes laid by Georgia upon goods that came into

143 Letter from George Washington, President of the Fed. Convention, to the President
of Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (Washington, U.S. Dep’t of State 1894) (“The friends
of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace, and
treaties, that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive
and judicial authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of
the Union . . . .”).
144 Rhode Island was the only state that did not send any delegates to the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 and was the last of the original thirteen states to ratify the Constitution.
See, e.g., Rhode Island’s Ratification of the Constitution, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/HistoricalHighlight/Detail/35264 (last
visited May 27, 2013).
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Savannah. That was a matter to be regulated by the government that was to
be established, and it is not too much to say that but for the necessity
arising out of a rule applicable to all the seaports of the states alike this
government might not have been established. But for that provision in the
Constitution, the requisite number of states would not have accepted this
Constitution.
Now, I have said that it is not commerce of every kind that the
government may regulate. There is a commerce with which the United
States has nothing to do, the power to control which has never been granted
to the United States.145 Take commerce between the City of New York and
the City of Rochester, New York, for instance, or commerce between
Alexandria and the City of Richmond, Virginia, or commerce between the
City of Cincinnati and Columbus, Ohio. That is purely domestic. That
commerce commences in a state and ends in the same state.
Now, commerce of that character is completely within the control of
the respective states where those points lie, and the government of the
United States has no more to do with it than it has with the commerce in
the interior of China. The states have never granted to the government of
the United States the power to control those things, and it is well that they
have not. If the power to control the internal domestic trade of the states
belonged to the government of the United States, there would be
foundation for the apprehensions of some that all powers of localities and
municipalities in this country would be lost sight of in a vast centralized
government, and the men who framed this Constitution were wise in the
thought that there were many things that could not be controlled by the
United States.
Why, the larger amount of the legislation in this country is by the
states in their local affairs. It is hard enough to get the attention of
Congress to matters that concern the nation. It is very difficult, our
institutions have become so numerous and varied and our two branches of
the legislature have become so large, that it is very difficult to get through
any session of Congress but a very few measures that relate to the nation at
large. Any man to do it in either house has got to have a good deal of tact.
He has got to be on a committee. He has got to have the eye and the ear of
the Speaker. When he gets up in his place in the House of Representatives,
145

See, e.g., Ex parte Clark, 128 U.S. 395 (Harlan, Circuit Justice 1888) (“If congress,
under the grant of power to regulate commerce between the states, can, by direct legislation
upon the subject, override the statute of Pennsylvania, so far as it applies to persons
controlling vessels or boats employed in such commerce within its limits—a proposition
which cannot, I think, be sustained—it has not exercised that power.”).
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although he may weigh more than two or three hundred pounds, and ought
to be seen a mile by a man of good sight, sometimes a Speaker does not see
him, does not recognize him.
I am not now commenting on that, or saying it is unwise. I am
speaking of the fact. I am speaking of the difficulty in our present system
of getting proper attention to matters that concern the nation. What would
we do if all these merely local affairs that belong now exclusively to the
states were under the control of the Congress of the United States, simply
because you call it commerce? No, the kind of commerce which Congress
can regulate is commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, that is commerce between the states.
Now, the difficult question that cannot be solved by any rule today that
would be applicable a hundred years from now is, what may be done under
the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states? What may the United States do in that matter? It is more
pertinent to inquire what may it not do under that broad power. May the
United States prohibit the introduction into this country of certain articles
that may be manufactured in England, or France, or Germany, or Spain,
absolutely prohibit them?
Well, who will say it cannot? Here is the power to regulate. How may
it regulate it? May it regulate it by a duty that is prohibitory in its
character? Well, if it does, how are you to sit in judgment as to the
methods that govern Congress in a matter of that sort? What does
commerce include? Does it include simply the transportation of goods? It
has been long settled that it includes something more than that. It includes
intercourse, and still more, it includes navigation, and if it includes
intercourse, as undoubtedly it does, the government of the United States
may, if it sees proper, say who shall and who shall not come into this
country from other countries. We have said, that is, the highest tribunal of
the country has said, that if it chooses, it may exclude citizens or subjects
of any particular nation from coming to this country under the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations.146
When this Constitution was adopted, what did commerce mean? And

146 See, e.g., Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 541–42 (1895) (Harlan,
J.) (“That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory, is a proposition which we do not think
open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every
independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would
be to that extent subject to the control of another power.” (quoting The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889)).
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that question suggests the wisdom of the remark made by the only
Englishman that I ever heard of that seemed ever to have had the slightest
comprehension of our system of government, and that was Mr. Bryce in his
history of the American Commonwealth.147 He is a distinguished
Englishman who seemed to have comprehended our system of government
and was able to put on paper correct ideas about it, tell exactly what it was.
He was the only Englishman within the last two hundred years that has
been able to understand our Constitution. He says that instrument was
wonderful in its capacity of expansion in order to suit the expansive power
of the country over which it was to preside.148 And that was illustrated in
the meaning of the word “commerce.”
When that Constitution was adopted, no man of that day had the
slightest idea that he would be able to start from the City of New York in
the morning at ten o’clock and find himself in Chicago the next day at nine
o’clock. The commerce that was then thought of was commerce on water,
commerce on navigable waters; the commerce between the City of New
York, for instance, and Savannah, Georgia, by the ocean; commerce from
the City of New York to Philadelphia, partly by ocean and partly by
Delaware River. Nobody ever thought then of steam railways, and yet it is
practically well settled at this day, and settled some while back, that that
provision of the Constitution of the United States embraces commerce
across the country by railroad as well as commerce upon the navigable
waters of the United States.
And that suggests a line of thought that no doubt has occurred to you.
It suggests a subject about which the public mind of this country is very
much divided today, and so much divided that no statesman is able to speak
with very great confidence as to what can be, or ought to be done. If, as
undoubtedly is the fact, commerce between the City of New York and the
City of San Francisco across lines of railway is commerce, that may be

147

1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (London, MacMillan & Co.

1888).
148

Id. at 465–66 (“That federalism supplies the best means of developing a new and
vast country. It permits an expansion whose extent, and whose rate and manner of progress,
cannot be foreseen to proceed with more variety of methods, more adaptation of laws and
administration to the circumstances of each part of the territory, and altogether in a more
truly natural and spontaneous way, than can be expected under a centralized government,
which is disposed to apply its settled system through all its dominions. Thus the special
needs of a new region are met by the inhabitants in the way they find best: its special evils
are cured by special remedies, perhaps more drastic than an old country demands, perhaps
more lax than an old country would tolerate; while at the same time the spirit of self-reliance
among those who build up these new communities is stimulated and respected.”).
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regulated by the United States. What shall be the extent of regulation that
the government of the United States will undertake? How far will it go?
Will the interests of this country compel in the end the government of the
United States to own lines of transportation connecting the two oceans, or
will it be left, as it now is, to regulations of the states so far as the states
may pass laws upon the subjects, and to regulation that comes from
competitions between great trunk railways?
For instance, a man living three hundred miles this side of the City of
Chicago wishes to ship certain articles from that place to the City of New
York. Another man has some of the same articles to ship from the city of
Chicago to the City of New York, three hundred miles farther. The
railroads say that it costs less to ship the articles from Chicago to New
York than it does to ship them from the place this side of Chicago to New
York, so that the man three hundred miles nearer to New York pays more
for a given amount of freight than a like shipment of the same amount and
sort of freight from Chicago to New York. And as you follow these lines
across the country the difficulty increases.
Is that theory sound? Is the country to agree to that mode of doing
business? Are these vast lines of communication that connect the Pacific
and Atlantic to fall ultimately into the hands of a few syndicates and bodies
of men that can control rates and fare as their interests may indicate or
suggest, or is the government of the United States put under the necessity
of owning lines of transportation of its own connecting these oceans, and
establishing rates that will be just to the people all along the line?149
Still further, you go to an office in the City of New York, for instance,
a railroad office, to buy a ticket to San Francisco. Well, you will pay a
certain price for it, and that price you would pay if you went to another
railroad office that had railroad connection all the way to San Francisco.
Shall the government of the United States take that subject of rates for
passengers and freight into its hands? Does the power to regulate
commerce among the states carry with it the power in the government of
the United States to say what shall be the rates for passengers and freight
between New York and San Francisco, or between New York in one state
and Philadelphia in another state? Shall this whole subject be taken
possession of by the government of the United States, and regulated by
some rule common to all parts of the country and upon a basis of equality

149 See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 (1897)
(holding that “the Anti-Trust Act applies to railroads, and that it renders illegal all
agreements which are in restraint of trade or commerce”).
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to all parts of the country?
Now, these questions thus suggested will indicate to you what vast
power lurks under that clause of the Constitution of the United States, but
as vast as that power is, and whatever may be the dangers that are to come
from its exercise, it had better be there; it had better rest with the
government of the United States than to rest with each state as to what shall
be charged for the transportation of persons and freight across that state.
Suppose that clause was not there. Suppose Congress had no power to
regulate commerce among the states. What might be the result?
Well, the State of New York would say how much should be charged
for freight and passengers from the City of New York to the western line of
New York. What would control it except its own discretion? Why, it
could say what it pleased on that subject. Very well; when that train
reached the State of Ohio, then an Ohio law would come into operation and
say what should be charged for that passenger or freight across the State of
Ohio, and then when you reach Indiana there is another rate, and Illinois
there is another rate, and Iowa there is another rate perhaps, and so on until
you got to the Pacific Ocean.
Now, a difference of rules of that sort would utterly demoralize the
commerce and business of this country, and put all to inconveniences that
would be intolerable. So far, the states have not assumed to regulate those
matters as between states. The State of Illinois a few years ago passed a
statute regulating rates for passengers and freight in that state. That statute
was so framed as that it was a regulation as to what should be charged for
freight or passengers starting in Illinois, their ultimate destination being the
City of New York.
Well, the Supreme Court of the United States held, that so far as rates,
whether for passengers or freight, commencing at a point in Illinois and
ending at a point in Illinois, that was a matter for Illinois. The government
of the United States had nothing to do with it, but that Illinois was not
competent to say what shall be the rates charged in Illinois to points beyond
the State of Illinois, and that part of the Illinois statute was held to be
unconstitutional and therefore void.150
Now, there is a line of decisions in this country that you ought to
become familiar with on that subject, for I can state to you with entire
confidence that when you get to the bar and have a good practice in your
profession, and you become connected with cases involving constitutional
law, probably the most important you will have are those connected with
150

See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
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the commerce of the country. Now, some of those are monuments to the
wisdom of the judge who delivered those opinions, and one of them will
live as long as our country exists, as long as our Constitution lasts, and you
cannot read it too often or study it too closely. I allude to the case of
Gibbons against Ogden, 9 Wheaton, page 1.151
Now, if you wish to understand that case thoroughly, you will have to
get hold of the original decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and not this condensed decision which I have here in my hands. I
assume that all of you have read more or less of the speeches of Mr.
Webster. If you have not, you cannot too soon read them, for in his public
speeches you will find his argument in the case of Gibbons against Ogden,
written out by himself, or revised by himself after it was published.152
Four very great lawyers appeared in that case, Mr. Webster and
William Wirt, who was then Attorney General, appeared for the plaintiff,
and on the other side was Oakley and Emmet.153 Emmet was a kinsman of
Emmet of Ireland, who was executed because he was a patriot.154
Now, read the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in this case. That was
the first attempt on the part of the state to draw to itself a control over
commerce that would have done infinite mischief if it had not been for the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is the first case
where the question was very elaborately considered as to the extent of this
power given to the Congress of the United States. There was a case before
that, but it was disposed of very shortly,155 but here it became necessary for
the Supreme Court of the United States to go to the very foundation of the
subject.
Now, in that certain propositions were laid down. I will read from the
head-note. “The power to regulate commerce includes the power to

151

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Edward Everett, Biographical Memoir of the Public Life of Daniel Webster, in 1
THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER lii–liii, lxxvi (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1853).
153 Harlan refers here to Thomas Jackson Oakley (1783–1857) and Thomas Addis
Emmet (1764–1827). See id. at lii–liii; see also Oakley, Thomas Jackson, BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY
OF
THE
U.S.
CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=O000003 (last visited June 20,
2013);
Thomas
Addis
Emmet,
BRITANNICA
ACADEMIC
EDITION,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/185952/Thomas-Addis-Emmet (last visited
June 20, 2013).
154 Thomas Emmet was the elder brother of Robert Emmet, who was executed for
leading the Irish Rebellion of 1803. L.B. Proctor, Robert Emmet, The Lawyer, Patriot and
Martyr, 1 LAW. SCRAP BOOK 33, 34, 40–41 (1909).
155 See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 176 (1819).
152
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regulate navigation, and does not stop at the external boundary of a state,
therefore vessels engaged in commerce between the states may be required
to have on board of them engineers licensed by the government of the
United States.”156
Now, the laws of the State of New York granted to Livingston and
Fulton the exclusive right to navigate all the waters within the jurisdiction
of that state with boats moved by steam or fire, for a term of years. Now,
the Supreme Court held that those laws were inoperative as against the
laws of the United States regulating the coasting trade, and could not
restrain vessels carrying on the coasting trade under the laws of the United
States from navigating those waters in the prosecution of their trade. What
would have been the condition of things if the State of New York had had
the power to say that only two men or their licensees should navigate the
navigable waters of the United States within the State of New York?
Now, luckily for this country, a navigable water is a water of the
United States, although it may be exclusively within the state. A navigable
water of the United States is one over which vessels may travel, although it
may be entirely within the state. A vessel starting from Philadelphia and
passing around the coast of New Jersey, when it gets to the mouth of the
Hudson, may want to go to Albany, New York. Now, what would have
been our condition if the State of New York could have stopped the vessel
at the mouth of the river, saying we have given the exclusive right to
Livingston and Fulton?
No state in this union which borders on the great Mississippi can
interfere with the navigation of the waters of that river, and any boat on the
Mississippi River that wants to go up the Ohio River has the right to go up
the Ohio, and no state on its borders can stop it, and any boat that is up the
Ohio River that wants to go up the Kentucky River can go up as far as it
chooses, and the State of Kentucky cannot stop it.
Now, while this is true, there are certain things that the state may do
that the United States will not interfere with, or rather that cannot be
interfered with, unless the United States steps in. I take for granted that
many of you have been to the City of Chicago. If you have not, every
citizen of the City of Chicago will be surprised that you have lived this
long without seeing it. That city is on Lake Michigan, but it is also on
Chicago River. On both sides of Chicago River, which fifty years ago was
a very modest unpretending stream, but the enterprise of that great people
has made it a highway of commerce—that river has been dredged so that
156

It is unclear what “head-note” Harlan is reading from here.
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thousands upon thousands of vessels come from Lake Michigan into the
Chicago River, and they will go up a mile and a half or three, perhaps five
miles, to the very heart of that marvelous city. Each side of that little river,
that is narrow enough to enable you to stand on one bank and talk to
somebody on the other side of it without difficulty, are great warehouses all
along.
Well, there are bridges over that river for vehicles and for persons,
without which bridges communication between North and South Chicago
would be very inconvenient and very difficult. Well, a number of years
ago the City Council of Chicago passed an ordinance, saying that the
bridges across that river should not be opened between six and seven
o’clock in the morning—I believe those were the hours—and between six
and seven in the evening. I take those hours for samples. They were
drawbridges.
Well, the steamboat interests said, that is an interference with
commerce; that is an interference with commerce among the states and we
deny the power to the City of Chicago to do that, although it is backed by
the authority of the State of Illinois, and the question came into the courts.
The case at its first hearing came before me, and I decided it, sitting in that
circuit, and the decision was afterward affirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United States.157
In that decision, I held that that river being entirely in the boundary of
the State of Illinois was primarily subject to the control of the State of
Illinois; that commerce across that river was a commerce which Congress
could regulate insofar as it affected the commerce there, but until Congress
acted, it belonged to the State of Illinois to say how that commerce across
that river should be regulated, but if Congress chooses to interfere it might
control.
And so in another case in reference to the Illinois River, which is
entirely within the State of Illinois, up which boats were accustomed to go,
starting from the City of St. Louis.158 The State of Illinois came to the
conclusion that the river might be improved and it made provision for its
being locked and dammed so as to throw the water further up into the state
to include boats of certain dimensions to go further up into the state, and
they charged rates of toll for passing through those locks. Some said this is

157 Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 12 F. 777 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1882) (Harlan, J.), aff’d sub nom. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1883).
158 Huse v. Glover, 15 F. 292 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883) (Harlan, J.), aff’d, 119 U.S. 543
(1886).
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an interference with the state commerce. We live in St. Louis; our boats
start from there; we have a right to go up there. And therefore this is an
obstruction. Now, the court said below, and the Supreme Court agreed
with it, that while it was perfectly true Congress could control that matter,
it had not done so, and until it did so, it belonged to the state to control that
matter.
In line with that is another class of cases that affected interstate
commerce, a principle that it is not everything that affects interstate
commerce that is beyond the power of the state. There are many things that
the state may do that affect interstate commerce that are good until upset by
Congress. Two terms ago, probably last term, there came before our court
the question as to the validity of the statute of the State of Georgia called
the Sunday Law.159 Georgia passed a statute which prohibited the running
of freight trains within that state between eight o’clock on Sunday morning
and eight o’clock Sunday night, and the statute was so framed that it
applied to interstate trains as well as domestic trains. An exception was
made in the statute in favor of the right of a train that should come into the
state before eight o’clock.
Well, the men that wanted to get their freight trains through that state
said that this was an interference with interstate commerce; that the power
to regulate interstate commerce belonged to the national government and
the state could not stop it. But the Supreme Court said that there remained
with the state what are called its police powers. They had not surrendered
those powers, and whatever tended toward public health, or public morals,
or public safety, was a thing that the state might accomplish, and if there
was in doing that something that affected more or less interstate commerce,
the remedy was not with the courts but with Congress. And therefore we
held that until the Congress acted, the legislature of Georgia had the right
to say to the men within the state and outside of the state that we want a
quiet, peaceable Sabbath here; we have a right to that; it is our own state;
we are regulating the affairs of this state in that regard, and you, because
you are starting from another state, or come in from another state, when
you come into this state must be subject to the police powers of the state,
and we held that that view was a sound one and could be maintained until
the Congress of the United States by some statute took that whole subject
in its hands and assumed to remedy it in some way that would apply to the
whole people of the United States.

159

Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896) (Harlan, J.).
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LECTURE 11: JANUARY 8, 1898
It has been some time since we were together on the consideration of
the Constitution. If I remember rightly, our last talk, or the latter part of it,
was upon the subject of commerce. I do not believe that I had gotten
beyond that. Exactly how much of the subject I covered I do not
remember, as I talk to you without notes, and if I should, in what I am
going to say, cover somewhat the same ground, why it will not hurt you to
hear it again.
There are some cases which I am sure I have not called to your
attention, which I wish to call to your attention. I believe I have stated to
you that the necessity of commerce among the states and foreign nations
was one of the principal causes for the establishment of the government of
the United States. The restrictions which the states were imposing on
commerce among the states were of such a serious character as to destroy
unity of feeling, that sort of feeling that ought to exist between people of
the same country living under the same government. Each state was then
regulating commerce for itself, and in the regulation each state would take
care of itself.
Now, we are all very much puffed up often with what we call “state
pride.” You will find a man from a particular state, and he is quite certain
that there is no such state on the Earth as his; no such people as the people
among whom he was reared; no such civilization as is to be found there,
and every other man is a little annoyed to hear a fellow talk that way about
his own state, but if you will follow the other man a little while and bring
up the subject of his state, you will find that he thinks about as much of his
state as the first man did about his. We are apt to think that our states
would not do some things that some other states would; we are quite sure
they would not, but one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that there is
not a state in this union which would not, if it had the power, support its
government from top to bottom by levying tribute or taxes upon the
commerce among the states; they have all tried to do it.
Miserable politicians in the state legislature won’t levy the requisite
amount of taxation in order to support that state government. They will
proceed upon the idea that if we put too much taxes upon our people, they
will beat me at the next election, and I must take care that I do not go upon
record levying taxes upon this, that, and the other thing, and I must take
particular care that I do not increase the taxes, that would beat me if
nothing else would. So he sets about by schemes by which his state can get
money from other people than his own constituents, and therefore he is
ready to raise a tax upon commerce.
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Now, it is not true of the new states, they have not had time to try their
hand, but all the old ones, nearly every one, have passed laws which have
had to be upset by the Supreme Court of the United States itself, or some
court of the state, upon the ground that the state was taxing something that
it ought not to tax. For instance, the good old State of New Jersey passed a
statute which made the railroads in that state pay a certain amount for every
passenger they carried to go into the treasury of the State of New Jersey.
Well, New Jersey thought that was all right; you are going through my state
here and we allow you, Mr. Railroad, to lay your track here on our land,
and we are protecting you and protecting your passengers while here with
our laws, why should you not pay a given tax upon every passenger that
you carry?
Well, the Court said, if you levy a tax of that sort that is in effect a tax
upon the passenger, because the railroads have only got to resort to an easy
device of adding that to the fare of the passenger and the passenger pays it,
and the result would be that if a man starts from Philadelphia to go to New
York, he in effect would pay a tax for the privilege of passing through New
Jersey. Now, commerce embraces not simply navigation but intercourse
between one state and another state or a foreign nation, and as no state can
burden interstate commerce, so no state could levy a tax of that sort under
the guise of putting a tax upon the railroads, when the practical operation
was to tax the passengers, and you were taxing that railroad for the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.160
Well, that is what the railroad running from Philadelphia to New York
does; it engages in interstate commerce, and the State of New Jersey has no
right to make the railroad pay for engaging in interstate commerce. And so
the good old State of Pennsylvania. She wanted to raise some money to
carry on her government out of something other than mere domestic
commerce, and so she would put a tax upon the gross receipts of
corporations whose whole business was exclusively in interstate commerce,
and so I could go the rounds and give you illustrations of many attempts of
that sort.161
The old Commonwealth of Virginia, in the interest of local butchers,
passed a law that would require a certain system of inspection in respect to
all meat brought into the state, and the statute was so framed as that men
who prepared meat outside of the state to be put into interstate commerce
160 See Erie Ry. Co. v. State, 31 N.J.L. 531, 535 (1864) (finding that levying a tax on
the owner of the transported goods has the same practical effect of levying a direct tax on
the goods themselves).
161 See Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 277–78 (1873).
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and sent to the markets of other states could not do it. The whole object of
the Virginia statute was to build up the Virginia butchers, and give them a
monopoly of furnishing meat in the State of Virginia.162
And so, Minnesota passed a statute having somewhat the same object
so as to prevent the meat men from Illinois from sending the product of
their industry into the State of Minnesota. It was done under the guise of a
statute for the public health of Minnesota, but the courts were not to be
fooled by mere words, and we said in that case, as we said in others, that
while the state may take care of the public health and public morals and
public safety, that may be the form, the mere form of a legislative
declaration, but the courts would look through the substance of things.163
Now, what is the power to regulate? It is the power to prescribe the
rule by which that commerce is to be conducted. Now, you must bear in
mind that it is not everything that a state may do which affects interstate
commerce that is beyond the power of the state. The state may go to a
certain limit, and until Congress acts that is good. There is a certain control
which each state has over the domestic order within its limits. This state
may take care of the public health and the public safety.
Therefore, the State of Alabama was maintained, sustained in its right
to pass a statute which prohibited any man from running a locomotive in
that state that had not been examined, and licensed, and commissioned as a
person having the requisite skill to run a locomotive, or any man from
running a locomotive or conductor, and particularly an engineer, who had
not been examined for color blindness, and that was held to be applicable
to interstate, as well as local trains, until Congress acted.164
In other words, as to every contrivance within that state, the
management of which had relation to the public safety, that could be
controlled by the State of Alabama, within the limits that were reasonably
necessary to protect the public safety, and if Congress had not acted upon
the subject, it was held that the state law was applicable for the purposes
indicated by it, not that Congress might not legislate upon the subject. Of
course it could. Congress could take charge of the question of competency
of the men that are controlling interstate trains, and could regulate it, and
could provide for the examination of those people.
Now, as to the power of the state to legislate, as long as Congress does
not act upon the case is furnished in the case of Gilman against the City of

162
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Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 82 (1891) (Harlan, J.).
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 317–19 (1890) (Harlan, J.).
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 96 (1888).
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Philadelphia, 2d Wallace, 743.165 It is worth your while to study this great
case, and when you master it, you have gotten about as far as if you were
reading a textbook.
Now, what was that case? I believe the river on which Philadelphia is
situated is the Delaware, and the Schuylkill also. Well, up one or the other
of those rivers commerce had gone for a long while. Boats came in from
the ocean and went up and down that river and went to the upper part of the
City of Philadelphia. Well, a bridge was finally constructed, by the
authority of the State of Pennsylvania, over the river Schuylkill, and
steamboat men and the men owning ships said, “This is obstructing the
navigable waters of the United States. We have been going up this river for
years. Now, if this bridge is maintained there, we cannot get our vessels up
there to the points to which we have been in the habit of going, and
therefore this is an obstruction to interstate commerce.”
Well, the Court said that was true as far as it went. It was not the
whole truth, however. That there was some other commerce, not only the
commerce up and down that river, there was also commerce across that
river, over lines of railroad, and the commerce over that river was not
entitled to any preference over the commerce up and down the river, and it
was for the state in the first instance, and until Congress had acted in the
matter, to determine how that matter was to be accommodated, and the
construction of these bridges across the river at Philadelphia was an
accommodation to the commerce across the river, and as that river was
wholly within the State of Pennsylvania, it was not, in a constitutional
sense, a violation of interstate commerce for the state to regulate that,
conceding all the while that it was within the competency of Congress, if it
chose, to take care of the subject, to cover the whole field of legislation.
That is one of the great problems in the future of this country. Will it
become necessary for the government of the United States, through
Congress, to take charge of commerce altogether—the states along all the
navigable waters of the United States, and along all the railroads that
connect one state to another—and pass uniform regulations equitable to
every part of the country?
Well now, another illustration of the power of the state is found in the
case of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad against the State
of New York, 165 U.S. 628.166 It is quite a recent case. There you will
find cited previous cases. This railroad extends from the City of New
165
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Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 732 (1865).
N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1897) (Harlan, J.).
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York, I believe to the City of Boston, certainly to the City of New Haven.
The travel over it commences in one state and goes into another state.
Freight is transported from one of those states to the other. It is in every
sense, therefore, a line of interstate transportation.
The State of New York came to the conclusion that the old-fashioned
stove that was kept in the passenger car was unsafe for passengers, that in
case of a collision, or in case of the train running off the track and car
turning over, with one of those large stoves in the corner of the car there
was a strong probability that the car would catch fire and people would be
burned up. It had happened more than once. Therefore, the State of New
York passed a statute which prescribed, if I remember the case rightly, the
kind of stove that was to be used, or which prohibited a particular kind of
stove.
Well, the railroad company said to the State of New York, “What have
you to do with this? This road is engaged in interstate commerce. You
have no right to regulate that.” Well, our Court held that it had. That while
Congress could cover the subject by legislation, and when it did enact
legislation that covered the subject and the state legislation could be done
away with, but until Congress acted there was the primary duty of the state
to take care of the safety of the people of the state no matter where they
were. They might be walking along the streets of the Greater New York.
There they are protected in their life and liberty by the State of New York,
and when a man gets off from one of those streets and steps into a railroad
car, he is for fifty or one hundred miles or more in the State of New York.
He has a right, while there, to look for protection from the state for his life,
liberty, and safety. And that railroad was bound to respect him, until
Congress made a regulation to the contrary.
Now, there is another case to which I invite your attention, for it
illustrates a great many. It is the case of the Railroad Company against
Husen, 95 U.S. page 473.167 The State of Texas, as you know, raises a
great many cattle. Texas cattle are known far and wide, and it has
sometimes been said that the importation of Texas cattle of a particular
kind is destructive of the life and safety of the cattle of other states. That
there is a disease among the cattle called Texas cattle disease, and the idea
propagated that it is not safe to admit any Texas cattle into the state, else
they would carry their disease to all other cattle.
Well, there is no difficulty at all in satisfying any Kansas man, or Iowa
man, or Missouri man, who is engaged in the raising of cattle there. He is
167

Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1878).
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particularly satisfied, not any doubt about it at all, that it is not safe to let
Texas cattle come into that state, it is endangering everything. So, the
politicians at the demand of those people would pass statutes under the
guise of protecting the property of that state, but the real purpose and object
of which was to keep Texas cattle out of those states entirely so that the
market could be monopolized by the home cattle. That is a very
convenient sort of arrangement for states that want it, but it is not very
comfortable for the farmers of Texas who raise cattle.
Well now, that case brings to your attention the statute of the State of
Missouri, passed previously for the purpose of protecting the people of that
state against the Texas cattle disease. But the Court looked underneath the
act, and through it at the practical operation of its provisions, and saw that
it was not framed with a view merely to the protection of the people of that
state against the introduction of diseases that might be brought there by
Texas cattle; that no such distinction was made between good and bad
Texas cattle as might have been made, and the law was upset because it
was really a statute that interrupted the introduction into those states of the
products of the other states.
Now, if there is one thing settled by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, it is that while the states have the undoubted
right to protect their people and their locality against disease, pauperism,
and crime by any regulations that are reasonable in their character adopted
to that end, the state may not, under the guise of executing its police
powers, put an embargo upon the trade of this country from state to state.
If a man owns a horse, or a drove of horses, here, and wants to send them
west to the State of Illinois to be sold, or south to the State of Georgia, now
this Constitution says to him, you may take them there. You may drive
them, if you choose, along the public highways from here through
Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, etc., until you get to the State of Georgia.
When you reach the State of Tennessee, Tennessee with all its power
cannot say, stop here at the border, unless the horse is really a diseased
animal, and his going into the state puts some of its people in peril. The
Constitution does not prevent any state from guarding itself as against the
spread of disease.
It is a far different thing from stopping trade between that state and
another state, and so the Constitution says that you may carry that horse
from here to the City of San Francisco, and no state can step between you
and the exercise of that right by any regulation that is really not in
execution of its police powers. Now, it is not too much to say, that there
are two or three hundred cases perhaps in the Supreme Court of the United
States since the formation of the government, arising under that commerce
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clause of the Constitution. There is not a term of the Supreme Court of the
United States that there is not half a dozen or more cases, new in their facts
and circumstances, calling for the expression of opinion whether a
particular thing which is being done under the sanction of the state is
inconsistent with the power given to Congress to regulate the commerce
between states, and I suppose we will never have an end of those questions.
I must stop here on that subject, referring you to the cases which you
have already upon your minutes, and I shall hold myself ready at any time
if any thought occurs to you in reading those cases to try to explain them so
that you may see the full scope and effect of that clause of the Constitution.
There is no clause, next to the taxing power, so important to the unity and
strength of the country as that commerce clause. We are to take care in
enforcing it that we do not entrench upon the just local power that belongs
to the states. If, at any time, any act which the state has passed under its
police powers comes in contact with the state law, why of course, the state
law must give way.
Our relations with the Indians in this country are of a peculiar
character. Here is the power given to Congress to regulate commerce with
the Indian tribes. The Indian tribes are a peculiar people, and our relations
with them are peculiar. We sometimes have made treaties with the Indians,
but our making treaties with them does not stand exactly upon the footing
of our treaties with foreign nations. We have been in the habit, since the
foundation of the government, of making treaties with the Indians, and then
when we wanted another treaty, compelled them to make another. If we
want a treaty modified, why the chiefs are brought here, and broadcloth
clothes put on them, and they are shown all the sights around Washington,
and we get out of them such a treaty as we want. They are the wards of the
nation, not citizens of the United States.168 They are dependent upon us.
They are mere wards, but the men who framed the Constitution knew what
infinite trouble there would be if the subject of our relations with the
Indians were not put in Congress, but left with the states.
Therefore, the Congress of the United States may say exactly what
may go to the Indians, and what may not. Congress may say that no
spirituous liquors may be carried into the Indian nations.169 Congress may
prescribe the rule by which you are to be governed in your trading with
them. Congress may say, you shall not trade with this tribe at all, or if you
do trade with it, it shall be under certain circumstances, and it was
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Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110 (1884) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 188 (1876).
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necessary to put it there because no state had exclusive interests or control
over the Indians.170 They were scattered throughout the country, and it
would never have done at all, as bad as has been the conduct of the United
States towards that dying race, to have left it to the states. The states would
have dealt with them in a way that might have shocked humanity, as some
of them did, and although they have been fairly well treated in their general
control by the United States, it is a race that is disappearing, and probably
within the lifetime of some that are now hearing me there will be very few
in this country. In a hundred years, you will probably not find one
anywhere, so that clause of the Constitution about regulating commerce
with the Indian tribes will amount to nothing.
That is not the only race that is disappearing. I may digress this far,
and I only do so for the purpose of indicating the immense reach of this
commerce power after awhile. To my mind, to my apprehension, it is as
certain as fate that in the course of time there will be nobody on this North
American continent but Anglo-Saxons. All other races are steadily going
to the wall. They are diminishing every year, and when this country comes
to have, as it will before a great many years, two or three hundred million
of people, when states that are now sparsely populated become thickly
populated, we will then appreciate, or the country will then appreciate more
than it does now, the immense importance of the common government of
the whole country having power to protect trade between the states and
with foreign nations, beyond the power of any state for its selfish purposes
to harass it.
Now, the next clause of the Constitution: Congress has power “[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”171 It is to be uniform, not one
for one state and another for another state. What do we mean by
naturalization? Why, it is a system, or a mode, by which a man not a
natural born citizen of the United States can become as if he were a natural
born citizen, subject of course to the few restrictions that are imposed upon
people who are not. And under that, laws have been passed providing for
naturalization, and the greatest farce in all the century has been the manner
in which these laws have been in the main enforced.
In these large cities that are the source of most of the dangers that
threaten our American civilization, men are invested with the privilege of
citizenship of the United States under these naturalization laws who have
not the slightest idea about our institutions, who scarcely know our
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Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 540–41 (1832).
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language, whose habits have been formed up and passed manhood in other
lands, under other systems of government, and who never do understand
our civilization as we understand it who were born here, and our own doors
are open practically to all the world, and the jails and penitentiaries of
Europe are being emptied into this country, and large portions of them
lodge in these great cities that are now becoming so large and so corrupt
that they are substantially controlling the public policy of many of the
states, despite what the people out in the country and away from such
scenes may want. If there is any one duty resting upon this country at this
time that is supreme in my opinion, it is the necessity to reorganize that
whole system, and to see to it that American citizenship does not become
as cheap in the future as it has been in the past.
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LECTURE 12: JANUARY 15, 1898
I said to you at our last meeting all that I cared to say on the subject of
naturalization.
We come now to the subject of bankruptcy. Congress shall have
power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States.”172 And that is a subject of far more
consequence than you would suppose, perhaps, at the first reading of the
text of the Constitution.
Before the adoption of the Constitution, several of the states had laws
upon the subject of bankruptcy that were very injurious to citizens of other
states. They discriminated against creditors in other states, and as there
was to be freedom of intercourse in this country among the states, it was
important that on that subject there should be a uniform rule.
One of the objects of the establishment of the government of the
United States by this Constitution was to establish justice. Therefore, the
states, if Congress had no bankruptcy law on the subject, and no power to
pass any, they could in the distribution of the estates of bankrupts do great
injustice to creditors of the bankrupt residing out of that particular state.
Therefore, this power was given to Congress, coupled with the condition
that whatever laws it had on the subject should be uniform; they should be
applicable to every part of the country.
Now, what do we mean by bankrupt law? We have not had many
since the foundation of the government—only three—and they are now
considering in Congress whether we shall have another one.173 Well, a man
has progressed so far in his business that he finds that, in the common
phrase, he has run aground; he owes more than he can pay; he cannot meet
his debts as they mature, and he probably owes more than he will ever be
able to pay.
Now, under a bankrupt law, that man may appear in the proper court
and take the benefit of that law. What do we mean by taking the benefit of
the law?
Why, that law ordinarily provides that when a man thus breaks down
in his business, he can surrender—that is the substance of it—his estate of
every kind, with certain exceptions that are important to enable the man to
live. For instance, if a merchant tradesman went into bankruptcy, he would
be allowed to retain certain things in his household that were absolutely
172
173

Id.
Bankruptcy Act (“Nelson Act”) of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
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essential to keep his family from want. The carpenter would be allowed to
retain his tools; the lawyer would be allowed to retain his law books; the
physician, his medical books; and any other sort of exception that Congress
may choose to make it may make. But with those exceptions, the law
would require him to surrender all he has got, and when he has done that,
and an opportunity given to his creditors to appear and make any complaint
that they may choose, he gets his discharge, his discharge from all debts
that he may owe.
Further along in the Constitution, you will find a provision to the effect
that no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contract. A man
holds my note for $1,500. It is my contract to pay him $1,500. Now, no
state can pass a law under any circumstances that would discharge me from
that obligation against the will of the creditor, but the United States can.
They can, by a general bankrupt law applicable to all the country, provide a
mode by which a man who has not got property to pay his debts, who has
not committed any fraud, who has not hid his property in the name of his
wife with a view to his insolvency, or with his children with a view to his
insolvency, the bankrupt law provides a way by which that man can be
freed from debt, get his discharge, absolute discharge, from all his
contracts. So that if I got such a discharge, and a man who held a $1,500
note against me, why my certificate of discharge wipes that debt out.
Those laws have their foundation in humanity, and in the best welfare
of the state. What interest has the state or the public in keeping a man’s
nose to the grindstone all the while, to express it in a familiar way? Why,
if I have run aground and cannot do any more than I have done, why may I
not be discharged and made free to start in my career of life again?
Now, that is one of the effects of the bankruptcy law. They are
generally passed after the country has passed through a season of distress
and financial embarrassment, and thus under those, all men overwhelmed
with debt, way beyond their expectations, and way beyond every
possibility of ever being worth, if they live to be much older than men live;
the bankrupt law says to those people, now be an honest man, and turn
over, with certain exceptions, all you have got, and you shall be discharged
from your indebtedness.
I believe in England they have a permanent bankrupt law, and it is the
belief of a great many that we ought to have a permanent bankrupt law in
this country, by which a man overwhelmed by financial embarrassment
may get his discharge, and not be compelled to resort to all sorts of devices
to evade creditors. I would suggest to you to take a minute of two cases on
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the subject of bankrupt laws—Sturgis against Crowningshield, 4 Wheaton,
122,174 and Ogden against Sanders, 12 Wallace, 213.175 I would advise you
to read those two cases.
Now, the next clause of the Constitution is one of great importance.
Congress shall have power “[t]o coin Money, regulate the Value thereof,
and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures.”176
What would be the condition of this country if every state in this union had
the power to coin money and fix the value thereof? We would not be much
better off than they are in China and some other Asiatic countries. Money
is connected with everything in this country. Whatever debases our money,
debases our morality. This is the power to coin money.
Now, that clause does not refer to paper money, because we do not
coin paper money. The word “coin” indicates that the word “money” there
refers to the precious metals, gold and silver, and as all values are affected
by what things are worth in money, therefore it is of the most importance
that the power in this country to coin money should rest with one
government, not with forty-odd governments, but with one government.
No state in this union has any power to coin money. Only the United
States can do that, and to regulate the value thereof, and to regulate the
value of foreign coin. We are not to be flooded with the coin of other
countries beyond the power of Congress to regulate the value of it.177
Now, you often hear of the legal tender cases.178 Those cases do not
depend upon that clause of the Constitution. They depend upon other
clauses. This is the power to coin what we understand as money, that is,
gold and silver, and of the United States, the power to fix the value of it.
Now, passing from that to the next clause, Congress shall have power
“[t]o provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and
current Coin of the United States.”179 Whoever assumes to put out a silver
dollar or a gold dollar that has not been coined by the United States, but
coined by themselves, is very apt to get into trouble. No man has the right
to counterfeit the current coin of the United States. It is a penitentiary
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offense. It is not simply the coin, it is the security.180
Therefore, no man may counterfeit a bond of the United States, a
certificate that may be issued by the Treasury of the United States to
circulate as money. Counterfeiting of that is an offense against the United
States, and may be punished by the United States, and is punished by the
United States.
You will find, in the revised statutes, the punishments for
counterfeiting the coin of the United States. It would be of very little value
for the United States to coin money, if it had not the power to punish the
counterfeiting of the coin, and this is a very tender spot with everybody in
the country - counterfeiting. But the people are liable to be deceived by
receiving counterfeit coin of the United States. It affects all their business.
And hence a man who is before a jury anywhere in this country upon a
charge of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, the security of the
United States, had better look out, for the ordinary jury will be more certain
to punish a man for counterfeiting the coin of the United States than for
killing a man, for there are two things that the American jury won’t stand,
that is, stealing horses and counterfeiting the coin.
And Congress shall have power “[t]o establish Post Offices and post
Roads.”181 Is that all? What would it amount to establish a post office, if
you could not protect it? A man goes down here and breaks into a post
office of the United States and steals something from it, takes letters from
it. Where is the authority of the United States to punish that man for that
act? Here is the power, simply to establish post offices and post roads.
Therefore, Congress may establish a post office in the City of
Washington—where does Congress get the power to punish a man for
breaking into that post office?
It comes from the clause a little farther on—the Congress shall have
power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”182 What would the power
be worth for establishing post offices and post roads unless Congress could
also pass laws to protect those post offices and their contents, and the post
roads?
What may Congress do under that? It has by statute declared all the
railroads in the United States running from one state to another post

180
181
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See 18 U.S.C. §§ 470–514 (2006).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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roads.183 Is that all that it may do? Might not the United States build post
roads? Might not United States build itself a post road to extend from the
Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean? While it has never done so, some people
think it should do so; that it ought to own its post roads itself.184
Has Congress the power to connect the post office system with a
telegraph system? Has Congress the power to establish a telegraph line and
connect every city and every town in the country with every other city and
town in the country? Well, why not? Why may not the government of the
United States make a part of its postal system communication from one
part of the country to the other by telegraph?
If Congress can provide for the carrying of the mails from the City of
New York to the City of San Francisco, why may it not make provision for
the communication of people of New York with people of San Francisco
by telegraph? A man now has to pay a good round sum to telegraph fifty
words from here to the City of San Francisco. Why may not Congress have
a system of its own on that subject by which a man may communicate fifty
words from here to San Francisco for twenty-five cents, as well as provide
facilities for communicating between these points by mail, or car, or some
other mode?
The time will come—it is not far off—when that will be considered
more seriously than it has been, and when the government may adopt
facilities for telegraphing and telephoning from one place to another. Why
not? You can talk with a man from here to Chicago by telephone. I have
done it. I have recognized the voice at the other end of the line just as
distinctly as you recognize my voice now, but it is very expensive, but it
may ultimately be concluded by the United States that it will open and
extend these facilities of communication from one part of the country to the
other. It is a question of policy more than of power.
Some men say that we have got offices enough now. If you establish
telegraphic communication as a part of the postal system, and telephonic
communications, you will have many more thousands of office holders
than you have got now, and it will be a little difficult to manage, and a little
dangerous to the people to have that vast power under the control of one
man who may be in the White House, who may want to be President not
only once but two or three or four times. That is the argument that is made

183 See, e.g., Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283; Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 146,
10 Stat. 225; Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 172, 5 Stat. 271.
184 The United States eventually exercised this authority in the Federal Aid Road Act
of 1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat. 355, and many later Federal-Aid Highway Acts.
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against the policy.
Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”185 Under
that they pass the patent laws, by which men get an exclusive right for a
limited period for their invention, for their authorship, for their discoveries.
Well, that has been of vast benefit in many ways to the country. What
is the meaning of that? It is to stimulate the faculty of invention. There are
some men that will work and work, day and night, from the very love of
science and the useful arts, for the love of fame that might attend it, but that
is not quite enough. These gentlemen who framed the Constitution thought
it wise and beneficial to stimulate it with a desire to make a fortune.
But it is not every invention so-called that may be patented. It is that
which is useful. It is to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.
A man may make an application for a patent for a particular invention.
Well, it is new to him, entirely new to him, he is certain that he is the first
inventor, but it turns out that some other man across the waters invented
that a year before, or made an invention that involves the same principle.
He is not the first inventor and he is not entitled to a patent. Sometimes it
is very interesting how near these people come to each other. The human
mind is groping off in the darkness, and a man here and a man there, and
one somewhere else is struggling for the same thing, and the history of
invention shows that one man has come out two or three weeks ahead of
the other.
Now, why do we give him the exclusive right in these writings and
discoveries? Well, as I said, it is to stimulate invention and to reward him.
He is given the exclusive right for a given time, for limited time, not for all
time. Congress could not give a man a right for all time, an exclusive right.
The Congress says to the man who has made a useful invention, good in the
arts and sciences, and that will contribute to the welfare and comfort of the
people, I will give you the exclusive right to use this for a certain number
of years, on condition that when that time expires, unless it is extended by
the government, that invention shall belong to the people.
There is a man continually applying to me through the post office, that
he is the inventor of a particular filter. I am not using his; I am using
somebody’s else. He says that his patent gives him the exclusive right for a
given period. Well, when two men are contesting for the priority of
invention, they come to the court and the court must decide; first, is this a
185
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useful invention? Is it an invention at all? Is it anything more than
mechanical skill? If it is an invention, and is useful, they will find out who
the first inventor is, and they will award it to him.
Some think when they get a patent from the United States, that they
have a right to do anything they choose and plead the authority of the
United States. Well, a man got an invention for some sort of oil for
lighting purposes, and he established his agencies in the State of Kentucky,
but the State of Kentucky had a statute to the effect that all sellers of oil in
that state should submit them to inspection by the proper person, and that
oils of a particular kind, unless they were of a particular kind, should not be
sold in that state, and that was upon the ground that any other sort of oil
was dangerous to the safety of property.
Well, this man says, “I don’t care what the State of Kentucky has to
say. The United States has patented this oil. They have given me the
exclusive right to this, and I may sell it everywhere.” Not so, said the
Supreme Court of the United States. It is merely that nobody shall make
that oil except upon your license. You have the exclusive right to use it,
but when you take it into a particular state, you are subject to the laws of
that state, and the state may say it is not reasonable that it should be used,
and if it is a reasonable law, it is bound to be respected.186
Congress shall have power “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court.”187 What sort of tribunals? How many? Well, that was
left to the discretion of Congress.
It would not have been wise for the men who framed this Constitution
to have limited the discretion of Congress in that particular. They would
not have been wise to have said that Congress shall establish tribunals upon
particular subjects only. They had far-knowledge enough, if I may so
describe it, to see into the future, and say that this country has only three or
four millions of people when we adopt this Constitution. It may have many
more millions of people. Washington, the wisest man of his day, saw
before anybody else saw the vast possibilities of the West, and the West
then included what now constitutes Michigan, Kentucky, and Ohio, and all
the country between there and the Mississippi River. We did not even own
the country beyond that, and therefore this was wisely left to the discretion
of Congress.
What tribunals has Congress established? Why, the Court of Claims is
established in virtue of that authority, a tribunal with limited jurisdiction to
186
187
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hear and determine certain classes of cases against the United States, and
under that section it establishes commissions sometimes.188 They will
establish a commission to hear certain claims.189 It is any sort of a tribunal.
It is not simply judicial tribunals, but tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court.
Congress shall have power “[t]o define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations.”190 Well, you may ask, what has Congress got to do with the high
seas? The territorial jurisdiction of the United States extends three miles
outside of the shores of the United States.191 What business has Congress
to punish piracies committed on the high seas? If you say it of the United
States you could say it of other nations. You might say, what business has
England to punish it out of the jurisdiction of England?
If every country had not the power to punish piracies, pirates would
cover the seas everywhere, and would destroy commerce. A pirate is an
enemy of the human race, and by the law of nations, by which I mean the
law that is common to all the nations of the Earth, any nation has the right
to punish piracies committed on the high seas, and felonies, not every
felony, it does not mean that, but it does include these cases. A vessel
registered in the United States, flying the United States flag, travelling
188

In 1855, Congress created the Court of Claims, which had jurisdiction over
monetary claims against the United States. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. In
1865, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Claims was created under Article I, rather
than Article III. See Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561, 561 (1865). In 1953,
Congress declared that the Court of Claims was created under Article III. Act of July 28,
1953, ch. 253, 67 Stat. 226. In 1982, Congress abolished the Court of Claims, transferred
most of its jurisdiction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and
created the United States Claims Court. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. In 1992, the United States Claims Court was renamed the United
States Court of Federal Claims. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516.
189 For example, in 1871, Congress created the Southern Claims Commission to
compensate pro-Union southerners for property confiscated by the United States Army. Act
of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 116, 16 Stat. 521, 524.
190 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
191 From the 18th century until the mid-20th century, most nations claimed territorial
waters extending three miles from their shores. See Territorial Waters, BRITANNICA
ACADEMIC EDITION, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/588351/territorial-waters
(last visited May 27, 2013). In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
defined the territorial waters of a nation as a belt of coastal waters extending at most twelve
nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal state. The United States still has not ratified
this treaty. Robin R. Churchill, Law of the Sea, BRITANNICA ACADEMIC EDITION,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/530433/Law-of-the-Sea (last visited May 27,
2013).
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between the City of New York and Liverpool, is, for the purposes of the
punishment of felonies upon the high seas, part of the territory of the
United States, and a murder committed on one of those vessels running
from New York to Liverpool is punishable in the court of the United States,
particularly if it be of an American.192
Not a great while ago—two or three years only—a small schooner left
the City of New York, going down to the southern seas somewhere, and
when far out in the ocean—only about six or seven people on board,
outside of the mere deckhands—the lives of three persons were taken in a
very mysterious manner. The vessel, by order of those that survived, was
taken to Halifax, and there certain persons on that boat were arrested and
brought to the City of Boston and tried for murder. One Bram was tried in
the federal court at Boston for having committed on the high seas a murder
on a vessel registered in the United States, and therefore subject to the
criminal jurisdiction of the United States.193
Some people often say there are too many delays in the administration
of the criminal laws, and the courts do often reverse judgments in criminal
cases. It makes it, they say, impossible to enforce the criminal law. Well,
that belongs to the same class as the complaint very often heard from men
who never read the Constitution and never read anything else much, but
who are quite content to have a mode of proceeding that would be quick
and sharp; end the matter; put this fellow out of the way; if he wasn’t guilty
he would not be charged; must not have these delays; let some man decide
and end it; if he has to be hung, let him be hung, and get over it quick.
That is the feeling of some. That is not the idea of this Constitution. It
is not the idea of the law. The scripture says, I believe, or somebody says,
better that ninety-nine guilty men escape than that one innocent man should
suffer, and therefore the law is merciful.194 The law is just, but it is
merciful. The law is tender in taking a human life, and therefore the law
properly administered never loses sight of these guarantees of life. Such,
for instance, as the clause in the amendments to the Constitution which
says, that no man shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. No
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Harlan is probably referring to Queen v. Lewis, (1857) 169 Eng. Rep. 968 (Crim.
App.). See also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); St. Clair v. United States, 154
U.S. 134 (1894).
193 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 532 (1897).
194 Harlan is probably referring to Blackstone’s assertion, “better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 (16th ed., A. Strahan, London 1825); cf. Alexander Volokh,
n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997).
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man shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. The accused shall be entitled to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed.
If there are delays in criminal cases, it is the delay caused by stupid
jurors, and not by the law; it is the delays caused by inefficient men,
charged with the administration of the law, who do not do their duty, and
therefore up to this time, speaking generally now of all of the state courts as
well as the federal courts, there is a purpose not to take life, not to take
liberty, not to take a man’s property, except in accordance with law, and in
accordance with the fundamental principle which, if we once depart from,
our liberties are gone, and therefore the complaint is too often made about
delays in the enforcement of the criminal law, and the delay comes not
from the law but from those who are charged with the administration of
it.195
Congress shall have power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”196
Congress shall have power to declare war. Nobody else in this country can
declare war but Congress, but that cannot be said of most of the countries
of the Earth. The government of England, with all the freedom that its
people enjoy, might have war on its hands by the act only of the Queen, or
speaking more literally by the act of the cabinet. Germany has more
recently occupied part of the territory of China.197 Russia, it has been said,
is going to occupy, for the time for winter purposes, Fort Arthur in
China.198
Well, Great Britain, suppose, comes to the conclusion that it is
dangerous to the policy of her plans, getting too near to her possessions in
India, and Lord Salisbury would say to the German government, “You
195 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 545 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“‘And
however convenient these may appear at first, (as doubtless all arbitrary powers, well
executed, are the most convenient,) yet let it be again remembered that delays and little
inconveniences in the forms of justice are the price that all free nations must pay for their
liberty in more substantial matters.’” (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 194, at 344)).
196 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
197 In 1897, Germany forced China to provide it a ninety-nine-year lease of Kiaochow.
See Guido Enderis, Germany Weighing Move to Get Back Colonies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
1937, at E5. China canceled the lease in 1914. See id. (noting that Germany’s lease of
Kiaochow was ended by the occurrence of the First World War).
198 In 1897, Russia forced China to provide it a ninety-nine-year lease of Port Arthur.
Wen-Sze King, The Lease Conventions Between China and the Foreign Powers, 1 CHINESE
SOC. & POL. SCI. REV. 24, 33 (1916). In 1905, Russia surrendered Port Arthur to Japan. Id.
at 34.
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must get out of there,” and to the Russian government, “You must not
occupy Fort Arthur.” And those countries refuse. And then, speaking for
the Queen, he could say, “We will fire on you,” and they could do it. How
far they could carry on that war would depend upon the House of
Commons to appropriate money. But when they did fire, it would be war
between England and Germany, and England and Russia, without
consulting Parliament.
But in this country there cannot be any war except by act of Congress
of the United States. Of course, if this country were attacked, it would
belong to the President of the United States to defend it, but a state of war
would not exist except by act of Congress.
Well, some may think that is too slow, but on the other hand, if the
power did not rest with Congress to declare war, but with an ambitious
President, we might often be involved in war that we did not want to have;
put in a position where countless millions of dollars might be expended,
and countless lives sacrificed, because of the notion of some President that
we must have war.
We intended to guard against that in this Constitution, and intended
that if war ever existed, it must be the act of the Congress of the United
States, who would speak more immediately for the people of the United
States, and when that did speak, if the President was with them of the
subject, we could then be sure of the united voice of the people of the
United States. And it was put in there because this country did not start out
with the idea of being a people that wanted to make acquisitions of
territory. We wanted to avoid the possibility of territory being added to the
country except by the consent of the people. We do not want to acquire a
territory in and of itself.
Under that clause, there has been a good deal of discussion recently as
to what the country ought to do with reference to certain matters now
pending not far from us.199 Well, those are questions of policy that I do not
intend to discuss. They will have to take care of themselves, and when the
time comes about, if it does come about, for a war between this country and
any other country about anything affecting us, all that any of us can hope
and desire is that we shall be on the right side, that our cause shall be just,
and if it does come, why I take it for granted that the world will find out, if
it does not know now, what it is possible for this American people to do if
they are brought to war.

199

Harlan refers to arguments that the United States should intervene in the Cuban
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Congress shall have power “[t]o raise and support Armies.”200 How
large an army? Why as large as we may want. There is no limit. We may
call every able-bodied man in the country into the service, and support
them while in the service. We have got a very small army now. You do
not need a very large one in time of peace. But we can expand it to the
extent of the capacity of the country to furnish men, and for what purpose?
Why for every purpose to which this government may be competent. For
purposes in time of war to send the soldiers out of the country into another
country, if need be, but always for the purpose of supporting the integrity
of this country; resist not only an attack upon our nation, but resist any
attack that may be made upon any part of the country. Not simply one
state, but all the country.
“[B]ut no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years.”201 Why that limitation? Andrew Jackson, I believe
it was, who said that “eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.”202 It was
seen from the history of other nations that standing armies, with armed
men, sometime were turned by ambitious aspiring leaders against the
government of the country, and overthrew it and established another
government.
Now, the experience of the men who had read the history of the world
suggested in that form, we will not put it in the power of any President of
the United States to keep and maintain an army that he thinks proper. We
will not make an appropriation of money to support the army. The army
might need, in a sense, to be disciplined. The military are subordinated to
the civil authority.
Now, we will have no army here for which an appropriation shall be
made longer than for two years, because we may come to the conclusion at
the end of that time that this army is too large; it endangers the peace and
the safety of the country. We will cut it down. Whereas we have
appropriated one year for one hundred thousand men, we will reduce it to
fifty thousand men. It was to keep the power in the hands of the
representatives of the people to the civil power from being overturned by
the military. Of course, we have had no danger as yet from that source.

200

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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202 This quotation is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, but does not appear in any of
his works. It is generally attributed to Wendell Phillips, a prominent Abolitionist.
WENDELL PHILLIPS, Speech at the Melodeon, Wednesday Evening, Jan. 28, in SPEECHES
BEFORE THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 3, 13 (Boston, Robert F. Wallcut
1852).
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Now, I call your attention to the next clause, which is: Congress shall
have power “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy.”203 There is no condition
annexed to that, that the appropriation shall not be for a longer term than
two years. Therefore, Congress may make an appropriation for longer than
two years for the purposes of the navy. Why the distinction? Well, I don’t
know, though it occurs to me that possibly because the Navy was outside of
the country and the Army was inside. There might be danger from a large
number of troops inside, but not from the navy outside. Now, the whole
number of men needed to man our navy would not amount to much in the
presence of a population such as we have here.
The power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces.”204 They have rules and regulations peculiar to
themselves. Well, there could be no discipline in the army and navy, if for
every offense committed by the soldier in the army or the sailor in the
navy, if the case had to be tried by the civil courts. Therefore, the rules and
regulations you will find in the revised statutes, which provide for the trial
by court-martial, and those rules are easily understood, and they provide for
a trial of offenses according to those modes, and in that connection “[t]o
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”205
Who constitutes the militia? Why, it is every able-bodied man in the
United States between certain ages.206 Now, Congress may provide for
calling them into service, not perpetually in the service, but for a given
period for emergencies. It is a great power, and a very important one. The
militia of the United States, added to the army of the United States, makes
an enormous force. We hear about the great number of men that the
Emperor of Germany can call into the field on short notice, and the Czar of
Russia can call on short notice, but this country can put into the field in a
short time forces that would equal the combined forces of Germany,
Russia, and France.
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205 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
206 In 1897, the militia consisted of all able-bodied male citizens, aged eighteen to
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LECTURE 13: JANUARY 22, 1898
We had reached the clause of the Constitution declaring that Congress
shall have power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”207
Now, you will see, upon a moment’s reflection, that the very existence
of the union might depend upon the execution of the laws of the union; its
very existence might depend upon the suppression of an insurrection. Of
course, this means an insurrection against the government of the United
States, and so its existence might depend upon the power existing
somewhere to repel invasion. That means an invasion by a foreign power.
You strike out that section of the Constitution, and you destroy the
government of the United States of the power to preserve its existence.
In 1833—I think I state the year correctly—there was trouble in the
State of South Carolina. Some laws had been passed by Congress which
the people of South Carolina did not like, but they were laws of the United
States.208 South Carolina passed counter-legislation, and made it an offense
for anybody in that state to attempt to execute certain acts passed by
Congress.209 South Carolina claimed as its theory, that it had the right to
nullify any act of Congress that it thought repugnant to the Constitution of
that state, and they passed a law saying in substance, that the act of
Congress shall not be enforced in the State of South Carolina; and South
Carolina’s view of the Constitution of the government of the United States
was, that the act of the state legislature of South Carolina was the law of
the people of that state and not the act of Congress.
That was Mr. Calhoun’s view, but there happened to be in the White
House at that time a man by the name of Andrew Jackson, who did not
accept that view of the Constitution. He had taken an oath to support the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and upon him rested the
obligation to execute the laws of the United States, and he said, almost in
words, to Mr. Calhoun and to those who agreed with him, “If you stand in
the way of the execution of these acts of Congress, I will see what power
there is in this government. I warn you.”
He issued a proclamation, a very famous one, to the people of the
207
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United States, but especially addressed to the people of South Carolina,
telling them, “If you resist these acts of Congress, I will employ against
you the whole power of the United States. I will see that those laws are
executed.”210 And they were executed. It is well known that that
gentlemen then in the White House meant business, and he meant what he
said, and that he had the courage of his convictions, and that he was
prepared to test the question whether the United States was stronger than
the State of South Carolina, and Jackson triumphed and the laws were
executed.
And this power was again brought into force in 1861—I refer to this
not to discuss war questions but as a part of the history of the country—
when our brethren in the states south of us started an insurrection. Mr.
Lincoln, under the authority of an act of Congress, called out 75,000
volunteers, and they responded at once, and a great many more than
75,000.211 We have not had occasion to exercise that authority in any
specific case to impel invasion, because we have not been invaded, but if
we were, we find authority in the Constitution of the United States for the
President of the United States to meet the invasion.
Now, nobody doubts at all at this day that these powers are very
essential to the existence of the nation, and their value has been illustrated
in many ways, and several times in the history of the government. We
have got here now in this country about seventy millions of people, and we
have got a great many people in our country that have no idea of law, have
no proper conception of liberty; they think liberty means license to do as
they please; a great many unruly elements. Why is it that we are as quiet as
we are? Why is it that more things are not done in the way of violence
towards disturbing the peace of this country than are done? Why is it that
210

Andrew Jackson, Proclamation to the People of South Carolina (Dec. 10, 1832),
reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS, supra note 31, at 273–83 (“No act of violent opposition to
the laws has yet been committed, but such a state of things is hourly apprehended; and it is
the intent of this instrument to proclaim, not only that the duty imposed on me by the
Constitution, ‘to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ shall be performed to the
extent of the powers already vested in me by law, or of such others as the wisdom of
Congress shall devise and entrust to me for that purpose, but to warn the citizens of South
Carolina, who have been deluded into an opposition to the laws, of the danger they will
incur by obedience to the illegal and disorganizing ordinance of the Convention; to exhort
those who have refused to support it to persevere in their determination to uphold the
Constitution and laws of their country; and to point out to all the perilous situation into
which the good people of that State have been led, and that the course they are urged to
pursue is one of ruin and disgrace to the very State whose rights they affect to support.”).
211 Proclamation No. 80, 12 Stat. 1258 (Apr.15, 1861). Lincoln relied on the Militia
Act of 1792. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264.
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there does not arise in different parts of the country armed opposition to the
laws of the United States when they happen to be distasteful to the people
of a particular locality?
Why, the main reason is that everybody knows that there exists here on
this continent a government strong enough to take care of itself, strong
enough to execute every law of the United States, strong enough to put
down insurrection wherever it may occur, strong enough to keep the peace
of the United States. The power of seventy millions of people with all the
wealth of this wealthy country behind it is a power that does not exist
anywhere on the Earth outside of this country, and those unruly elements
know it, and therefore they are kept quiet, and they are educated in the idea
that if anybody does not like a law that may be passed by Congress they
must wait until the next election; turn the Congress out that passed it; turn
the party out that passed it. If the law infringes the Constitution, infringes
the rights of any individual, go into the courts of the country. There is a
remedy in the courts of the country for every wrong done to person or
property.
Alongside of this, Congress shall have power “[t]o provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress.”212 The government may not only call to its aid the regular
army and navy of the United States, but it may call to its aid the militia of
the United States, and may employ them in the service of the United States
for any purpose germane to the powers that the government of the United
States may possess.
Now, when the militia is called forth—you observe here the clause
“reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress.”213 I think without exception every regiment of volunteers in
the late civil war in the army of the United States was commanded by men
appointed by the governors of the respective states. The regiments were
primarily organized by the states and then turned over to the government of
the United States, mustered into the service of the United States, and
thenceforth under the authority of the United States, and a vacancy
occurring in the Colonel of a regiment was supplied by this governor of the

212
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
Id.
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state from which the regiment came.
Congress shall have power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress,
become the Seat of the Government of the United States.”214 Under that
power we have got the national seat of government here, and the history of
the location of the seat of government here is not without interest. The seat
of government for a time was at Philadelphia, and at the time it was
organized, I believe it was in New York.215 Washington was inaugurated
President of the United States in New York, but the seat of the national
government had not been finally established.
Where should it be at the close of the Revolutionary War? It appeared
that there was a vast debt upon many of the original thirteen states, a debt
contracted by those states in the prosecution of the war, in caring for the
soldiers that they furnished, and providing for them.216 It was a debt that
would not disturb any financier’s sleep more than an hour any night now.
We talk about borrowing two or three millions of dollars. Does not disturb
us at all. Why, we can do that twenty-four hours after we advertise. We
are richer now. Then the debt, looking at it from our present standpoint,
was small. The question arose, what should be done with that debt?
Well, a large number of statesmen in the country said that debt was
incurred in the common defense and general welfare, and the United States
ought to assume it—pay it.217 Some states replied, Virginia among them,
“We bore our expenses in the war; we do not ask the government of the
United States to pay us back anything. We responded to all requisitions
made upon us; we furnished all the men and money called for from us, and
why should not other states do the very same thing for themselves? Why

214

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
From March 4, 1789 to August 12, 1790, Congress met in Federal Hall, New York
City, New York, and from December 6, 1790 to May 14, 1800, it met in Congress Hall,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Nine Capitals of the United States, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_item/Nine_Capitals_of_the_United_States.htm
(last visited May 27, 2013) (citing ROBERT FORTENBAUGH, THE NINE CAPITALS OF THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1948)).
216 During the Revolutionary War, the United States borrowed about $37 million, and
the states borrowed an additional $114 million. MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781–1789, at 379 (1950).
217 Alexander Hamilton advocated the federal assumption of Revolutionary War debts.
1 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on Public Credit, Jan. 9,
1790, in THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1, 21 (New York, Williams & Whiting
1810).
215

152

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

should that debt be saddled upon the whole country?”218
Well, as the discussion extended, great bitterness arose over it. Those
debts at that time were bringing a very small sum in the market. Nobody
ever thought of investing in those claims of the states where they were
seeking for some returns in the way of dividends or interest. Of course,
everybody knew or felt at that time that if the government of the United
States assumed those debts they would go up at once, and therefore it was
said by those who were opposed to the scheme of paying those debts
through the national government, that they were being speculated in by
politicians, and if you look into McMaster’s History of the People of the
United States, you will see that all sorts of charges were made against
parties and statesmen of that day, charging that Senators and
Representatives were speculating in those debts, and owned some of them
at the very time the question was before them whether the United States
should assume them or not.219
There may have been some truth in that—probably a good deal of
exaggeration—but so it happened there were two parties to that
controversy. Mr. Hamilton took the ground—and nobody doubted his
integrity; nobody today doubts his personal integrity—Mr. Hamilton took
the ground that those debts were incurred for the benefit of the whole
country, and the whole country ought to assume them. Mr. Jefferson took
the other view, and he was opposed to the government of the United States
assuming those debts.
The country was beginning to be divided somewhat upon a sectional
line, but Mr. Jefferson and his friends wanted the seat of government south
of the Potomac, or on the Potomac. They did not want it in New York at
one end of the country; they did not want it at Philadelphia; they wanted it
down here, south, around the Potomac.
Now, this is preliminary to saying, that the fact is very well
authenticated that the way in which the seat of government happened to be
established here on the banks of the Potomac was a sort of understanding
between the leaders of the respective sides of this debt question; that if you

218 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the opposition to Hamilton’s assumption
plan.
See
The
Dinner
Table
Bargain,
June
1790,
PBS.ORG,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/hamilton/peopleevents/e_dinner.html (last visited May 27,
2013).
219 1 JOHN BACH MCMASTER, A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 570–71 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1891). In
1789, state securities traded at twenty-five cents on the dollar; Hamilton proposed to pay
face value. 1 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 217, at 11.
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down here on the Potomac want the national government here, will
surrender your opposition to the national government assuming those debts,
we will let you have the seat of government.
I don’t suppose Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Hamilton ever met each other
and came to any understanding in words of that sort, but that some follower
of each talked with each other and reached that conclusion, and that that
was the reason why opposition to the location of the national government
here on the banks of the Potomac ceased.220 I think it pretty well
authenticated, and there was no bribery in it.
It could not be called intrigue and corruption. It very often occurs in
the life of statesmen that when they find they cannot get all they want, they
take what they can get. A statesman may want to accomplish a half a
dozen objects of legislation. He cannot accomplish them all, but he can
accomplish two or three out of the five, and if he gets these, he may keep
his mouth shut about something somebody else wants, and in that way he
makes a little advance in what he wants to secure.
That often occurs in the life of statesmen, without there being any
ground to charge corruption, just as a lawyer might say, or a judge might
say, “Well, I don’t like this doctrine. I don’t like this view of the
Constitution, but it has been settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States; not simply once, but a half a dozen times. Every chance they have
had to pass on that question they have decided one way.” Therefore, the
gentlemen say, “Why the time has come for me to surrender my view on
that subject. I acquiesce and go on and execute the Constitution of the
United States on that theory.”
That is well illustrated in a great many things. Why, go back fifty
years ago—certainly sixty years ago—there were a number of statesmen in
this country whose memories we revere, men of great ability, who utterly
denied the power of the government of the United States to contribute any
money to improve the western rivers.221 There was an absolute want of
220

According to Jefferson, he arranged a dinner with Hamilton and Madison, at which
they formed the Compromise of 1790. See Jacob E. Cooke, The Compromise of 1790, 27
WM. & MARY Q. 523, 523 (1970).
221 Federal public works or “internal improvements” defined many antebellum debates
over the constitutional scope of federal power. See Stephen Minicucci, Internal
Improvements and the Union, 1790–1860, 18 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 160, 160 (2004).
George Washington and Alexander Hamilton of the Federalist Party proposed internal
improvements. See id. at 163. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison of the DemocraticRepublican Party opposed them. See id. at 172. Later, Henry Clay of the Whig Party
advocated internal improvements, and Andrew Jackson of the Democratic Party opposed
them. See id. at 162, 165.
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power, they said, to do it. They fought it, but do you know of any
statesman today that talks that way? Not a one of them. On the contrary,
they are all trying to get appropriations from Congress to improve every
creek in their localities.
The great quarrel between Mr. Clay and Mr. Jackson was about the
United States bank. Jackson denied the power to the government of the
United States to incorporate a national bank, and he had his way for a time,
and the United States bank went down.222 But when the war came of 1861,
when the government of the United States was confronted with an
organized force covering half the territory of this union, and the forces
composed of men of the same blood as those who stood by the government
of the United States, and there was before them the enormous task of
putting down that insurrection and reinstating the authority of the United
States, there was no difficulty in formulating a scheme for national
banks.223
And who today is prepared to stand up in a court of justice anywhere
and deny the constitutionality of a law which organizes the national banks
of the country, whatever they may say about the policy of such a system?
The fact is that many of the views of Mr. Hamilton have been accepted and
incorporated in the policy of the government, many of the views of Mr.
Jefferson have been accepted, and the country today is wiser than the
country was at that time, the statesmen of today are wiser than they were at
that day, although they may not have as great an intellect as the men of that
day.
What is the power of the government of the United States over this
district? Has any state authority to legislate for this district? No, because
the Constitution says, the power of Congress is “exclusive” in legislating
for this district “in all Cases whatsoever.”224 No state has any authority
within this ten miles square, and I am glad they have not. Whatever is the
line around the district constituting the District of Columbia, the important
222

In 1832, Senators Henry Clay and Daniel Webster led Congress to reauthorize the
charter of the Second Bank of the United States, but President Andrew Jackson vetoed the
bill. See Edwin J. Perkins, Lost Opportunities for Compromise in the Bank War: A
Reassessment of Jackson’s Veto Message, 61 BUS. HIST. REV. 531, 533, 538 (1987).
Jackson ran for reelection on an anti-Bank platform, and decisively defeated Clay, who ran
on a pro-Bank platform. See id. at 548. When the Bank’s charter expired in 1836, it
became a private institution and folded in 1841. See id. at 532–33; Bray Hammond, The
Second Bank of the United States, 43 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 80, 85 (1953).
223 See National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99; National Banking Act of
1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665.
224 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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thing is that over that territory no state can exercise any authority whatever.
The power to legislate is exclusive in Congress. I said I was glad it is
so. Why? When a squad of eighty-odd discontented soldiers during the
War of the Revolution appeared around the hall in Philadelphia where the
Congress was sitting, and demanded that certain things be done,
threatening Congress, and the Governor of Pennsylvania was appealed to to
disperse that mob and afford the requisite protection to the Congress, and
he replied in substance that he had not the power, what was the result? The
Congress of the United States that was controlling the great war of the
United States went into the State of New Jersey and met for a time in the
town of Princeton.225
And during the first administration, when an insurrection arose in
Pennsylvania on account of an excise law passed by Congress, and a little
rebellion arose there, and public meetings were held and mobs and strikes
against the officers of the United States, making it uncomfortable for them
to live there if they attempted to enforce that law. Luckily for the country,
Washington was in the presidential chair, and Alexander Hamilton was
Secretary of the Treasury, and Washington saw that if the government of
the United States quailed before that rebellion in western Pennsylvania, he
might as well quit, and he called out the militia of Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and Virginia, warned those people in western Pennsylvania that he had
taken an oath to execute the laws of the United States, and that he was
going to suppress that disorder or the government should perish in the
attempt. And the militia was set in motion—placed under Whitehorse
Harry Lee—and when they got inside of Pennsylvania the rebels
disappeared. They could not be found.226

225 Harlan refers to the Pennsylvania Mutiny of 1783. From 1781 to 1783, the
Congress of the Confederation sat at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. See
VARNUM LANSING COLLINS, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS AT PRINCETON vii (1908). On
June 17, 1783, soldiers in the Continental Army sent Congress a message demanding their
pay, which Congress ignored. See id. at 13. On June 20, about 300 soldiers mobbed
Independence Hall. See id. at 20. A congressional committee led by Alexander Hamilton
asked the Pennsylvania Council to protect Congress from the soldiers, but it refused, so
Congress moved to Princeton, New Jersey. See id. at 25, 29.
226 Harlan refers to the Whiskey Rebellion. In 1791, Congress levied an excise tax on
distilled spirits. See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199. Distillers in Western
Pennsylvania refused to pay the tax. In July 1794, the United States attempted to enforce
the tax and provoked an armed rebellion. See Wythe Holt, The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794:
A Democratic Working-Class Insurrection 10 (Jan. 23, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://colonialseminar.uga.edu/whiskeyrebellion-6.pdf.
President George
Washington sent three commissioners to negotiate with the rebels and called up the militia,
which he placed under the command of Governor Henry Lee of Virginia. See id. at 11. In
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Now, we have got here a district ten miles square in which the national
government has its principal offices, and where no state has the right to
come or to send its forces. Now, let anybody today get up a mob in the city
of Washington and march to the Capitol on the hill and threaten the
Congress of the United States if they do not do this, that, or the other thing,
they will get in trouble.
How long would they stay around the Capitol? They know that the
whole power of this great nation could be employed to suppress it, and no
state—whatever may be the troubles or disaffection in its midst—has the
right to exercise a particle of authority in this district. It belongs to the
whole United States, is the seat of the national government, and that was
the idea of having a particular piece of ground somewhere in the United
States over which the authority of no state extended, over which Congress
alone could exercise exclusive legislation.
The District of Columbia is a municipal corporation, and for this
reason can be sued, and because it is allowed by acts of Congress to be
sued.227 It is a municipal corporation under the authority of the United
States. The City of New York is a municipal corporation, part of the State
of New York. It is organized by the State of New York as a part of the
machinery by which the State of New York conducts its affairs. Instead of
the State of New York attempting to control all the details of the municipal
affairs in the City of New York, it organizes a municipal corporation and
invests it with authority to attend to this, that, or the other thing.228 So, we
have the District of Columbia, but under the authority of the United States.
District Commissioners are appointed by authority of an act of Congress.
The laws in force here are those passed by Congress.
No doubt the thought will occur to you, what may Congress do in this
District? How far may it go? Well, that is an important question. It is
easily answered, however, although I have heard arguments made upon that
subject that a little surprised me at the time. For instance, in the case of
Callan against Wilson, 120 United States, which is a case that went from
this district, where the question was whether certain parties who were

October 1794, the militia marched into western Pennsylvania and the rebellion collapsed.
See id. at 63.
227 See Act of June 16, 1880, ch. 243, 21 Stat. 284 (providing for the settlement of all
outstanding claims against the District of Columbia and conferring jurisdiction on the Court
of Claims to hear the same); Act of Feb. 21, 1871, ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419 (creating a municipal
corporation called “the District of Columbia”).
228 See Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in
Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 370–71 (1985).
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indicted for a conspiracy to injure AB were entitled to trial by jury. It was
argued by learned counsel that they were not entitled to a trial by jury,
unless Congress chose to give it.229 And I put the question to counsel in
argument, and he met it like a conscientious, consistent lawyer—cited
Article V of the amendments to the Constitution, which says, that no
person shall be held to answer to a capital or other infamous crime unless
on indictment of a grand jury. Says I, “Can Congress authorize a man to be
proceeded against for his life in the District of Columbia, except by
indictment of a grand jury?” He said, “Yes.” “Well,” says I, “The same
Amendment says private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. Can Congress provide for the taking of private property
in this District for public use without just compensation?” “Yes,” says he.
“Well,” says I, “What may not Congress do then in the District of
Columbia?” “Well,” says he, “There is very little that it cannot do.” I put
to him the further question, “Can Congress establish an order of people in
the District of Columbia with titles and have an order of nobility here in
this District?” He said, “Yes.” “Because,” said he, “the Constitution says
that Congress shall exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatever over
the District of Columbia.”
Well, our court did not take that view of that provision of the
Constitution, and we held in that case that the exclusive power of
legislation which Congress had over this District was to be exercised with
reference to all of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the rights of
life, liberty, and property, and that the citizens of the District of Columbia
were just as much entitled to the fundamental guarantees of life, liberty,
and property, and to the benefit of all the provisions of the Constitution as
the people in the states, and that the power given to Congress to pass
exclusive legislation over this District meant that that legislation must be
considered with reference to the fundamental provisions of the
Constitution.
“[A]nd to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings.”230 If the United States, with the consent of the state of
Kentucky, purchased a particular piece of property in the city of Louisville
on which to erect a custom house, and the title in fee passed to the United
States, the United States could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over that

229
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Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (Harlan, J.).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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piece of ground, and all that occurred inside of that building.
But mark you, that does not mean that the United States cannot
become the owner of real estate inside of the state, except with the consent
of the legislature of the state. The United States wants ground for a fort on
the Ohio River in the State of Kentucky. The State of Kentucky may not
want it there. The United States may want a piece of ground for the
purposes of erecting a custom house or a post office, and the state may not
want it there. But the United States may proceed to condemn property for
those purposes without reference to the consent of the state. That is well
settled.231 In short, whatever is necessary to the execution of the powers of
the United States, Congress may do without hindrance from any state.
Therein lies the great difference between the government that we now have
and the government we had before this.
And that brings us to the last clause of Section 8, which has been the
battleground of political parties in this country ever since the organization
of the union, and is to some extent today. That is, Congress shall have
power, “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof.”232
Now, it has been said by some learned statesmen that that clause of the
Constitution was not absolutely necessary, because if that had not been
there the courts would have said, the country would have said, that when a
power was granted to Congress, that carried with it the power to do
whatever was necessary to give effect to the grant of that power. In other
words, that when the Constitution gave Congress power to establish post
offices and post roads, and stopped right there, that would have carried
with it, by necessary implication, authority to do all that was necessary to
subserve the purposes for which they were established.233
Now, that may be true. It is not necessary to discuss whether it would
be true or not, though I may say this, that it is very probable that if this
clause that I have just read had not been in the Constitution, from the very
necessity of the case the courts would have considered the Constitution as
231

See Kohl v. United States., 91 U.S. 367, 368, 371 (1875).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
233 See, e.g., 3 STORY, supra note 43, at § 1227 (“It is only declaratory of a truth, which
would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of
establishing the national government, and vesting it with certain powers. What is a power,
but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of
employing the means necessary to its execution?”).
232
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giving the power to pass any laws necessary to carry into effect a given
grant of power. But all doubt upon that subject is removed by this clause,
“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers.”234
Here is power to establish post offices and post roads, and the
authority to pass all laws necessary to carry it into execution, and Congress
may pass laws prescribing what sort of mail matter may be excluded from
the mails of the United States. Congress shall have power to regulate
commerce among the several states. Therefore, it may also pass laws to
give effect to those regulations, that will punish those who obstruct those
regulations that may be passed by Congress.
Out of that clause came the school of strict construction and liberal
construction, and it is very amusing to hear a man say, with intense wisdom
in his countenance, “I am for a strict construction of the Constitution.”
“What do you mean by that?”
“Well,” says he, “I am for so construing the Constitution that Congress
shall not exercise any power that does not belong to it.”
“Well,” you might very well say, “Do you know of anybody favoring
Congress exercising any powers that do not belong to it?”
Well, there he stops. His power of argument is at an end, for he has
never seen just that man.
Well, there is another class of men who believe that Congress can do
anything, that there is nothing that Congress cannot do under the general
welfare clause of the Constitution. Whatever Congress thinks is for the
general welfare, that it may do; therefore, they would have you pass a
general divorce law applicable to all the states, and therefore they would
have you pass a law establishing at the expense of the United States all
sorts of reformatory institutions everywhere from one end of the country to
the other.
Well now, those people are at the other extreme, but we have been
protected in this country by the saving common sense of the American
people. They have taken a path between these two extremes of cranks, and
they have said, “Do not get excited and do not let your judgments run
away, your passions carry your judgments astray; remember that this
government has not all governmental power; it has not all legislative
power; it is not the only government in this country.”
We have got forty-odd other governments here, and this national
government was established for specific objects. They are enumerated in
234
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this Constitution. The purposes to which the government of the United
States is competent are named in the Constitution. The details are not
given there. This Constitution is not a code of practice in statesmanship for
the United States. It is a general enumeration of the power belonging to a
government brought into existence to accomplish certain objects.
Therefore, when the question arose whether an act of Congress is
within the competency of Congress under the rules now established and
acquiesced in, you may inquire, what is the object of this act? Then you
turn to this instrument and see whether there is any object there that will
embrace this object at all. There is not; that is the end of it, that act of
Congress is a nullity. But if there is the object that is embraced there, we
then inquire, is the act necessary and proper?
Very well, what other considerations are you to take into view? Here
is the Congress of the United States, brought into existence to determine
what is necessary and proper; not absolutely, but within bounds. A bank of
the United States was regarded by the Congress of the United States as one
of the means to accomplish the ends of the government of the United
States, to operate as a fiscal agent of the government of the United States.
Now, the Constitution does not say that Congress shall pass all laws
that are indispensably necessary, absolutely necessary, that is not the
language, but necessary and proper, and therefore the courts inquire, is
there any relation between this act of Congress and this object? Is there
any room to doubt that it has some relation to it? If it has, that is the end of
the question, so far as the judiciary is concerned. If Congress may employ
one or more means, and they are at all germane to the object itself, for
Congress to determine which is the best, it is not for the judiciary to sit in
judgment upon the acts of the representatives of the people in that regard.235
You will allow me to say just here that there are many people in this
country who think that the function of the courts of the United States is to

235 See 8 REG. DEB. 1268 (1832) (statement of Sen. Henry Clay) (“The power to
establish a bank is deduced from that clause of the Constitution which confers on Congress
all powers necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers.”); Alexander
Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States (Feb. 23, 1791),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
97–100 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832). But see
6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791),
in THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 197–204 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904); Andrew
Jackson, Bank Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 1 ADDRESSES AND MESSAGES OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM WASHINGTON TO HARRISON 418, 423–24
(Edward Walker ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1841) [hereinafter ADDRESSES AND
MESSAGES].

2013]

JUSTICE HARLAN: LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

161

run this government; is to lay its hand upon every branch of the
government; approve this or reject that according to the notion the court
may have as to the expediency of the matter brought to their attention.
Now, the Supreme Court of the United States long ago said, and that is
the rule of the courts of all the states, that no court shall strike down an act
of legislation as unconstitutional and void unless it is clearly so; unless it is
palpably so.236 If the court doubts—here is room for argument on both
sides of this question as to whether these means are germane to this object,
there is room here for debate—there being room for debate that ends the
responsibility of the judiciary. The responsibility rests with the United
States and not with the courts. And it will be a dangerous period in the
history of this country if we shall ever reach the point when the action of
the executive of the United States and of the legislative branch of the
United States is to be supervised by the judiciary on the ground of mere
expediency and policy.
There are three separate coordinate independent branches of the
government: executive, legislative, judicial. The judiciary handles judicial
matters, not political matters. The judiciary are to see that the fundamental
law, which is the supreme law of the land for all, for Presidents, Congress,
Courts, and all others, to see to it that the fundamental law is not violated,
is not infringed upon. But when the question arises as to whether a
particular law does or does not transcend the authority of the government,
if the court doubts, its duty is to hold its hands off; respect the will of the
people expressed in the law, and await the action of the people upon the
expression of public sentiment.
Section 9. “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited
by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight,
but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
dollars for each Person.”237
There is an illustration of the hesitancy on the part of the men who
framed this instrument about using any word that indicated the
recommendation in the Constitution of the institution of slavery in mere
words. The word “slave” is not mentioned there; colored persons or
236

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (Harlan, J.) (“If, therefore, a statute
purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the Constitution.”).
237 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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Africans are not mentioned, and yet that clause had its origin out of the
relation in a part of this country to that people.238 The people of some of
the northern states were beginning to apprehend trouble on account of the
existence in this country of a large class of people, human beings, held in
the bonds of slavery, although the Declaration of Independence said that all
men are created free and equal, and upon that they went into the War of the
Rebellion.
But the statesmen of Virginia said to them in reply, “These people are
not here of our seeking; they were brought here against our will, and the
ships of the northern states, as they were called, helped to bring them here.
Here they are. What are we to do with them? They have become now
intertwined with our social organization; large amounts of money invested
in this property. We do not want any violent action upon that subject.”
And they threatened to divide the members of the convention so that no
Constitution could be adopted, and that was put in there as a compromise to
the effect that the government of the United States shall keep its hands off
of the importation of these persons to this country up to 1808. After that
they may prohibit their importation, as we have prohibited it since 1808. If
that had not been made a part of the Constitution, it is quite certain that this
instrument would not have been adopted.239
Now, this clause upon which we are now commenting is a clause of
considerable importance, because it is a denial of powers both to the federal
and state government.

238

See 3 STORY, supra note 43, at §§ 1325–31.
See, e.g., 1 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 443–44 (Gaillard
Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920) (showing Madison’s notes from debates on August
22, 1787 in the Federal Convention of 1787).
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LECTURE 14: JANUARY 29, 1898
I was inviting your attention at the last meeting to the ninth section of
Article I, declaring that “The migration and importation of such persons as
any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808, but a tax or duty may be
imposed on such importation, not exceeding $10 for each person.” I stated
to you that this clause had its origin in difficulties which arose at that time
as to the importation into this country, or the bringing to this country, of
African slaves, and that section was a compromise between those in this
country who did not wish the extension of that institution at the time, which
had grown to such proportions that it could not well be eradicated from that
part of the country without a disturbance of their social conditions;
therefore, the men from the South, speaking generally, having agreed that
Congress might lay its hands on that subject after the year 1808.
But I ought not to stop with that statement without some further
explanation, because you might get the impression that the people of the
South were unitedly in favor of the extension of slavery at that time. But
the history of those days shows that such was not the fact. There were
exceptions on both sides of what we more literally call Mason’s and
Dixon’s Line.240
Well, generally speaking, the people of the northern colonies were
opposed to the institution of slavery on all grounds, especially on moral
grounds. There were persons even in Boston at that time that were engaged
in and profited by the importation of slaves from Africa into this country,
made it a matter of merchandise.241 And during the period of the
Revolution you will find in the old newspapers of that day now and then
advertisements of runaway slaves, although there were very few at that
time, and although the great masses of people were hostile to that
institution.

240

See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY
(2d ed. 2001).
241 See JOANNE POPE MELISH, DISOWNING SLAVERY: GRADUAL EMANCIPATION AND
“RACE” IN NEW ENGLAND 1780–1860, at 74–76 (1998). Massachusetts officially abolished
slavery on March 26, 1788, but the slave trade continued in Boston until 1801. Cliff Odle,
The Rise and Fall of the Slave Trade in Massachusetts Part II, FREEDOM TRAIL FOUND.,
http://www.thefreedomtrail.org/staging/beta/educational-resources/article-rise-and-fall-ofslave-trade-part2.shtml (last visited June 15, 2013).
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So there were exceptions in the South. It is not stating it too strongly
to say that all the leading statesmen of the South, with few exceptions, were
opposed to the institution of slavery, and regretted that it was there. That
was Mr. Jefferson’s feeling about it.242 And the most terrific arraignment
of the institution of slavery upon high moral and public grounds was made
in the convention which framed the Constitution by George Mason of
Virginia.243 Nothing which proceeded in later days from Garrison244 or
Wendell Phillips exceeded the denunciation of George Mason, and yet he
was a man who had the confidence and affection of all men in the State of
Virginia.
But this clause, like many others in the Constitution, although arising
out of and suggested by a particular state of case, is much broader in the
language used than that occasioned. “The Migration or Importation.”245 It
is not simply importation. The word “importation” implies that you are
bringing something in that does not partake of human life, of human
liberty. It was natural to apply the word “importation” to slaves, but there
is the other word, “migration.”
The migration of such persons as any of the states now existing shall
think proper to admit shall not be prohibited by any act of Congress prior to
1808, but since that time, the whole question of migration of persons to this
country belongs to the government of the United States. And it is partly

242

See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Thomas Jefferson and Antislavery: The Myth Goes On,
102 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 193, 203 (1994) (“Jefferson’s ‘hatred’ of slavery was a
peculiarly cramped kind of hatred. It was not so much slavery he hated as what it did to his
society. This ‘hatred’ took three forms. First, he hated what slavery did to whites. Second,
he hated slavery because he feared it would lead to a rebellion that would destroy his
society. Third, he hated slavery because it brought Africans to America and kept them
there. None of these feelings motivated him to do anything about the institution.”).
243 1 MADISON, supra note 239, at 444 (summarizing the remarks of George Mason:
“Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the judgment of heaven on a
Country. As nations can not be rewarded or punished in the next world they must be in this.
By an inevitable chain of causes [and] effects providence punishes national sins, by national
calamities. He lamented that some of our Eastern brethren had from a lust of gain embarked
in this nefarious traffic. As to the States being in possession of the Right to import, this was
the case with many other rights, now to be properly given up. He held it essential in every
point of view that the Gen[eral] Gov[ernment] should have power to prevent the increase of
slavery.”).
244 Harlan refers to William Lloyd Garrison, a founder of the American Anti-Slavery
Society and editor of The Liberator, an abolitionist newspaper. See William Lloyd Garrison
and The Liberator, U.S.HISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/us/28a.asp (last visited June 15,
2013).
245 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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under that clause that Congress has passed the Chinese Exclusion Act,246 by
which we exclude Chinese from this country absolutely, with a few
exceptions. But a good many come nevertheless—they all look alike. A
little difficult to enforce that law, particularly because of the invisible line
that separates this country from Canada. They can land at Victoria and
there is a wide space of country all along between the United States and
Canada through which they can come. But the provision suggests
something more far-reaching and extensive than the mere exclusion of
Chinese.
The power of the government of the United States to exclude any
particular people from our shores is beyond question. We could exclude
any particular race anywhere on the Earth from our country by an act of
Congress, and say “You shan’t come here. Whoever we may want to be
here, we do not want you.”247
Well, of course, it is impossible to exclude everybody. We have got
too much coast. But we may limit it, and we may limit it if we choose to
those people only who can understand our language, who can read our
Constitution in our own language. And we can exclude also, if we want—
we do in terms, I believe, do so by some act—paupers and criminals. But
they are badly enforced, those acts, and the nations of the Earth are
unloading upon this country all their criminals, or a good many of them.
A gentleman now high in the public service, one of our ambassadors
abroad, told me upon one occasion that he happened to be in an English
court, and witnessed the trial of a man for some crime of which he was
found guilty. He was beyond question guilty, and it was a felony under the
English law, but sentence was postponed on motion of his attorney until he
could ascertain whether the county would not assist him to go abroad. The
county did assist him, and he went abroad. The English county got rid of
the expense of maintaining him there, and got rid of the evil consequences
of having such a fellow as a part of its citizenship.
And that is being practiced, I have no doubt, in all the nations of
Europe. And we sit idly by while that is being done. And we are having
infused into our civilization here vast bodies of men that are disqualified to
understand the duties of citizens. And they are collecting in the great cities
246

Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
See, e.g., Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 543 (1895) (Harlan, J.)
(observing that “according to the accepted maxims of international law, every sovereign
nation has the power, inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe”).
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of the country—New York and Chicago and Boston and Baltimore and
Cincinnati and New Orleans—so that to the far-reaching statesman of this
day, the most difficult problem we have got before us to solve is how to
govern those great cities.
Here is the City of New York today—greater New York—now nearly
large enough to have control of each branch of the legislature of that
state.248 Cook County, Illinois is large enough in population to enable
either one of the political parties there in sending delegates to the state
convention to furnish nearly delegates enough to make the nomination of
their party.249 And if there happens to be bosses, they have only to stipulate
for the vote of a few counties, and they nominate the candidate, and it is a
real peril that is before us.
There is no trouble in this country as to its future, outside of these
great cities. We can rely with absolute confidence upon the sound
judgment of the American people upon any proposition—outside of these
great cities—which you will give them time to think about and to formulate
in their mind. You have only to tell them what the propositions are, give
them an opportunity to hear both sides, and although they may go astray
one year, they will come back to their senses the next year, and in the end
their judgment will be that which is best for the common interest of all.
And we may all express the hope that this power of the government of the
United States will be exercised with a closer regard to our institutions, with
a closer regard to what is before this country. And what may happen to it if
we do not preserve in its integrity those ideas, the idea which underlies our
institutions, which is not simply liberty, but liberty regulated by law?
Now, I pass to the next clause. “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”250

248 In 1900, the population of New York City was 3,437,202 and the population of
New York State was 7,268,894. Campbell Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and
Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Population
Div.,
Working
Paper
No.
27,
1998),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/twps0027.html; Richard
L. Forstall, New York, Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990, U.S.
BUREAU
OF
THE
CENSUS
(Mar.
27,
1995),
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ny190090.txt.
249 In 1900, the population of Cook County, Illinois was 1,838,735, and the population
of Illinois was 4,821,550. Richard L. Forstall, Illinois, Population of Counties by Decennial
Census: 1900 to 1990, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, (Mar. 27, 1995),
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/il190090.txt.
250 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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You know already what the writ of habeas corpus is, I take it. Briefly
stated, it is a writ issued by some judge or some court, acting under a
statute, directed to the man who has the custody of a human being, and
requiring that man to make a return and show the ground upon which he
deprives that man of his liberty.
Now, there is no privilege that we enjoy greater than that. There is no
feature of our system which more clearly distinguishes our system of
government from the continental system than that. It does not exist even in
the Republic of France to the extent that we have it here.
Now, what does it mean, if there is a rebellion on hand? Why, the arm
of the government is not to be paralyzed by writs of habeas corpus. If there
is a rebellion on hand, there must be power somewhere—uncontrolled by
the civil tribunals—that can lay its hands upon that rebellion and extinguish
it. And the movements of the armed forces of the United States to suppress
the rebellion are not to be disturbed by Tom, Dick, and Harry, suing out
writs of habeas corpus directed to the general, commanding the forces to
stop his movements and cause him to appear in a civil court, and tell by
what authority he has got a man under arrest.
Those men were wise men. They knew that the suppression of a
rebellion was a serious matter, and that all minor considerations must step
aside, and the whole country must put itself behind the government of the
country in suppressing that rebellion. We must all stop for the time being
talking about abstract questions, and we must say to the general of the
army, “Go ahead and put down that rebellion in the only way it can be put
down, by armed forces.”
Therefore, if there is a rebellion, the writ of habeas corpus may be
suspended. It is a serious question sometimes as to how it is to be done,
whether by the President alone or by an act of Congress.251 The important
question is that it may be suspended, and so in cases of invasion. The same
principles apply in that case as in the case of rebellion, but with the
exception of these two cases, the privilege may not be suspended.
This is an authority of the states as well as of the United States.252 We
have got an immense country here, three thousand miles I believe from one
ocean to the other. We have got seventy millions of people or more. This
251

See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144, 151–52 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, Circuit Justice); 3 STORY, supra
note 43, at § 1336.
252 The Suspension Clause is generally understood to limit only the United States. See,
e.g., Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367, 369 (1917); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135
(1876).
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Constitution says that no man—whether he is a citizen of this country or
not—no human being shall be detained in the custody of any authority in
this country, beyond the power of that man to have that matter investigated.
There was a time in the mother country when that was not so. It took a
great many years of fighting and struggles, and raises very arbitrary power,
that privilege. I have with my own eyes looked down into a dungeon in the
old Tower of London—no light in it—in which human beings were once
placed by the arbitrary order of a Secretary of State, or King or Queen, and
held at their pleasure, sometimes for months or years, with nobody having
the right to communicate with him. His wife or children denied even the
right to see him. His attorney not being able to see him, and the
government under no obligation by existing law to bring him out into the
open air into a court of justice to tell by what authority they detain him.
But finally the right to that writ was established in England, and
became established before our government was founded.253 And the
principle is incorporated in every constitution in this country, state and
federal, so that under the existing statutes, if a man were to apply to me at
my chambers for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he, or somebody
pleading for him, that he was detained by a sheriff in lower California in
jail in violation of the Constitution of the United States, I have the authority
under the existing statutes of the United States to issue a writ of habeas
corpus, addressed to that sheriff in California, and order him to bring that
man before me here in the City of Washington, with the reasons for his
detention in custody.254
I would not issue such a writ, because I would tell that man to go to the
United States judge in the State of California nearby where the man was.
But I would have the power to grant it, and what would the officer do?
Why he would have to make a return to that writ. He would say, “I am
holding this man in custody by virtue of the order of a certain court,
granted on a certain day, in a certain case. I submit a copy of the mittimus.
That is my authority.”
“Well,” says the petitioner’s counsel, or friend, “that is no authority,
that court has acted without jurisdiction, that court has put this man in jail
in violation of the Constitution of the United States under a statute which is
void under the Constitution of the United States.”

253
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See Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 32 Car. 2, c. 2.
See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 625 (1884) (Harlan, J.).
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And upon that, issue would be taken, and if the judge or the court
found that was true, that the man was thus held under a statute void under
the Constitution of the United States, then the court or judge would hold
that he was held in violation of the Constitution of the United States and
would order his discharge, set him at liberty.
The most difficult application of this principle, however, arises in our
special system here, while the man is in custody under a statute of a state,
not federal authority. But the state is bound to respect this Constitution.
This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Never let your minds lose
sight of that idea, that this Constitution, on its face, says in words that it is
the supreme law of the land. The law that is supreme is the law which is
above every other human law. It is a law that has to be respected, and I
repeat what I have said before, because it is important for you to never
overlook that fact, that every judge of every state court in this union, down
to and including every justice of the peace, takes an oath to support the
Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, it necessarily follows that an act of a state legislature that is
in conflict with the Constitution of the United States is not law, and
anything done by an officer or state that is violative of the Constitution is a
void act, which nobody is bound to respect. Let me, therefore, suppose the
case of a man arrested by a state constable or sheriff on an indictment by a
grand jury in a state court, which indictment appears on its face to be based
upon an act of the state legislature, upon an indictment and warrant of
arrest, and AB is arrested, and not giving bail he is put in jail to answer the
indictment at the next term of the court.
Well now, is he remediless because that is done under a state law? By
no means. He can appeal to the supremacy of the Constitution of the
United States. He can say, if such be the fact, “This whole proceeding
against me is null and void. This act of the state legislature is
unconstitutional because it is contrary to the Constitution of the United
States. Therefore, this indictment is a nullity. This warrant of arrest
against me is a nullity. This act of the sheriff is a nullity, and therefore
they are holding me in this jail, depriving me of my liberty, in violation of
the Constitution of the United States.”
Well now, if a man in that condition were to present his application for
a writ of habeas corpus to me, I could grant it, and I could have that man
brought before me—or in the circuit court where I am sitting, if it be within
that judicial circuit—and I could investigate that question. If I came to the
conclusion that the man was held in violation of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, I could discharge him.
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Well now, you will say that is a pretty serious matter, that that judge of
the court of the United States could take a man out of the custody of the
state authority prescribed under a state law and discharge him from
custody. Why should that be allowed? Why should that be done?
Why, it is because of the supremacy of the laws of the United States.
And a judge of a court of the United States is under a duty in the case
before him to see that that Constitution is respected.
But in the case that I have put to you, when the return was made
showing that this man was held under a state prosecution, under a state
indictment, under a law passed by the state, I would say—not that I would
be bound to say so—but I would say to that petitioner, you must stand your
trial in the state court. I will not discharge you. Go back and stand your
trial in the state court. The state court may itself determine that that state
law is unconstitutional and void. The duty rests upon the state judges, as
well as upon the judges of the United States, to enforce the Constitution of
the United States as the supreme law of the land.
Therefore, the rule has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States, except in a few cases of special character, not to interfere by
writ of habeas corpus with the regular proceedings against a man in the
state under the state statutes. You can very easily see how great trouble
might arise in this country by this cross-firing between the state and federal
authorities, because under the statutes as they now stand, a man might be
on trial, actual trial, in a court of a state for an offense under the laws of the
state. The federal judge, or the federal court, can by writ of habeas corpus
send the marshal of the United States into that courtroom and take hold of
that man, and bring him before the federal judge, and inquire whether the
man is being deprived of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the
United States.
But that would be an unseemly proceeding. That would tend to arouse
a conflict between state and federal authorities, and therefore the rule
adopted is that if a man is indicted in a state court and has not yet stood his
trial, that for the sake of comity between these two governments we will
not discharge that man in ordinary cases from the custody of the state
authorities, but let him go into the courts of his own state and fight it out. It
may be that the state court will discharge him. The state court may hold
the statute not to be void. Then take your writ of error to the Supreme
Court of the United States, and when the state authorities have got through
with you, when they have gone to the utmost limit, if by the final judgment
of the highest court of the state and you are still deprived of your liberty,
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you then have a remedy by habeas corpus to the highest court of the United
States.255
The Supreme Court of the United States has got jurisdiction over the
federal judgment of every one of the highest courts of the states of this
union to determine the question whether a man has a federal right that has
been invaded. Early in the history of the Supreme Court that right was
disputed in the case of Martin and Hunter, I believe, along about 11
Peters.256 A judgment of the highest court of the state was brought into the
Supreme Court of the United States for re-examination. It was a part of the
old original Judiciary Act that the Supreme Court of the United States
should have the power to review, re-examine, reverse, or modify the final
judgment of the highest court of the state denying a man a right claimed by
him under the federal Constitution. Virginia said in that case that the
Supreme Court of the United States has nothing to do with the final
judgments of our highest court.
What have they got to do with them? The Virginia politicians, some
of them, said—including Mr. Jefferson—that the Court of Appeals of
Virginia have the right to pass on this case, and no tribunal of any other can
sit on that. “We have jurisdiction to determine whether or not the federal
Constitution has been violated, and if we say it has not been violated, that
is the end of it.”257
“No,” says the Supreme Court of the United States, the tribunal
established by the supreme law of the land for the final determination of
questions of that character, with power to see to it that this supreme law is
not violated by any individuals or by states. And that court said, “Of what
use is it to declare this to be the supreme law of the land, if any power in
any state of this land can deny a right which belongs to a man by this
Constitution of the United States?” And that power of review was
maintained.
“Well,” says the Court of Appeals of Virginia, “you may review it, if
you choose, and you may reverse it and send it back, but we won’t enter
your judgment; you cannot lay your hands upon us judges of the Court of
Appeals of Virginia and make us enter your judgment reversing it. We
won’t do it.”
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Well, the Supreme Court was not to be outdone in that way, and they
said, “Very well, if you don’t choose to enter our judgment, we will enter
the final judgment here. We will make our judgment the final and
conclusive judgment in the same, and we will execute it through the
marshal of the Supreme Court of the United States.”
One would have supposed that would have ended the controversy, but
no. Twenty years ago—as recently as that—the first term of the Supreme
Court of which I had the honor to be one of its members—and I would not
have you suppose from that that I am an old man at all—reversed the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and the court refused to enter
that judgment. Well then, we entered the judgment; we made it final and
put it in a shape that we thought was the end of the litigation.258
Now, there was another side to this question you ought to know about.
Perhaps the question has come into your minds already. If the federal
courts in executing the federal Constitution may take a man out of the
custody of the state authority by habeas corpus, why may not the courts of
the state take a man out of the custody of the federal authorities upon the
ground that he is held by the federal authorities in violation of the
Constitution of the United States?
Well, that is a pretty fair question. That looks reasonable at first blush,
but the rule is well settled that a state order cannot disturb the custody of
the United States authorities in their possession of a man held under
proceedings in the United States court. Therefore, when a state judge in
Wisconsin issued a writ of habeas corpus to a general commanding the
army of the United States at a particular point in Wisconsin for that general
to appear before him to show cause why he had a young boy in the army as
a soldier of the United States, proceeding upon the ground that the boy was
under the age fixed in the statutes of the United States, and there was no
authority in the general to hold him. The general replied—treated the writ
respectfully—said in substance, “I am an officer of the United States, and I
am holding this boy by authority of the United States, and I cannot produce
him into court; I am not allowed to do so by the orders under which I am
acting.”
Now that was Tarble’s case in 13th Wallace, and there it was settled
that the state authorities could not disturb the United States authorities.259
Why the difference? One reason of the difference is—and that is an allsufficient one—that one is the supreme government of the country, the
258
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highest government of the country. The laws of the United States are the
supreme law of the land, and therefore it is incongruous that the authorities
of the state should discharge from the custody of the laws of the United
States. But that is not the end of the matter.
We can go through the courts of the United States and finally bring it
to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that court is not foreign. Do
not get that idea in your heads, that the courts of the United States are
courts of a foreign government. A judge of the court of the United States,
sitting in the State of New York, sits there to administer in part—and that is
the most that he does—the laws of the State of New York, the court getting
jurisdiction by reason of diverse citizenship. And a federal court sitting in
the State of New York is in every sense a court of the State of New York,
and the Supreme Court of the United States is a court for all the states and
all the people of all the states.
Two cases I want you to take a minute of. I want you to read on these
questions:
Ex Parte Royall, 117 United States, 241.260 Mr. Royall is a lawyer of
Virginia, most estimable gentleman, still lives. He was arrested under a
statute of Virginia because he was practicing law without a license. He
went to jail without giving bail, and applied to the Supreme Court of the
United States for a habeas corpus. We held that he must stand his trial in
the state court before the United States would interfere.
New York against Eno, 155 United States, 89.261 That was a case of a
gentleman indicted in one of the state courts of the United States for
alleged fraudulent acts as an officer of a national bank, and as soon as he
was indicted he had business in other lands. He retired in good order to
Canada, and after being there twelve, fifteen years, or more, he came back
to the State of New York. Of course, it was all an arranged affair, and he
surrendered himself to the custody of the state authorities, I believe, and
then sued out a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the prosecution against
him in the courts of the State of New York were in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, and covered a subject with which the
state could not deal, and he was discharged by the court below.
We reversed the matter and said the court below ought not to have
discharged him, “Appear in the state court and make your fight there. That
state court may discharge you, and if it does not, take the case to the
highest court of the State of New York. If they do not discharge you, then
260
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Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (Harlan, J.).
New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894) (Harlan, J.).
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come to this court upon a writ of error, but do not talk about interference
with the state proceedings until you have resorted to all of those methods.”
Take one other case in that connection—Robb against Connolly, 111
United States, 624.262 That was a case in which it was laid down that the
state court is under precisely the same obligation to support the
Constitution of the United States that the federal courts are, and that their
duty is to enforce that instrument just as well as in the federal court.

262
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LECTURE 15: FEBRUARY 5, 1898
“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”263
A bill of attainder is one which taints, in a legal sense, the blood of a
subject or citizen. That cannot be done in this country. Every man in this
country stands upon his own person, his own right, and he is not to be
affected by the fact that his ancestor may have been guilty of some crime
for which he may have been convicted.
A man is not to be tainted in this country because he is a convict. He
is tainted in a large sense. His character is destroyed when he is convicted
of a felony and put inside of the walls of a penitentiary, but whatever bad
influence or effect comes from that, it is confined to him. It does not affect
the rights of his wife, or his children, or any descendent.
The government of the United States has the power by legislation to
declare the punishment of treason against the United States, but the
Constitution expressly declares that no attainder of the person shall work
corruption of the blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the person
attainted. In the last civil war, there was some legislation that forfeited the
estate of those who were engaged in active rebellion against the
government, but it was well settled and recognized that the real estate of
the person thus engaged in rebellion could not be taken absolutely away
from his tribe or family, and that he could only forfeit his life estate.264
Upon the termination of that life estate, the heirs came into possession of it.
“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”265
There is a common impression that this is a civil matter and matter of
contract. A man not acquainted with the word sometimes says a law
passed by the legislature relating to a particular civil matter or particular
contract is ex post facto.
Well now, the phrase has nothing to do with civil matters at all. Ex
post facto laws are those which relate to criminal proceedings.266 The
meaning of an ex post facto law was well settled at the time the
Constitution was adopted, well settled by judicial decisions in England, and
263

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
See Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589; Resolution of July 17, 1862, no. 63,
12 Stat. 627 (“[N]or shall any punishment or proceedings under said act be so construed as
to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life.”); Act of Aug.
6, 1861, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319; see also Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268
(1870).
265 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
266 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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to state it shortly, an ex post facto law is one which makes that criminal
today which was not criminal when that act was done. Ex post facto, that
is, after the deed.
Now, if today I do a certain thing that everybody regards as criminal in
its nature, as dishonorable in its nature, if there is no law in force at the
time I commit that deed which subjects me to punishment for it, it is
beyond the power of any legislative body in this country to affix a crime to
that. I am to be punished according to the law in force at the time the crime
was committed.
A particular injury if committed today is punishable say by five years
confinement in the penitentiary. Well, by the time a man is tried, a law has
been passed which fixes the punishment at twenty years. Well now, he is
to be tried by the law in force when he committed the offense, and you
cannot say he shall be put in the penitentiary for twenty years if found
guilty of that crime, if by the law in force when he committed the crime the
utmost penalty in the way of punishment was five years.
A case in the Supreme Court of the United States—not a very old
case—was of this sort.267 When an offense was committed in the state
where that particular one was committed, there was no such thing as
solitary confinement as a part of the punishment for any length of time, but
by the time that man was tried there was a statute of the state which
provided for solitary confinement from the time of the conviction until the
execution, and the question was whether that was ex post facto. Did that
add to the man’s punishment; did it increase the punishment?
A majority of our court held that it did; that according to the testimony
of scientific men everywhere, no punishment is more terrific than that of
solitary confinement. To think of being in a narrow cell or place where no
human being could see you, or talk with you; from which for a large part of
the twenty-four hours light was excluded; where the sun never shone at all;
where you never saw a human face; where when your meal was brought, a
little door was lifted and it was shoved in to you—you would see a man’s
hand but you would not see his face. And those who have studied that
subject say that it is terrific in its operation upon the human mind. The
majority of our court held that, as to the crime for which that man was
convicted, it was not competent for the state to add the additional
punishment of solitary confinement, even for a few months.
Now, observe that this inhibition applies not only to Congress but to
the states as well. Congress cannot make an ex post facto law, the states
267
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cannot, and therefore a man may bring to the Supreme Court of the United
States a case from the highest state court, where that court is adjudged to
have enforced against the person a law that is ex post facto in its nature.
“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion
to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”268
What is a capitation tax? Why, it is derived from a Latin word which
means head. It is called in some of the states a head tax. In some of the
states, they impose a head tax of a dollar on each man—or of two dollars—
and in some states they won’t allow a man to vote unless he pays that head
tax. It is quite an offensive tax in many localities, though it ought not to be.
Every man ought to be able in some way or other to pay a tax of two
dollars a year.
“[O]r other direct, Tax . . . .”269
That is to be laid on the basis of inhabitants enumerated. Now, if you
want to find a discussion on the subject of what are direct taxes, if you will
look to the case of Pollock against the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company,
at the close of 157 United States, and the same case in 158 United States,
you will find there all that the Supreme Court of the United States, and
each of its members, had occasion to say awhile back upon an income
tax.270 I do not intend to enter upon a discussion of what an income tax is.
I have elsewhere said on that case all that I propose to say, unless another
case comes up.
Perhaps you ought to know why there happens to be two reports on
that case. When it was at first before the Supreme Court, they considered
only one question, and upon the determination of that question held the
income tax law to be unconstitutional.271 Upon the rehearing, it was held
that there were other questions, and a rehearing was granted and the court
had one more member at the last hearing, and then the court expanded its
decision.272 You will see when you get to that case that there was a tax
268 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (1913) (“The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
or enumeration.”).
269 Id.
270 See generally Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), vacated
on reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
271 Pollock, 157 U.S. at 442 (holding that a tax on income from real estate is a direct
tax and that a tax on income from a municipal bond is impermissible).
272 Pollock, 158 U.S. at 601 (holding that a tax on individual income is a direct tax).
When Pollock was first argued on March 7, 1895, Justice Jackson was absent. While a
majority of the justices agreed that a tax on income is a direct tax and that a tax on income
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levied upon the income deriving from real estate, and the question was
whether that was a direct tax. The court held that it was a direct tax, that a
tax upon the income of real estate was in the sense of the Constitution the
same as a tax upon the real estate itself. And the court in the last case held
that a tax upon bonds, stock, et cetera, was a direct tax.
Practically, it would not amount to much whether direct or indirect, but
for the basis prescribed—a direct tax is to be laid upon the basis of
population among the states. Take for instance any state that is full of
income derived from real estate, and full of bonds and stocks. You put the
tax on that state in proportion that the number of inhabitants of that state
bear to all the inhabitants of the union. Now, the result might be that a tax
on bonds—for instance, an income from real estate might be put on the
inhabitants of another state in proportion to its population, and it would
have to be borne by a very few, because a very few would own bonds and
stock from which an income was derived. Now, read that case if you wish
to get the views of the majority and the minority of the Supreme Court.273
“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”274
Why was that? Suppose any state in this union could lay a tax upon
articles exported from that state to any other state. Suppose each state of
the union could do that. That would disturb the freedom of commerce, and
the ability of people to find a market in other states for the products of their
farms or skill and get the very best prices for them.
Now, a man may raise a lot of horses. If he raises them in the State of
Tennessee he can take them out of that state and into any state of this union
without asking the State of Tennessee or any state into which he takes
them, unless they are diseased. Tennessee cannot make you pay a tax for
from a municipal bond is impermissible, they were split on whether a tax on individual
income is a direct tax, and the Court issued a narrow opinion on April 8. The parties asked
to reargue the case when Justice Jackson returned, and the Court agreed, hearing arguments
on May 6, and issuing a new opinion on May 20. See David G. Farrelly, Justice Harlan’s
Dissent in the Pollock Case, 24 S. CAL L. REV. 175, 176 (1951); Note, William Jennings
Bryan and the Income Tax: Economic Statism and Judicial Usurpation in the Election of
1896, 16 J.L. & POL. 163, 180 (2000).
273 Harlan strongly objected to the Court’s holding that a tax on individual income is a
direct tax, largely because he saw it as an assertion of states’ rights. Pollock, 158 U.S. at
638 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The recent Civil War, involving the very existence of the
nation, was brought to a successful end, and the authority of the Union restored, in part, by
the use of vast amounts of money raised under statutes imposing duties on incomes derived
from every kind of property, real and personal, not by the unequal rule of apportionment
among the states on the basis of numbers, but by the rule of uniformity, operating upon
individuals and corporations in all the states.”)
274 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
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the privilege of taking them out of the state to sell, and that sometimes may
become a very onerous tax and its effects far-reaching.275
For instance, I have heard it said by gentlemen who were well skilled
in that matter, that if we were to reduce—for instance, if we had a tax on
the importation of coffee and sugar coming into this country and were to
reduce that tax, it would not affect the price of coffee or sugar. Now,
ordinarily, as a general rule, putting a tax on goods imported into this
country does make it a little more costly for us here to buy them, but
gentlemen who have looked into it say that it is not the same with coffee
and sugar. “Why?” I said. One of them said, “As soon as you reduce the
importation of coffee, why the government of Brazil imposes a tax on
coffee, and so when it gets here, a man to whom it is consigned in this
country must sell it for just what he did before, although he pays less tax
here than his government. He has to do that to meet the tax put upon the
coffee by Brazil.”276
If that principle were applied between the states of this union, our trade
would get into confusion. For purposes of trade, there are no state lines;
you do not know a state line. No state can erect a barrier between itself and
another state in reference to merchandise going from one state to another.
The utmost it can do in the protecting of products from one state coming
into another is where it imperils the health or morals of the people of the
state. They can protect that.
“No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or
Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another . . . .”277
The government of the United States shall have all the ports of this
country upon the same footing.
“[N]or shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter,
clear, or pay Duties in another.”278
A boat may start from St. Paul, Minnesota, for New Orleans, and in its
journey it will pass Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana. She is not bound to stop at a single
port on those great waters. They may hail her and ask her to stop, but she
may say, “I don’t want to stop.” No state can compel one of those vessels
to stop and pay it a duty for the privilege of passing along the borders of
that state on those great navigable waters. If a boat has landed on the Ohio

275
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See Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591, 600 (1891) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (Harlan, J.).
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River at the City of Louisville, it does not have to ask the privilege of the
State of Kentucky. It is not required to pay a single cent, except this, that if
the boat has used a wharf belonging to the City of Louisville, which the
city has established at her expense, she may be required to pay for the use
of that wharf reasonable compensation because she is using the property of
somebody else.279
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law . . . .”280
Now, that is a provision that would not attract the attention of the
ordinary student of the Constitution, particularly if he had not been long in
this life. He would say, how can that be, and why should it be? Suppose
the President of the United States and Secretary of the Treasury were of
opinion that $5,000 might be expended just here for a particular purpose for
the good of the United States. Why should we not trust them for that?
Recently a distinguished gentleman, who is President of the Republic
of Hawaii, and his good lady, have been here, guests of the nation.281 They
are at the Arlington.282 They will have no bill to pay. The United States
will pay it, because they are our guests. How does the United States pay it?
Our excellent President does not pay it out of his own pocket; he could not
repeat that very often at his present salary. But he does so, I suppose, out
of a fund in the hands of the State Department.
At every session of Congress there is a sum, not a large one, placed in
the hands of the Secretary of State to be employed by him in his discretion
in connection with our foreign affairs, and to further the good relations
between this and other countries. I think there is a fund of that sort, and out
of that those expenses may be incurred, but if there is no fund of that sort, I
do not see how they can be incurred. The mandate of that Constitution is
that not one five-cent piece belonging to the government of the United
States, and in the Treasury of the United States, shall be used by any officer
279

See Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 710 (1883).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
281 Sanford B. Dole was the first and only President of the Republic of Hawaii, which
existed from 1894 to 1900. See David C. Farmer, The Legal Legacy, in BIOGRAPHY
HAWAI’I: FIVE LIVES, THE LEGACIES OF SANFORD BALLARD DOLE 2–4,
http://www.hawaii.edu/biograph/biohi/doleguide.pdf (last visited June 15 2013).
282 In the 1880s and 1890s, the Arlington was the toniest hotel in Washington, D.C.
John DeFerrari, Lost Washington: The Arlington Hotel, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Aug. 17,
2010, 2:15 PM), http://greatergreaterwashington.org/post/6836/lost-washington-thearlington-hotel/. Built in 1869, it was located on Vermont Avenue, between H Street and I
Street. Id. It was demolished in 1912, and was replaced by the Department of Veterans
Affairs building in 1918. Id.
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of the government of the United States except in pursuance of
appropriations made by law.
The Constitution of the United States says that the salary of the
President of the United States shall not be diminished during his term of
office, and there is a similar provision to the effect that the compensation
given to the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States shall not be
diminished during their term of office.
Now, suppose there is no appropriation made by Congress for the
payment of the salaries of the President and the judges. Where do they get
them? Why, they don’t get them at all. They are to do without them. If a
Secretary of the Treasury were to pay money out of the Treasury for the
salary of the President or for the salary of a judge, without a statute
authorizing it, he would be a felon under the law and could be incarcerated
in a penitentiary for that misappropriation of money.
At every session of Congress you will find an appropriation act,
legislative, judicial, and executive appropriation act, and in a diplomatic
appropriation act, or in a sundry civil bill, or in some other form, you will
find an appropriation for that one fiscal year of money to meet the salaries
of the officers of the United States. Salaries of the judges are fixed by law,
and at the end of every month the Secretary of the Treasury can cause that
amount to be paid.
I tell you, in these days of extravagance and waste, in these days when
a million of dollars appears more insignificant than a thousand dollars did
to the representatives of the people seventy-five years ago, it is well that
there is a constitutional guarantee of that sort for the protection of the
money in the Treasury from use otherwise than pursuant to a statute on the
subject. And that statute says what it is for: so many thousand dollars to
pay diplomatic salaries, judicial salaries, Representatives and Senators.
Therein the purpose is expressed in the law, and the people can see what
becomes of their money.
And in that connection another safeguard and regulation: “[A]nd a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.”283
I take it for granted that none of you are ever concerned in those
accounts enough to look into that published statement, but there is one
down to every five-cent piece. You can see an account of it somewhere,
unless somebody has stolen something that they do not give account of, but
for every service paid there should be a voucher somewhere.
283
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You say, why publish it? Well, publicity is a great thing in the affairs
of government. The idea of publicity keeps many a man in either house of
Congress from voting in one way, or in any particular way, when if there
was no publicity about it, he might subserve some selfish purpose in voting
another way.
Everybody does not see these statements. They throw away these
reports in the wastebasket and say, “What do I care about them? All I want
to see is to read the discussions of the Secretary of the Treasury on great
problems.” But there is somebody that does care. You may rely upon it
that there is somebody in the party that is in the minority that is watching
the majority, that is looking with keen eyes into every document showing
an expenditure of the public money, and when he finds it there, brings it
out in his speech in Congress or in the public prints, and that is why those
wise statesmen put that provision in the Constitution.
“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States . . . .”284
Well, you might think that was entirely useless. Would anybody ever
think in this country of granting a title of nobility?
Well, I think not at this day, but at the time this Constitution was
adopted there were people of high character in high public positions in
those days that would not have been shocked at all at the idea of there
being introduced into our free system of government an element of title and
nobility. Many men thought our fathers made a great mistake when they
established this leveling government, based upon the idea that all the men
are created free and equal, and that all the men are to stand equal before the
law. They believed in having one branch of the government with an
element of aristocracy in it, or nobility. Those men were beaten. They
said, we do give up in form, but we think a mistake has been made, but we
will see after a while.
In the library you will find a book called Maclay’s History of the First
Senate of the United States.285 You will find there a very serious dispute as
to how the President of the United States should be addressed; in what
form.286 The practice at that time was for the President of the United States
to come down in person to the Senate, and confer with the Senate, and
deliver his messages to the Senate. Sometimes, he would send them in
writing, and the question was how the Senate or Congress should address
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him in return.
Well, some gentlemen very deliberately and carefully insisted that they
should address the President of the United States as “His High
Mightyness,” and other phrases of that sort, and that did not run its career
until after one or two sessions.287 The debate on the subject got over into
the House of Representatives, and the point was raised there, how should
the House of Representatives address the President when answering one of
his messages. But it was soon ended by the common sense and the sagacity
of Mr. Madison, who expressed surprise that there should be any question
upon that subject. “Why,” says he, “address him in the words of the
Constitution. The Constitution says that he is President of the United
States. Why shall we not address him as ‘Mr. President,’ or ‘To the
President of the United States’? That is the simple constitutional mode.”288
And it seemed to have ended the trouble at once, and from that day to this
we say “Mr. President.”
“And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them,
shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince,
or foreign State.”289
One of you, if you were abroad and were to do some act that would
commend itself to a King or a government there, could accept from him
some title of nobility, some gift, as an expression of gratitude on the part of
that government for the particular service you had performed. You would
have the right to do that, but I would not. Why? I hold an office of trust
under the United States, and the command of the United States is directed
to me and to all men holding office of profit and trust.
Now and then, one of our war vessels is in the harbors of some great
cities, and some occasion may arise when the commander of that vessel
may be able to do some great service to those people. Maybe some great
plague or some great fire, and that officer and his men may be able to do
287

Id. at 25–26 (“At length the committee came in and reported a title—His Highness
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288 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 333–34 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
James Madison) (“I am not afraid of titles, because I fear the danger of any power they
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some great service, perhaps perform gallant service in saving the life of
some officer of the government.
Well, shortly there would arise in that government a desire to express
their thanks to this gallant American officer and these gallant American
sailors, and they would offer to make them presents and confer titles upon
them. They would all have to decline it. But they could accept it by
consent of Congress. At nearly every session of Congress, acts are passed
authorizing A, B, and C, named officers in the service of the United States,
to accept a particular present from a government abroad.
We had first a declaration of the powers granted to the government of
the United States. We have now gone through section 9, which contains
prohibitions both upon the state and nation. And now we come to specific
prohibitions that are put upon the states. They are very simple.
“Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation . . . .”290
No state in this union can enter into any treaty with any other country
on the face of the Earth. More than that, no state of this union can enter
into a treaty with another state of this union. New York and Pennsylvania,
two great states, could not constitutionally form an alliance by which they
would agree to stand by each other in the Congress of the United States and
stand with each other for this, that, and the other measure, or against those
measures, and an alliance of that sort would impose no obligation upon
each other.
Nor “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”291
Now, all of these, except one, I have gone over, but I have as yet said
nothing about the last clause, which is becoming one of the most farreaching and most important in the Constitution. No state shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of contracts.
You will find very little said in the debates of the convention about
that clause. It was not passed, of course, without examination, but I doubt
whether any man of that day dreamed of the consequences of that clause,
how important it was to the country, and what vast interests it would
embrace from time to time. The primary object was to protect the people
of the different states against the hostile and selfish legislation of some of
290
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the states, in favor of their own people against people of other states. One
state, for instance, would pass a statute assuming to exempt one of its own
citizens from contracts made between him and a citizen of another state,
and say that the courts should be closed against the citizen of the other state
for enforcing that obligation.292
A state may repudiate its own contracts, because if it does there is no
way to enforce it by direct suit against the state.293 You cannot bring a state
to the bar of any court in this country against its will and compel it to
answer a suit. And the state may put out its bonds and borrow millions of
dollars in the belief on the part of those who invest their money in those
bonds that the state’s sense of honor may not repudiate it. But it may get so
low down that it will refuse to pay them, and when it does there is no
remedy for it.294
A and B may have a contract with each other, and that contract may be
the subject of a suit and get up to the highest court of the state, and the
highest court of the state may misinterpret it and say it does not mean this
but that, and it may be so plainly wrong to your own sense that you will
have a suspicion that that is not the meaning, but there is no remedy for it.
This is simply not that a state shall not misinterpret contracts by its courts,
but that no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract.
Let me explain that a little more fully. A and B have a contract today
made in a state, and suit is brought upon it. The Supreme Court of the state
says that the right to make that contract depends upon the meaning of a
certain statute of that state which was in force when the contract was made,
and they construe the contract in a certain way, and under that construction
the contract falls.295
Now, that presents no federal question. That presents no case that is
subject to review in the federal court. But suppose a statute passed by a
state after a contract has been entered into between parties, and that statute
does impair the obligation of the contract, then you have got a case under
the Constitution. That obligation of a contract, the obligation comes from
the Latin word that means to “tie,” a thing which ties together. The
obligation of a contract is that which ties the parties together to do a
particular thing or not to do a particular thing.
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See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
293 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
294 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring).
295 See, e.g., Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U.S. 388, 390 (1887) (Harlan, J.).
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Now, this injunction is that that obligation shall not be impaired. Not
impaired a little, not impaired much, but shall not be impaired at all. It
must stand as the parties have made it. If it was lawful when made, it is not
in the power of any state to make it unlawful.296
“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing it’s inspection Laws . . . .”297
Maryland requires all the tobacco raised in that state to be brought into
the City of Baltimore to be inspected and branded. It has been held that it
could do that.298
“[A]nd the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United
States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of
the Congress.”299
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will
not admit of delay.”300
That brings me to the second Article of the Constitution, which treats
of the executive power of the United States.
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See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 589, 592

(1819).
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LECTURE 16: FEBRUARY 12, 1898
Lecture delivered by Judge William A. Maury301
I regret to announce, gentlemen, that our friend Mr. Justice Harlan is
not able to be here this evening, in consequence of an engagement
elsewhere. And in an unguarded moment, I must say, I promised to take
his place and appear before you this evening without reflecting that I
should have no opportunity whatever to make the necessary preparation.
But still I made the promise with some faint hope that I might be able to
induce Professor Johnson to come here this evening with his harrow and go
over the field. But unfortunately an engagement prevented him from
coming to my relief, so nothing was left but for me to be as good as my
word and appear before you.
I have often been amused at the story of the individual who, on being
asked if he could play on the violin, said he didn’t know, as he had never
tried. But I never supposed that it was in store for me to make a still
greater exhibition of self-confidence by giving a public performance on an
instrument which I had never tried, the Constitution of the United States.
You need not be surprised, therefore, if you find that the strings of that
instrument are swept this evening by a hand which knows no approach to
the masterly touch to which you are accustomed.
The subject appointed for discussion this evening, as my colleague
informs me, is the executive power of the Constitution of the United States.
But it has seemed to me perhaps a proper thing to do before entering upon
that subject to advert for a few moments to the distribution of powers made
by the Constitution, in order that we may see the relations which those
powers hold towards each other, and particularly the relation which the
executive holds toward those other powers.
Now, all the powers of the government which are conferred by the
Constitution of the United States are confided to three departments, three
separate departments: the legislative, the executive, the judicial. Now,
while of course the Constitution professes to make a distribution of these
powers, it is soon apparent upon an examination of the instrument, and

301 William A. Maury was appointed Assistant United States Attorney General by
President Arthur. Later, he served on the faculty of Columbian University School of Law.
In 1901, Maury was appointed as a member of the Spanish Treaty Commission. Maury died
on June 15, 1918. Chew Heong v. United States: Chinese Exclusion and the Federal
Courts,
Biographies:
William
A.
Maury,
FED.
JUDICIAL
CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/tu_exclusion_bio_maury.html (last visited June
15, 2013).
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particularly of the working of the government, that a sharp distinction or
partition between these three departments of government is impracticable,
is impossible. While the legislative department professes to be entirely
separate and distinct from the other departments, judicial and executive, we
find that any such arrangement as that is wild and visionary.
The classification into which the powers of government are distributed
by the Constitution is necessarily imperfect. It was intended to be so, as
will be seen. The Constitution does not aim at a perfect distribution and
classification of the powers of government, and it will be apparent that a
certain amount of overlapping and interference of those powers is
absolutely necessary to the strength and efficiency of the Constitution as a
practical instrument.
Well now, we have but to look at it, and it will only be necessary for
me to remind you of things which are well known, beginning now with the
executive power. That power participates in the legislative power, and just
enough to steady the legislative power, to make it more effective and to
make it safer as the depository of legislative power. The executive veto,
you observe, puts an interdict upon legislation to a certain extent, because
unless that veto is overborne by a two-thirds vote of both houses, why, it
blocks the legislation to which the veto applies completely.
Well now, you see that the interference of the executive with the
legislative department of the government in that case brings the legislature
to its sober second thought. The legislature itself is constructed with a
view to preventing precipitate action. The Senate, by its constitution, is
more conservative than the House, but still it was deemed necessary to
lodge in the hands of the executive a power to put an interdict upon
legislation to a certain extent, analogous to the power of the Roman
Tribune. Only the Roman Tribune could put an absolute interdict upon
legislation, and yet under the Roman Tribune, why, we see how long that
commonwealth lasted, and to what power it attained and what vitality it
had.302
Now then, take another instance. The Senate is not exclusively a
legislative body. The Senate is the high court for the trial of impeachments
of officers who are charged with high crimes and misdemeanors under the
Constitution.303 Therefore, the Senate participates in judicial power.

302 Roman tribunes were officials elected by the plebians.
Among other things,
tribunes could veto the acts of magistrates. See, e.g., M. CARY & H.H. SCULLARD, A
HISTORY OF ROME (3d ed., 1975); MICHAEL CRAWFORD, THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (1978).
303 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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The House of Representatives and the Senate both participate in
judicial power in other respects. Why, look at the vast amount of claims
against the United States with which Congress has been flooded from the
organization of the government, to such an extent that it was necessary that
Congress should establish a court for the purpose of entertaining those
claims to a certain extent.304 But there is a large class of claims which is
outside of that court, a large class of claims which it is still necessary for
Congress to pass upon.305
Is not it perfectly apparent that Congress, in passing upon those claims,
exercises a judicial function? Manifestly so. Is it not apparent that each
house of Congress, in deciding upon the election and qualification of its
members, participates in judicial power?306 I cannot say that it always
exercises that judicial power in a way calculated to reflect credit upon it,
and we would do well—if I may be allowed to digress for a moment in that
respect—we would do well if we imitated the British Parliament, which
relegates all those questions to the courts of justice, and consequently takes
away from Parliament the scandals which always attach to a very
considerable extent to the trial of these contested seats, and questions
involved in these contested elections.307 We would do well to have an
amendment to the Constitution providing that the judicial department of the
government should decide all those controversies, and then a decision of a
controversy of that sort would not be according to policy or the wishes of
any party controlling either house of Congress.
Again, the executive department participates still further in legislative
304 In 1855, Congress created the United States Court of Claims to hear private claims
against the United States. History of the Federal Judiciary: Court of Claims, 1855–1982,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_coc.html (last
visited June 15, 2013). Initially, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to hear monetary
claims based upon a law, a regulation, or a federal government contract. Id. It reported its
findings to Congress and prepared bills for payment. Id. In 1863, Congress authorized the
Court of Claims to issue final judgments. Id. In 1887, Congress expanded the jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims to include all claims against the United States, except claims
sounding in tort, equity, and admiralty. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).
305 WILLIAM A. RICHARDSON, HISTORY, JURISDICTION, AND PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF
CLAIMS 12–13 (2d ed., Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1885).
306 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
307 Under the Grenville Act of 1770, 10 Geo. 3, c. 16 (Eng.), Parliament tried election
petitions by select committee. In the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict., c.
125, § 11 (Eng.), Parliament delegated the trial of election petitions to the Queen’s Bench.
Currently, election petitions are tried by an Election Court, which is created to hear the
petition and dissolved after it issues its decision. The Election Court for an election petition
challenging a Parliamentary election consists of two High Court or Court of Session judges.
Representation of the People Act, 1983 c. 2, § 123 (U.K.).
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power. Has not the executive department, has not the President of the
United States—in whom is centered all the executive power—has not the
President of the United States the express power given him by the United
States to negotiate treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate? And
are not those treaties—when they are duly ratified and promulgated—are
they not made the law of the land as much as a legislative enactment?
Certainly they are.
And then again with reference to the treaty making power, we find it
necessary for the legislative power to cooperate because, of course, a treaty
which requires an appropriation of money or which calls for legislation of
any kind—as for example, suppose a treaty provides for a commission to
sit and adjudicate upon claims against each of the governments that are
parties to the treaty. Why, it is necessary, of course, that Congress should
legislate in order to provide salaries for the commissioners, in order to
provide appropriations for the other expenses of the commission.
Now, it is very true that the appointment of officers is a purely
executive act. And as we see that with reference to many of the offices
under the Constitution of the United States, that the Senate participates in
that appointment, that the advice and consent of the Senate are necessary
before the appointment can be consummated.
And even the courts of justice may have a share of the appointing
power, because the Constitution expressly provides that “Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”308 There we find that an executive power is expressly
provided for the courts of justice, if Congress should deem it proper to
confide that power to them.
And then we have the judicial department exercising legislative power
to a certain extent. The exercise of all judicial power involves, more or
less, that almost imperceptible, unseen and impalpable judicial legislation
which is going on all the time and which, by the way, is the best legislation
we have.
And then we find the executive exercising judicial power—necessarily
so. Why, is not the whole domain of the law which the President is
charged by the Constitution to faithfully execute? How can that law be
executed? How can it be applied without exercising the judicial function of
interpreting it? And that executive interpretation is beyond the reach of
judicial control.
308
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Then again, the House of Representatives may be called upon to elect
a President and Vice President of the United States, should the electors fail
to do so.309 So that, gentlemen, you see that from the necessity of the case
there is an overlapping of all these departments among one another, and
that it is impossible, impracticable, and undesirable that there should be a
strict line of demarcation dividing the powers of the three departments of
the government.
Why, just suppose that the executive had to go to the judiciary for the
purpose of interpreting every law which the executive is charged with the
duty of executing. That would embarrass and hamper the government.
What a clog that would be upon the administration of the government, to
have any such dependence of the government as that of one department
upon the other.
Now, the Constitution tells us that all executive power shall be
centered in the President of the United States of America.310 All executive
power, but the Constitution does not mean by that declaration that the
President shall participate actually in the performance of every executive
act. Why, it would be a superhuman person who should undertake to
perform any such Atlantean task as that.
The President of the United States is felt in the execution of the laws,
in the performance of his duty to see that the laws shall be executed. He is
felt in all the ramifications of the executive department of the government,
because he is charged with the duty and responsibility of filling all places
under the government with competent persons. And if the appointing
power—as is done by Congress under the Constitution—is committed to
the hands of the heads of departments so far as their respective departments
are concerned, nevertheless, although the President has nothing to do with
the appointment of the subordinates of the heads of the executive
departments, he can hold the head of each department responsible, and he
can remove him if he fails to fill the offices which are within his gift with
faithful and proper persons. So that, while he cannot intermeddle with
every executive act—while it is impossible that he should intermeddle with
every executive act—still the ultimate responsibility all centers upon him.
It is perfectly consistent with what I have said that, although the President
cannot participate in every executive act, still the ultimate responsibility is
with him as to all officers over whom he has no control immediately,
because he has direct and immediate control over those who have

309
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Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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appointed the subordinates who are beyond his reach.
The executive department, then, is the co-equal of the other
departments. The whole theory of the government proceeds upon the idea
of coordination. Each department is independent of the other. No one of
the three can trench upon the domain or province of the other. The
President is not subject to the control of the judiciary. Congress is not
subject to the control of the judiciary. Congress cannot interfere with the
judiciary. The executive cannot interfere with the judiciary. And a notable
instance of the abstinence of the judiciary from interference with the
executive power is furnished by those cases where an appeal was made—or
application to the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction—to
interfere with President Johnson in the legislation which was called the
Reconstruction Act. Why, the Supreme Court said that the fact that no
such bill as was filed in that case had ever been filed before was strong that
no such bill ought to be filed, that the judicial power had no right to restrain
the executive with reference to that legislation.311
If the President of the United States is unfaithful to his trust, he is
responsible to the great constituency of the United States. And not only so,
he is liable to be arraigned by the House of Representatives before the
Senate, the great court of impeachment, for trial for the imputed offense.
He can never be reached for any mistake in exercise of discretion. He can
never be reached for anything which falls short of a high crime or a
misdemeanor.
Now, of course, the wants of the government necessitate the
establishment by law of a large number of executive offices, and which
laws provide for the appointment of a large number of subordinate officers.
Now, those officers, if they are entrusted with discretion, they are as much
beyond the reach of judicial control as the President of the United States
himself is, and the only instance in which an executive officer can be
controlled by the judicial department of the government is where that
officer is charged with a plain simple duty, admitting of no discretion
whatever. In such a case as that he is amenable to the courts.
And such a case was the case of Schurz against the United States,
where a patent had been issued, but not delivered, to an individual who
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Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866) (“It is true that a State
may file an original bill in this court. And it may be true, in some cases, that such a bill may
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jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that
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claimed the land which was described in a patent.312 And the Secretary
refused to deliver the patent to the claimant, and he went before the courts
for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to deliver that patent. And
the Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal from the local court
here, held in that case that, inasmuch as all executive discretion had been
exercised by the Secretary of the Interior, as the patent had been made of
record, that the title had passed to the patentee, and that the duty of the
Secretary was a plain ministerial duty to deliver that patent to the patentee,
and so a writ of mandamus was issued compelling him to surrender the
patent.
Now, there are some powers which are committed to the hands of the
executive. There are some powers which do not require any legislation
whatever, and which may be executed by the executive in virtue of its
inherent power.313 For instance, there is a treaty, which may be executed
by the executive, if the treaty is of such a character as not to require
supplemental legislation by Congress.
So, the President can receive foreign ambassadors by virtue of his
inherent power.314 So, the President can furnish information to Congress
by virtue of his inherent power.315 So, he can recommend measures to
Congress by virtue of the same inherent power. So, he can convene
Congress or either house at his will.316 And so, in case the houses of
Congress cannot agree upon a time of adjournment, the President has the
right to adjourn them by his own command, by the express provision of the
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United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 379 (1880).
The inherent powers of the President of the United States are derived from the
clauses, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,” id. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
314 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The President is also to be
authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. This, though it has been a
rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance
which will be without consequence in the administration of the government; and it was far
more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a
necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign
minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.”).
315 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“He shall from time to time give to the Congress
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient . . . .”); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR
AND THE CONSTITUTION 136–37 (1947) (observing that the President alone negotiates
treaties and decides what information to furnish the Senate).
316 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both
Houses, or either of them . . . .”).
313
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Constitution.317
Now, it is interesting to note the extreme delicacy with which
Congress, when the legislation was made which set on foot the government
and set it in operation—it is interesting to see the delicacy with which
Congress treated the executive power. For example, when it established
the Department of State, Congress did not undertake to prescribe the duties
of the Secretary of State in respect to foreign international matters. When
Congress established the Navy Department, it did not undertake to
prescribe the duties of the Secretary of the Navy, so far as the government
of the Navy was concerned. It did not undertake to prescribe the duties of
the Secretary of War, so far as the army was concerned, when it established
the War Department.
The President of the United States is invested with all authority with
reference to our foreign relations, receiving ambassadors, negotiating
treaties, and sending ambassadors and consuls abroad to represent this
country.318 He is entirely beyond the reach of the legislative department.
Now, it is very interesting to see those provisions of law. For instance,
the statute establishing the State Department, which is now embodied in
Section 208 of the revised statutes, the Secretary of State shall perform
such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or entrusted to him by
the President relative to correspondence, commission of instructions to or
with public ministers or consuls from the United States, or to negotiate with
those from foreign states, or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs
as the President of the United States shall assign to the Department, and he
shall conduct the business of the Department in such manner as the
President shall direct.319 You see how scrupulously there Congress has
abstained from any appearance of interference with executive authority.
Then, when we come to the War Department, revised statutes section
216 says the Secretary of War shall perform such duties as shall from time
to time be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President relative to
military commissions—perform such duties as shall from time to time be
enjoined on or entrusted to him with reference to the business of the
Department—in such manner as the President shall direct.320 Showing that,
in the view of Congress, as was undoubtedly correct, that the Secretary of
317

Id.
Id.
319 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (2006); Act of Sept. 15, 1789, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 68; Act of July 27,
1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28; see also United States ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U.S. 306, 319–
20 (1891).
320 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49; see also 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2006).
318
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War was the mere hand of the President, and whatever he does, does not
proceed from him, but is the act of the President’s, and the President is
supposed to have a hand in everything which is transacted either in the
State, or War, or Navy Departments. Section 417, with reference to the
Navy Department, says the Secretary of the Navy shall execute such orders
as he shall receive from the President connected with the Navy
Department.321
Well now, we have seen the harmful consequences that may flow from
the attempt of the other departments of the government to interfere with the
executive. Why, in recent days at the very present time, now and then we
see a movement in Congress with reference to foreign affairs, which may
be extremely harmful. Because how is it possible for Congress to act upon
these matters without having the data before them which the President has,
and which is secret, and which for public purposes he does not disclose to
any other department of the government?322
Now, one of the most important powers which are committed to the
President is the appointing power. “[A]nd he shall,” says the Constitution,
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think
proper in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.323
Well now, it was maintained at the beginning of the government under
this present Constitution that all appointments—movements in the
directions of appointments—should be initiated in the Senate. And the
argument was that these appointments are to be with the advice as well as
the consent of the Senate. How can the Senate give any advice after a
321

Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 553; see also 10 U.S.C. § 5013 (2006).
Maury was probably referring to congressional intervention into diplomatic
relations with Spain and Cuba. On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland signed a
proclamation of neutrality. Grover Cleveland, A Proclamation (June 12, 1895), reprinted in
9 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 591–92
(James D. Richardson ed., Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1898). But on February 28,
1896, Congress passed a resolution supporting Cuba; on March 24, it sent $50,000 to Cuba;
and on December 21, it recognized the independence of the Republic of Cuba. Rebecca
Edwards,
1896:
U.S.
Foreign
Relations,
VASSAR
C.,
http://projects.vassar.edu/1896/foreignrelations.html (last visited June 15, 2013)
323 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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nomination is made? Before the nomination is made is the time for advice.
That is the time to give the President good counsel as to who he shall
select.324
But that view, of course, has not prevailed. And we may say the word
“advice” is commanded to silence in the Constitution, and consent—or it is
the equivalent of consent because of the hand which the Senate has in the
exercise of the appointing power is by giving consent to the nominations
which are laid before it by the executive.
The nomination in an appointment is the initial step. The confirmation
is the next step. The appointment, mark you, is the next. It does not follow
because there is confirmation that there must be appointment. There may
be disappointment, for the President may change his mind, and he may
recall all that he has done and send in a new name.
But when the appointment is made, then the commission issues, which
like a title deed is held by the appointee as a high and controlling evidence
of his authority to exercise the functions of the office which is referred to in
the commission. And that was the great mistake which Mr. Jefferson made
when he came in as President of the United States for the first time. He
found a lot of commissions of various officers, commissions which had
been signed by President Adams.
Well, President Adams was a Federalist, and Mr. Jefferson thought
that it was his whole duty to destroy all those commissions. That gave rise
to the case of Marbury v. Madison, and the decision of the Supreme Court
with reference to appointing and the steps necessary to a complete
appointment.325 And the Chief Justice, in that great judgment of his, held
there that the commission was not analogous to a deed, that the
appointment was made before the commission was signed, that there was
power in the courts to compel the Secretary of State to deliver these several
commissions to the various appointees named in them.
To be sure, no such process was issued in that case, because the court
held that they had no jurisdiction to issue it. But the mistake made by
President Jefferson was in following the analogy of a deed and holding that
the commission was as necessary to transfer title to office as the delivery of
a deed is to transfer title to real estate. But that was not so.
And the same doctrine was laid down in the case of Schurz.326 The
Supreme Court held that the title had passed before the patent was issued,
324
325
326

See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 288, at 581–82.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 403 (1880).
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that it had passed by matter of record, and therefore that the Secretary had
no alternative but to deliver the patent to the patentee.
Well now, one of the great questions which embarrassed the statesmen
of the early days of the Republic was as to the power of removal in those
cases where the advice and consent of the Senate was necessary in order to
an appointment.
Now, they said that certainly the agencies of the government which it
is necessary should cooperate in order to appoint, that those agencies
should also cooperate in order to remove.327 But the settled construction of
the Constitution from the earliest time of the Republic under the present
system is that, although the concurrence of the Senate may be necessary to
an appointment, the President may remove the appointee without
consulting the Senate at all.328
Now, during President Johnson’s administration, when there was so
much collision between him and the Congress, Congress passed an act in
1867, for the express purpose of putting fetters upon the executive. 329 In
other words, by legislative enactment they insisted upon the interpretation
which was early insisted upon, that the Senate should concur in the removal
of officers, where their concurrence was necessary to the appointment of
such officers. And so the act of 1867 provided that, in case Congress was
not in session, that the President might for any cause that seemed fitting to
him suspend an officer until the Senate should reassemble, but should not
remove him. And if the Senate did not agree with the President, why then
that officer should walk back into his office and there stay.
Now, for nearly a century of practical interpretation of the Constitution
to the contrary Congress undertook to put these fetters upon the executive.
Well, afterward Congress repealed that law, so that it is no longer in the
way.330
Why, things must be settled in some way. There are many questions
under the Constitution which can never be submitted to judicial
327

1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 288, at 576–91.
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119–26 (1926).
329 Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867) (providing that federal officials
whose appointment required the advice and consent of the Senate could not be removed
without the consent of the Senate). On August 5, 1867, President Johnson asked Secretary
of War Edwin Stanton, a Lincoln appointee, to resign. Douglas O. Linder, The
Impeachment Trial of Andrew Johnson, UNIV. OF MO.-KAN. CITY SCH. OF L.,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/impeach/imp_account2.html (last visited June
15, 2013). Stanton refused, so Johnson removed him from office. Id. The Senate refused to
consent to Stanton’s removal and began impeachment proceedings. Id.
330 Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
328
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arbitrament. If they are never settled, if after years the questions may be
re-agitated and opened, why, what a state of turmoil we would be in all the
time. When, therefore, the meaning of the Constitution is settled by years
of practice, nobody is a friend of his country who attempts to unsettle it.
There is another provision here with reference to the executive which
has given rise to a great deal of interesting discussion, and that is this
provision: “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”331
Well now, a question very naturally arises of this kind: after the
Congress adjourns, the President removes an officer. Well now, is that
vacancy a vacancy that happens? Does happening mean something that is
accidental? Can the President himself produce that state of things which
shall give rise to his power under this provision? Can he remove a man and
say that that vacancy happens in the recess of the Senate?
Well now, the construction of the Constitution is that it does happen,
that it is a vacancy that happens in the sense of the instrument.332
“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate . . . .”333
Well now, suppose the President does not fill up a vacancy during the
session of the Senate, and when the Senate adjourns, then makes an
appointment. Is that a vacancy happening in the recess of the Senate when
he has deliberately allowed the Senate to sit and then adjourn without
taking any step whatever towards filling up the vacancy? Well, some of
the courts have held, not the Supreme Court, that the President has power
to fill up that vacancy after the adjournment of the Senate, although the
vacancy existed before the Senate adjourned.334
331

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
See Vacancy in Office, 19 Op. Att’y Gen. 261 (1889); Filling Vacancies in Office,
18 Op. Att’y Gen. 28 (1884); Appointments During Recess of the Senate, 16 Op. Att’y Gen.
522 (1880); Temporary Appointments by the President, 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 207 (1877);
Temporary Appointments in the Army, 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 562 (1875); Case of the
Collectorship of Customs for Alaska, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 455 (1868); President’s Power to
Fill Vacancies in Recess of the Senate, 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 32 (1866); President’s Power to
Appoint to Office, 11 Op. Att’y Gen. 179 (1865); President’s Appointing Power, 10 Op.
Att’y Gen. 356 (1862); Power of President to Appoint to Office During Recess of Senate, 4
Op. Att’y Gen. 523 (1846); Power of the President to Fill Vacancies, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 673
(1841); Power of President to Fill Vacancies, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 525 (1832); Executive
Authority to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631 (1823).
333 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
334 See In re Yancey, 28 F. 445, 450 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1886); In re Farrow, 3 F. 112,
116 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880).
332
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Well now, take that case of where a vacancy is said to happen when it
is caused by a removal made by the President during the recess of the
Senate. Why that interpretation of the Constitution must now be regarded
as settled and it should not be allowed to be disturbed.335
Now, another question arises, which is one of very great importance
and one which has given a great deal of cause to a great deal of controversy
and discrepancy of opinion, and that is as to how far the President is called
upon to execute an unconstitutional law. Now, can he take upon himself
the responsibility of determining whether a law is void or not? He may
say, well, I am not called upon to execute an unconstitutional law.
Well, is the law unconstitutional? The judicial department is charged
with the duty of interpreting and applying the laws. Well, would it not lead
to anarchy almost if the President should take it upon himself to say that a
law should not be executed because he regarded it as unconstitutional? Is it
not his plain duty to give effect to the law?
Well now, of course, that matter may be carried too far. For instance,
suppose Congress attempts to invade his constitutional functions. Suppose
Congress attempts to hamper him in the exercise of a constitutional power.
Why, there he owes it to the country, he owes it to the Constitution, he
owes it to himself to resist that attempt, and to refuse to yield to it. And so
if Congress should pass an act which is palpably beyond all boundaries and
limitations of the Constitution, it is to be supposed that in a case of that
kind that the President of the United States would be justified in refusing to
enforce the law.
But then when it comes to the question—and a doubtful question—as
to whether a law is unconstitutional or not, why, it seems to me that it is
going rather far to say that the President of the United States shall sit in
judgment upon the acts of Congress. In the first place, every act done by
either one of the three coordinate departments of the government is
presumed to be properly and constitutionally done. The Supreme Court of
the United States will never declare an act of Congress unconstitutional if
there is a doubt about it, because it acts upon the presumption that
Congress has kept within the constitutional limitations which confine its

335 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that “the Tenure of
Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing
executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so”). See
generally T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A
LEGAL
OVERVIEW
(2005),
available
at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50801.pdf.
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powers.
Hence we see that, time and again, that the executive has resisted the
attempts of Congress. But then see to what an extent this doctrine has been
carried by Mr. Jefferson, then by General Jackson following him, General
Jackson insisting in the idea that the Bank of the United States was
unconstitutional, that Congress had no authority to create the institution,
after the Supreme Court, after solemn argument, decided that the act was
constitutional.336
Well now, it has been laid down by high authority, and it is by no
means a settled question, that each department of this government is
independent of the other, and that it has a right to expound the Constitution
for itself. Now, you observe the Supreme Court of the United States has no
power to expound the Constitution except where it comes in question in a
controversy between John Doe and Richard Roe. Each department of the
government is bound to construe that instrument for itself, as it has been
said: the President for himself, Congress for itself, and the judiciary for
itself.
Would anything be more monstrous than for the Supreme Court of the
United States to issue an injunction to operate upon Congress to prevent it
from carrying into effect any constitutional project in the way of
legislation? Why, it would be absurd. Well, how far is that to be carried,
because if you take an extreme view of it, why then you have a government
that consists of three departments, each one independent of the other, and
each one at liberty to construe the Constitution of the United States to suit
itself. Why, the bare suggestion of such a thing suggests anarchy.

336 For example, Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, which
declared the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky
Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES, supra note 26, at 540–45. The
Supreme Court held that the Bank of the United States was constitutional in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819). Jackson declared the Bank unconstitutional
in his Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States, July 10, 1832, reprinted in
ADDRESSES AND MESSAGES, supra note 235, at 418.
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LECTURE 17: FEBRUARY 19, 1898
I regret very much that I was not able to be with you on last Saturday
evening. I congratulate you that you had an opportunity to hear my brother
Maury about that which we had reached in the Constitution, that relating to
the executive power.
You remember that I called your attention to the division of the powers
of the government of the United States among three departments. We had
finished the consideration of those clauses of the Constitution which
enumerated the powers granted to the Congress of the United States—the
legislative branch of the government—and we now come to Article II,
relating to the executive power of the government.
You cannot too often remember that these different powers of the
government are coequal—or rather that these departments of the
government are coequal—and that we are not to suppose that one is of
more consequence than the other. The legislative department cannot
interfere with that which is committed to the executive department of the
government, nor the executive department interfere with that committed to
the legislative department. And neither of these departments can interfere
with that which is committed to the judiciary department of the
government.
These three departments embrace all the powers that can emanate from
any government, and with few exceptions they stand upon their separate
ground marked out for them by the Constitution of the United States. And
neither may rightfully encroach upon the domain of the other without
danger to our institutions. If the Congress of the United States should order
the President of the United States to do something that he had no right to
do, he could simply refuse to do it, and there would be no power to compel
him.
The executive power is the power to execute. The President does not
make laws. He executes the laws which have been passed by the
legislative department of the government. He does that which is essential
to carry into effect the will of the people of the United States as expressed
in the Constitution and in the acts of Congress.
Now, we vest this power under the Constitution in one man. Why not
in two? Why not in three or four? Why not in legislative council? Well,
that question has been answered in the experience of the world. No
government is likely to last if the executive power of that government is in
more than one person.
We have a pretty fair illustration of a triple-headed executive in this
District. We have three Commissioners, very reputable gentlemen and of
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character, and want to do what is right, but with very little power to do
anything. The theory of the law is that they all cooperate, they all concur in
everything that is done. And the mere theory is kept up. But in the
division of their labors they have assigned one branch to one
Commissioner, another to another, and another to another. And when they
get into trouble, or differ, there is division in the executive power. And that
difficulty is increased from the fact that they are without power to pass any
laws. There are very few ordinances they can pass, and we are moving
along in this District without any head, except that which the people have
in the government of the United States and the law of itself.337
It is sometimes said that the best municipal law in the world is found
here in the City of Washington. Why, no mobs are here? Well, it is
because the men who would be in the mob would be in the eye of the
White House. It is the fear of the government. The disorderly spirits in our
midst do not make trouble. They know there is an army and navy here, if
need be, to keep up the peace. Not because there is any executive head of
the government, but it is because of the power that is around it and behind
it.
Now, the matter was thoroughly considered when the Convention
framed the Constitution, and it was believed to be wisest to have this
executive power in one man.338 But I think it is fair to say that that one
man has grown to a consequence far beyond anything anticipated when the
Constitution formed. Very few men of that day supposed that at this time
we would have seventy millions of people. Very few of that day supposed
there would be one or two hundred thousand men in this country who
would hold their offices at the will of one man. And he is now a very
potent individual.
He can do a vast deal, but I do not think that we are to become uneasy
by reason of that fact. He may exert, if he chooses, a power in the
elections. He may have an army behind him, in the shape of officeholders
to carry out his will. But I think we have found from experience that the
337

From 1874 to 1967, the District of Columbia was governed by a three-member
Board of Commissioners. Aaron E. Price, Sr., Comment, A Representative Democracy: An
Unfulfilled Ideal for Citizens of the District of Columbia, 7 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 77, 83–84
(2003). The Commissioners were appointed by the President of the United States, and
consisted of two civilians and one officer or captain with experience in the Army Corps of
Engineers. W.B. BRYAN, FORMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 26
(1903). John Wesley Ross was the President of the Board of Commissioners from 1893 to
1898, and John Brewer Wight served as the President of the Board of Commissioners from
1898 to 1900. See id. at 51.
338 See 1 MADISON, supra note 239, at 49–56.
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President of the United States is not strong before the people because he
has got officeholders behind him.
On the contrary, human nature is such that all that have not offices are
apt to combine against those that have. The outs want to get in, and want
to get the ins out, and the result is that a man is not ordinarily as strong if
he wants a second term as he was before he got the first. And he will not
be apt to get the second term unless he has so managed his high office as to
commend himself to the people of the country as a wise, safe, and prudent
man.
So, I do not think there is any danger from that source. But whatever
may be the power behind him—whatever is the nature of that power—the
great fact in this Constitution is that he, like the balance of us, is subject to
law. He cannot budge an inch outside of the law without there being power
somewhere to check, if not him, the man whom he may employ. He may
appoint a bad man to office, but there is power existing elsewhere to
impeach that man for high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and turn
him out. He may order this, that, or the other thing to be done, but there is
power in one department of the law to say to him, “Thus far thou shalt go
and no farther.”339
Now, the value of this single-headedness, if I may so express it, lies in
the fact that it gives directness and point and energy in the execution of that
office. If this country should ever get into war, for instance, it is well for
the country—it would be well for us—that the executive power of the
nation in that contingency is in the hands of one person. Not two persons,
no divided council, the whole responsibility as far as that is concerned
resting in one man, and he having the power to wield the entire executive
power of the United States in order to accomplish the safety of the nation.
Now, I think that is well, and particularly well in this free country. In
this country, where men think as they please, talk as they please, and very
often act as they please. We want the power somewhere, with all that is
behind it, to lay its hand upon ourselves, if need be, when we get out of
temper, and when we depart from sound sense—when we give way to
passions and oppose the law. It is well in this free Republic that this power

339 See Four Letters on Interesting Subjects, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760–1805, at 368, 385 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz
eds., 1983) (“No country can be called free which is governed by an absolute power; and it
matters not whether it be an absolute royal power or an absolute legislative power, as the
consequences will be the same to the people. That England is governed by the latter, no
man can deny, there being, as is said before, no Constitution in that country which says to
the legislative powers, ‘Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther.’”).
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is in the hands of one man, so far as he may wield the Constitution and
laws of the government. And he holds his term for four years, not a minute
longer. Not until his successor is qualified, but for four years.
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may
be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or
Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be an Elector.340
It is a very common mode of speech in this country for a man to say
that “I voted for William McKinley for President of the United States,” or
“for William J. Bryan for President of the United States.” There was not a
single vote cast at the last election for either one of them. They voted for
electors in the several states. Each party had electors, and they voted for
those electors. And it was supposed when the Constitution was adopted
that the country would secure the best President possible if the election was
through a board of electors in each of the states, that would meet on the
same day throughout the country and cast their votes for the best man that
they could think of, or the best one for the country.341 That theory
disappeared, and although we do not vote for the President, we vote for
men who, if they do not vote as they agree to vote, will get into trouble.
Here are a dozen candidates for electors, and they pledge themselves if
elected that they will vote for this man. And they meet in the electoral
college and they vote according to popular indication at the election.
“[E]qual to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”342
Now, there is a gap right here in the Constitution that is a pretty
serious one. Further along in the Constitution, in Article 12 of the
Amendments, there are provisions as to how these electors shall discharge
the duty committed to them.
340

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
Article II, section 1 of the Constitution originally provided that
[t]he Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two
Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with
themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the
Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the Seat of Government of the United States, directed to the President of
the Senate . . . .
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. This provision was superseded by the Twelfth Amendment, which was
ratified on June 15, 1804. Id. amend. XII.
342 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
341
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The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by
ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least,
shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they
shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they
shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and
of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of
votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of government of the United States, directed to
the President of the Senate.343
Now, I have not probably told you what was the occasion of the
Twelfth Amendment. The original Constitution did not require the electors
to vote separately for a President and separately for a Vice President. It
provided—the provision was so general in its nature—that the man
receiving the highest number of votes should be the President and the next
the Vice President.344
In 1801, the party then called the Republican Party—headed by Mr.
Jefferson, that is—their representatives had a ticket, Thomas Jefferson for
President, Aaron Burr for Vice President. There was no question in the
minds of any honest man at that time that the Republican Party wanted
Jefferson for President and Burr for Vice President. The opposing
candidates were John Adams for the Federalists for President, and
Pinckney for Vice President.
The result of the election was that Jefferson and Burr got a larger vote
than Adams and Pinckney, and that Jefferson’s and Burr’s votes were
exactly even. And the result was the election went into the House of
Representatives. And it is a blot upon the memory of Aaron Burr that will
343

Id. amend. XII.
Article II, section 1 of the Constitution originally provided that
[t]he Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such
Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be
more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then
the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for
President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List
the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the
President, the Votes shall be taken by the States, the Representation from each
State having one Vote . . . . In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the
Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice
President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the
Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot of the Vice President.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. This provision was also superseded by the Twelfth Amendment. Id.
amend. XII.
344
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never be erased, that although he knew that his party did not vote for him to
be President, he schemed in that House to have himself elected President
over Mr. Jefferson. He tried to get the Federalists to join and elect him
President, so as to give him the highest number of votes, and he would be
President, and Jefferson Vice President.
The head of the opposite to Mr. Jefferson at that time was Alexander
Hamilton. He and Mr. Jefferson were unalterably opposed to each other.
They differed fundamentally on many questions. On some matters
Jefferson doubted Hamilton’s patriotism, and on some matters Hamilton
doubted Jefferson’s patriotism. But Hamilton doubted Burr’s integrity. He
believed that it was not safe for this country that Burr should be in the
White House. And it is a fact well authenticated by the history of the time
that he interposed in that contest with the members of his own party, and he
got two of them to vote for Jefferson for President of the United States.
And no doubt, Mr. Jefferson owed his election to his life-long opponent,
Alexander Hamilton.345
Now, this article was put in the Constitution as the result of that
trouble, so as to render it impossible for any such trouble to occur again.
But that is not all the gap that I referred to.
Twelfth Amendment. On a given day, the Senate and House of
Representatives meet together in the House of Representatives. The
President of the United States is there, with the Speaker of the House. The
direction of the Constitution is, “The President of the Senate shall, in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
Certificates and the Votes shall then be counted.”346 That is all the
Constitution says.
The Person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such
majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the
House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the
President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken
by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a
quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members
from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall

345

See generally Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of
Political Change, 108 YALE L.J. 1959 (1999).
346 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives
shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall
devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the
case of the death or other constitutional disability of the
President.347
Now, it never occurred to the framers of the Constitution when it was
adopted that there would ever be any dispute over the simple arrangement
that this certificate shall be opened, and the President of the Senate shall
count the votes in the presence of the two Houses. You will understand
that if an election is over in a state, the return is made to the proper officers
at the capital of the state. And the electors there certify to the United States
that certain electors received so many votes, and certain others received so
many votes. That is the certificate that is sent.
The framers of the Constitution never supposed there would be any
difficulty in the President of the United States reading those votes, and
saying which was the larger number. But suppose that in some state there
is an election board at the capital of the State composed of scoundrels that
are ready to do anything for party, and that that election board will
deliberately miscount the vote of that state. That they will throw out the
vote of this county upon some technicality, and that county upon some
mere technicality, that does not affect the integrity of the vote. And the
result of the action on their part is to change the vote of that state, and to
cause a certificate to be sent to Washington that is not in accordance with
the vote really cast by the people of the state. And suppose that it further
turns out that that false and fraudulent certificate from that state changed
the election and put a man in the White House that was not really elected.
Now, you can very well see how uncomfortable that might make the
people of the United States. You can very well understand that if that sort
of thing was repeated very often in this country, why in the end there might
be revolution.
Now, no provision is made in the Constitution to meet a case of that
kind. No mode is provided to test the question as to what was the vote
really cast by the state.
Now, of course, there will be no trouble as long as the majority one
way or the other is so large as to make such an inquiry inconsequential.
We might say, “This state was counted wrong, but here are enough votes
347

Id. amend. XII. The last clause of the Twelfth Amendment was superseded by the
Twentieth Amendment, which was ratified on January 23, 1933. Id. amend. XX.
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besides to elect the man declared elected.” But we may get to the point, as
we once were, where one vote turns the scale, and where people are
supposed on either side to suspect the integrity of everybody on the other
side. There ought to be an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States that would provide some mode by which, in advance of the fourth of
March, to determine the integrity of this certificate from the several states.
“[B]ut no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”348
An elector must not owe anything to the United States other than that
which comes from his being a citizen of the United States, if he wants to be
an elector.
“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and
the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States.”349
That is plain enough. It does not need any explanation in order to
make it plainer.
Relative to the votes for Hayes and Tilden, according to the face of the
returns, Hayes had 186 and Tilden 185.350 Well, Mr. Tilden’s friends said
that that was rascality, and Hayes’s friends said as to some of the returns
there were rascalities, and very serious trouble was about to arise. I recall
the time very well. I could read in the face of the people almost as I
walked along the streets that we were upon the brink of a volcano that
might burst out at any time and tear our institutions to pieces.
Who was to settle it? The Senate of the United States by itself could
not settle it. The House of Representatives by itself could not settle it. The
whole requirement of the Constitution was “The President of the Senate
should count the vote.”351
Well, when the Senate and House of Representatives were together in
348

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
350 Harlan refers to the 1876 presidential election between Republican Rutherford B.
Hayes and Democrat Samuel J. Tilden, which turned on twenty disputed electoral votes
from Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Oregon. See Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S.
Grant and the Electoral Crisis of 1876–77, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES PRESIDENTIAL CENTER
http://www.rbhayes.org/hayes/content/files/hayes_historical_journal/ulysses_s._grant.htm
(last visited June 15, 2013). On January 29, 1877, Congress created a fifteen-member
Electoral Commission to resolve the dispute. See id. The Commission awarded the
disputed electoral votes to Hayes, who was inaugurated on March 4, 1877. Id.
351 See U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 1, cl. 3. (“The President of the Senate shall, in the
Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates and the Votes
shall then be counted.”).
349
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the House of Representatives, and the certificate was opened that came
from Louisiana, for instance, and one that came from Florida, and one from
the state of South Carolina, and one from the state of Oregon, they had
nothing before them but those four pieces of paper. They said so and so.
“But,” said one of the parties, “that is a fraudulent return from Louisiana;
this is a fraudulent return from Florida, that is not the way Louisiana voted
or Florida voted, or Oregon voted.”
Well, how were they to settle it? The Constitution was silent. And
finally they devised the scheme of the electoral commission, composed, I
believe, of fifteen: five Senators, five Representatives, and five members of
the Supreme Court of the United States, all men of high character and
standing.
But such were the times—such was the temper of the times—that it
was hard to find anybody that had the fairness and the patience to judge of
a man on the opposite side of politics fairly and justly. It so happened that
upon every question in that case—perhaps with one exception—that was
material upon which the result depended, that the Democrats voted all one
way, and the Republicans the other.
One of the members of the Supreme Court of the United States was on
that commission, and no purer, better man ever lived than he was. He was
a man who had strong political convictions, but he never meddled in
politics, and he did not know what politics he had when he got on the
bench. I allude to Mr. Justice Clifford of Maine.352
One day he met one of his brethren who was not on the commission,
and Brother Clifford, with perfect simplicity, said to that brother judge, that
he was sick at heart. Why, what was the matter? “Why, up to this time
every question that has been considered here, the commission is divided on
352 Associate Justice Nathan Clifford (August 18, 1803–July 25, 1881) was born in
New Hampshire and moved to Maine to practice law. Clifford, Nathan, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://history.house.gov/People/Listing/C/CLIFFORD,-Nathan%28C000518%29/ (last visited June 15, 2013). He served in the Maine House of
Representatives from 1830 to 1834, and was the Speaker from 1832 to 1834. Id. From
1834 to 1838, he served as Maine Attorney General. Id. In 1838, he was elected as a
Democrat to the United States House of Representatives, and served until 1842. Id. In
1846, President James K. Polk appointed Clifford Attorney General of the United States. Id.
In 1848, Clifford became United States Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to
Mexico and negotiated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which made California part of the
United States. See id. In 1857, Clifford was nominated for the Supreme Court by President
James Buchanan, and in 1858, he was confirmed. See id. Clifford voted for Tilden, and
never accepted the Electoral Commission’s decision in favor of Hayes. See PHILLIP GREELY
CLIFFORD, NATHAN CLIFFORD, DEMOCRAT (1803–1881) 319–24 (1922). He served on the
Supreme Court until 1881, when he died of a stroke. See id. at 341–42
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the line of politics.” “Yes,” said his brother Republican friend, “I observe
‘Cliffy’ that all of you Democrats vote together every time a vote is cast.”
Now, he had not observed that. He had not been aware that he had any
politics in the matter. And I believe that every judge that participated in
that question voted the same way. But there were vast numbers of people
in this country that did not believe that.
It was a misfortune for the country that the division was exactly on
party lines. It would have been well for the country if it had not been so,
but it was so. And it suggests to my mind the thought that I hope it never
will occur again in the history of this country. I hope that the condition of
this country never will be such as to make it necessary for the Congress of
the United States to create a commission to determine quasi-political
questions, upon which a member of the Supreme Court will be required to
sit. For it has made an impression with a great many men that will take
some years perhaps for it to die out, that even in that high tribunal which is
supposed to be above party—which I think is above party—members will
not forget that they have particular political principles. If there is one
element of safety for the future of this country, and of our institutions, it is
in the belief, which I hope will always obtain, that that court of last resort
in this country will give its judgment upon the law of the case without the
slightest reference to the politics of the litigants or to its effects upon the
politics of the country.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States.353
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice
President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President
and Vice-President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.354
Until a few years ago, there was a good deal of uneasiness arising out
353
354

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amends. XX, XXV.
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of that provision of the Constitution. In case of the death of the President
and Vice-President both, the President of the Senate would become
President of the United States. Mr. Lincoln was assassinated in 1865.
Andrew Johnson became President of the United States then. The
Republican Party, having control of the Senate, elected one of their number
President of the Senate. Mr. Johnson got into a quarrel with his political
party. They became mad at him, and he became mad at them, and he did
many things that were distasteful to his party and, as they thought,
dangerous to the country.
One of the results of the quarrel was articles of impeachment and trial
by the Senate of the United States. There then, Andrew Johnson was being
tried by the Senate of the United States, composed of the party that he did
not recognize at the time fully, and which party—in the event that they put
him out of office—would have had a representative in the White House in
Mr. Wade of Ohio, and I am not sure but that he voted in that question
himself.355
Now, don’t you see what a temptation there was to put Mr. Johnson
out of the White House, in order that one of their own number could get
into the White House, and they could carry through the projects that they
had in hand? Now, one of the results of that has been the passage of the
law that takes away the desire, if any ever had it.
But now there is nothing to be accomplished for a political party by the
death of the opposing President and his Vice-President, because under the
law as it now stands, if President McKinley should die, and Vice-President
Hobart should die, the President of the Senate would not go into the office,
but the Secretary of State would become President of the United States, the
Secretary of the Treasury next, I believe, the Secretary of War after that.356
355

Harlan refers to Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio, the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, who would have become President if Johnson had been convicted. See Benjamin
Wade
(1800–1878),
LATIN
LIBR.,
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/chron/civilwarnotes/wade.html (last visited June 15, 2013).
Wade did vote to convict Johnson. Id.
356 President William McKinley was assassinated on September 5, 1901, while visiting
the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York.
See William McKinley,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/williammckinley (last
visited June 15, 2013). He was succeeded by Vice President Theodore Roosevelt. See
Theodore
Roosevelt,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/theodoreroosevelt (last visited June 15, 2013).
Vice President Garret Hobart had died of heart failure on November 21, 1899. See Garret
A.
Hobart
(1897–1899),
MILLER
CENTER,
http://millercenter.org/president/mckinley/essays/vicepresident/1847 (last visited June 15,
2013).
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They are named in the statutes in the order of time that those departments
were created. And so it is absolutely certain that when a political party
elects a particular man to the Presidency, that party can count of having the
offices of the government for the whole four years.
“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within
that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of
them.”357
The President of the United States, when he enters upon his office, is
entitled to receive the salary then fixed by law. He can count under this
provision upon that amount being paid him until the end of his four years,
and Congress cannot diminish it during that time. It gives him a sense of
independence. It is to take away from Congress the power of starving the
President into surrendering to their will. It is to say to the President, stand
on your own rights and the amount that we agreed to pay you at the start
we will pay you until the close. That is a wise provision. The President of
the United States cannot, however, while he is doing that receive
emoluments from states. The state of Ohio could not employ Mr.
McKinley to represent them in a case and pay him for it, although he could
come into our court and argue a case, if he thought it consistent with his
high office, we would hear him, but he could not receive compensation for
it.358
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution of the United States.359
Mr. Lincoln said to our brethren of the South, before the war actually
opened,
I have upon my soul an oath to protect and defend the United
States, to preserve the Constitution of the United States. I cannot
357

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
No sitting President has argued a case before the Supreme Court. John Quincy
Adams, James Knox Polk, Abraham Lincoln, James Abram Garfield, Grover Cleveland,
Benjamin Harrison, William Howard Taft, and Richard Nixon argued cases before the
Supreme Court before or after they served as President. See Robert Nedelkoff, Nixon,
Lincoln, Et Al Before the High Court, NEW NIXON, (Aug. 31, 2010),
http://blog.nixonfoundation.org/2010/08/nixon-lincoln-et-al-before-the-high-court/.
359 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
358
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permit you to destroy the authority of the United States, to take
possession of its property, and resist its laws, without violating my
oath. You have got no oath upon your souls such as I have upon
mine. I beg you to halt and think before you go further.360
And that is his oath today. Wherever—anywhere between the two
oceans and the lakes on the North and the Gulf on the South—anybody is
defying the laws of the United States, the President of the United States—
in conformity of course with the statutes of the United States—may
proceed and employ the power of the United States, to maintain its
authority wherever it is assailed.
“Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”361
Commander-in-Chief, we know what that is. We do not need any
words to define that. He commands that army, and he commands that
navy, wherever it is. He is the military commander. I see nothing in the
Constitution of the United States that will prevent the President of the
United States, if we had war, if he chooses to go to the actual scene of
conflict and take command.
There is no defined authority. We have not two Commanders-inChief, or three Commanders-in-Chief, and whatever military authority is to
be exercised it is with one man. The authority is with him. The
responsibility is with him. And whether that navy is lying in the harbor of
New York, whether it is over on the Asiatic coast watching the interests of
our country there, or whether it is in the waters of the Southwest here,
gathering around the hulk of that magnificent vessel recently destroyed, it
is still the navy and he may command it.362
Now, I do not think that I can better close what I want to say tonight
than by saying to you that we are now in times when people ought not to
lose their heads, as some people are in Congress, and out of Congress. I
cannot perform any better service to you, I am sure, than to advise you to
keep cool, and not to pass judgments upon grave questions when you have
not the facts before you. If there is anything that our profession teaches us,
it is wait until the case is presented before you to reach a final conclusion.
360 Harlan is summarizing Abraham Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address, delivered
March 4, 1961. Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in GREAT WORDS
FROM GREAT AMERICANS 155 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1890).
361 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
362 Harlan refers to the USS Maine, which exploded and sank in Havana Harbor, Cuba,
on February 15, 1898. Warship Maine Destroyed, SALT LAKE HERALD, Feb. 16, 1898 at 1.
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You will understand very well to what I allude, the great calamity that
has occurred in the waters nearby. It is idle for any man to say that he
knows how that calamity occurred. And any man belittles his nature and
lowers himself in the estimation of his fellow men if he expresses the
anxiety that it will turn out that that was treachery, rather than an accident.
Brave, generous men do not want to think so badly of their fellow men.
We do not want to believe that that was an act of treachery and
duplicity. We hope it will turn out otherwise. And we ought all to have
this feeling. If it turns out to be accidental, we should rejoice. If it turns
out not to be accidental, we will not hear any more of North, South, East, or
West in this country, but we will only hear of Americans.
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LECTURE 18: FEBRUARY 26, 1898
We are still engaged in the examination of that part of the Constitution
relating to the executive power of the United States, one of the coequal,
coordinate departments of the government. We closed at the last evening
by reference, in a general way, to Section 2 of Article II, which states that
“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
Service of the United States.” The only other observation I care to make on
that subject is to remind you that, although the general rule is that in time
of war the laws are silent, in time of peace they are not silent, that the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy is subject to the law just as we
are, and that whatever authority is in him as Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy in time of peace must be exerted by him with reference to
all the other parts of the Constitution. He cannot because he is Commander
in Chief violate any of the rights of citizens, nor override the guaranties of
the Constitution that are provided for the protection of life, liberty, and
property. As Commander in Chief of the Army he cannot order an arrest of
a citizen any more than one of you may do so. He is subordinated to the
law, to the civil law.
Now, of course, in time of war different considerations come in. The
Constitution says that Congress shall have power to declare war in this
country.363 It means that there are rules of war that govern in time of war.
Some things may be done in a time of war and within the limits of the
operation of an army that may not be done in time of peace. It would be an
endless discussion if I were to attempt to go over that whole field in all its
details and tell you what might or might not be done in time of war.
Suffice it to say that in a time of peace the army and the navy, and the
President as its Commander in Chief, are subject to the civil law and must
proceed according to the civil law in their intercourse on the outside of the
army and navy with citizens. The army and navy are subject to peculiar
rules and regulations which have been established by Congress. Now, one
of the express powers given to Congress is to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces. The President may
not make them, but Congress may, and when they are made, they are
binding not only upon the army and navy but binding upon him and upon
citizens where their rights may be involved.364

363
364

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id. art. I, § 1, 8.
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“[H]e may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices . . . .”365 If a matter arises before him for
consideration relating to the finances of the country, for instance,
somebody may suggest to the President—and there are always any number
of people ready to make suggestions as to the best mode of improving the
conditions of this country upon the subject of currency—he may suggest a
plan. Well, the President can write on the back of that paper, and he may
refer it to the Secretary of the Treasury, with the direction that he give his
opinion in writing about the practicability and the feasibility of that plan,
and the Secretary of the Treasury will proceed to give his opinion. The
President may be asked to do this or that in reference to the army or navy.
Well, he would refer one to the Secretary of War and the other to the
Secretary of the Navy and ask their opinion. He may be asked something
that involves a question not of public policy but of law. Well, he would
refer that to the Attorney General with a request that he give his opinion.
That provision of the Constitution was first brought into recognition, if
I remember correctly from my reading, when the first act was passed
establishing the Bank of the United States. Washington was President, and
he referred that act of Congress to the heads of Departments, and asked
each one of them his opinion about it.366 He asked it in order that he might
be advised as to his duty to approve it or veto it. That was a very
memorable occasion in the history of the country. All the heads of
Departments gave their opinions. None of them were very long or full
except one, and that was by the youngest man in the cabinet of
Washington, Alexander Hamilton, who was at that time only about thirty-

365

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
George
Washington—First
Term,
PROFILES
OF
U.S. PRESIDENTS,
http://www.presidentprofiles.com/Washington-Johnson/George-Washington-Firstterm.html#ixzz20LHvtMsQ (last visited June 15, 2013) (“Although brief, the debate in the
House was heated enough and the opposition’s arguments were plausible enough to make
Washington uneasy about the measure’s constitutionality. To dispel such misgivings, he
solicited the advice of Attorney General Edmund Randolph, who pronounced the bank
unconstitutional. Still undecided, Washington turned to his secretary of state. A
constitutional fundamentalist and fiscal conservative, Jefferson set forth in his opinion on
the bank a rigidly literal and strict construction of the Constitution that would have virtually
strangled the national government in its infancy. Still undecided, the president sent copies
of Randolph’s and Jefferson’s opinions to the secretary of the treasury, implicitly requesting
him to refute them. Although he was confident of Hamilton’s ability to do so, Washington
could not have forecast the masterfulness of the essay in constitutional law that he received
in reply.”).
366
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four or thirty-five years of age.367 The question presented to Washington
was, Has Congress the authority to create a national bank, or a bank of the
United States? Does the power belong to it under the Constitution? Of
course, it was important to have it settled upon the right ground.
Washington was not a lawyer. He was a planter, not versed in the
principles of constitutional law, except in the way that every American was
of that day. The question was, did the Constitution authorize it?
Now, the tradition is that Mr. Hamilton wrote his answer to the
question propounded to him in one evening, that he sat up all night——
substantially all night—completed it and sent it to the President.368 Time
was important because the bill would become a law within the ten-day limit
if it was not approved or sent back. Well, it was a marvelous document,
that prepared by Mr. Hamilton. It covered the whole theory of the
Constitution as he understood it.
But observe that these opinions are not law in the sense of the
judgment of a court is law. They are given for the information and
guidance of the President. He has called his cabinet around him. He has
tried to select men qualified to head these departments. Some of them
would perhaps have special knowledge on the special subjects belonging to
their departments, and therefore the framers of the Constitution said it was
wise and proper that the President of the United States should have the
benefit of the views of all the members of the cabinet, or any one of them
that he might call for. He might conclude to follow the opinion of the head
of the department, but that did not make it law.
If what was done was called in question in a court of law it would have
been no answer to say that the President did this because he was advised by
the Attorney General that it might be legally done. There is only one state
in the union, I believe, that has that system in its Constitution, that is the

367 This document has come to be known as Hamilton’s “Opinion on the
Constitutionality of a National Bank,” written in response to then-Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson’s own opinion attacking the constitutionality of a national bank. See Alexander
Hamilton, supra note 235, at 95. Hamilton supported the notion of a strong national
government and construed Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers broadly, whereas
Jefferson believed in small, decentralized government with limited national power. See id.
368 This appears to be incorrect in its details. President Washington sent the opinions
of Secretary of State Jefferson and Attorney General Edmund Randolph, both rejecting the
constitutionality of a national bank, to Hamilton, and then requested Hamilton to write his
own opinion. Although Justice Harlan here states the response was crafted overnight,
research suggests Hamilton’s approximately 15,000 word response took just over a week,
with Hamilton’s wife, Eliza, recalling that she “sat up all night [copying] out his writing”
before delivering it to Washington. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 351–53 (2004).
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state of Massachusetts. Their Constitution permits either branch of the
legislature, if a bill is pending before it, for instance, to be adopted or
rejected, and involves a grave question of law, that body is entitled to send
that bill to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, or rather to the
members of that court collectively, and ask their opinion, is this law
consistent with the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts?369 They get that opinion, not to control them, but for their
guidance. Of course, the presumption would be that if the members of that
court before the bill passed said it would be constitutional, the probability
is that they would adhere to that view when the case arose in court, unless
for good reasons their minds were changed. I do not know but what it is a
good system.
Now, it might be supplemented by another change if it was thought
wise, and some think it would be, and that is instead of the heads of
departments being confined to giving opinions to the President in writing,
to allow them a seat on the floor of the two Houses. Some very wise men
have said that ought to be the arrangement here; not that the heads of those
departments being there could vote—by no means—but they might be
there to answer questions, and the answer to those questions would give the
Representatives a great deal of information which they could not otherwise
obtain previous to the passage of the law.
They have that system in England today. All the members of Lord
Salisbury’s cabinet, I believe, are members of one of the two Houses of
Parliament.370 Lord Salisbury himself is a member of the House of Lords.
The leader of the House of Commons is Mr. Balfour. The usage now is
that questions may be propounded to these heads of departments that are
sitting there, not at one meeting and the head of department expected to get
up on the spot and give his answer, but they are filed and that gives notice,
and the head of foreign affairs in that branch of Parliament would know,
for instance, when Parliament meets next week, here is a question I have
got to answer.371
369

MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II.
Cabinet members are Members of Parliament, and are thus accountable to the
House of which they are a member. See 1 JOSEF REDLICH, THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS 71 (A. Ernest Steinthal trans., 1908).
371 At the time of Harlan’s lecture, the general idea of “question time” had been put
into parliamentary standing orders, which are procedural rules for Parliament. As with
much of the Parliament’s history, the tradition of “question time” began as unwritten and
informal custom and only later became officially recognized in a standing order. See HOUSE
OF COMMONS, STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2012, H.C., at 29, 31 (U.K.),
available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmstords/240512.pdf.
370
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And how much may he answer? Well, he may say to the House of
Commons, “I cannot, consistent with the public interest, answer this
question at this time. Correspondence is now going on between this
country and America, for instance, at this time about this matter. It is not
concluded. It would not be wise and not good for the public interests that I
should speak of that public matter, and I must decline to answer.” Well,
ordinarily that is accepted. A man true to his government would not
embarrass the executive of the government, and would not ask why.
Now, one advantage of these questions is to keep the public informed
of what is going on, and there is a publicity in public affairs up to a certain
extent that is valuable, to be recognized and valued, and there is a reticence
often in public affairs which it is important to observe if we wish to bring
things to a proper conclusion.
“[A]nd he,” that is, the President, “shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.”372
Now, observe that the power to grant reprieves and pardons here is
only for offenses against the United States. A man may be convicted in the
state of Connecticut, for instance, of larceny, grand or petit, or murder, or
burglary—an offense against the laws of that state. The United States has
nothing earthly to do with that case or with that offense, and a pardon by
the President of the United States against an offense committed against the
state of Connecticut would not be worth any more than a pardon by one of
you. It relates only to offenses against the United States.
Well, what is a reprieve? Why, it is a document that delays the
execution of the sentence. A man may be condemned in the Indian
Territory, or some other territory of the United States, or here in the District
of Columbia, to be hung on a given day in the future. Now, the President
may, for reasons satisfactory to himself, postpone the execution of that
sentence for ninety days.373 There may be reasons for it. He may doubt,
upon looking into the case, whether this man ought to be hung. He has not
had time to look into the case; there is something that he wants to find out
that is not developed in the record, and he does not want an innocent man
hung. He wants to be sure that he is in the right if this man is hung. And,
therefore, he says I delay this execution for sixty days until I look further
372

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Jerry Carannante, Note, What to Do About the Executive Clemency Power in the
Wake of the Clinton Presidency, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 325, 328 (2003) (“Reprieves
typically postpone executions until death-row inmates can give birth, recover from illness,
or be heard on a final appeal.”).
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into the case. So in the case of the payment of a fine which may be due, he
may postpone the payment by a reprieve.
What is a pardon? It is a document that wipes out the offense
altogether. A man convicted of murder in this District may be pardoned by
the President of the United States, and when that pardon is presented it
discharges that man from prison or from arrest and he goes free. It wipes
out that offense.
When may he pardon? Now first let me suppose a man today commits
what is supposed to be the crime of murder here on the streets in the city of
Washington. Perhaps it is murder according to technical law. The grand
jury has not met though and no indictment has been found. Can the
President pardon that man the day after this offense is alleged to have been
committed? Yes. He does not pardon a man from a trial, from an
indictment, from a judgment of a jury or court. He has a right to pardon the
offense, and if the offense exists, that it exists whether the man has been
indicted or not, and the President may pardon the offense, and that will
prevent the man from being indicted, or if he is indicted for that offense
why he has nothing to do except to plead that pardon. Here is a pardon
which wipes out that offense, and therefore you cannot proceed against me
with this indictment.
Now, of course, that is rarely done, because every man will see in a
moment that when a grand jury has indicted a man the President ought not
to interfere. If the grand jury has not indicted the man, the President ought
to wait until the grand jury acts, and if they indict the man, wait and see if
he is guilty. If he is guilty there is no need to interfere. If he is convicted,
that proves that the President ought not to have interfered before any trial.
But there may be cases, though they would be extreme cases, that would
justify the President to interfere before indictment and trial and pardon an
offense against the United States.
Now, sometimes a question has arisen—it has not been decided I think
in the Supreme Court of the United States, it has been decided on some of
the circuits—as to whether a man could be pardoned on condition.374 Well,
it has sometimes been done. For instance, if a man were convicted of an
offense here in this District, the President might issue a pardon conditioned
that that man should leave the United States in thirty days and never return
to it, and if he did return he would be subject to arrest and prosecution.
374 This statement is inaccurate. The Supreme Court settled this issue several decades
prior: “In this view of the constitution, by giving to its words their proper meaning, the
power to pardon conditionally is not one of inference at all, but one conferred in terms.” Ex
parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 315 (1855).
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Now, some courts have held that the President may annex a condition of
that sort to his pardon. I need not discuss whether that is sound or not. It is
certain that the Constitution does not in words say that that cannot be done.
There is no qualification made to the power to pardon, therefore, it may be
fairly stated that there is no objection in the Constitution to a pardon on a
condition of that sort.
“He,” the President, “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.”375
It was a matter of great deliberation, the subject of frequent discussion
in the conventions, as to where that power should be lodged to make
treaties.376 Who should be allowed to make treaties? It was the view of
some that the power should be vested in a triple-headed body.377 Well, the
answer to that was, if the power to make a treaty was given to a body
composed of three persons, for instance, and it needed the concurrence of
all three to make the treaty, a treaty would never be made. At last they fell
upon this plan to give the President, with the consent of the Senate, the
power to make treaties.
Now let me suppose that the Senate and House of Representatives
should by a joint resolution unanimously declare that the following treaty
written out shall be made between this country and England. And let me
suppose that that joint resolution was approved by all the Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States. And in this way obtaining the
concurrence of the legislative and judicial branches of the Government,
would that be a treaty, would that amount to the paper upon which it was
written?
No, simply because these judges of the Supreme Court of the United
States are not allowed by this Constitution to participate in the making of
treaties, nor is the House of Representatives invested with authority to
make a treaty. Nobody is invested with authority to make a treaty except
the President of the United States, and not he alone. He makes the treaty,
but he can only make it in the sense of the Constitution with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Senate may resolve every day in the year in
favor of a particular document as a treaty, but unless the President of the
375
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United States assents to it, it cannot be a treaty.
All the judicial power in this country combined could not compel the
President to assent to that treaty made by the Senate. He must initiate all
movements for a treaty, and until he does, until he agrees to a treaty with a
foreign government nothing can be done in that way. And when he does it
through his agent, whoever it may be—it may be the Secretary of State or
somebody else—that treaty must then go to the Senate, and then it requires
two-thirds of the Senators present to concur.
Therefore, if when they come to vote in the Senate on the Hawaiian
Treaty, if some Senator has not made up his mind how he ought to vote, or
wants to vote, why he can get sick and remain at home, or he can be absent
if he chooses, then it is two-thirds of the Senators present.378 If they
concur, then it becomes a treaty, and all that remains is to exchange
ratification of that treaty between the two governments.
Now there is one question right along there to which I ought to call
your attention. It may seem to you a little anomalous that such is the fact.
I have often read to you the clause of the Constitution to the effect that the
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof,” that is all valid enactments, “and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.”379
Now when the President makes a treaty and the Senate, by the
requisite vote, concurs, that treaty is the supreme law of this land as long as
it is in force. Of that treaty every port in this country must take notice
whether it is pleaded or not. The judges are judicially informed of that fact,
and they will enforce that treaty as the supreme law of the land. Yet it is
settled, and there is no authority to the contrary, that a treaty may be
repealed by an act of Congress; that is, when by an act subsequent to the
making of the treaty in which both houses concur, and in which the
President concurs, abrogating a treaty between this country and another
country, that act supersedes the treaty. And that is because Congress and
the President together constitute the machinery which makes law. And
when the people of the United States, speaking through its legislative
branches in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, say that this treaty
made by the President and Senate alone shall no longer be the law of the
land, that is the end of it.
We have no secret treaties with any country. It is sometimes said that
378
379
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there is a secret treaty of alliance between two nations. Perhaps there is. It
has often been said in the history of diplomacy that two nations would have
a secret understanding between themselves about a particular subject, a
particular point. Each of them knows what that is, but the other nations
dealing with them do not.
Well now, there is no such thing in this country. You cannot conceive
of the idea of law in this country that is to bind everybody, of which
everybody must take notice, that is not open on the statute books. And
there is no such thing possible under our Constitution, for the President and
Senate of the United States to have a secret understanding with any
government without its being known to the people of the United States.
Can the United States government protect citizens of all other nations
directly? The United States would have no more authority than the Czar of
Russia to protect the citizens of other nations. The obligation, or rather the
right to be protected in life, liberty, and property belongs primarily to the
states in which we live. Every man must look to that.
A mob might spring up in the city of New Orleans, an organized mob,
and destroy the lives of every foreign-born man in the city of New Orleans
in one blow, but the government of the United States has nothing to do with
that.380 It cannot send a soldier there for that purpose to protect it or to
prevent it. The duty is upon Louisiana to give that protection to life,
liberty, and property that belongs to human beings that are there, and there
is no greater misconception abroad than is abroad with some than that
which would suggest the idea that it belongs to the government of the
United States to right all the wrongs to humanity in the country. These
things belong to the states primarily.
Now let me make one exception to that. The Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States says that
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
380

Harlan is referring to the events surrounding the assassination of New Orleans
police chief David Hennessy in 1890. See CARL SIFAKIS, THE MAFIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 329–
31 (3d ed. 2005). The assassination was the first widely publicized incident involving the
Italian Mafia in the United States. Following a sensational trial in which many of the men
indicted for Hennessey’s murder—all of whom were Italian—were acquitted, a mob formed
outside the prison where the men were being held. See id. at 329–31. All in all, eleven
Italian men were lynched and another five prisoners died in the assault. See id. The U.S.
government paid $25,000 to the Italian government as compensation for the deaths and antiItalian sentiment that swept the nation in the aftermath of Hennessy’s assassination. See id.
at 331.
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due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.381
If Louisiana should pass any laws by which it would deny to men in
that state the equal protection of the law, thus denying to one class those
rights which they give to another, or deprive any person, foreign or native,
of his right to life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that
case should get into the courts of the United States, the courts of the United
States would strike out that law. The United States paid a given amount of
money as an act of grace to the Italian government for the lives of its
citizens murdered in New Orleans.382 It paid the money merely as a matter
of grace and to maintain the friendly relations existing between the two
governments.
The primary duty of every state in this union is to give protection to
life, liberty, and property to all within its bounds, and people are not to
suppose that because of a wrong done here or there that therefore he is to
turn his face to the city of Washington and appeal to the authorities to come
within the limits of that state and exert an authority which they have no
right to exert, and if it were not that way we would not have the
government we have. The United States is absolutely incompetent to take
care of the minor details that may occur in the life of every man in it, and
the safety depends upon each local government attending to it in the way
they ought to, and to keep their hands off and only interfere when the states
by some law or organized action do something that is violative of the rights
that belong to men under the Constitution of the United States.
Under what authority did President Cleveland call out the troops to
suppress the Chicago strike?383 Suits were brought in the courts of the
United States to enjoin certain men there from interfering with the process
of the mails of the United States, and with the progress of interstate
commerce which Congress has got power to regulate, and the process of
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See supra note 380.
383 In the Pullman Strike of 1894, striking Pullman Palace Car Company workers were
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See The Origins of Labor Day, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 2, 2001, 8:01 PM),
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injunction was issued, an injunction from a court of the United States.384
Now is it possible that—if the authority of the United States thus being
executed, thus being manifested by an order from a court of the United
States—is it possible that there is not any power in the executive offices of
the United States to go to the side of the marshal of the United States and
see to the enforcement of the order of the United States? I suppose that
was the reason. He has taken an oath to execute the laws of the United
States, and the existence of these courts and their orders were a part of the
laws of the United States.
Now, I am not talking about the policy of that litigation. I care nothing
about that, nor about the justice or injustice of strikes. I do not stop to
consider, for I do not know what the facts were, whether or not the strikers
against the railroads or Pullman Palace Car Company had just grounds for
it or not, but I do undertake to say that if the regular and peaceable and
orderly transmission of the mails of the United States from one part of this
country to the other in the regular, peaceable, and orderly conduct of
commerce among the states of this union can be interrupted by any
organized band of men for its purpose, and if there is no power anywhere in
the authorities of the United States to protect these federal rights, why the
sooner we amend the Constitution and give that power the better.
In the New Orleans case, if the Louisiana government had declared
themselves incompetent to deal with the matter, could the United States
then take hold under the Fourteenth Amendment?
Not under the Fourteenth Amendment, but there is power in the United
States when called upon by the state in regular form to suppress
insurrection. You present a very difficult question, one not so easily
answered. Suppose a state is incompetent to suppress a disorder of that
sort, and there is a governor of that state that is not worth the powder that
would blow him up, he sits idly by and does nothing, the legislature of the
state is preparing for the next presidential campaign and it does nothing,
and here is a mob that has got possession of the state and paralyzing all the
industry of the state, but not interfering with anything of a federal character
at all, do not stop the mails, do not interfere with commerce, is not
violating any federal law at all, but has simply paralyzed that state. Let me
ask, what is to be done there? Well, I do not know any other answer to
give than to say that the country has got to stand still and see that people
work out their own salvation. If they can stand the condition of things of
that sort, the people of the other states can afford to stand it a while at any
384
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rate. I know of but one provision in the Constitution to meet a case of that
sort, and that is one that has never been interpreted. I hope there will never
be any occasion to interpret it. It is the last section of Article IV. “The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and
on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”385 Now, if a
governor of the state calls on the President of the United States, saying that
there is domestic violence here that is paralyzing all the arms of authority
in the state, I cannot do anything about it, I have not the power to do it, the
militia are on the other side, and I can do nothing, then the United States, if
Congress has passed an act on the subject that covers it, could interfere, and
so if the legislature of the state acknowledged its incompetency, and said
that the state was at the mercy of a mob and could do nothing, then the
President could interfere if Congress passed an act on the subject, but no
act has been passed on the subject in order to guarantee a Republican form
of government. We have never yet determined as to what is a republican
form of government.
“[A]nd he,” the President, “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”386 All that power
belongs to the President. Could we add a given number of judges of the
Supreme Court of the United States, as some want to do?387 Some think we
have got too many now, and some want more, but can Congress increase
the court to fifteen and say who shall be those judges in order to bring
about a particular decision? No, because the Constitution says they shall be
appointed by the President. Congress cannot create an ambassador, and say
who shall fill it. The President has the appointment of all officers of the
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United States, with the single exception that he may invest the appointment
of inferior officers in the heads of departments. A great many in the
Treasury Department are not confirmed by the Senate at all. A great many
are appointed by heads of departments, and their names are not sent to the
Senate at all.
It is said in the section below, “[H]e,” the President, “shall receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”388 What do we mean by the
President receiving Ambassadors? You very often see in the papers that
Mr. so-and-so, with an unpronounceable name, has arrived here as the
Minister from a certain country in South America, Africa, or Asia, and he
has stopped at the Arlington or the Shoreham. Now, we know to a moral
certainty that this is so. We know that he has been sent here to represent
his country, and we could be certain of it if we asked to see him and read
his commission, if we could read it. But he might be here with a
commission from Queen Victoria of England or Emperor William of
Germany at the Arlington or at the Shoreham. He might have all his
retinue about him, put on all the style he chooses to put on peculiar to his
country, but he is not here up to that moment as the official representative
of his country. He has got to be recognized by the President of the United
States; he has got to be received by the President of the United States.
We see that account in the paper of a particular gentleman
accompanied to the White House by the Secretary of State, and presented
to the President; he presents his commission, and makes a speech, often not
a word of it that the President can understand, but the President responds to
it in a written address, not a word of which the foreign man understands.
That being done, the Ambassador is received. This country then put its seal
upon him as the official representative of his country, and every citizen of
the United States, and every officer of the United States, is bound to know
that that man represents his country.
So that little ceremony that you see described in the paper of receiving
has some legal significance attached to it. But out of those few words has
come, in recent days, a controversy of very great significance not yet
determined, I mean officially. No case has ever come into a court of justice
that gave the courts an opportunity to speak upon the subject. There are
some gentlemen who assert—and valued men too, patriotic men—who
assert that it belongs to the President alone to determine whether we shall
have ambassadors from this country to another, or whether an ambassador
shall be received by him for a particular country. The whole Christian
388
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world was recently stirred to the very foundations by the cruelties practiced
in Armenia by the Turkish government towards the Christians there.389
There was hardly a man in this country from one end of it to the other
whose indignation was not aroused, and so of the people of England.
Well, this republic is not in such a condition under its Constitution
where it can interfere way off yonder with matters of that sort. All we can
do is to cry aloud through our public prints, through our legislative
departments by resolutions, through our President by proclamation—call
the attention of the civilized world to the atrocities. Now suppose the
Congress of the United States should pass a statute to this effect: that the
government of Turkey was an outlaw, that it was a government that ought
not to be respected by civilized nations anywhere, and that we would not
show such respect to that government as would be implied in having a
minister from it located here in the national capital, and that the lawmaking
power of the United States cuts off all diplomatic intercourse with such a
barbarous and uncivilized country as that. And suppose that joint
resolution should become a law.
There are gentlemen who assert—and they have asserted it on the floor
of Congress, and from the State Department—have asserted that the
President of the United States, in defiance of a public policy of that sort, if
Mr. AB, commissioned here from the government of Turkey, after he
presents his credentials, that it was in the power of the President of the
United States to receive him as such against the declared will of the
Congress of the United States.
Well, I don’t believe in any such nonsense as that. I don’t believe that
we have got in this country an executive officer who can by his fiat declare
what are to be the public relations between this country and any other
government on the face of the Earth. So long as this country does not in
the usual form declare against such relations, I grant that the President may
receive him. And when the country through the legislative department has
said we will have no diplomatic relations with a particular country, it does
not belong to the President of the United States to upset that.
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LECTURE 19: MARCH 5, 1898
There are a few concluding observations I wish to make about the
second article of the Constitution. That article, as you will remember,
relates to the executive power of the United States, which is vested in the
President of the United States.
“He,” that is, the President, “shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”390
In the early history of the government that was done in part by the
President of the United States visiting the Capitol and occupying the place,
for the time being, of the President of the Senate, and expressing from his
position there orally such views as he had about public questions, and
making such recommendation as he saw proper. You will find from a
reading of the history of that time that President Washington delivered his
first annual message in person in the Senate of the United States. That
custom has left us, and now the President communicates by messages.391
The language of the Constitution is, “He shall from time to time give
to the Congress Information of the State of the Union.”392 It is
peremptory—mandatory—that he shall do it. If he fails to do so, or
declines to do so, there is no mode of compelling him, but there is no
difficulty in these latter days in the execution of that article of the
Constitution. The President is always glad of an opportunity to
communicate his views to Congress. He does so sometimes at very great
length, and he recognizes such measures as he deems necessary and
expedient. They are recommendations only. They are not bound to accept
his recommendations. Congress can do as it pleases about it. If any
member of Congress thinks that the only way he can keep control of
patronage of his district will be to fall in with the recommendations of the
President, why he can do so, nothing to prevent him. And perhaps some do
so, I don’t know.
Then, “[H]e may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses
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[of Congress] or either of them.”393 If Congress is not in session and some
extraordinary emergency arises in our history which cannot be met except
by legislation on the part of Congress, the President by special
proclamation convenes the two houses.
You probably will want to understand what the words “or either of
them” mean. Can he convene one House of Congress and not another?
Yes. At the close of every presidential term, or immediately after the close
of it, the incoming President calls an extraordinary session of the Senate of
the United States. That is to the end that his appointments may be
confirmed. The House has nothing to do with confirming the appointments
of the President. Of course, the incoming President wants his own cabinet.
He does not want the cabinet of his predecessor, even if he is of the same
political party, and he wants his nominations for cabinet positions
confirmed. Then perhaps the incoming administration wants a change in
the principal affairs of the government, and in our ambassadors and
ministers abroad. In connection with that the presence of the Senate only is
necessary, and not the House.394
Then, “in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the
Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think
proper.”395 The Senate wants to adjourn to one period. The House says,
“No, we won’t agree to that. We propose to adjourn to another day.” Well,
the Senate won’t agree to that. And here is a hung jury, to use a popular
phrase. And the time of the country, and the money of the country, is not
to be wasted in fruitless endeavor of these two Houses to agree as to the
time to which they shall adjourn. Now, in that state of case the President
may interfere and say, “I adjourn you both to a certain day in the future.”
That is lawful.
“[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”396 I
have already explained to you the ceremony of receiving ambassadors at
the White House.
Now comes a clause of the Constitution of greater importance than any
of those that I have just read. “[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be
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faithfully executed.”397
If you will turn back to the former part of the Constitution, you will
see that the President solemnly swears, among other things, that he will
“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”398
Here, the Constitution adds the further idea, which is really involved in his
oath, that he shall take care that the laws of the United States are faithfully
executed.
Take care how? According to his arbitrary will, to do whatever in his
judgment may be necessary to that end? No, because when he is executing
the laws of the United States, he must understand there are certain things he
cannot do. There are other provisions of the Constitution involving the
safety of life, liberty, and property which he cannot, in executing the laws,
forget or overlook or override. He must take into view the whole
Constitution of the United States, but take care that the laws—that the
statutes passed in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States shall
be executed. That is a very general phrase. It was left general purposely
because the framers of the Constitution could not foresee exactly in what
way the laws might be obstructed in their execution, but stated generally,
take care that the laws are faithfully executed.
That provision of the Constitution had an illustration in part in a very
celebrated case in the Supreme Court of the United States. Several years
ago—I forget the number of years, inside of eight or nine years—one of the
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States went to his circuit. You
will understand that the United States is divided into nine judicial circuits,
and to each circuit is assigned a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United
States.399 This Supreme Court Justice went out to his circuit in the state of
California—I allude to Mr. Justice Field—went out there to hold his court,
to discharge his duties as a Circuit Justice.
He had before that rendered federal decisions in that circuit, and they
had aroused the animosity of two people: Judge Terry and his wife,
formerly a Mrs. Hill. Cases in which they were concerned, which involved
large amounts of property. Judge Field, holding the Circuit Court in the
state of California, had rendered certain decisions that were very distasteful
to them. They upset their plans to get possession of the estate of a
gentleman in California. Reaching San Francisco, and holding court there
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for a day or two, he then started to hold his court in the lower part of that
district, San Diego I believe, or Los Angeles.
Before he went on this last journey, the Attorney General of the United
States—the Department of Justice—was informed that it was the purpose
of Colonel Terry to take the life of Judge Field, if he got a chance, because
of decisions he had rendered. And that Judge Field’s life as he went
through the circuit there in the discharge of his duties as a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States was constantly imperiled from these
people. The Attorney General instantly ordered the Marshal of the United
States of the District of California to see to it that Judge Field was not
molested or interfered with. And when he went on this trip to lower
California to hold court there he was accompanied by a Deputy Marshal.
He got through his work there and was on his way back to San
Francisco to resume his duties there. A certain station on the way was
reached, and he got out with this Deputy Marshal, and went into the
railroad station to get his breakfast. And they were sitting at the table
together, the Judge and the Deputy Marshal. Well, while they were sitting
there, Colonel Terry, a man of large physical proportions and undoubted
courage—at least he had the reputation of that—approached Judge Field
from the rear and, with a wave of the hand, slapped his jaw. The venerable
judge turned. It is supposed that the purpose of Terry was to provoke
Judge Field to resent that and then kill him.
Well, it so happened that this Deputy Marshal, who was very quick
and active, saw this blow being given to Judge Field. Instantly he arose
and warned Terry, “I am a Deputy Marshal of the United States, sir.”
Something that Terry did indicated that he didn’t care for that; he was
going to hurt this Judge. And this Deputy Marshal fired his pistol and it
went to its destination. This giant dropped and died instantly.
Immediately he was indicted in the state court, this Deputy Marshal,
for murder. And it happened to be a state court in a county where the
influence of this dead man was supposed to be overshadowed. He sued out
a writ of habeas corpus in the federal court based upon the ground, “I have
discharged my duty as a Deputy Marshal of the United States. I have done
nothing but to protect this Judge in the discharge of his duty as a Judge of
the court of the United States, and I deny the right of this state court to try
me for murder.”
Well, he was brought under the writ of habeas corpus into the federal
court at San Francisco, and discharged because he had acted in the
execution of his lawful duty as an officer of the United States. Afterwards,
the case came to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that judgment
was affirmed, in part upon the ground that the President of the United
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States, speaking through the Attorney General, had ordered this Marshal to
protect that Judge in the discharge of his duty. And that was in execution
of the laws of the United States, and those laws of the United States were
the supreme law of the land, and therefore that Marshal was simply in the
line of his duty.400
Now, if you want to read that case and take a minute of it, it is one of
considerable interest, I will give you a reference to it. The case is entitled
In re Neagle, 135 United States, page 1, opinion by Mr. Justice Miller.401 I
may repeat here what I have stated to you often: that you will derive great
profit in understanding the Constitution of the United States in the study of
great cases. And if you study that case, you will then understand as you
have not understood before the full scope of this constitutional requirement
that the President of the United States shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
“Section 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”402
It is the glory of our system of government that there is no man, no
matter what office he holds, who is above our law. And that cannot be
affirmed of any other government that exists on the Earth. No matter what
the King or the Queen of England may do, they cannot be impeached. The
joint vote of the House of Lords and the House of Commons together could
not remove Victoria from her office. It is quite true that if the House of

400 David S. Terry was a Justice of the California Supreme Court from 1855 to 1859,
and the Chief Justice from 1857 to 1859. Kenneth W. Hobbs, Terry, David Smith, TEXAS
STATE HISTORICAL ASS’N, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fte29 (last
visited June 15, 2013). Terry was born in Kentucky and grew up in Texas. Id. He served in
the First Regiment of Texas Mounted Riflemen during the Mexican War and joined the
California gold rush in 1849. Id. In 1855, Terry was elected to the California Supreme
Court on the American Party ticket, with Democratic Party support. Id. His political career
ended in 1859 when he killed United States Senator David C. Broderick in a duel. Id. Terry
served in the Confederate Army during the Civil War and returned to California in 1868. Id.
In the 1880s, Terry represented Sarah Althea Hill, who claimed to be the wife of
millionaire William Sharon and sued him for divorce. Id. When Hill lost, she married
Terry. Id. Justice Field heard the appeal and sentenced Terry and Hill both for contempt.
Id. On August 14, 1889, Terry assaulted Field at a train station in Lathrop, California. Id.
Field’s bodyguard, United States Marshal David Neagle, shot and killed Terry. Id.
California arrested Neagle and charged him with murder, but the United States obtained a
writ of habeas corpus, which the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed. Id.
401 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
402 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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Commons and the House of Lords were united in declaring that she should
no longer he recognized as Queen, people would be apt to follow them, but
it would not be done inside of the law. That would be a civil revolution.403
But in our country, without revolution, without disturbing the course
of the law, the people of this country, speaking through this Constitution,
can lay their hands upon every official in this country—or any one of them,
from the President down—and say that if you are tried, if you are
impeached by the Senate and House of Representatives in the required
mode, you shall get out of this office. That applies to the President, to the
Chief Justice of the United States, and to all the members of that Court, and
to every civil official of the United States, every one of them, for any one
of them can be put out of office for the commission of high crimes and
misdemeanors.404
Now, that brings us to the consideration of the third article of the
Constitution, in some respects the most important of all. It relates to “[t]he
judicial Power of the United States.”405 What do we mean by the judicial
power of the United States? It is the power to determine disputes in an
appointed mode, in regular form, according to the established modes.
Not all judicial power is here referred to, but the judicial power of the
United States. That does not embrace all the judicial power exercised in
this country. The largest part of the judicial power exercised in this
country is by the states, not by the government of the United States, the
states dealing with questions under their own judicial organization and with
questions that do not concern the United States. This Constitution, dealing
only with the government of the United States—its powers, its functions,
and the rights that arise under the Constitution of the United States—
distributes the judicial power of the United States alone.
Well now, by whom is that to be exercised? This instrument says it
403 On November 22, 1641, Parliament stated its grievances against King Charles I in a
Grand Remonstrance and attempted to impeach Queen Henrietta Maria, who eventually fled
England.
Maurice
Ashley,
Charles
I,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9022559 (last visited June 15, 2013). The English
Civil War began in 1642 and ended in 1648, when Oliver Cromwell’s New Model Army
defeated the last of Charles I’s supporters. Id. On January 20, 1649, Parliament charged
Charles I with treason. Id. While Charles I refused to recognize Parliament’s jurisdiction,
he was sentenced to death and executed on January 30, 1649. Id.
404 While the Constitution provides federal judges with their offices during “good
Behaviour,” U.S. CONST., art III, § 1, it does not expressly provide for their removal. It is
assumed, however, that judges may be impeached as “civil Officers of the United States.”
See Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. 265,
282 (1993).
405 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

2013]

JUSTICE HARLAN: LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

235

“shall be vested”—not may be vested—“in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”406
Can the Congress of the United States abolish the Supreme Court of
the United States? Why, if they tried it, we could declare that law to be
unconstitutional. And we would so declare it, not because we had the
power to declare it simply, but because the Constitution says there shall be
one Supreme Court. That is the only thing in our organization that
Congress cannot get rid of. The scriptures, I believe, say—these young
gentlemen here that read their Bible every morning will correct me if I am
wrong—that the poor ye have always with you.407 And so you have the
Supreme Court of the United States always with you. It cannot be
abolished.
Now, observe that this judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court. Not two Supreme Courts, but one. And some gentlemen, whose
statesmanship and wisdom and great legal knowledge everybody respects,
have suggested that the Supreme Court of the United States ought to be
increased—might be increased—to fifteen, and then let the court sit in two
parts and have two Supreme Courts.408 Well, there may be serious ground
to doubt the constitutionality of a law of that sort of if you have Supreme
Courts. That Congress may increase the Supreme Court to fifteen nobody
can doubt, but it is the fifteen that must together constitute one court. You
cannot make two Supreme Courts out of it.
You will not suspect me of lauding or praising a court to which I
happen to belong when I say that that court—or rather the organization of
that court, and the putting it into the Constitution of the United States—is
today the amazement of statesmen in Europe and all over the world. They
do not understand it. I have talked with judges of great distinction in
England, and men in public life there, but they have said to me in a
personal conversation, “I wish we had in our country a court like that.” He
406

Id. (emphasis added).
“For ye have the poor with you always, and whensoever ye will ye may do them
good: but me ye have not always.” Mark 14:7 (King James). “For ye have the poor always
with you; but me ye have not always.” Matthew 26:11 (King James). “For the poor always
ye have with you; but me ye have not always.” John 12:8 (King James). See also “For the
poor shall never cease out of the land: therefore I command thee, saying, Thou shalt open
thine hand wide unto thy brother, to thy poor, and to thy needy, in thy land.” Deuteronomy
15:11 (King James).
408 See Edward J. Phelps et al., Minority Report on the Relief of the United States
Courts, 5 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 363, 368–69 (1882) (proposing that Congress divide the Court
into two sections and suggesting an increase in the number of Justices to twelve or fifteen).
407
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was not complimenting the personnel of that court at any particular time,
but he was referring to the fact that it was a vital part of the American
system of government. That there was a tribunal imbedded in that system
that had the power to declare what the law of this land was—not to make it,
but to declare what it was—and that its judgment could be enforced over
every foot of American soil. “Why,” says one of the great English judges
to me, “Parliament here can do anything.”
As one of their leading men, still alive, has said in his book on the
American Commonwealth—I allude to Mr. Bryce, and he is the only
Englishman in the last five hundred years that has exhibited the slightest
capacity to understand our form of government here or know anything
about it—he says there that the British Parliament can do anything in the
world, except turn a man into a woman or a woman into a man.409 And so
it can, speaking from a standpoint of law. And this judge says there is no
check upon Parliament.
I thought I saw in his words, and from other circumstances, that there
was something in his mind that he did not fully express, because he had
then been recently made a member of the House of Lords. What was in his
mind, as one of the titled men of England, was the sound that was coming
from the advance in England of what they call the democracy of the people.
He saw that they had in England already reached the period when the voice
of the House of Commons was all-powerful. When the Commons of
England, coming immediately from the people by election, were to have
more and more each year their own way. And that the House of Lords,
with its Lords and Earls, was losing its power. And that everything in
England was at the mercy of the democracy of the House of Commons.
Therefore, he wanted, although he had never said so publicly, he
wanted a written Constitution as we have got here that defines the powers
of government. That tells what Congress may do and what it may not do.

409 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 44 (London, MacMillan & Co.
1888) (stating that Parliament “is to-day the only and the sufficient depository of the
authority of the nation; and is therefore, within the sphere of law, irresponsible and
omnipotent”). James Bryce was born in Belfast in 1838 and became the first Viscount
Bryce. He was also an academic, jurist, historian and Liberal politician. See James Bryce,
Viscount
Bryce,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/82530/James-Bryce-Viscount-Bryce
(last
visited June 15, 2013). The assertion that Harlan attributes to Bryce was actually made by
Jean Louis de Lolme, Swiss author of a 1788 treatise on the English Constitution. See
ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 40–
41 (Elibron Classics 2005) (1902) (quoting de Lolme’s “grotesque expression which has
become almost proverbial”).
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That tells what neither Congress nor the states can do. That defines the
principles that protect life, liberty, and property in this country. And that
creates as a separate, independent, coordinate department of the
government—a judicial system—which can see to it that this law is
supreme.
Therefore, these men do not understand how it is that we wild fellows
on this side of the ocean, that this ungovernable American democracy,
could ever have conceived of the idea of having a form of government
which made a part of it a system which was a check upon all other branches
of government.
Well, that is conservatism that Europe does not understand. It gives a
sense of security to every human being in this country. To every man that
values his own right to labor. To every man that owns a dollar of property
in the United States. He knows that there are limits to the power of a state
legislature, there are limits to the powers even of the Congress of the
United States. That if Congress and the President combined should put
before the people a particular statute as a law of the United States, still the
humblest man in this land whose rights—as he conceived—were infringed
by that law could come to a tribunal, separate and apart from all the other
departments of the government, and appeal to that tribunal. And could say
to a court that this act of Congress tramples upon my rights of property.
This act of Congress deprives me of my property. In its largest sense, this
act before stated transgresses my rights of property or liberty, and I appeal
to the judicial tribunal to say whether that is not true. And when the
highest court of the land says that it is true—that this written Constitution is
the supreme law of the land and binds Congresses and state legislatures as
well—that written Constitution says that this law is void. And being so
declared that is the end of it.
Now, ought not an American to be proud that he lives in a country that
has a system of that sort? Is it too much to say that the perpetuity of our
institutions and the liberties of the people depend in no small degree upon
the power vested in the judicial branch of the United States to enforce this
Constitution, the supreme law of the land, against Presidents and
Congresses?
“[A]nd in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish.”410
What inferior courts are there referred to? Well, they did not know.
They said inferior courts; inferior to this one Supreme Court. What courts
410

U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
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of the United States have we got now, that are inferior to the Supreme
Court? Well, there is a Circuit Court of the United States. There are nine
circuits. There are the district courts of the United States. Under that
clause Congress creates the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the
Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, the
Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States, one in each circuit.
How many may Congress create? Why, as many as it wants. If it
chooses, we could have a Circuit Court of the United States in every county
in the United States. Of course, any Congressman who voted for such an
act would not come back a second time. But the power exists: no limit to
the number of these inferior courts that may be established.
Where did the idea of the judicial system we have here now originate,
and how was it worked out in its present form? Well, that is a little
difficult to answer. The question is a very proper one, and one that would
suggest inquiry.
We are amazed today—and rightly—when we think of the results of
this Constitution. And when we look back and recognize the fact that this
Constitution was adopted in 1788—the final vote was given, accepted by
the people—we are amazed that these men were as wise as they were.
They had before them only the example of the English government. But
upon that they builded this structure. And they were able, in part of their
own foresight and wisdom, to see that a system of this sort was necessary.
They did not believe in establishing what was called a parliamentary
government, a government in which the legislative department could do as
it pleased. They cast about, considered and reflected what check was
necessary upon the arbitrary power of the legislature, and reached the
conclusion embodied in this instrument.
How much the framers of the Constitution had read, I do not know.
But if you have not got it in your library, I advise you to look tomorrow in
the secondhand bookstores and see if you cannot buy one for half price, for
it is worth its weight in gold. It is a single volume called The Federalist.
When this Constitution was adopted by the convention and put before
the people, it was assailed by a great many men, and a great many men
whose patriotism nobody doubted. Patrick Henry started the ball in motion
probably before any other man. Yet he was opposed to the acceptance of
this Constitution because he thought it would endanger the rights of the
people. And other people were of the same opinion. But their views did
not prevail. And when this Constitution was put before the people there
was a hand-to-hand struggle from one end of the old states to the other.
There were at that time three young men, young in years relatively:
John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton. No one of them at that
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time was forty years of age, if I am not mistaken. I am quite sure Madison
was not more than thirty-six, and Hamilton was not more than thirty-one,
and Jay perhaps about forty.411
This Federalist contains articles written by those three young men,
urging the people to accept the Constitution of the United States, meeting
all the attacks upon it, explaining it. Probably the best of the articles—the
strongest—was written by the youngest one of the three, Alexander
Hamilton.412
Now, that book today is an authority with every court in this country.
It is cited in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in every state in
this union. And when you read these articles, you will probably be able to
answer the question put to me better than I can. But I can no more answer
it than I can answer the question, where did Alexander Hamilton acquire
the knowledge which he had?
At eighteen years of age he stood before a crowd in the city of New
York advocating the cause of his country against British aggression.413 At
twenty-six years of age he was on the staff of Washington, and the man
upon whom Washington leaned perhaps more than he did upon any
other.414 At thirty-one years of age he was expounding this instrument.415
411

The Constitutional Convention adopted the Constitution on September 17, 1787.
Teaching with Documents: Observing Constitution Day, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/constitution-day/ (last visited June 15, 2013).
John Jay was forty-one years old and was born on December 12, 1745. See John Jay,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/301875/John-Jay
(last visited June 15, 2013). James Madison was thirty-six years old and was born on March
16, 1751.
See Irving Brant, James Madison, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/355859/James-Madison (last visited June 15,
2013). It is unclear whether Hamilton was thirty-two or thirty-four years old, as he was
born on either January 11, 1755 or January 11, 1757. See Alexander DeConde, Alexander
Hamilton,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/253372/Alexander-Hamilton (last visited June
15, 2013).
412 Harlan is probably referring to THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton).
413 On July 6, 1774, Hamilton made a speech attacking British policies at a public
meeting in New York City, and on December 15, 1774, he published his first political essay,
A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress (Dec. 15, 1774), in THE REVOLUTIONARY
WRITINGS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Richard B. Vernier ed., 2008).
414 Hamilton joined Washington’s staff as a Lieutenant Colonel in March 1777. See
Alexander DeConde, supra note 411. He served as Washington’s chief of staff until 1781,
and led the final assault at Yorktown. Id.
415 Hamilton was one of three New York delegates to the Constitutional Convention in
1787, although his direct influence on the drafting of the Constitution was limited by New
York politics. Id. He also wrote fifty-one of the eighty-five essays promoting the
ratification of the Constitution now known as The Federalist Papers, published in The
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At about thirty-four years of age he was Secretary of the Treasury of the
United States.416
And while Secretary, he wrote his report on
417
manufactures, and his opinion on the national bank of the United States,
418
and other documents that today are the textbooks for every statesman
and judge in this country who believes in Hamilton’s interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States.
I can only answer the question in a general way, put to me by the
statement that he seemed to be—from our reading of the history of the
human family, that whenever a great crisis came upon any people,
Providence was kind enough to raise up the man to meet the emergency. In
the last civil war—the greatest that any country has ever seen—before that
war was half over, the American people found out who were the men to
lead the union. Who was the man to take charge of that vast machinery,
and who were the men to be his subordinates. And the man that did take
charge, and the men who were his subordinates, were all under forty years
of age.419 And so it happened when this Constitution was adopted.
Where the thought originated of one Supreme Court, I do not know.
They certainly did not borrow it from any country on the Earth. There is
one supreme court in England today—the House of Lords—but the House
of Lords is composed of a vast number of people who do not know much
about law.
The House of Lords as a body constitutes the court of last resort,
although only a few of them that are lawyers participate in the decisions.420
Independent Journal and The New York Packet between October 1787 and August 1788.
See
About
the
Federalist
Papers,
LIBR.
OF
CONG.,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt_fedpapers.html (last visited June 15, 2013);
Federalist
Papers,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/203506/Federalist-papers (last visited June 15,
2013).
416 Hamilton became the first Secretary of the Treasury on September 11, 1789.
Alexander DeConde, supra note 411.
417 1 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report of the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 217, at 157.
418 1 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on the Subject of a National Bank (Dec. 13,
1790), in WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 217, at 59.
419 George Washington was forty-three years old when he assumed command of the
Continental Army in July 1775. See Henry Graff, George Washington, ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/636381/George-Washington (last
visited June 15, 2013). While the average age of Washington’s generals was forty, many
were considerably older. Who Served Here? Washington’s Officers at Valley Forge,
HISTORIC VALLEY FORGE, http://www.ushistory.org/valleyforge/served/ages.html (last
visited June 20, 2013).
420 Historically, the House of Lords was the United Kingdom’s court of last resort.
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But the decision of the House of Lords cannot control the House of Lords,
and cannot control the House of Commons, if it does not want to be.421
And last of all, does it control the Queen?
I cannot find any account of it in the history of any other nation. It
seems to have come providentially into this instrument that there should be
a judicial organization by usage, by principles, and by theory to set apart
from the controversies of the present day, having in its organization no
connection with political parties, but that should represent the people of the
United States according to their will as expressed in this instrument. And
when this court of last resort referred to speaks and delivers its judgment,
that is the end of it. And one of the highest evidences of the innate respect
of these American people for the law as regularly declared is the fact that
up to this time, and we are now more than a hundred years old, there is not
a single instance in which the people of this country have ever sought to
arise in revolution or insurrection against that final deliverance of that court
of last resort upon any question of law, whatever it might be.
Now, these judges, “both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.”422
What do you mean by “during good behavior?”
Well, you can answer that question as well as I can. They left it
undefined. What behavior for which a judge of the Supreme Court—or a
judge of any other federal court—may be impeached, I say is left undefined
by the Constitution. But if the Congress of the United States, in the mode
prescribed by law, impeaches a judge of a federal court because he is not of
good behavior, that is the end of it. I suppose that if it were true that a
judge of a federal court was in the habit of coming upon the bench every
The Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 59 (U.K.), delegated most of the
appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords to Lords of Appeal in Ordinary or “Law Lords,”
with the exception of matters reserved to the Privy Council. The Constitutional Reform Act,
2005, c. 4 (U.K.), transferred the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords to the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom.
421 In theory, the House of Lords could have overruled the Law Lords. Originally, the
House of Lords could veto a bill passed by the House of Commons. See The Parliament
Acts, UK PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/parliamentacts/ (last
visited June 16, 2013). During the Nineteenth Century, the House of Commons achieved
predominance over the House of Lords. See id. Eventually, the House of Commons
compelled the House of Lords to pass the Parliament Act of 1911, which enabled a majority
of the House of Commons to overrule the House of Lords. Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2
Geo. 5, c. 13 (U.K.).
422 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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day in a state of intoxication, so that he could not properly discharge his
duty, that would not be good behavior, and if he should be impeached upon
that ground the impeachment would stand. But whatever was the ground,
the judgment of the impeaching tribunals, the Senate and the House, would
stand.
And then, we are to have a compensation, which shall not be
diminished during our continuance in office.423 A most comfortable
provision. A federal judge knows that however mad anybody may become,
they cannot deprive him of the power of meeting his grocer’s bill or paying
his rent.
According to the rate fixed when he went into office. Is that wise, or is
it not wise? I rather think it is a wise provision. It has some ups and
downs. Do not know but I have explained it to you. I sometimes find it
difficult to remember whether a thing I am about to tell you was told this
term or last term, there is danger always of repeating, but perhaps this will
bear repeating.
About fifteen or twenty years ago, some gentlemen in the House of
Representatives came to the conclusion that they were not getting enough,
and they got up a bill to increase the salaries of members of Congress in the
lower House and Senate.424 That is all it contained when it was first
presented, and the bill was so drawn as to take effect as from the beginning
of the term, nearly two years back. A man elected, for instance, at the time
when the salary was $5,000, towards the close of his term he joined in
passing a law saying he should have $7,500 from the beginning of the term.
Well, there was some criticism of it, and General Butler—the late
General Butler of Massachusetts—was credited with the thought that that
might be strengthened if some amendments were made to the bill. And so
in order to give it strength he had a provision that the salary of the
President should be increased from $25,000 to $50,000 a year. And then
the provision was added that the salaries of the judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States should be increased from $6,000 to $10,000 a
year. It was supposed that would give the measure more respectability.
And it went through on that line, and as soon as it went through there was a
howl from one end of this country to the other about a “back salary grant,”
423

Id. (“The Judges . . . shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
424 On March 3, 1873, Congress voted to increase the salary of congressmen and other
government officials. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 226, 17 Stat. 485. This act was colloquially
referred to as the “salary grab.” See Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment 200 Years Too Late?, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 501, 540–41 (1994).
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as it was called. The people of the United States said that was practically
stealing.
If there is anything in the world that the average American voter hates
it is a double-tongued fellow: a fellow that deceives, a fellow that wants to
play a false part. And they did not object to increasing the salaries of
Representatives and Senators, if you made it take effect for the future. But
when a Representative had been before them and asked their votes at a time
when his salary was to be $5,000 a year, and then towards the close of his
term he joined in for a law to give him $7,500 from the beginning of the
term, why the plain average man of the country said that was rascality. I
don’t like that, that is double-dealing.
And the politicians went tumbling over each other to get to the
Treasury to pay back this extra money that they had received, so that they
could go before the people and say that it is true that law was passed, but I
did not take any of the money. And most of the fellows who did that were
left at home; they did not come back. The fellow who went before his
constituents with open countenance and brave words and said, “Yes, I
voted for it, and I took it. I found that you had sent me to Washington to
live upon $5,000 and I could not do it. I could not do your work there
properly, and I voted for that increase, and I have no apologies to make for
it, but I would do it again.” And many of those fellows were returned for
their frankness.
Now, did you observe the wording of the clause here, that it should not
be diminished during the term of office of the judge? So, when at the next
session of Congress they repealed that law so far as Senators and
Representatives were concerned, they could not repeal it as to the judges.
I will complete what I have to say about the judicial power of the
Constitution next Saturday night, and probably be able to enter upon
Article IV.
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LECTURE 20: MARCH 12, 1898
When we were together last Saturday night, the subject was Article III
of the Constitution, relating to the judicial power of the United States. I
had said all upon the subject treated of in that first section which I need
refer to. I called your attention to the fact that the judges of the courts of
the United States under the Constitution were entitled to hold their offices
during good behavior, and at stated times to receive for their services a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office.425 Of course, you have occasion often to consider, what are the
principles which underlie the federal system of judges appointed for life or
during good behavior, and the system prevailing in many of the states
under which the judges are elected for a short term, and then must stand for
re-election, provided they are nominated by their political parties?426
Now in some of the states, curiously enough, no judge has been
elected to office at any time within forty years that was not the nominee of
a political party, with very few exceptions. I know of states in reference to
which that is true. And if you were to attend the conventions of those
parties—the one as well as the other—and look over that convention
previously, if you had an opportunity to know them all, you would stand
amazed in the presence of the fact that there were four or five hundred men
here selecting a candidate for judge, and not one of them is a lawyer. Not
one of them ever opened a book on the subject of the law, and yet they pick
out a man to be the candidate of their party for judge. And they vote for
him because he is the nominee of the party, and when he gets on the bench,
why he forgets that fact, if he can. If he is an honest man he will forget that
fact, and he will administer justice as he understands it.
But let me suppose that an election is near at hand: here is a case on
trial that involves a man’s property, or liberty, or life; that man has a large
connection through the county, and that fact is known to the judge. He
knows that if he rules the law against that man that whole tribe will be
against him at the polls. That is what he believes. Well, if he is a
thoroughly honest man and had rather starve than be dishonest, he will
march right up to the line of duty and discharge it. If he is a weak man, or
a little timid, he will trim his way, or he may put the case in a shape to save
that man and please that large connection.
425

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
For a historical analysis of partisan and nonpartisan judicial selection methods, see
generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 14–84 (2012).
426
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Now, that is the difficulty, and that is the temptation in the way of
judges elected for a short time by popular vote, and who must get their
nominations from a political party. Let me suppose that before an election
there was a case before that judge, the decision of which was going to bear
very materially upon the election just approaching. He knows very well
that if he decides it against the will of the leading politicians of his party
that he will fail of his nomination and of his election. That intimidates
some men. Now, the judge who is on his bench for life, or during good
behavior, with the assurance in the Constitution that his salary cannot be
diminished during his term of office, is in a condition where he can say to
the politicians, “do what you want to do, do as you will, you cannot hurt
me, I am here to administer the law, and I am going to give the law
whatever may be the consequences to my political associates or to my
party.” Now, is that system better than the other?
Now let us go to the next section. “Section 2. The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases . . . .”427 Now, speaking of the judicial power of
the United States, to all cases
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction—to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party—to Controversies between two or more
States—between a State and Citizens of another State—between
Citizens of different States—between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or
Subjects.428
You will meet with people who seem to labor under the impression
that it is competent for the courts of the United States to meet every
possible case that may arise in a court of justice, and particularly if you
meet with one of our friends of the gentler sex who has just come to the
conclusion that she ought to be a lawyer.429 She don’t understand why it is
427

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Id.
429 This is probably a veiled reference to In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894), which
was decided while Justice Harlan was a member of the Court. In that case, Ms. Belva
Lockwood—who had been admitted to the bar in Washington, D.C., the federal circuit, and
“the bars of several states of the Union”—sought a writ of mandamus to compel the high
court of Virginia to admit her to the practice of law. Id. In denying the writ, the Court cited
428
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that the courts of the United States cannot dispose of every case and every
question that involves the general welfare. It is hard to explain it, equally
hard to explain it to a man who don’t stop to think, and who don’t read the
words of this Constitution.
Here is a case between A and B. It is certain upon the statement of
that case, let me assume, that to give a judgment in favor of B is to give a
judgment that will advance the cause of dishonesty and rascality.
Therefore, many a man will say, “Well, why don’t the United States take
hold of that?” They forget that the United States is a government of
enumerated power, and that the courts of the United States cannot take hold
of any question except one embraced by the judicial government of the
United States, one embraced by the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, when A sues B in a Circuit Court of the United States on a
promissory note for $10,000, let me assume, and the judge says, “hand me
up that declaration here.” And he looks at it and it says, in substance, that
A complains of B that B owes him $10,000 evidenced by his promissory
note herein referred to and made a part of this complaint. He has not paid
any part of it, the whole of it is due and unpaid. He seeks judgment. Of
course, if B owes A and don’t pay him, why he is doing wrong.
But the judge of the United States says, “What have I to do with that
case, that is not a case to which the judicial power of the United States
extends. Some man has drawn that declaration that does not know what he
is about, has not read the Constitution of the United States, has not read the
Judiciary Act.” “But,” says the lawyer for the plaintiff, “A is a citizen of
New York, and B is a citizen of Virginia,” in the latter state the suit was
brought. “Very well,” says the judge, “Why didn’t you state that? Why
didn’t you show in your declaration that this is a suit between citizens of
different states? If you had done that I could take jurisdiction.430 Now you
must amend your declaration.”
Suppose it has been amended. Now the Circuit Court has jurisdiction
of that case. Why? It is answered when it is seen that it is given
jurisdiction between citizens of different states.431 Why was that done? Let
me ask this, why was not a citizen of New York required to sue the citizen

a case from just before Justice Harlan’s tenure: Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872). This case was cited to support the proposition that the right to practice law in a state
court is not a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, and essentially that it
should be left to states—not federal courts—to determine the requirements for the admission
to the practice of law. Lockwood, 154 U.S. at 117–18.
430 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
431 Id.
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of Virginia in one of the courts of Virginia? Why, it was upon the idea that
if he did, the courts of the State of Virginia, or the jury there, would lean to
its own people, would lean to its own fellow citizens. And no man has ever
had any practice to any extent in the state that has not seen that that would
be the case very often.432
I saw it when I was at the bar, and sometimes got judgment against a
man upon no other ground really. I didn’t say so, and I didn’t argue so. If I
had, the judge would have stopped me. If I had said to the jury, when I was
arguing the case for the plaintiff against the defendant who lived in Indiana,
“You should give my client a judgment because this fellow lives over in
Indiana,” he would have stopped me and rebuked me.
But if, in the course of my argument, very innocently the fact leaked
out that my client was one of their own people, was living right among
them, and the other fellow lived across the river, all things being equal, that
jury would lean to the Kentuckian every time. And so it would occur in
every state in this Union, one quite as naturally as in the other. Therefore,
the Framers of the Constitution very wisely put in the provision that if this
was a controversy between citizens of different states the judicial power of
the United States should extend to that.
Now, there are cases—those enumerated here on their face—cases of
which the United States courts ought to have cognizance. If it is a case
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties of the
United States, it is appropriate that those cases should be dealt with by the
United States. If it is a case affecting ambassadors, ministers, and consuls,
the jurisdiction ought to extend to that. Well why? Because the treatment
which we will extend here toward ambassadors, ministers, and consuls of
other countries will affect our foreign relations, and therefore it is
appropriate that cases affecting those officers of foreign countries should
be cases which could be brought in the courts of the United States. And
then to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, and that is
one of which the federal courts can take cognizance.
“Controversies between two or more states.” The judicial power of the

432 3 STORY, supra note 43, at § 1632. Justice Frankfurter later summarized his
understanding of the issue:
Diversity jurisdiction is founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts
free from susceptibility to potential local bias. The Framers of the Constitution,
according to Marshall, entertained apprehensions lest distant suitors be subjected to
local bias in State courts, or, at least, viewed with indulgence the possible fears and
apprehensions of such suitors.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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United States extends to controversies between what we call in popular
language “sovereign states.” The State of New York and the State of
Pennsylvania have a dispute about the boundary line between New York
and Pennsylvania.433 It don’t amount to a great deal in point of value, but it
does amount to a great deal in the estimation of either one in point of pride.
How are you going to settle it? Can New York and Pennsylvania be
permitted to go to war? Why, of course not. If they attempted to, the
United States would take hold of both of them and stop them. 434 No war
between states. No states can go to war with each other. We will not
permit it. We will put our soldiers between you, you shall not fight, and if
your troops try to fight we will punish them.
Why, Pennsylvania would not wish to bring its suit in a court of New
York. New York would not trust to Pennsylvania courts to determine that.
Now, the only power which can determine it is a power which is
represented in the United States. And where would that suit be brought?
Why, it would be brought in the Supreme Court of the United States.435
There is a tribunal that represents those two states and all the country.
Half a dozen cases in our reports now about disputed boundaries
between states: disputed boundary between Massachusetts and Rhode
Island;436 between Virginia and Tennessee;437 between Kentucky and
Tennessee;438 between Kentucky and Indiana;439 between Missouri and
Iowa.440 All these cases have been determined in the Supreme Court of the
United States. Now, is it not a spectacle that may well surprise, as it has
surprised European statesmen, that there is a tribunal in this country that
can settle finally and to the satisfaction of both parties controversies
between two great empires, you might call them? The State of New York,
with its seven or eight or nine million, and Pennsylvania with its six or
433 Harlan is most likely referring to a dispute over the “Erie Triangle” area, which is
the area of land now embracing Erie, Pennsylvania. See Settlement of the Erie Triangle,
ERIE YESTERDAY (July 1, 2011), http://www.erieyesterday.org/feature-articles/settlement-ofthe-erie-triangle/. Disputed lands were ceded to the federal government and after
congressional deliberation, the disputed Erie Triangle land was sold to Pennsylvania. Id.
While New York was the primary disputant, Connecticut and Massachusetts also made
failed claims upon the land. See id.
434 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 18.
435 See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction over
this dispute. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
436 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
437 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
438 Poole v. Fleeger’s Lessee, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837).
439 Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890).
440 Missouri v. Iowa, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 660 (1849).
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seven million of people, that these two states could litigate a matter of
difference between themselves about a boundary with as much unconcern
as A and B would litigate about a $500 note, and when the Supreme Court
reached its conclusion on the subject that was the end of it.
Only a few years ago there was a dispute between the United States
and the State of Texas about some land.441 There is a lot of land in the
southwestern part of the Indian Territory, embracing about a million and a
half acres of land, once was a part of Spain, afterwards a part of Mexico,
before Texas independence was achieved.
And then there was a question as to whether it was embraced in Texas.
And the government of the United States and the State of Texas quarreled
one way and another in a peaceable way about who owned it. If the United
States owned it, it was a part of the Indian Territory; if Texas owned it, it
was a part of Texas.
They never reached a conclusion. Finally, the United States passed a
law directing the Attorney General to bring a suit against the State of
Texas.442 Texas said the United States had no jurisdiction of the suit.
Why? it was asked. Why, Texas is a sovereign state, and a sovereign state
of this Union cannot be brought to the bar of any court in this country to
answer for anything. We said while that was true between Texas and
individuals,443 it was not true between Texas and the United States. That if
this was a dispute between the United States and Texas, the Constitution
gave jurisdiction to that court of such a controversy, and we held the
investigation did rest in the court to decide that question.444
And then proof was taken and the court considered the case upon its
merits, and we said the law of the case was with the United States, and that
that million and a half acres of land was no part of the State of Texas.445
Well, although they had been quarreling fifty years over that question,446 as

441 United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1 (1896) (Harlan, J.) (holding that the territory east
of the 100th meridian of longitude between the North Fork of the Red River and the south
bank of the South Fork was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and did
not belong to Texas); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (Harlan, J.) (holding that
the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over boundary disputes between a State and a
territory of the United States).
442 Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 25, 26 Stat. 81, 92.
443 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity protects states against suits filed by their own citizens, as well as
citizens of other states).
444 United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 639–41.
445 United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. at 22–23, 90–92.
446 Id. at 32–36.
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soon as it was decided, that was the end of it. To the honor of the people of
the State of Texas, there was not a murmur of dissent against the opinion.
Now suppose we had not a Constitution that would enable some federal
court to take hold of a question of that sort, there would have been a
perpetual dispute.
Now, this article further says, “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the
Congress may by Law have directed.”447
You should read in connection with that Article 6 of the Amendments
to the Constitution, which says that
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . .448
Before this constitution was adopted, there were many instances in
which the people in the Colonies were taken across the waters and tried in
England for crimes committed, if committed at all, on this side of the water
in the Colonies.449 Now, it was intended to put an end to that, and therefore
it stated that the trial of crimes shall be in the state where the crime was
committed.
Now, what do we mean by a trial by jury? There are some strange
notions in these later days about the right to trial by jury. I have heard
quite recently gentlemen of intelligence and of undoubted humanity say
that it was entirely competent for a state, if it chose, to provide for the trial
of a man for murder before a single judge without a jury. If they wanted to
reduce the jury—the jury is to be interpreted here in the light of the
common law:450 it means a jury of twelve men. So they said if a State
wants to try by a jury of eight men it may do so, or by five men. If it wants
to constitute a jury for the trial of murder by three persons, it may. Or if
the state chooses, it may try a man for his life before the judge alone.451
447

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
Id. amend. VI.
449 The Declaration of Independence makes a direct reference to this practice in its
Indictment of King George III: “For transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended
offences.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 21 (U.S. 1776).
450 See Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274 (1875).
451 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 548 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
448
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Well now, whether that be so or not, I will refer to it further when we
come to consider the Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States—particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that no man
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. I
will have occasion to consider whether a State can, since that amendment,
try a man for any criminal offense in any other way then by a petit jury of
twelve men. Suffice it here to say that this article regulates criminal
proceedings in the courts of the United States, and an act of Congress
which should provide for the trial of crimes in this District by a jury
composed of less than twelve people would be void. 452
The trial of all crimes—not simply felony, but all crimes—shall be by
jury.453 There is only one exception to that broad statement: that language
is to be interpreted in the light of the common law when the Constitution
was established. There were petty offenses which might be tried without a
jury. For instance, if there was a license to be paid of $6.00 for driving a
hack, and if the man who drove the hack didn’t take out his license, he
might be fined by the judge alone without a jury. But with the exception of
that class of cases, I make the broad statement that whenever a man is tried
in the court of the United States, or in this District, or in any Territory of
the United States, he must be tried by jury.454 He must be tried by a jury of
twelve men, and not less than twelve men.455
There are some who think that these proceedings are dilatory, that
there is too much delay in justice when you have twelve men to sit upon a
jury, and that it is a wrong rule to say that no man shall be returned guilty
unless the whole twelve men agree that he is guilty, that it results in defeat
of justice. That may be true in some cases because of the corruption of
some juries, some jurors, but it is oftener the results of an inefficient officer
or commissioners who select the jurors.
For my own part, I believe that there is no feature of our Anglo-Saxon
civilization today that lies more nearly to the liberty of man than the right
of a trial by the old-fashioned jury composed of twelve honest men, and I
452 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (providing Congress with “exclusive Legislation”
over the District of Columbia).
453 Id. amend. VI.
454 Modern application of this principle in the United States results in the right to a jury
trial being implicated only if the offense is not “petty,” in that the potential length of
imprisonment is greater than six months. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68–69 (1970).
Individual states still have the ability to choose whether to grant a jury trial even for petty
offenses.
455 The Supreme Court later rejected this twelve-person rule for state jury trials.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
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would not dispense with any essential feature of that system. I am not a
convert to the idea that a single man, sitting upon the bench, who is a
candidate for re-election, is a safe depository. Nor, whether candidate for
re-election or not, that he is a safer depository of sound principle arising
out of facts that are to be established than a jury properly composed of men
of fair intelligence. The glory of our civilization is that we do have some
regard for human life and human liberty when a man’s life is put at stake,
or when his liberty is put at stake. I have heard that three-fourths might be
sufficient to agree to a verdict. I think that a unanimous verdict is required
under this Constitution in the Courts of the United States.456
Let me state what is one of the largest questions before the courts of
this country yet to determine. The Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States says that no man shall be deprived of his
life or liberty without due process of law. Now, that is an inhibition upon
the states. The Fifth Amendment said the same thing, and that tied the
hands of the United States. It said the United States should not, in the
federal courts, take away any man’s life or his liberty except in accordance
with due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment made that a national
right beyond the power of any state to affect, and therefore a state today no
more than the United States can deprive any man of life or liberty without
due process of law.
What do we mean by “due process”? It is not defined in the
Constitution. We are, therefore, to go back to the time when the words
were first introduced in the Constitution to ascertain what it means. Now,
the large question that I spoke about just now, not yet directly covered by
any decision of the Supreme Court, is what rights are secured against state
action by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The old Constitution
states, for instance, that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted. Let me give you the exact words: “Excessive bail shall not be
required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”457
Now, undoubtedly, before the Fourteenth Amendment, that applied
456 This point has been reflected in the Court’s later opinions. Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 359–62 (1972) (explaining the difference between state jury trials, where the
“unanimity rule” does not have to be followed, and federal jury trials, where the unanimity
rule is required); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment did not require that a jury’s vote be unanimous in state criminal trials). The
United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case that would reconsider the
fractured opinions in Apodaca. State v. Herrera, 234 Or. App. 785 (2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 904 (2011).
457 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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only to the United States’ authority. That clause did not stand in the way of
any state imposing a cruel and unusual punishment. But now the
Fourteenth Amendment says no state shall deprive any man of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. Suppose a state today should pass
a law introducing the punishments of torture, a law which would authorize
some ministerial officer to put a man to torture in order to make him
confess before he was tried. Or suppose it provided the punishment of
burning a man at the stake if he was convicted of a particular crime. Is that
due process of law? Is the state prohibited from resorting to any mode of
punishment of that sort?
So, along in that line of cases is the large question, not yet concluded,
that as to whether a state may dispense with a petit jury or modify the trial
as it was at the time of the adoption of the Constitution? I answer
unhesitatingly that no court of the United States can try a man for any
crime by a jury less than twelve, or can sentence any man upon the return
of a verdict of jury in which all the jury have not concurred.
Has not the State of California done away with an indictment by grand
jury?
Yes. How does that bear on this question? Take a minute, if you
please, of a case that I will give you that is worth your while to read:
Hurtado and the State of California, 110 United States.458
California adopted a statute which authorized a man to be proceeded
against for any criminal offense by information, not indictment. The state
could take either.
Now you know the difference between an indictment and an
information. The grand jury is an old system connected with the
administration of criminal justice. It is a given number of men selected by
ballot or some impartial mode who come from the whole county, different
parts of the county, generally men of the first standing in their
neighborhood. They come together to inquire whether any crime has been
committed in that county since the last term of the court. The
Commonwealth’s Attorney,459 for instance, has heard of a crime and that is
brought to the attention of the grand jury, and they summon witnesses and
458

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
“Commonwealth’s Attorney” is probably a tip of the cap to Harlan’s home state of
Kentucky, which uses this term instead of “district attorney” to refer to its prosecutors of
felony
crimes.
Office
of
Criminal
Law,
KENTUCKY.GOV,
http://ag.ky.gov/criminal/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June 16, 2013). Virginia also uses
the same designation. See Commonwealth Attorney’s Services Council, VIRGINIA.GOV,
http://www.cas.state.va.us (last visited June 16, 2013).
459
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investigate the matter. And if they find that here is a serious case, we do
not know whether the man is guilty or not, but it is serious enough to be
looked into, therefore they return an indictment.
Well, that is an indictment by a grand jury. An information filed by
the District Attorney is this: he steps into the court and files the information
charging John Jones with the crime of murder. He does that on his own
responsibility. Well, a man was tried under an information of that sort in
California and convicted and sentenced to be hung. He brought the case to
our court, and he made the point that whatever might have been done by
the state before the Fourteenth Amendment, that now no state can deprive a
man of his life except in accordance with due process of law.
Well, the Supreme Court of the United States didn’t take that view of
it, and held that it was competent for the state to adopt that measure of
proceeding for the purpose of initiating the prosecution, and the gentleman
who now addresses you is the only one who had the misfortune to differ
with them.460 If you will read that case, you will read a very great opinion
representing the majority by the late Justice Mathews, and the opinion
which I wrote.
I can add nothing tonight to what I said in that opinion. That case has
been reaffirmed a number of times since, so that it can be regarded as the
settled rule of the present day that the grand jury is not indispensable. Now
may a state take another step? May a state go so far as to abolish the petit
jury for criminal cases and try a man before a judge or before less than
twelve? There is an opinion in some localities, particularly with book men
and learned professionals, that a petit jury is a nuisance and that the whole
thing ought to be modified. Whether that can be done is yet to be
determined.461
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,

460

Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538–58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
When the Court later held that jury trial was not guaranteed to those in American
colonies, Harlan dissented, arguing that grand and petit juries both were fundamental
guarantees “for the benefit of all, of whatever race or nationality, in the states comprising
the Union, or in any territory.” Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 154 (1904); see also
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 235–36 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
constitutional rights extended to Hawaii even before it became a state); Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 356–57 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution’s
restrictions on federal power extend to U.S. territories).
461
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or on Confession in open Court.462
We have had very few trials for treason in this country since the
foundation of the Government. We have had one that was a historic trial,
not only because of the positions of the men, but because of the high
character of the great magistrate who presided over that trial.
I told you a few evenings ago of the disreputable conduct of Aaron
Burr when he attempted to steal the Presidency from Mr. Jefferson. When
his term was ended, he had lost the confidence of his party and of
everybody else almost. And there was a movement in the western states on
the Mississippi that looked to a severance of part of the country we then
owned, along with Texas and probably taking a part of Mexico and making
a new government there. The bad feeling there was from the fear that the
government of the United States would make some sort of terms with the
government of Spain by which the people on the upper Mississippi would
be interfered with in the free navigation of the Mississippi River. Mr.
Jefferson believed that there was a scheme on foot to dismember the Union,
and he watched it, and he thought that Burr was in it.
Burr, while he was in the West, was in the city of Frankfort, Kentucky,
the capital of the state. I well remember the old house, now demolished, in
which it was said the Legislature of Kentucky assembled, nearby where
Burr was at one time. While out there he was indicted in the federal courts
for treason against the United States, or for some offense under the laws of
the United States, a pretty serious one. He sent for Henry Clay to defend
him. Mr. Clay was then in the very prime of his young manhood, and Mr.
Clay had heard that Mr. Burr had some hostility against the United States,
and he required from Burr his assurance that he was not guilty of any such
offense. They could not find proof against him, but not a very great while
afterwards he was arrested and carried to the city of Richmond and there
tried. Chief Justice Marshall presided.463
Now, I refer to that case as an illustration of the value from the
standpoint of human experience that clause of the Constitution of the
United States that gives the judge a fixed compensation. He presided at
that trial—if there was a man in all the United States that was hated at that
time from one end of it to the other, it was Aaron Burr. He was prosecuted
with all the power and all the money of the United States. He was not
distrusted by any person any more than he was by John Marshall who
presided at the trial. And the question arose whether or not the evidence
462
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U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,639).
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was sufficient to convict him of treason under the Constitution. In an
opinion which you will see in Burr’s trial, he ruled in such a way as
resulted in the [acquittal]464 of Aaron Burr.
Now, I refer to this as an illustration of courage and high integrity of
the part of that great magistrate. To his honor as a judge be it said, and
may every judge who acts with the same spirit have the same honor
accorded to him, that he never stopped for a moment to see whether or not
his opinion would be in accord with the public feeling.

The manuscript reads “conviction,” but Burr was acquitted. See id. at 181. Either
Harlan misspoke or his students misheard him.
464
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LECTURE 21: MARCH 19, 1898
At our last Saturday night meeting, I made some observations upon the
last clause of Article III, relating to the judicial power of the United States.
One additional observation to that clause, and one or two general
observations to the whole article, and I will pass from that subject.
That clause is: “The Congress shall have Power to declare the
Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption
of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.”465
Now, what is treason? That is defined by the previous clause.
“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them . . . .”466
But a man may be guilty of treason without levying war. He may
adhere to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort.467
Let us suppose this country was in a war, and one of our own people
adhered to the enemy and gave them aid and comfort. Why, the one who
did so would be guilty of treason.
Well now, suppose he owned real estate. If he were tried for treason,
and convicted, and sentenced to be hung, that judgment sentencing him to
be hung on account of treason, of which he was convicted, would not work
corruption of blood as it would in other countries.468 That is to say, the son
of that man would have all the rights that you would have, precisely. He
could not be called into account anywhere, or under any circumstances, on
account of the treason of his father. If the attainder of treason worked
corruption of blood, why the result would be that the son would be under
the displeasure of the government, and would be in a position not to inherit
its honors or to exercise rights.

465

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
467 Id.
468 Corruption of blood is a result of attainder, which at English common law
prohibited the attainted party from inheriting, possessing, or disposing of real property due
to a conviction of treason or felony punishable by death. The attainted person’s property
would be relinquished to the crown. See Max Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal
Protection: Why the Sins of the Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 727, 729
(1992). Since corruption of blood is flatly prohibited in the Constitution, the doctrine is
largely unknown in the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. However, many
states have so-called “slayer statutes” which may prohibit or proscribe property rights that
have or will become vested in a person as the result of the commission of a homicide. See
Gregory C. Blackwell, Comment, Property: Creating a Slayer Statute Oklahomans Can
Live With, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 143, 143 (2004).
466
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Well, we rooted that out of our republican system, and said in
substance that no man was to suffer because of the treason committed by
his father or his ancestor. He would stand upon his own merits. The real
estate of the father might be forfeited on account of treason, but that
forfeiture could only be during the lifetime of the father.469 That is, the
government might cause him to forfeit his life estate, and when he died,
why that estate would descend according to the course of the law, or
according to the course of his will, if he has made one.470
Now, the general observations that I wanted to make about the judicial
power of the United States I made heretofore, I think, in one way or the
other. But it is an important observation, and one that cannot be repeated
too often because it gives you an idea of our system of government, which
is important for you to always bear in mind. And that is that the judicial
power of our government has a function which the judicial branch of no
other government on the Earth possesses. I do not think there is an
exception to this broad statement.
Let me repeat it: no government on the Earth, and no government that
ever existed on the Earth, had a judicial department such as we have got in
this country.
We have recently heard in the papers the account of a fantastic trial in
the city of Paris of the novelist Zola for something that he had said about
the conviction heretofore of a man of the name of Dreyfus.471 Now, we
were not there to look upon the trial, and it may be that we are misinformed
about it. But if one-half of what appeared in the public prints about that
trial is true, there never was a more complete farce on the earth than that.
As to its being called a trial in a court of justice, why there was no
semblance to such a trial. A man called at the stand as a witness and asked
a question, he declines to answer it, and then turns to the jury and makes a
speech in the presence of the court. And according to the account that was
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See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
See Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 212–14 (1875).
471 Émile Zola was a French novelist who risked his career by becoming involved in
“the Dreyfus affair.” See LESLIE DERFLER, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR (2002). Captain Alfred
Dreyfus was a Jewish officer in the French army, who was court-martialed and convicted of
treason. Id. at 76–78. On January 13, 1898, Zola published a letter in the newspaper
L’Aurore, claiming that Dreyfus was innocent and accusing the government of antisemitism. Id. at 113. The letter was intended to provoke a libel charge, which would enable
Zola to disclose exculpatory evidence about Dreyfus. Id. Zola was charged and convicted
of criminal libel, but fled to England. Id. at 113–14. The government offered Dreyfus a
pardon, which he accepted. Id. In 1906, Dreyfus was exonerated by the French Supreme
Court. Id.
470

2013]

JUSTICE HARLAN: LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

259

given, the court was in consultation half the time with the officers of the
government in the so-called Republic of France, and it was said—and I
suppose it to be true—that the government of France intimated to the court
that it would not do to allow this or that or the other thing. The result was
the conviction of Zola and his being sentenced to imprisonment.
Could that occur in this country? Why, nowhere, in no court of this
country, federal or state, could that occur. Let me illustrate what is in my
mind.
Let me suppose that President McKinley was in one of the states,
visiting at a summer resort for his health that was near the capital of some
county in the state, and a Circuit Court or Common Pleas Court was being
held there, a court of general jurisdiction. And President McKinley should
conclude that he would go into that courthouse to see how that trial was
being conducted. Well, that he would have a right to do, and he would
walk in like any of the rest of us would walk in if we were there. The
sheriff, if he recognized him, would pay respect to high office, of course,
and provide a seat for him. It might be that the judge of the court—and he
could do so with great propriety—would, recognizing the President of the
United States, send the sheriff to him and invite the President to come and
take a seat beside the judge.
Well, the President might accept the invitation and he would walk up
and take the seat beside the judge. There probably would not be—if the
court was a well-conducted one there would not be—any applause. It
would be done very quietly, but there you would have the spectacle of the
President of seventy millions of people sitting by the side of a judge of a
subordinate state court, and that President would have no authority to
interfere in that trial, no authority to make a suggestion.472 If he dared to
make a suggestion to that judge about it, that judge–if he understood what
were his functions and had any sense of the dignity of his office—would
resent the insult of it. The President would sit there with no more authority
than any one of you would have if you were in that courthouse.
But to bring the case closer, let us suppose that the government of the
United States, through the Department of Justice, had ordered the
prosecution of a particular man for an alleged offense against the laws of
the United States, and the man was on trial in the federal court. It might be
472

Justice Harlan’s estimate is fairly accurate: according to the U.S. Census Bureau,
the aggregate population in 1890 was approximately 63.06 million people, and in 1900 it
was approximately 76.30 million people. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF
THE
UNITED
STATES:
1900,
at
10
(1901),
available
at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1900-02.pdf.
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that the President of the United States thought that the public interest
demanded that that man, if guilty, should be punished. But does anyone
suppose that the President of the United States would write a letter to the
judge of that court and express the hope that the man would be convicted or
that another man on trial might be acquitted? Would the President of the
United States do that?
Why, of course, he would not. The judge of that federal court would
resent such an insult to the administration of justice. And when that judge
sits in the courthouse trying a case according to law and under the
Constitution of the country, he knows nobody, neither the President of the
United States nor the whole Congress of the United States. He is there
representing the majesty of the law, and that law is above everybody. It is
above presidents; it is above congresses; it is above all the seventy millions
of people.
That judge under our system is under an oath of office to do justice in
that case. And when the court disposes of these questions, and when they
get, if they can, to the Supreme Court of the United States, there they are
decided. That is the end of the matter in that case, and no power exists
anywhere to review that. And that decision is as binding upon the
President of the United States and the Congress of the United States as it is
upon the individuals in that case.
And why is that so? It is because this Constitution says that that
document, and the laws of the United States passed in pursuance of it, are
the supreme law of the land, and the judicial power of the United States,
extending as it does to cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, is supreme.473
Now, I repeat that that cannot be said of any country on the face of the
Earth except this.
It cannot be said of our kingdom across the ocean in the British
government. Although their judiciary stands as high as any upon the Earth
for integrity and learning, that judiciary cannot upset a law passed by the
legislative branch of the British government. If Parliament passes a statute,
no matter what it is—if Parliament passed a statute today confiscating all
the estate of Lord Salisbury, the Premier of the British Government, and
directs that the proceeds of that sale shall be put into the Treasury of Great

473 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”);
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . . .”).

2013]

JUSTICE HARLAN: LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

261

Britain without one cent compensation being made, no court could gainsay
it. Parliament makes the law, and when they have said this, that, or the
other, it is the law.474 The courts simply execute that.
Now, in this country, no legislature is paramount, no executive is
paramount. The judicial branch of the government is authorized by this
instrument to give effect to this Constitution. And therefore, when
anything done by the President of the United States, or anything done by
the Congress of the United States, violates any right secured by this
instrument, and that question comes up in a court of justice anywhere in the
United States, federal or state, that court can say that that act is a nullity
because it is in opposition to this fundamental law.
And that power under our system belongs even to a justice of the
peace. A justice of the peace in this District, if he is called upon to give a
judgment in a case, and that judgment depends upon what purports to be an
act of Congress, that justice of the peace having taken an oath to support
the Constitution of the United States has a right to say, and it is his duty to
say so if he believes such to be the fact, that “I won’t respect that act of
Congress because it is in violation of the Constitution of the United States.”
That is his sworn duty. I would not advise an ordinary justice of the
peace to take that course, but he might do it.
Now, can an Englishman take advantage of his fundamental rights
when they are violated by legislation? Way back in the thirteenth
century—you are familiar, no doubt, with the history of England, and
remember the history of the Magna Charta, and that Magna Charta is one
of the statutes of England.475 And then, further along in the history, there
was a further struggle with the royal power, and they wrung from that
power certain concessions embodied in statutes: the Bill of Rights, the
statute which gave the right of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and others

474 This parliamentary sovereignty is still in place today; however, judicial review is
available for parliamentary laws that violate the laws of the European Union. See The Legal
Framework,
EUROFOUND
(Nov.
21,
2011),
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/dictionary2.htm.
Judicial review is therefore primarily used only for alleged improper application of the law
by government actors. For Parliament’s own explanation of parliamentary sovereignty, see
Parliamentary
Sovereignty,
PARLIAMENT.U.K.,
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/sovereignty (last visited June 16, 2013).
475 It is technically a charter and not a statute, hence its full title: “The Great Charter.”
For a detailed contemporary commentary on the history, meaning, and contents of the
Magna Carta, see WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN (2d ed. 1914).
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which make up what we call Anglo-Saxon liberty.476 Now, all that had
been done before our government was established. And hence you will
find, in all of the legislation passed preceding the Revolution of 1776, that
our Fathers of that day said that we are entitled to the fundamental rights
that all Englishmen have, and when those rights were accorded, they had
full liberty.
Now, you ask, how is an Englishman to take advantage of his rights?
If a question arises in an English court as to whether this man is entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus, the court will enforce the statute. If Parliament
passes a statute repealing that writ of habeas corpus, taking it away, then
the English court could not grant it. We have, by the privileges of Magna
Charta, that no man shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Now, suppose Parliament should repeal that?
That is what I meant, competent for Parliament to wipe out a statute. Of
course, one Parliament cannot bind another Parliament, and any subsequent
Parliament can wipe out the statutes of a previous Parliament.
But why cannot that occur in this country? In England they have got
no written constitution. They have got no unalterable constitution. We
have got a Constitution which may be amended, but until it is amended it is
the supreme law of the land for everybody. And when a man says that this
proceeding here against me deprives me of my property without due
process of law, that this act is in violation of the Constitution of the United
States, and he appeals to the Fourteenth Amendment, a federal court or
state court is to consider the question, “Is this consistent with the
Constitution?”
An English court is bound by the existing statutes, whatever they are.
It is literally true that nowhere on the Earth up to this time and at this day is
more respect paid to the liberty of man, to the rights of property, than in
England. But any day that Parliament is so minded they could by a statute
ten lines long wipe out all these guarantees of life, liberty, and property.
They cannot do it in this country.
Cannot the court of England so construe an act of Parliament as to
make it a dead letter?
Well, I answer that yes and no. Yes, if the court chooses to so
construe it; but no, if the thing is plain enough. If there is no room to doubt
about its construction, the court must march up to that result. Sometime an

476 The Bill of Rights of 1688 and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 join the Magna
Carta to form the basis for Britain’s unwritten constitution. See Douglas W. Vick, The
Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329, 336–37 (2002).
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act of Parliament may be passed that is very obscure, and the court has said
in some cases, “Well, we don’t understand this act. This act is inconsistent.
The first and second sections do not stand together. Our duty is to make
them all stand together if we can so as to give some intention to the act of
Parliament, but we cannot make them stand together.” The court did not
announce that they intended to make the statute De Donis a dead letter by
construction.477 They may have construed it so as to make it a dead letter,
but they did not say that they did that.
Parliament could not, perhaps by any vague statute, get around the
effect of a judgment. But Parliament could no doubt, if the court said that
this piece of property belonged to A—if that was the judgment of the court
of last resort—I take it that Parliament could by a statute declare that it
belongs to B and ought to be delivered to B, and no court could upset it.
When Mr. Blackstone says that an act of Parliament is void because it is
impossible of enforcement, he means to say that the court is powerless to
enforce it.478 If it is impossible of enforcement, why is it to be called an
act? The court simply says that, “We do not understand it; we cannot
enforce it,” and therefore it is so much waste paper. Well, of course, one
Parliament cannot undertake to bind subsequent Parliaments. Would
Parliament be omnipotent if Parliament could bind subsequent
Parliaments?

477

De Donis Conditionalibus, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (Eng.). This statute introduced
perpetuities to England and had several unintended and undesired consequences, including
broken leases, defrauded creditors, and a general lack of fear regarding repercussions for
such acts. See JOSHUA WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 35 (London,
C. Roworth & Sons 1845).
478 It seems Justice Harlan misspoke here.
In Thomas Bonham v. College of
Physicians (more commonly known as Dr. Bonham’s Case), it was Sir Edward Coke rather
than Blackstone who declared that “in many cases, the common law will control Acts of
Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament
is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the
common law will control it, and adjudge such an Act to be void.” Dr. Bonham’s Case,
(1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.) 652; 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a (emphasis added). In his
famous work, Sir William Blackstone stated that
if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I
know of no power in the ordinary forms of the constitution that is vested with
authority to control it; and the examples usually alleged in support of this sense of
the rule do none of them prove, that, where the main object of a statute is
unreasonable, the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to set the judicial
power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive of all government.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 194, at *91. While Blackstone’s view
of parliamentary sovereignty won out in the United Kingdom, the United States evolved
more in line with Coke’s view.
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Now I pass from that subject to Article 4. The first section of that
Article was the subject of consideration at our last meeting when we talked
about personal property. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.”479 I do not care to add anything to what I said on that subject.
The second section is one of vastly more consequence. It has been the
subject of much consideration, and it will be the subject of much more
consideration. It is only two lines and a half, and they are very weighty
words: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”480 It is a little awkwardly
worded, but the object of it cannot be misunderstood: “The Citizens of each
State.” Read in connection with that and consider the first clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons.”481
We sometimes talk, when we think of the Civil War, about this, that,
and the other battle being the turning point in that war; that if this particular
battle had gone that way rather than the way it did, the results would have
been far different. We say very often, for instance, that the turning point in
the war was the battle of Gettysburg.
Well when we take our minds off of military matters to consider the
political matters of the country. I think we may say that, but for this clause
that I am about to read, the Constitution of this country might have been
very different.
The first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “All persons.” Not
some persons, but all persons. Mark you, not all citizens, but “All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.”482
That, I believe, is the first time in the Constitution that you find the
phrase “citizens of the United States.”483 You find in the judiciary article a
statement to the effect that the judicial power of the United States extends,
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
481 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
482 Id.
483 Actually, the first reference to a “Citizen of the United States” appears in Article I,
Section 2 regarding the requirements for representatives. Justice Harlan is technically
correct in that the phrase “citizens of the United States” does not appear until the Fourteenth
Amendment. For further discussions on the meaning of “Citizen of the United States” in
Article I of the Constitution, see Josh Blackman, Essay, Original Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 95 (2010).
480
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among other things, to controversies between a state and citizens of another
state, and between citizens of different states, but the phrase “citizens of the
United States” appears for the first time in the Fourteenth Amendment.
What does that mean? What is the history of it? Along in the early
fifties a case got to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is the case of
Dred Scott against Sandford.484 It is in 18 or 19 Howard. Unless you read
that case you will not understand many things that have occurred since that
time. That was the case of a colored man bringing a suit in a circuit court
of the United States, at the City of Saint Louis, I believe. It involved the
question of his freedom, and it got to the Supreme Court of the United
States.485
Now, you will remember I have just read to you that the judicial power
of the United States extended to controversies between citizens of different
states. One of the questions raised in the case was whether or not this
colored man of African descent was a citizen, or could be a citizen, of the
State of Missouri, so as to authorize him to sue in that capacity. And that
induced the court to consider the question of citizenship generally: what
was meant by citizenship of a state, what was meant by citizenship of the
United States.
We sometimes are in the habit in our ordinary conversation of
speaking of particular things which have occurred as providences: “That
was a special providence.” We say that George Washington was a special
providence, that he was raised up for the work he did, and that no other
man could have done the work—so far as we can tell—that he did. We say
that Jefferson was a special providence, and that no other man could have
performed the work that he did. We talk in the same way about Abraham
Lincoln, and about Ulysses S. Grant in the same sense.
I think I may say that that case was a sort of special providence to this
country, in that it laid the foundation of a civil war which, terrible as it was,
awful as it was in its consequences in the loss of life and money, was in the
end a blessing to this country, in that it rid us of the institution of African
slavery. That case was the beginning of that struggle.
484 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
485 Dred Scott, a slave owned by Dr. John Emerson, was moved from a slave state,
Missouri, through two different free states, Illinois and the Wisconsin territory. See id. at
397–98. Scott remained in this free territory for two and a half years, during which time his
slave master hired out Scott’s services, thereby bringing slavery into a free state. Id. After
Emerson’s death, Scott brought suit against John Sanford, who was the executor of
Emerson’s estate, seeking Scott’s freedom. Id. Scott alleged several grounds for his
freedom, with the main ground being his extended residence in free states. See id.
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The majority of the Supreme Court of the United States as then
constituted said that a colored man of African descent was not one of the
people of the United States by whom and for whom this Constitution was
ordained. It laid down the doctrine that citizenship of a state was different
from the citizenship of the United States; that a man might be a citizen of
the United States but he could not be a citizen of a state, except with the
consent of that state.486
Now, in the light of that historical statement about which there can be
no controversy, laid down in that opinion which stirred this country from
one end of it to the other, which brought this country face to face with the
problem that this government must die or slavery must die, it was
consequences following from that which brought on the Civil War largely,
which resulted in this Amendment, which says, beyond the power of any
state to alter it—I am not now discussing the policy of these things, but
telling you historical facts—which says by the fiat of the people of the
United States that all persons born in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, or all persons naturalized in the United
States, are not only citizens of the United States but they are citizens of the
state in which they reside.
Now, to state it in a way that you will understand it, here is a colored
man in the state of Tennessee of African descent. He was born in the state
of Tennessee, as his father was before him, freed by the Thirteenth
Amendment, made a freeman.487 Now, that man, whatever Tennessee may
think about him, however much she may grumble about it—if she does, I
do not say that she does, but whatever she may think of it—that man is not
only a citizen of the United States, but he is a citizen of the state of
Tennessee, because he was born in the United States, and born subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States. And the mandate of this instrument is
those two facts concurring. He is a citizen of the United States, as well as a
citizen of the state in which he resides.
Judge, does that include Indians?
No. The case of Elk against Wilkins—I wish I knew the volume—
they were considered an exception.488 You will find a very learned opinion
there by the majority of the Court. It was the case of an Indian who had
486

Id. at 453–54.
The Thirteenth Amendment provides, “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1.
488 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884).
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left his tribe and came into the state of Nebraska, intending to become a
part of that people, and the majority of the Court thought that he could not
become a citizen of the United States. That case was apart from this
Amendment. They were wards of the nation, and they thought he could not
become a citizen of the United States. I had the misfortune to differ from
the Court upon that question, and of course I was wrong.489
Would a Chinaman born in this country be a citizen?
We have now before us under consideration this case, and when I tell
you the case you will probably understand why I cannot answer your
question, as it has not been decided.490 It will be decided some of these
days. It is the case of a man whose parents both were Chinese. They came
to San Francisco at a time when it was easier for a Chinaman to get into
this country than it is now, and the father engaged in business there. And
shortly after he did engage in business there—still, however, a subject of
the Emperor of China—a male child was born to him, twenty-odd years
ago. A few years ago, that young man went back to China, and then
attempted to return to this country, and was refused admission.
He claims that he was entitled to be admitted. He claims that he was a
citizen of the United States, although his parents when he was born and still
are today the subjects of the Emperor of China. For, says he, “I was born
in the United States, and by the very terms of this Fourteenth Amendment I
am a citizen of the United States.” That is the question in the case.
Now, that question involves other considerations. You will remember
in the Constitution there is power given to Congress to establish a uniform
rule of naturalization.491 Did this Fourteenth Amendment curtail that
power? What is naturalization? Why, it is turning a foreign-born man, or
turning somebody who was not born of American parents, into a citizen.492
Now, does that Fourteenth Amendment curtail the power of the United
States over the subject of naturalization? We have for many years had the
policy—I am now giving you the argument on one side—we have had the
policy of excluding the Chinese from this country absolutely, except certain
classes, and the power of the government to do that no one disputes now or
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Elk v. Wilkins was abrogated by the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43
Stat. 253.
490 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 649 (1898) (argued Mar. 5 & 8,
1897 and decided Mar. 28, 1898).
491 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
492 Black’s Law Dictionary defines naturalization as, “The granting of citizenship to a
foreign-born person under statutory authority.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (8th ed.
2004).
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can dispute.493
It has been asserted time and time again, and we have done that upon
the idea that this is a race utterly foreign to us, and never will assimilate
with us. They are pagans in religion, so different from us that they do not
intermarry with us, and we don’t want to intermarry with them. And when
they die, no matter how long they have been here, they make arrangements
to be sent back to their fatherland. That there is a wide gulf between our
civilization and their civilization, and we don’t want to mix.494
The consequences of a different policy perhaps may be apprehended in
my asking you one question, which I don’t expect you to answer: What
would have been the condition today of the states of California, Oregon,
Washington, Nevada, and Utah, and that western Pacific slope, if we had
no restriction whatever against the admission of Chinese in this country?
If out of two or three hundred million that are in China, if out of that
number fifty million had been here by this time, as there would have been
if there had been no restrictions, that whole Pacific slope today would have
been dominated by that race. They would have rooted out the American
population that is there, would have compelled all the laboring part of that
country to have left and come to other parts of the country to seek
subsistence.
Now, that is said on one side, and the question was put to the Court,
“Can it be possible that the Fourteenth Amendment had the effect of tying
the hands of the Congress of the United States in the matter of
naturalization, so that children born in this country of people who are
Chinese subjects, and who always remain such, should become citizens of
the United States? If so, what would follow?” we were asked.

493

Following the influx of Chinese workers during the California Gold Rush, the
United States severely restricted entry of Chinese people through the Chinese Exclusion
Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), (repealed 1943). See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 853, 855–56 (1987). The Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943 by the
Magnuson Act, allowing Chinese nationals to be naturalized by the United States. Chinese
Exclusion Repeal (Magnuson) Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-199, 57 Stat. 600, 600–01. The
Magnuson Act itself was repealed in 1965, paving the way for increased Chinese
immigration. Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Cellar) Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
79 Stat. 911.
494 Harlan stated this opinion in his lone dissent to Plessy v. Ferguson: “There is a race
so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of
the United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded
from our country. I allude to the Chinese race.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Why, they said, “It would follow that, although that man’s mother or
father, no matter what they could do, could never become naturalized
citizens of the United States because we had never permitted naturalization
of the Chinese, if that father and mother and that race were excluded from
this country, that this son by the accident of his birth in this country became
a citizen of the United States, and therefore eligible to the Presidency of the
United States, eligible to the Senate of the United States, and eligible to any
position in this country.”
And according to the same principle, it was argued that if some of our
own people, American-born and their ancestors American-born, but they
should be traveling in foreign lands and stay there a year or so and a child
boy should happen be born to them while there, that son would not be a
citizen of the United States because he was neither born in the United
States or naturalized in the United States.
Now, those questions are involved I say in that case, and I do not think
I can answer it yet. When the case is decided, I will try and bring it to the
attention of the class. How it may be decided, I do not know. If I did, I
would not say. Of course, the argument on the other side is that the very
words of the Constitution embrace just such a cause.
Now go back to that second section of Article IV. “The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.”495 What does that mean?
Here is a man in the state of Virginia who was entitled by the law of
that state to make a will and to devise his estate. Suppose the state of
Virginia by a statute should say that no man living in any state outside
Virginia should inherit real estate in the state of Virginia? Would that
statute stand? Not for a moment. And why? Here is a Virginian entitled to
inherit real estate, but that law would deny the right of the New Yorker to
inherit that real estate in Virginia.
Now, this section means that a citizen of New York is entitled in the
state of Virginia to the same rights that are accorded to a man of the same
sort in the state of Virginia, a citizen of the United States.
Now, I ought not to stop right here without making one observation.
Not that there are not certain things that may be required. For instance, a
citizen of Virginia may bring a suit in one of the courts of that state without
giving a bond for costs. Now, the state of Virginia might rightfully require
that a citizen of another state bringing a suit in the courts of that state give a
bond for costs, because he lives out of state, and the state of Virginia
495

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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cannot touch his property. So, she says you must give a bond for costs or
deposit the amount of money that may be necessary for the costs.
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LECTURE 22: MARCH 26, 1898
We were considering at our last meeting Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”496
Before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, there were cases in
the federal and state courts which involved a construction of that section of
the Constitution. A citizen of New York, for instance, bringing a suit in a
state court of Pennsylvania would be required by the laws of Pennsylvania
to give a bond for costs, whereas a citizen of Pennsylvania suing in one of
the courts of Pennsylvania would not be required to give a bond for costs in
order that he might maintain an prosecute his action to a conclusion. And it
was stated in some of the cases—it was contended that that was a violation
of this section of the Constitution that I have just read. It was said,
plausibly, “You are imposing upon the citizen of New York a burden you
don’t impose upon your own people when suing in the courts of your
state.”
But it was held, I think without any contrary opinion anywhere, that
that was a reasonable regulation that was entirely consistent with this
clause of the Constitution. And for the reason that, when a court gives a
judgment for costs, that judgment would be ineffectual for any purpose
unless it could reach the man against whom the costs were charged. But if
he lived in another state, the process of the court of Pennsylvania for costs
could not reach him. Therefore, as the citizen of New York was beyond
the process of the courts of Pennsylvania, it was but fair and right that if he
sought justice at the hands of a Pennsylvania court, he should give security
to pay the costs if he should lost the suit. And it was held not to be a
violation of that clause of the Constitution.497
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Id.
See Kilmer v. Groome, 6 Pa. D. 540, 540 (1897) (citing Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md.
194, 209 (1856)) (“[T]he rule referred to does not interfere with the privileges and
immunities of non-residents, but it merely places them on a basis in relation to the payment
of costs similar to that on which our own citizens stand.”). Later that year, in Blake v.
McClung, Harlan used this holding as an example of the limits of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898) (“For instance, a State
cannot forbid citizens of other States from suing in its courts, that right being enjoyed by its
own people; but it may require a non-resident, although a citizen of another State, to give
bond for costs, although such bond be not required of a resident. Such a regulation of the
internal affairs of a state cannot reasonably be characterized as hostile to the fundamental
rights of citizens of other states.”).
497
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In an early case, reported in one of Washington’s circuit court reports,
there was a decision by Mr. Justice Washington under that clause of the
Constitution, in which he said that the privileges and immunities that are
there referred to were those fundamental privileges relating to life, liberty,
and property that inhered in Anglo-Saxon liberty, and that it did not apply
to the ordinary regulation as to business, as to proceedings in courts.498
Now, that section was very much enlarged by the war. I say by the
war, because there are certain amendments to the Constitution of the
United States which everybody knows were the result of the war—which
would never have been incorporated into the fundamental law but for that
Civil War—and the amendment resulting from that war which relates to
this subject of citizenship in this country is the first clause of the 14th
Amendment. I have read it to you before—perhaps not in this connection,
let me read it again.
“All persons”—not some persons, not a few persons, not any
privileged character, but, “All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.”499
What was the occasion of that clause? What does it mean? Before the
war, there came that case to which I called your attention at the close of my
remarks at the last meeting, Dred Scott against Sandford, at which the
question arose whether the colored man in that case, Dred Scott, was a
citizen of the United States.500 The question was pertinent because the
jurisdiction of the federal court depended upon the inquiry whether or not
he was a citizen of the United States.
The majority of the court, speaking by Chief Justice Taney, said that
that class of people, descendants of Africans, were not a part of the “people
of the United States” referred to in the Preamble of the Constitution, for

498 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (“The inquiry is,
what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no
hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. . . . But we
cannot accede to the proposition which was insisted on by the counsel, that, under this
provision of the constitution, the citizens of the several states are permitted to participate in
all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state, merely
upon the ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens . . . .”).
499 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
500 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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whom the government of the United States was ordained. And in that
opinion, there is a great discussion upon the question of citizenship. And it
was held by the majority of the court that a man might be a citizen of the
United States, and yet not a citizen of the state in which he resided. That
citizenship of a state and citizenship of the United States were two different
things. That it was for each state to say who should be citizens of that
state. And that the United States might legislate as long as it chose in
making citizens of the United States, but that did not make them citizens of
the state unless that state assented to it.
Well, that was ended. But it did not end before the people of the
United States abolished the institution of slavery, and took out of slavery
several millions of people who had been chattels—who had been property
under the laws of the several states—and made them free.501 You might
make them freemen, but the question still remained, were they citizens?
Were they citizens of the United States? Were they citizens of the states in
which they were?
That question it was intended to place beyond all peradventure or
dispute by this Fourteenth Amendment. And therefore it is incontrovertible
under that amendment—whatever we may think about it, as to the policy of
it—it is incontrovertible since the adoption of that amendment that every
colored man, woman, and child in the United States is not only a citizen of
the United States, but is a citizen of the state in which he resides. The state
might declare at every session of the legislature for a half a century that the
colored man was not a citizen of a state, and could not be accorded the
rights of citizenship of that state, but such a declaration would fall to the
ground as an utter nullity under this amendment.
Mark you, it is not all white persons, it is not all Anglo-Saxons, but it
is all persons that were born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States. They are citizens not only of the
United States, but citizens of the state in which they reside.

501

There were about 4 million slaves in the United States at the time of the Civil War.
See
Emancipation
Proclamation,
MR.
LINCOLN
AND
FREEDOM,
http://www.mrlincolnandfreedom.org/inside.asp?ID=39 (last visited June 16, 2013). About
3.1 million were freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, on January 1, 1863.
Emancipation Proclamation, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/emancipationproclamation (last visited June 16, 2013). The remainder were freed by the Thirteenth
Amendment, which was ratified on December 6, 1865. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also
Primary Documents of American History: Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, LIBR.
OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/13thamendment.html (last visited
June 15, 2013).
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Therefore, a colored man living in the state of Tennessee, if he had a
cause of action against somebody in the state of New York, could bring his
action in the federal court sitting in the state of New York, and in his
declaration allege that the plaintiff, John Jones, a citizen of the state of
Tennessee, complains of John Thompson, a citizen of the state of New
York. And if the defendant in that case made a plea in abatement to the
effect that the plaintiff, John Jones, was not a citizen of the state of
Tennessee, he could not sustain that plea by proving that the plaintiff was a
black man. He would have to go beyond that. And in the case that I am
putting, the plea in abatement would be perfectly idle, because the black
man was born in the United States, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, and a citizen therefore, by virtue of this amendment, not only of the
United States but of the state in which he resided, whether the state wanted
it or not.
Therefore, no state can justify any legislation which is grounded upon
discrimination on account of color.502 It cannot make one law—no matter
what the law is, whether it relates to voting, whether it relates to holding of
office, whether it relates to the acquisition and disposition of property—it
cannot make one law applicable to the white man and another applicable to
the black man, because the white man and the black man in that state are
equally citizens of that state, and you cannot distinguish against them in
respect to their immunities on account of their race or color. If a state, for
instance, passed a statute by which it attempted to prevent a black man
from inheriting estate devised to him by will, why that law would fall
before this Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and this clause that
I am reading, because it is not competent for the state to deny that right to
that race, while according it to the white race.
In other words, these two amendments—or rather this one amendment,
the Fourteenth, in connection with the original Constitution—establishes
once for all, until you change that Constitution, that every citizen of the
United States, whether a native or naturalized, is the equal before the law of
every other citizen, and that no power in this country, federal or state, can
discriminate against a citizen on account of his color. Equality before the
law, therefore, is the fundamental underlying principle upon which our
Constitution rests, and it rests there securely. It never will be changed, as I
think.
Now go to the next clause.

502

But see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537; contra id. at 563 (1896) (Harlan, J.
dissenting) (arguing that forced segregation violates the 14th Amendment).
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A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.503
Only five and half lines there, and unless you had read up on the
subject, you would probably read it—unless you were watching very
closely—as a thing of no very great consequence in itself. And yet, it is
one of the links which bind this country together, and which preserve the
peace of this country. What would happen if that provision was not in the
federal Constitution today? What would happen? Everybody agrees that
except to the extent that the states have parted with their power, and
organized a general government, and given it control of matters specified in
the Constitution, in all other matters, the state has reserved its full power,
and is absolute—that is, beyond the control of the national government.
Now, strike that provision out. What might occur? A man could
commit murder in the state of Virginia tomorrow, and he had only to step
across the line into the state of Pennsylvania, and that is the end of that
prosecution.504 No sheriff from the state of Virginia could go into the state
of Pennsylvania and arrest that man, and bring him out and into Virginia.
Pennsylvania would make trouble about that, if any officer of the state of
Virginia assumed to come upon the soil of Pennsylvania and to lay his
hands upon a man in that state and take him into another state.
Pennsylvania would have some inquiry to make on that subject. She would
not allow that to be done.
But now, under the clause that I have read, no man can commit crime
in this country and escape justice, unless the Governor of some state is
unfaithful to the obligations which he has taken an oath to support that
Constitution, or unless the man flees the United States and gets into some
country with which we have no treaty of extradition, and where he cannot
be reached.
There are cases of that sort. Until recently—perhaps I am speaking too
fast when I indicate that it is now otherwise, perhaps it is not, but I think it
is—but I know that fifteen or twenty years ago, if a man robbed a savings
bank, if the president or cashier of some national bank robbed it, defrauded
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
Virginia and Pennsylvania do not share a common border, and have not shared one
since the creation of West Virginia on June 20, 1863. See Today in History: June 20, LIBR.
OF CONG., http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/jun20.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2010).
504
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the stockholders, he had only to get upon a train come night in the city of
New York, before the exposure came, and find himself the next morning in
Montreal or Quebec, perfectly safe. We could not reach him.
Fifteen or twenty years ago, a gentleman—so-called—son of a very
rich man in New York, was guilty of great frauds in connection with a
national bank in the city of New York. And he left his home, and he could
not be reached. He had taken up his abode in Canada. He had rented a
home, carried his family there, was having a good time, and we could not
reach him. We had no treaty with England that would cover cases of that
sort, and our process could not reach him.
It was convenient for him to keep out of the United States for ten or
twelve years. And finally he came back not long ago. But in the
meantime, he had been indicted in the state courts for his alleged rascality
in reference to that bank. He supposed that it had been forgotten perhaps,
or somebody advised him that those indictments were not valid, that those
were federal offenses and not state, and that the indictments in the state
were void.
So, having made due arrangements with some of the bosses in the state
of New York, he came back and surrendered himself to the state
authorities, and then sued out a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court,
asking that he be discharged, upon the ground that the state courts had
nothing to do with the offense against him, had no jurisdiction. And the
case was brought to our court, and we said—I had the honor of delivering
the opinion of the court in that case—“This may or may not be true, but let
it be tried, Mr. Ex-Canadian. Go back to the state of New York and stand
your trial in the state court. It may be that the state court will acquit you. It
may be that the state court will hold your view about it. But if they do not
and you are convicted in the state court, why then you have a writ of error
to the Supreme Court of the United States upon the federal question, and
when the case gets to us in due form we will then consider this
question.”505
Well, as soon as that decision was announced he returned to Canada.
Now, a man may escape to Canada and escape the justice of the United
States, if we have no treaty of extradition. And there are some countries
with which we have none; I believe we have none with Belgium. But he
cannot in this country.
If a man commits a crime in the state of New York, and chooses to go
to the farthest ends of the country, way over in California—and it does not
505

See New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 98 (1894) (Harlan, J.).
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matter what crime it is, it is treason, felony, or other crimes, it will include
a misdemeanor—and the authorities in the state of New York find out that
this man is now in California under an assumed name. He has been
indicted in the state of New York, and he has fled from the justice of the
state of New York, and is hid in California.
Now, how do you get him to New York? A New York sheriff cannot
go there and by virtue of his office bring him to the state of New York. It
is pointed out here how it shall be done. If a man flees from justice in one
state to another state, he “shall on Demand of the executive Authority of
the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed.”506
In other words, the Governor of the state of New York could make a
demand upon the state of California for the arrest of this man. And he
would in that written demand inform the Governor of California, “That
man stands indicted in the state of New York for a given crime. He has
fled from the justice of New York, as evidence whereof I transmit herewith
a copy of the indictment. And I therefore ask that you shall issue your
warrant for the arrest of this man and deliver him to the agent of the state of
New York.”
And it is the duty of the Governor of California to do that. And it is
the duty of the sheriffs, and constables, and marshals of that state, to whom
that warrant may be addressed, when they find where that man is to lay
their hands upon him. And then he is taken into a court of the United
States and identified.
Now, the California court, or the California Governor, will not stop to
inquire whether he is innocent or guilty. That belongs to the state in which
he has committed the crime. But if the proceedings are all regular on their
face, and he is indicted in New York and charged with a crime there, and if
he fled from the justice of that state, then the duty of the Governor of
California is to have that man arrested and deliver him over to the state of
New York, when he is taken to New York and tried.
That cannot be enforced, can it, Judge?
No. In the case of—it is worth your while to read the case, it is the
case of Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. Dennison, 24 Howard 66.507 It is a
very suggestive case on many accounts. I know something about the
history of that case.508

506

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
508 Kentucky v. Dennison concerned the 1859 indictment of Willis Lago, a free black
man, for assisting in the escape of Charlotte, a slave who belonged to C.W. Nuckols. Id. at
507
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I remember when quite a young man—and I am a young man yet I
hope—of sitting in the courthouse at the capital of Kentucky and hearing
an Ohio lawyer—now dead, a man of rare ability—making a plea on behalf
of a colored man, which colored man had been taken out of the state of
Ohio and brought back there to Kentucky, and was alleged to be the
slave—property—of an old lady who lived right opposite from where I
lived—knew her very well.509 Evidence showed that the colored man had
been out of Kentucky for nearly twenty years. He had run away, as was not
unnatural, and he had been in Ohio, but they managed to get him back there
some way. And this was a proceeding advocated by this Ohio lawyer for
the purpose of getting that colored man back to the state of Ohio.
Well, he failed, as might have been expected. And Governor
Dennison of Ohio in that, or one of the kindred cases, refused to honor a
warrant made upon him by the Governor of the state of Kentucky, who
wanted to get some man into Kentucky who had been harboring that slave.
They wanted to put him in the Kentucky penitentiary. Well, Governor
Dennison declined to honor that requisition, as he could under certain
circumstances. Then a proceeding was instituted to compel him to issue his
warrant.
Well, the Supreme Court of the United States held that it was out of
the question to talk about judicial process being served upon the Governor
of a state to compel him to do anything.510 The court looked beyond the
mere form of the proceeding to the consequences. What might happen?
You will read that between the lines of the opinion.

67. Governor Dennison of Ohio refused Governor Magoffin of Kentucky’s request to
extradite Lago. Id.; see also Stephen R. McAllister, A Marbury v. Madison Moment on the
Eve of the Civil War: Chief Justice Roger Taney and the Kentucky v. Dennison Case, 14
GREEN BAG 2D 405, 406 (2011). Harlan appears to recall a different case that presented
some similar issues.
509 In 1860, Harlan was twenty-six years old and practicing law in his father’s
Frankfort, Kentucky law office. See Harlan, John Marshall, AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY
ONLINE, http://www.anb.org/articles/11/11-00385.html (last visited June 16, 2013).
510 Dennison, 65 U.S. at 109–10 (“And it would seem that when the Constitution was
framed, and when this law was passed, it was confidently believed that a sense of justice and
of mutual interest would insure a faithful execution of this constitutional provision by the
Executive of every State, for every State had an equal interest in the execution of a compact
absolutely essential to their peace and well being in their internal concerns, as well as
members of the Union. Hence, the use of the words ordinarily employed when an
undoubted obligation is required to be performed, ‘it shall be his duty.’ But if the Governor
of Ohio refuses to discharge this duty, there is no power delegated to the General
Government, either through the Judicial Department or any other department, to use any
coercive means to compel him.”).
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What might happen in this country if any court assumed by its process
of contempt to lay its hands upon a Governor of one of the states of this
union and put him in jail? A pretty serious matter. The Constitution had
not provided for it. And the court worked out that result, that it may be true
that the duty of the Governor of Ohio under the Constitution was to issue
that warrant, but you cannot compel him to do it by judicial process. And
there is no case in the books that more clearly illustrates the nature of our
form of government than that.
You will now and then come across a lunatic who is going abroad
through the land indoctrinating the people with the idea—or trying to do
it—that here is a great consolidated government at the city of Washington,
backed by the Supreme Court of the United States, which is absorbing all
power in this country, and which is destroying the liberties of the people.
Well, I have sometimes seen men who looked as if they actually felt the
chains were on their limbs, and that they were just about to go to jail
because of some fearful order that had issued from the city of Washington
that was going to destroy us all.
Well, I congratulate you that you live in an era of knowledge and
information which enables you to regard all such stuff as that at its real
value. The fact is so far from the national government absorbing all the
power of this country and destroying the states. The national government
has been compelled to fight from the very start, from the origination of the
government, for the right to live, for the right to have any power at all.
The natural tendency of every American—perfectly natural to us all—
is to think a great deal of home rule. A man is not half a man that don’t
think more of his family than of every other family, that don’t like his state
above every other state. A man is not half a man that does not take pride in
his state. But the longer we live, and the oftener we have difficulties—the
more nearly we reach the point in this country when we are to come in
conflict with other people and other countries—the greater the necessity
every true American feels that there shall be a government right here at
Washington which, while it protects the states and all their rights, is yet
strong enough to protect every state and every citizen of the United States
when his rights may be invaded by any power.
This clause says such a man shall be delivered up. Can you give us an
outline, Judge, of the decision which says that the Governor of a state
cannot be compelled to deliver him up?
The decision is that you cannot compel by judicial process the
Governor to answer that demand. The obligation of the Constitution is that
he shall be delivered up, that the Governor of the state upon which the
demand is made shall issue his warrant, and that he shall be delivered up.
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Now, the decision in that case of Kentucky and Dennison is that
whenever you come square up to the proposition that a Governor of a state
will not issue his warrant, he is not bound to give any reason. He may
simply say that I won’t honor that demand. It may be that he has got good
legal reasons for it, but the courts cannot inquire into the reason, and cannot
compel him, because he is the representative of one of the states of this
Union, the head of the executive department. And that it is inconsistent
with the framework of the government of the state to put a governor in jail,
because whenever you admit the proposition that a court may lay its hands
upon the governor of a state and order him to do a thing, if he has got
jurisdiction to do that and he refuses, the next thing is to send process of
contempt and arrest that governor, and finally put him in jail for contempt
of court.
Now, that you may not misapprehend the scope of that, let me remind
you that the demand that may be made by one state upon another is not
always conclusive, not absolutely conclusive. It has occurred often in these
fugitive of justice cases that a smart merchant in the city of New York
thinks himself to have been swindled by a man out west that has bought
goods from him. The man never had been in the city of New York at all.
He has ordered goods by mail. He had made representations, perhaps, that
were not exactly accurate, and the New York merchant sent his goods out
to the man in the west. And in the course of a short while, the man in the
west failed in business, made an assignment.
The New York merchant says, “Well, I have been caught. I thought
this fellow was good. He made me believe he was, and I sent my goods
out. And here he is a bankrupt, and that is a swindle on me.” He finds an
obsequious district attorney that is a candidate for re-election at the next
election, or wants to curry favor with a particular part of the population.
And that man will go before the grand jury with the aid of that district
attorney, and have that western merchant indicted for obtaining goods
under false pretenses. And then go up to the Governor of New York at
Albany with a copy of this indictment and get a requisition upon the
Governor of Kansas, for instance, for this man.
Well, that is presented to the Governor of Kansas, and what may the
Governor of Kansas do without violating the law? Why, he may ask this
agent of the state of New York, “Was this man in New York at all? Did he
go there in person, and buy these goods?” “I don’t know,” says the agent
of New York, “All I know is here is this indictment against him. Here is a
warrant of the Governor of New York.” By that time, the retail merchant
gets wind of what is going on, and he comes before the Governor, and he
says, “Why, I wasn’t in New York. I didn’t go there at all. I, therefore,
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have never fled from the justice of the state of New York.”
The language of the Constitution is, “A person charged in any state
with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice.” Well, if
the man never was in New York, he didn’t flee from the justice of New
York, and upon that fact being known in some satisfactory way to the
Governor of the state of Kansas, why he will say to the agent of the state of
New York, “You don’t bring me a case under the Constitution. This man
didn’t go to New York, and he simply corresponded by mail.”
Now, in such a state of case, the Governor of Kansas might well say
that this not a case embraced by the Constitution, and I shall not deliver up
this man to the agent of the state of New York, to be carried to New York
and tried.
Do the proceedings which you have described apply to the case of a
man where he flees to a territory from a state?
No. The question is a very appropriate one, and I am glad you asked
it. It gives me a chance to call your attention to the very words. It is “a
person charged in any state” with crime “who shall flee from Justice, and
be found in another State.”511 He must commit the crime in one state and
flee to another state.
Well, you would ask at once, can it be that man is safe when he flees
from a state and goes to a territory? No, because there are statutes of the
United States passed by Congress that govern that case. The territories of
the United States are subject to the jurisdiction and authority of Congress.
Congress may make legislation for the territories. And you will find in the
statutes of the United States provisions that will enable the governor of one
of the states to reach a man who has secreted himself in a territory. And
they are substantially the same as those of criminals fleeing from one state
to another.
Why was not that decision of the court in the Kentucky case practically
equivalent to declaring that provision null and could not be enforced?
Well, the effect of the decision was not that that clause was nullified,
but that it was not intended by the framers of the Constitution to embrace
that case. That it never was the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to allow any man to lay his hands upon the governor of a state. Would
there be any action of impeachment by the governor’s own state for
violation of duty? It might be, and I would have to look at the constitution
of the particular state to speak with accuracy. But I would say just off-hand
that if the constitution of the state authorized the impeachment of the
511

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.

282

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

governor for high crimes or misdemeanors, that if the governor with his
eyes open and in disregard of the provision of the Constitution should
refuse to issue his warrant, why I think that he might be committing a crime
that might be reached.
Now the next clause.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law
or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour,
But shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such
Service or Labour may be due.512
There lurked under that clause a principle that had a great deal to do
with the recent Civil War. It would not occur to the casual reader that there
was such power in a section couched in such simple and apparently
innocent language as that. It is a curious fact that you do not find the word
“slave” anywhere in the Constitution of the United States. They did not
mention it, and yet there were slaves when the Constitution was adopted.
And that clause that I have just read had reference primarily to slaves.
“No person held to service or labor in any state under the laws
thereof.” What did the statesmen of the South say in convention when that
matter was being considered? Within a very short while before the
Constitution was adopted, there was a very tolerant view of the institution
of slavery in some of the extreme northern states. If any of you are over in
Boston or the Congressional Library here, and will turn to the newspapers
published in Boston about the time of the Declaration of Independence, and
even after that, you will find there advertisements in those papers for
runaway slaves.
There were a good many people in the South that felt, here was a great
trouble in their midst. The best-educated men of the South of that day were
by no means partial to the institution of slavery. You cannot find—I don’t
think you can find, I have never been able to find in the writings or letters
or speeches of any statesmen of the South during the Revolutionary period,
and before the Constitution was adopted, any defense of the institution of
slavery upon moral or economic grounds.
Mr. Jefferson didn’t like the institution of slavery. You know that
Washington didn’t. The most terrific arraignment that ever was made in
the country against it was that by George Mason of Virginia.513 But the
statesmen said, “We are not responsible for these people being here. Here
512
513
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See supra note 243.
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they are. Our laws recognize them as property. We cannot get rid of them.
Anything in the Constitution here that would uproot that institution all at
once would disturb all of our local affairs, produce infinite confusion.”
And that clause was a part of the compromises of the institution. The
northern and the southern men met upon that ground and said
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law
or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour,
but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such
Service or Labour may be due.514
In other words—that is, the English of it—if a slave, one such by the
laws of Virginia, escaped and went into Pennsylvania, he could not by
reason of the laws of Pennsylvania be discharged from such service or
labor. And that clause is the basis of what we popularly know to be the
fugitive slave laws you will find discussed in the case of Prigg and the
Commonwealth, about 16 Peters, and its validity sustained.515
But in about 1860, when we were approaching the war, when the
institution of slavery had been extended and the number of slaves
increased, when—to speak plainly—the institution of slavery had got its
hand upon the throat of this country, when the institution, understanding
what was necessary to maintain it, adopted the motto, “Death or Tribute”—
you have got to sustain this institution, else we are ready for anything that
may come.
That was the feeling on the one side. On the other side, the desire for
liberty and freedom throughout the whole land had increased, abolitionists
springing up everywhere to place their opposition to slavery upon high
moral grounds. Same sort of feeling that induced John Brown, with a
handful of men, to cross into the state of Virginia and attempt to raise a
revolt among the negroes, and which induced him to risk his own life.
In 1850 it became necessary to have another fugitive slave law, more
rigid, more severe in its terms.516 And when it was passed, then
commenced a political contest which never ended until Sumter was fired
upon, and until the close of the war at Appomattox. Under that law, men of
the colored race that had been in the North for years were arrested, after
having been there for a great many years, and brought back by the orders of
courts of justice to states of slavery.
514
515
516
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Now, that clause is of no further consequences today, except as it may
embrace apprentices. A boy or girl apprenticed under the laws of a state to
somebody to learn a trade, if they escape from one state to another, may be
reached and delivered up to the party entitled to their service. But it is of
no other consequence.
Now, the next section is one of very large consequence. “New States
may be admitted by the Congress into this Union . . . .”517 In those few
words you find the authority for the admission of a very large number of
states which now constitute the Union. There may be, in time, other states.
When they shall be admitted into the Union as states belongs to the
Government of the United States to determine. What countries, and what
parts of countries, shall come into this Union under the protection of our
Constitution and flag depends upon the United States. But that is so large a
subject that I will not attempt to detain you after having heard the sound of
that bell, and will continue on next Saturday night.

517

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
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LECTURE 23: APRIL 2, 1898
We have reached in our examination of the Constitution the third
section of Article IV. I was barely able at the last meeting to open the
subject of that section. It is one of very considerable importance.
The first clause of that section is, “New States may be admitted by the
Congress into this Union . . . .”518 Those of you who are at all familiar with
the history of the country will recall the fact that when this Constitution
was adopted there was no state west of Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. All the states west of those states
have been admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Constitution.
It is quite an interesting fact in the history of the country that the man
who above all others seemed to anticipate the probable future of this
country—of its extension westward from the original thirteen states—better
than anybody else of his day, was George Washington. Not a lawyer, not
trained in the politics, or what we commonly call statesmanship. Yet, the
more his life is studied, the more that we read of his letters, the better
satisfied we will be with the conclusion that there was no man of his day
that was wiser than he was. You will hardly find in any letter that he ever
wrote a sentence that you would alter today. You might improve it perhaps
in its rhetoric, but you could not improve its sense.
There is to be said of him what cannot be said of all the public men of
his day, that no man has ever seen any letter that came from him that could
not be read in any crowd, or in any audience. Nothing in it of an unworthy
character, nothing in it that was indecent or unchaste, that was not
consistent with the highest dignity of human character.
He looked ahead and saw what was the future of this country in the
West. Now, Virginia at that time laid claim to a large extended territory in
the West, which includes today Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and other parts of
the country there. She surrendered to the government of the United States
all of that territory, and all further debate about it ceased.519 And out of it
great states have been made, so that it is easy to be seen today—and
everybody recognizes the fact—that the seat of empire in this country has
gone West. And that more and more, every year our country exists, will we
recognize that the seat of empire and of power is in the valley of the
Mississippi and of the Ohio rather than on the Atlantic coast.
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Benjamin F. Shearer, E Pluribus Unum, in 1 THE UNITING STATES: THE STORY OF
STATEHOOD FOR THE FIFTY UNITED STATES 1, 6 (Benjamin F. Shearer ed., 2004).
519

286

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

We have had formed out of that territory, since this Constitution was
formed, all of these western states, and under the authority of this clause
that I have read to you, “New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union.”520 Not, be it observed, new territories or new tracts of land,
but new states may be admitted into the Union.
Now, it would occur at first blush that in the admission of new states
into the Union—which, of course, as is prescribed by this article, must be
by Congress, cannot be otherwise done—that states might be admitted into
the Union subject to condition. In other words, a man—unless he thought
about it or was familiar with the history of the question or had read the
decision of the courts on the subject—might suppose as it was a matter of
discretion with Congress whether it would admit states or not. Might also
prescribe conditions. And therefore might proscribe that it should prohibit
polygamy, for instance. Or that it might pass such and such a law, or
should pass another law. Or that a state should be admitted on condition
that a certain principle should always remain in the constitution of that
state.
Now, nothing is further from the fact. Congress cannot impose any
such condition upon the admission of a state into the Union.521 Every state
admitted into the Union must be admitted in the eye of the Constitution—
or of the law—absolutely, unconditionally as a state, the equal of any other
state when admitted.
Therefore, when the state of Nebraska, for instance, was admitted into
the Union, as soon as it was admitted it took its position side by side with
all of the other states of the Union, with all the power that any other state
had. Congress could not impose any conditions upon its admission. And if
the state came into the Union under an act of Congress which said, we
admit this state to the Union upon this, that, or the other condition, those
conditions would be nullities. They would not bind the state at all.
That is why some people were very solicitous and anxious when the
state of Utah was admitted to the Union. They knew, as every lawyer
knows, that when Utah was admitted to the Union as a state, it became the
equal of every other state. And it had the same power precisely as the state
of New York would have, or the state of Mississippi would have, over the
question of marriage and divorce. And that Utah—if it was admitted into
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the Union—could, if it sat proper, change its Constitution, the one it had
when admitted, and authorize polygamy. And if it did, there was nothing
in the Constitution of the United States to prohibit it.522 It could not be
reached, except by an amendment of the Constitution which would place
the subject of marriage and divorce under federal control, federal
jurisdiction.
Now, this applies not only to the territory which is within the political
jurisdiction of the United States, but any territory that we may acquire.
Some people once had the opinion that the United States had no authority
under the Constitution to acquire new territory. Mr. Jefferson, when he
was President, made a treaty with France, when Napoleon was First Consul
and absolute in his power, by which we acquired what was called the
Louisiana Territory, which includes Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri,
and stretched way out to the Northwest.523 Napoleon needed money. He
knew perfectly well that France could never hold that territory long. He
was wise enough to look forward in the future and anticipate the destiny of
this Anglo-Saxon people in this continent, and that he could never hold that
territory. And as he wanted money, as he had those views, he sold it.524
Mr. Jefferson made a treaty. As an illustration of a public man doing
an act which he deemed for the good of his country, and essential to the
best interests of his country, with the conviction at the time that he was
violating the Constitution of his country, as soon as he has concluded that
treaty, and as soon as it was ratified, Mr. Jefferson sought at the hands of
Congress an amendment to the Constitution of the United States that would

522 Although Utah became a territory of the United States in 1848 following the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, legislators did not admit Utah as a state until 1896. JACK ERICSON
EBLEN, THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES EMPIRES: GOVERNORS AND TERRITORIAL
GOVERNMENT, 1784–1912, at 5–7 (1968). In debating whether to admit Utah as a state, the
congressional record is rife with references to polygamy and discussion of the Mormon
lifestyle. See, e.g., HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON TERRITORIES IN REGARD TO THE
ADMISSION OF UTAH AS A STATE (Washington, Gov’t Printing Office, 1889) (argument of
F.S. Richards).
523 This is, of course, a reference to the Louisiana Purchase, which Thomas Jefferson
negotiated with France. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French
Republic, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.
524 Napoleon planned to make Florida, Louisiana, and the Caribbean a French
stronghold in North America, but was frustrated by Spain’s refusal to relinquish Florida,
which left the Louisiana Territory indefensible. See GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO
SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at 101–14 (2008). Desperately in need
of money to fund his war with England, Napoleon eventually abandoned his plan and sold
the Louisiana Territory to the United States, exclaiming, “Damn sugar, damn coffee, damn
colonies.” Id. at 106.
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validate that purchase.525 He didn’t believe that there was authority in the
United States under the Constitution to acquire new territory, and his
conscience was troubled that he had made that treaty and that we acquired
that territory in violation of the Constitution of the United States.526
But his political friends laughed at him, in substance, and they said, of
course the United States could acquire territory.527 The Constitution didn’t
forbid it. No amendment to the Constitution was necessary, and the subject
was dropped. And out of that territory acquired by treaty with foreign
power all those states were formed.528
Then we had the war with Mexico, 1846, the result of which was that
we acquired a large part, or a good part of the territory of Mexico. And
that we formed into states, under which the state of Utah, I believe,
Nevada, California. And we acquired New Mexico by treaty, that will
perhaps in time come into the Union as a state.
So, if it should be before us in the future that Hawaii should become a
part of the United States by treaty, we could annex Hawaii as a state. That
is, we could convert it into a state, or we could hold it as a part of the
territory of the United States, to be governed as a territory until the time
when it was competent and ready for admission into the Union.529 So, if it
should result also in the near future that an island down southwest should
become a part of the United States, no matter how, it could be organized as
a territory. And after a while, if we saw proper, it could be admitted into
the United States as one of the states of the Union.530
There is no limitation in this clause of the Constitution as to the
locality of the territory which may be converted into states and become a
part of the American Union, and the American Union is going to be larger
than it is today. I don’t know when, nor do I know how. We may extend it
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528 One prominent scholar frames the debate in a slightly different manner:
Having acquired far more than he had sought, Jefferson quickly cleared away
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529 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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South and North. North, if the time ever should come—I hope it will never
come—when there is trouble of a serious character between this and our
so-called mother country. If that should come, and these two branches of
the Anglo-Saxon race should be arrayed against each other in war, it is
absolutely certain that if it ever came, the northern boundary of the United
States would be most probably extended up to the North Pole.
“[B]ut no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction
of any other State . . . .”531
It will not be competent for the United States, for instance, to divide
the state of New York into two states. Nor will it be competent for the
United States to divide the state of Texas into two or more states. We are
pledged by this Constitution, “[N]o new State shall be formed or erected
within the Jurisdiction of any other State.”532
Now, there never has been any question arising out of that clause of
the Constitution until the last Civil War. Those of you who have read the
history of that war will probably ask yourselves the question, “How does it
happen, therefore, under that clause that the state of West Virginia is one of
the states of this Union, and that it was formed entirely within the territory
of the old state of Virginia. How does that happen?”533
Well, that is a very difficult question. It is not so easily answered. It
has been answered by time, and by judicial decision.534 No man today
disputes the lawful existence of the state of West Virginia. Nobody even in
Virginia disputes it. The final judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia are brought to the Supreme Court of the United States and
revised just as regularly as are the final judgments of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of the State of Virginia. The State of West Virginia has senators
and representatives, part of the political department of the government.
You will ask how that occurred, how can that be under this clause of
the Constitution, “[B]ut no new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State.”535 I won’t go into that question at large or
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Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
Id.
533 During the Civil War, the western portion of Virginia voted to separate from
Virginia proper to form the state of Kanawha, which later became known simply as West
Virginia. See A State of Convenience: The Creation of West Virginia, W. VA. ARCHIVES &
HIST., http://www.wvculture.org/history/statehood/statehood.html (last visited June 16,
2013).
534 Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39 (1870) (upholding the
constitutionality of the new state of West Virginia).
535 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
532
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discuss it upon principle. But I remind you of that fact that in 1861 all the
constituted authority of the State of Virginia allied themselves with the
Southern Confederacy. And when that state was thus allied with the
Southern Confederacy, was it a state of the union? Did the old state for the
time being die?536
Now, these are questions never dreamed of by the men that framed this
Constitution. And in time, the people of this country will come to
recognize the fact that the most difficult problems of statesmanship ever
presented to this country were presented during the Civil War and after the
Civil War. For a time after that war opened, there were no authorities in
the State of Virginia that recognized the authority of the United States.
And people within the old State of Virginia met who did adhere to the
United States, and organized the State of West Virginia upon the theory
that the old state had cut loose from the union. And the new state was
admitted.537 There the matter ended. There has been no special discussion
about it; it is just one of the things that resulted from that war, which the
less said about the better for the country.
How could that portion of the state be recognized as a new state while
the United States still adhered to the fact that the entire state of Virginia
never actually went out of the union, Judge?
Where was the old state of Virginia during the war? Who constituted
the state of Virginia during the war—I mean the state as a component part
of the Union? Its government, its legislators, its senators, and every public
officer in that state took an oath to support the Southern Confederacy. And
where was the state, who represented it? Who could represent it, in that
condition of things? It was in that condition of things—upon the theory
that the old state for the time being had committed suicide, and that there
was no state of Virginia left as a part of the United States—that the new
state was organized.
Now, if you tell me that you don’t quite understand that, I am quite
ready to agree with you that it is not very easy to understand.
Judge, the history of West Virginia recites that when the state was
organized it was entitled “The Reorganized Government of Virginia.”538
536

The Supreme Court had at this time already held that Texas’s secession from the
Union was a “nullity” and that the Confederate states had in fact never ceased to be under
the jurisdiction of the Union. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), overruled on
other grounds by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885).
537 For a more detailed account of West Virginia’s separation from Virginia, see JOHN
ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA: A HISTORY (1984).
538 It was also known as the “Restored Government of Virginia.” For a contemporary
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Let me, in Yankee fashion, answer that question by putting another.
Let me suppose that in the case of a Civil War in this country—which
involved the question of the existence or non-existence of the United States
in its form under the Constitution—let me suppose that the legislature of
Kentucky, in both branches, the governor backing them, repudiate all
connection with the government of the United States.539
Now, that is putting it more strongly than it was in Virginia and West
Virginia. Where was the state of Kentucky after that, the state of Kentucky
as one of the states of the United States? Let me add to that supposition
that a majority of the people of the state of Kentucky by vote at the polls
declare their opposition to the government of the United States, and try to
set up an independent government outside of the government of the United
States. Well, was the state of Kentucky counted as one of the United
States?
Suppose the minority in that state had met in convention and declared
their adherence to the government of the United States, and declared that
they represented the state of Kentucky as one of the states of the United
States. They elected a governor and legislature, and sent senators and
representatives to Congress. And they were admitted to the Congress of
the United States. Which would be the true state of Kentucky, this last one,
or the one that said they were out of the United States?
Now, the question would have been rid of all difficulty if these
gentlemen who formed the state of West Virginia had said that we are the
state of Virginia, we represent the people in that state, we adhere to the
government of the United States. And that they were the state of Virginia,
and they had been so recognized by the admission of their senators and
representatives in the Congress. There would have been less trouble in the
question than is presented.
Well now, in the case that I put, let us suppose that a majority of the
people of the states of this union rebel against the government of the United
States; say that, “We are going out of the union, and we are going to take
this state out of the union.” Well, they don’t get out by saying they are
going out. The territory is there; the state in its corporate capacity is there.

recapitulation of events, see Letter to the Editor, The Restored Government of Virginia—
History of the New State of Things, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1864, at 3.
539 This line of questioning appears to be a reference to Kentucky’s brief stint under a
Confederate government. See Lowell H. Harrison, The Government of Confederate
Kentucky, in THE CIVIL WAR IN KENTUCKY: BATTLE FOR THE BLUEGRASS STATE 79, 84 (Kent
Masterson Brown ed., 2000).
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Now, suppose the minority organized a state government as the
government of that state, and it is recognized by the government of the
United States as the local government of that state within the meaning of
this Constitution. Why, it would be the minority thus organized, for the
government of the United States could never recognize the legality of any
movement which proposed to take a state bodaciously, if I may coin a
word, out of the union.
I do not know whether I have made myself clear. I am not sure that I
understand myself on that question.
After the states were readmitted to the union, upon what theory was
that? Do you find the word “readmitted” in the Acts of Congress?
Well, I doubt whether you will find the word “readmitted” in the Acts
of Congress, but I expect you will find substantially this, that after the war
when the people came together in some of the usual forms and announced
themselves to be the government of the state of Alabama, for instance,
Congress by an act recognized that as the government of the state of
Alabama.540 But I don’t think you will find any act of Congress that
recognized that Alabama got out of the Union and was readmitted as state.
I reckon not.
“[N]or any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or
Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress.”541
You cannot join Alabama and Georgia against their will into one state.
You cannot join Delaware and Maryland, upon the idea that Delaware is a
little bit of a thing, against the will of that state. The states that form the
Union, without regard to their size or population, are equal and
independent. The state legislatures may consent, and then Congress may
unite them. And some think that the Constitution ought to be amended so
as to put these little states out of existence.542 And you occasionally hear a
man say that it is an outrage that the little state of Delaware—which is so
far advanced in civilization that it has got the whipping post543—that it is
540 The process of readmitting Confederate states began in 1867 with the first part of
the so-called Reconstruction Acts. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
541 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
542 The nine eastern counties of Maryland have had three rounds of debate since the
nineteenth century regarding joining the area where Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia
intersect—the Delmarva Peninsula—and seceding to create what would now be the fiftyfirst state. See Passions Still Run High for State of Delmarva, FREE LANCE-STAR, Mar. 18,
1994, at C12.
543 Delaware did not abolish the whipping post until 1972, three years after man
stepped foot on the moon.
See Enforcing the Law, STATE OF DELAWARE,
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an outrage that the little state of Delaware should have the same power in
the Senate of the United States that the imperial state of New York has; that
the two Senators from Delaware can neutralize the votes of the two
Senators from the state of New York. That is an outrage they say.
Well, I don’t think it is. And it would be an unhappy day for this
country if that principle was ever altered. I am not one of those who
believe that the greatest safety in this country lies in the notions, or the
legislatures, or the policies of the great states of the Union. The safety does
not lie in what may be determined by the states that have got millions of
people. A great deal depends upon who the people are. What are their
policies? What are their plans?
I am one of those old-fashioned people who believe that some of the
greatest dangers that are ahead for this country come from the great centers
of business and of population, where the great mass of people come to
think that everything must be made to bend to what they call their
“business interests.” One of the dangers that this country has always got to
confront, particularly if it has got a question of honor to settle with a
foreign nation, is that what are popularly called the more moneyed and
commercial interests of this country will subordinate national honor to
dollars and cents.
I want to see these little states preserved. I want to see these small
states presented with all their power in the Senate of the United States.
And therefore this country will consult its own safety, if they will stand
resolutely by those compromises of the Constitution, one of which was that
the states of this Union were to be equal with each other, particularly in one
branch of the national government.
Now the next clause. “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States . . . .”544
Under that clause we organize the territories and we govern them. We
govern them as we please, speaking in a large sense, but we must govern
them subject to this Constitution. We cannot prescribe for the people of
one of the territories of the United States a rule forbidden by the principles
of this Constitution. Congress could not prescribe for one of the territories
of the United States, for instance, a rule to the effect that a man in a
criminal case shall be compelled to testify against himself, a rule that

http://archives.delaware.gov/100/other_stories/Enforcing%20the%20Law.shtml
updated June 11, 2010, 4:17 PM).
544 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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would subject a man to trial for a criminal offense by a jury composed of
less persons than twelve. The Congress of the United States is bound to
respect the fundamental guarantee of the Constitution relating to life,
liberty, and property when applied to the people in the territories of the
United States.
Now, Section 4 is a section of the Constitution that has never been
interpreted.545 I doubt whether we will ever have occasion to interpret it,
although some people think that this country is going to the dogs, that it is
not many years hence before our institutions will be overturned and we will
be either under a king or under a mob.546 That is the view of some.
I got only today a letter from a gentleman, a resident of this city,
whose friendship I enjoy, and whom I know to be one of the best men in
the world. He says, in substance, that the days of the American Republic
are very few, and that the government is going to be overthrown, he thinks,
by those whom he styles, “wild people in reference to politics.”
Well, I know what it is in his mind. He is a true American. He is a
friend of the government of the United States. But he is a man of large
means, and he is thinking of preserving those means. He is unnecessarily
alarmed, for fear that what he calls the masses in this country are going to
upturn everything, and play the mischief generally. And that is the view of
some.
But I take leave to believe that, so far from any possibility of that sort
being shortly ahead of us, true republicanism—the love of the fundamental
principles that constitute what is popularly styled Anglo-Saxon freedom—
is stronger today in this country than it ever was. And that there is absolute
certainty—although we have got seventy million of people—there is
absolute certainty that the sense of law and order in this country is strong
enough to protect and preserve all of those rights.
Now, this clause here is that “The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.”547
What does that clause mean, that the United States shall guarantee to
every state a republican form of government? What is a republican form of

545

Harlan is referring to the Guaranty Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
This provision later came to be an oft-cited passage in cases involving voting rights.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 (1962).
547 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
546
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government? You will not find that defined in any decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States. It is left at large.548
It is easy to say what is not a republican form of government. Let me
suppose that one of the states of this union should, under the lead of a
particular religious denomination, establish a state religion and compel
every citizen, whatever might be his religious tendency, to pay a tax to
support that particular religion. Would that be a republican form of
government? I should say no.549
Suppose one of the states of this union should establish a form of state
government under which the right to fill the office of governor of that state
should reside in a particular family. And say that when AB—the thengovernor of the state—died, that the right to fill the office of governor
should descend to his eldest male heir. And when that fellow petered out
that it should descend to his eldest male heir. And they should also have
titles and ape some of the monarchical governments of Europe in that way.
Would that be a republican form of government? Well, I should say no.
Very well. If any state did that, how would the United States
government reach it? Here is the broad duty assigned to it, by guaranteeing
to every state in the union a republican form of government.
Well, I should say in the cases I have put before you, Congress could
by an act wipe out such a state government, and if necessary send our army
down there to kick that fellow out of office, drive him out of power. I say,
we will never have that issue. There is no danger that this American people
will ever lean in any state to a form of government that is not republican.
The only danger is that they may lead to forms of government that are
rather loose, that do not sufficiently guard the rights of life, liberty, and
property.
Now, Article V.
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several
States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which,
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of
this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths

548 More specifically, that determination is not within the grasp of the judiciary.
Instead, it is up to the legislature to determine the meaning of “republican form of
government” and to promulgate rules supporting that notion of government. Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–44 (1849).
549 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof . . . .550
We talk about particular battles in the last Civil War determining the
result. We sometimes say, those of us who sympathize with the cause of
the Union, that Gettysburg was the battle which turned the scale and saved
the Union. I have no trouble referring to these things, for I have come to
the conclusion that all of our American brethren that were on the Southern
side have come to the conclusion that the best thing that could have
happened to them was the defeat of the South. So I can say that this
amendment section was the turning point in the great struggle for the
acceptance or rejection of this Constitution.
Patrick Henry, George Mason, and James Monroe, men whose
patriotism was not to be doubted, said that the Constitution as originally
proposed would not do. “There is nothing in that Constitution that
guarantees the rights of life, liberty, and property against invasion. There is
no national bill of rights in it.”551
Well, Washington said, “It was not deemed necessary to put those
things in it, because as the government of the United States was
government of enumerated powers it could not endanger life, liberty, or
property, because it has no power to do so. But suppose I am wrong. Here
is a provision made in the fifth article of the Constitution to amend that
instrument. I appeal to you patriots of America, that in view of the fact that
if this Constitution is rejected we have got anarchy. We will never get
another convention together again. I appeal to you to take this
Constitution, because here is a provision made for its amendment, and if
anything is wanting in it we can put it in by amendment.”552
550

U.S. CONST. art. V.
See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Speech at the Convention of Virginia (June 14, 1788), in 2
THE DEBATES, supra note 26, at 329–32.
552 In a letter to Patrick Henry, Benjamin Harrison, and Thomas Nelson, Jr. dated Sept.
24, 1787, George Washington wrote:
In the first moment after my return I take the liberty of sending you a copy of
the Constitution which the [federal] Convention has submitted to the People of
these States. I accompany it with no observations; your own Judgment will at once
discover the good, and the exceptionable parts of it. [A]nd your experience of the
difficulties, which have ever arisen when attempts have been made to reconcile
such variety of interests, and local prejudices as pervade the several States will
render explanation unnecessary. I wish the Constitution which is offered had been
made more perfect, but I sincerely believe it is the best that could be obtained at
this time; and, as a Constitutional door is opened for amendment hereafter, the
adoption of it under the present circumstances of the Union is in my opinion
desirable.
551
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And that view carried the day. That caused the acceptance of this
Constitution. And at the first session of Congress after its acceptance, the
first ten amendments were adopted, which constitute the national Bill of
Rights. But there is another aspect of that article that is in my judgment of
considerable moment, and that is that it is not easy to amend the
Constitution of the United States.
The first ten amendments were adopted because everybody wanted
them.553 There was no trouble. The Eleventh Amendment was adopted
because everybody wanted that. The Twelfth Amendment was adopted
because of the difficulty arising out of the election of Thomas Jefferson and
Aaron Burr as President and Vice-President of the United States.554 And
from 1801 down to the Thirteenth Amendment, there was no amendment to
this Constitution. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
arose out of the Civil War.
We are now thirty-three years after the close of that Civil War, as
evidenced by the surrender of Appomattox, and yet no further amendment
has been made to the Constitution.555 Our country is full of all sorts of
From a variety of concurring accounts it appears to me that the political
concerns of this Country are, in a manner, suspended by a thread. That the
Convention has been looked up to by the reflecting part of the community with a
sollicitude [sic] which is hardly to be conceived, and that, if nothing had been
agreed on by that body, anarchy would soon have ensued, the seeds being richly
sown in every soil.
Letter from George Washington to Patrick Henry, Benjamin Harrison, and Thomas Nelson,
Jr.
(Sept.
24,
1787),
available
at
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=mgw2&fileName=gwpage014.db&recNum=155.
553 The Bill of Rights was adopted and ratified all at once, but there were twelve
amendments on the table, therefore leaving two amendments unratified: the Congressional
Apportionment Amendment and the Congressional Salary Amendment.
RUSSELL
FREEDMAN, IN DEFENSE OF LIBERTY: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S BILL OF RIGHTS 17–18
(2003). The first, dealing with how the number of representatives to Congress from each
state would be determined, has never been ratified and is technically still pending before the
states; the latter, limiting the ability of Congress to increase Congressional salaries, was
ratified in 1992 as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Id. at 18; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.
554 Under the system in place prior to the Twelfth Amendment, Jefferson and Burr had
both received a majority of electoral votes, but the number was tied at 73. See TADAHISA
KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787–1804, at 99 (1994). Despite the fact that Jefferson was clearly the
party’s choice for President, each electoral vote for Burr had the effect of counting as a vote
for President. See id. The House of Representatives therefore had to resolve the uncertainty
according to constitutional contingent election procedures. See id.
555 The Battle of Appomattox Court House, fought on the morning of April 9, 1865,
was the final engagement between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and the
Union Army of the Potomac. See P.H. Sheridan, The Last Days of the Rebellion, 147 N.
AM. REV. 270, 270 (1888). Confederate General Robert E. Lee recognized that he had lost,
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notions. It is full of brain, and energy in every part of it. There are
educated men, and thoughtful men, and reading men, and scheming men,
too, that think we must amend this instrument this way—it ought to be
amended in that way, it must be amended in that and another way. And at
every session of the Congress of the United States, somebody who thinks
he knows more than all the country beside, proposes an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. But it dies with that session, because it
takes two-thirds of each house to put it before the public, and then it takes
three-fourths of the states to have it adopted.
Now, these gentlemen across the waters affect to look upon this
country of ours as a wild democracy, as going headlong and tumbling over
head and heels, and don’t know what they are doing. But they forget that
while it is in the power of the armies of European countries, or with the
heads of European countries, to overturn their governments in one night or
in one day, it is not in the power of any bare majority in this democratic
government to change this fundamental law. We recognize the right of
every man to say what he wants, and we recognize the rights of the people
to vote as they please. But we have imposed upon ourselves this check,
that this fundamental law of the land—the law for the states, the law for
individuals, the law for every department of the government, federal or
state—we have said by this Constitution it shan’t be easily changed. You
shan’t lay your hands upon that instrument unless you are preceded by a
vote of two-thirds of each branch of the national Congress, and that must
be supplemented by the vote of three-fourths of the states of this union
before you can depart from this instrument at all.
Therein lies the safety of this country. Therein lies the security of our
people against temporary excitement, sudden violence of temper as the
result of bad legislation. The whole thing is so checked and balanced that
there can be no hasty action, but before anything is done of a serious or
material character, all these provisions must be complied with.
Now one clause more and I conclude what I have to say about the
original Constitution and will commence at our next meeting considering
the amendments to the Constitution.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
and surrendered to Union General Ulysses S. Grant that afternoon. See id at 279.
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State to the Contrary notwithstanding.556
I love to read these clauses. Let me read one more before we close.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification [of] any Office or public Trust under the United
States.557
Is there any country on the Earth that has in its statutes or laws a
provision like that? Not one. This is the only people which have adopted a
written Constitution, which by its very terms is above everybody, all
governments, federal and state, all judges, all Congresses.
And the people of the United States have said to everybody, “You
shall not assume to exert any authority in the name of the people of the
United States, unless you can find warrant for that in this instrument.” So
that whatever a President may do, whatever the head of a department may
do, whatever may be said in an Act of Congress, all of it must be brought to
the test of this instrument.
And if there is not authority in that instrument for it, what is done is
void, so that whatever in our future history—whatever anybody may
assume to do—every human being in this country, whether citizen or not,
can rest secure in the conviction that that which may be done in the name
of the law, under authority of any department of the government, must be
brought to the test of that supreme law of the land.

556
557

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
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LECTURE 24: APRIL 16, 1898
We have reached in our consideration of the Constitution the
amendments of that instrument, not the least important part of it I beg to
assure you. These amendments are popularly called the national Bill of
Rights. I assume that you have read, or will soon read if you have not
already, a history of England besides a history of your own country.
Way back a thousand years ago, the people of England had very little
idea of what constituted true liberty. But that people developed from year
to year, and from century to century, so that by the time this country
adopted the Constitution of the United States, that people, the English
people, after several hundred years of trial and suffering and expenditure of
blood, had imbedded into what is called the Constitution of England certain
great fundamental principles which are called the guarantees of life, liberty,
and property among free people. And when that country had reached the
period just before the adoption of the present Constitution of the United
States, those principles were well understood and embodied in statutes in
England.558
One of them was the Magna Charta, wrung from King John in the 13th
Century, and then habeas corpus, and various other statutes well-known in
English history.559 These all together constitute what is popularly called
Anglo-Saxon freedom.560 And when our fathers rebelled against the
English government and determined to have a government of our own
here—whenever the people appeared in convention preparatory to the
Revolution out of which our Constitution came—they declared that these
rights belonged to them here as English subjects as much as they belonged
to the people who lived in England. And they were recognized in this
country everywhere before the adoption of the Constitution.561
Well, when this Constitution was adopted, no one of those
fundamental guarantees of life, liberty, and property was found in the
instrument. And the Constitution was submitted to conventions in the
558 The notions of guaranteed protection of “life, liberty, or estate” are traced back to
English philosopher John Locke, whose various theories were very influential in England
during the Glorious Revolution. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 119
(Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (1690).
559 See supra notes 475–476 and accompanying text; see also 3 STORY, supra note 43,
at § 1858.
560 For a contemporary analysis of the notion of so-called “Anglo-Saxon freedom,” see
JAMES K. HOSMER, A SHORT HISTORY OF ANGLO-SAXON FREEDOM (New York, Charles
Scribner’s Sons 1890).
561 3 STORY, supra note 43, at §§ 1851–62.
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several states without any declaration upon that subject. What was the
result? Why, in Virginia, Patrick Henry, whose great speech was said to
have set the ball of the Revolution in motion, said, “I am opposed to
accepting this Constitution because these guarantees are not embodied in
it.”562 And George Mason, a great friend of the liberties of the country,
took the same ground. And James Monroe took the same ground. And
other men, whose patriotism no one doubted, whose love of liberty no one
doubted, whom everybody knew to be in favor of an independent republic
here, independent of the English government in every way, these and others
opposed the adoption of this Constitution for that reason, for the absence of
this Bill of Rights.563 It was very difficult to meet.
On the other side it was said, “Why put this into the Constitution of the
United States? The Constitution of the United States guarantees a general
government, but it has got no powers except what are granted to it.” And
they said, “You cannot find in the Constitution as we submit it to you any
authority in the Congress of the United States, expressly or by implication,
to go against what are these fundamental rights, and, therefore, it was not
necessary to put them in the Constitution. We have got them in all of our
state constitutions, and we do not need them in the national
Constitution.”564
But that argument did not quite allay the apprehension of a good many
men whose patriotism I say no one doubted, and the influence of
Washington finally turned the scale. He said in various forms, and in
letters to those who were afraid of the Constitution of the United States, “If
you reject this Constitution we are in anarchy. We cannot get another
convention together. Here are these states all separate, with no common
government to present to the world, and if this Constitution is rejected there
is no telling when we will get another.”565
562 Patrick Henry opposed the federal Constitution primarily because he believed it
reduced states’ rights and that the price of a strong national government was the loss of
individual liberties. See Patrick Henry, Speech at the Convention of Virginia (June 5,
1788), in 2 THE DEBATES, supra note 26, at 61.
563 Much of this anti-federalist sentiment was captured in writings and speeches of the
time in what are known as the “Anti-Federalist Papers.” See generally THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed.,
1986).
564 This idea sprung from the Federalists, who believed a bill of rights was not
necessary to protect personal liberties. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
565 It was reported that Washington said, “Should the States reject this excellent
Constitution, the probability is that an opportunity will never again offer to cancel another in
peace—the next will be drawn in blood.” See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 717 (1928).
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“Luckily,” he said, “this Constitution provides for its own amendment.
And therefore let us accept this Constitution, and then amend it in order to
embody those principles about which there can be no controversies.”566
And that view finally prevailed. And—by small majorities in many of the
states—the Constitution was accepted.567
Now, in accordance with the understanding at that time, as soon as the
first Congress met, on the twenty-fifth of September, 1789, these first ten
amendments were adopted.568 They were supposed to have been prepared
by Mr. Madison.569 And the experience of this country, since the
foundation of the government, tells us that those who wanted these
provisions in the Constitution were right, and that it was a mistake to have
omitted them. But that mistake amounted practically to nothing because
they were immediately put into the Constitution.570 The last state which
accepted these amendments to the Constitution did so in December 1791.571
Curiously enough, there is no evidence on the journals of Congress
that three great states, Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts, ever
ratified them.572 What may be the fact about that as to whether they in fact
ratified them, I do not know. Perhaps Massachusetts thought we have got it
in our present Constitution here and we do not need it. Connecticut may
have acted for the same reason, and Georgia also.

566

See supra note 552.
While some states voted unanimously to ratify the Constitution, some states ratified
with much closer margins, including Pennsylvania (46–23), Massachusetts (187–168), New
Hampshire (57–47), Virginia (89–79), New York (30–27), and Rhode Island (34–32).
Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a
Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 467–68.
568 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 288, at 90–91. For a general overview of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, including archival materials and background information, see
Bill
of
Rights,
NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights.html (last visited June 16, 2013).
569 James Madison, who later became known as the “Father of the Bill of Rights,”
proposed the amendments that would become the Bill of Rights. ROBERT A. GOLDWIN,
FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: HOW JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE
CONSTITUTION 82–85 (1997).
570 Madison introduced the amendments to the House of Representatives through a
series of legislative bills. See H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85–87 (1789).
571 On December 15, 1791, Virginia ratified the Bill of Rights and it went into effect.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN LIBERTIES xxi (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1992).
572 Massachusetts, Georgia, and Connecticut did ratify the amendments as part of
sesquicentennial celebrations on March 2, March 24, and April 19, 1939, respectively. Id. at
xxii.
567
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But here they are, and they constitute what we ordinarily call, and call
with pride, the national Bill of Rights. What do we mean by Bill of Rights?
Why, it is that part of the constitution of a government which lays down
certain fundamental principles which are not under any circumstances to be
invaded by the legislature, which the legislature has no power to violate.
Now, what are these? Let us see how important they are.
The first article of amendment is: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”573
Right in the front of these guarantees was the one relating to the
establishment of religion. Why was that put there? Observe, it says:
“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.”
When Virginia was admitted into the union it had an established religion,
that is, a religion that was recognized by the state, a particular form of
religion, the Church of England. And every citizen of Virginia, whether a
member of the Church of England or not, was compelled to pay taxes to
support that established religion.574 James Madison was a member of that
church, but he encouraged the amendment. Jefferson was with him in
favor of abolishing that religion, in the sense that the state should have no
connection with it. No man should be compelled to pay any tax to support
any religion; that all religions were to be alike under the Constitution.
Now, these words, it seems to me, are a little awkwardly put together:
“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.”
What is the meaning of that? Now, there is one thing we know it does
mean. It means that Congress cannot establish a religion. Congress cannot
by any act recognize a religion, one religion above another in the District of
Columbia, or in any territory of the United States. If Congress were to pass
a statute recognizing a particular form of religion as a state religion here, it
would not be worth the paper on which it was written. “Or prohibit the free
exercise thereof.” You cannot put any burden upon any man’s conscience
573

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Tithes to the Church of England were suspended in 1776 and were never reenacted.
See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1436 (1990). The compulsory relationship with the
Church of England ceased permanently in 1786 when the Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom was enacted. See Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785 Va. Acts 26,
available
at
http://www.virginiamemory.com/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/religious_
freedom.
574

304

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

in respect to his religion. It cannot favor one religion at the expense of
another before the words “respecting an establishment of religion.”
I saw not a great while ago in the papers—I know nothing beyond
that—that someone raised the question of the validity of an act of Congress
which made an appropriation for the maintenance and support of one of the
charitable hospitals of this city, Providence Hospital, which is managed by
a religious entity, that is part and parcel of the Roman Catholic Church.
And the question was made that that appropriation was unconstitutional
under this provision of the Constitution of the United States. In opposition
to that view it was said that law did not relate to the establishment of a
religion. Congress founds here a hospital for taking care of poor people
who are not able to take care of themselves, and it was said that is not a law
respecting an establishment of religion. The Congress of the United States
is simply accepting the aid of an organization of that sort in order to care
for these sick and indigent people. And that view was sustained in the
Supreme Court of this District, and in the Court of Appeals of this District
it was reversed, and it is said the case will be attempted to be taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States.575
I mean neither to intimate nor express any opinion upon the point. The
important thing is that the Congress of the United States shall not, in any
place where it has jurisdiction, favor any religion at the expense of another,
or put any burden upon any person in this country because of his religion;
that Congress shall not by any law prohibit the free exercise of religion. A
man may say—and I may say here if I choose—that I have no religion, and
I do not believe in any religion. I may say if I choose—of course I would
not say it, but if I did say it, no one has a right to call me to account under
the law of Congress—that I do not believe in the inspiration of the
scriptures, or that I believe it was a myth, or that I do not believe in the
divinity of the Savior.576
I may say, if I choose, that there is no future life; that when I die, and
my bones go into the ground, that is the last of it. I have a right to say that,
so far as the law is concerned. I may have no moral right, I may be

575 Harlan refers to Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D.C. 453 (D.C. Cir. 1898). The
Supreme Court granted the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeals in Bradfield v.
Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
576 Justice Harlan was an observant Presbyterian and occasionally taught Sunday
school in Washington, DC. For a detailed exploration of the influence of religion on Justice
Harlan’s jurisprudence, see James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan: A
Case Study in Late Nineteenth Century Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARQ. L. REV.
317 (2001).
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responsible to a higher power than any on this Earth for notions of this sort,
but I am not responsible to any human power. I have the right to have what
religion I please, or I have the right to have no religion. That is the
meaning of this Constitution.
And curiously enough, that struggle resulting in that amendment arose
largely out of contests between people that did believe in some form of
religion, but neither believed in the other. The Established Church of
England persecuted the Dissenters, and they persecuted the Established
Church.577 And the experience of the world showed that the worst thing
that could possibly happen for freedom for the human race would be to put
it in the power of any religious denomination to dominate the conscience of
the mind of the people of the country where that religion was maintained.
And this amendment says to the Congress of the United States, which is
invested with all the power of this Constitution, “keep your hands off of the
conscience of every man in matters of religion, and let every man be free to
have what religion he chooses, and to exercise without let or hindrance
from any human power.” And that is the glory of this country today.
There are not many countries in the world of which that can be said. It
can be said of this country. It can be said of England. It can be said of no
other country beside those in the largest sense, although there are other socalled republics. Yet they are republics and governments that have a
religious attachment to them which interferes with the free exercise of
religion.578
Nor shall Congress abridge “the freedom of speech, or of the press.”579
What is freedom of speech? Well, I need not say what that is in
America. We certainly have a good deal of free speech here, and we know
577

Harlan seems to refer to early conflicts between Anglicans and Congregationalists.
Later, these became established religions that persecuted new “dissenters,” including
Baptists, Methodists, Quakers, and Unitarians. See David Bebbington, Nonconformists,
LIBERAL
DEMOCRAT
HIST.
GROUP
(July
27,
2006),
http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/item_single.php?item_id=40&item=history.
578 Harlan is likely referring to France. “Laïcité,” or “French secularism,” had taken
root in France in the 1880s and was later codified in the 1905 Law on the Separation of
Churches and State. See T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of
the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 420–21 n.2. For further discussion
on international regimes of religious freedom, see Ben Vermeulen, Speech at the
International Coalition for Religious Freedom Conference on Religious Freedom and the
New Millennium: The Historical Development of Religious Freedom (Apr. 17–19, 1998),
available
at
http://www.religiousfreedom.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=378&I
temid=18.
579 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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what freedom of the press is. We have not only got freedom of the press,
but you might call it the “licentiousness of the press.” If there is anything
that a newspaper wants to say, it says it. And it says a great many things
that are not so, but it says them, and you cannot suppress it. You can hold
the manager of that paper responsible for any libel, but that is practically
all.
The newspapers of this country are great searchlights that are looking
into everything, not only that which concerns the public, but that which
does not concern the public. And the privilege is abused. But we had
better stand it abused than to have the press subjected—as it is on the
continent of Europe—to a sort of censorship, under which somebody sitting
near a telegraph office in a room adjoining, says by the authority of
government that no telegrams shall go from this office to a foreign country
unless submitted to this censor. And he strikes this out and that out and the
other out, so that if in such a government they do not want the truth known,
it keeps it back.
Well, we have no trouble of that sort in this country. We have not only
got the truth, but we have got more than the truth, constantly traveling in
the telegrams and newspapers. I say better that—a thousand times better—
than any condition of things that would subject the press or speech of this
country to a governmental censorship.
Nor shall Congress abridge “the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”580
Anywhere in all this broad land the people have the right to
assemble—not riotously, but peaceably—and petition their government,
whether federal or state, to remedy the grievance. It is a great privilege; it
is one we do not appreciate because nobody ever proposes to abridge it, in
a time of peace, at least. Masses of people are often stirred into excitement.
They would call a public meeting and express their views. Well, they have
a right to meet. They have a right to express their views. Deny them that
right and they will think they have been wronged, and out of that feeling
would come revolution in the end. But as long as the republic, the people,
have a right to meet peaceably and speak out their minds, and ask the
government to redress what they deem grievances, they are content. Their
right to assemble is acknowledged. Their right to ask that these grievances,
or that grievance, or that which they deem a grievance, be remedied is not
disputed, and then they quietly submit.

580

Id.
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In some parts of the world you cannot have a public meeting unless
you get the consent of the chief of police, or secretary of war, or some
department of the law. We have got no law of that sort. Those fellows
across the waters think we are a wild sort of people because we have not
laws of that sort. In fact, those people that have got those privileges have
got more patience, more good sense than any people anywhere on the
Earth. And if you don’t attempt to repress them, they are quite apt in the
end to reach solid ground, and to reach a conclusion that is commended by
the sound judgment of men everywhere.
Now, Amendment II: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.”581
What do you mean by “militia” here? Why, it means the men that are
not in the regular forces. Back in the Constitution, you will remember, it is
stated that Congress shall have power “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,”
“[t]o raise and support Armies,” and Congress shall have power “to make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”
and the power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”582
The militia is composed of the people outside of the regular forces, and
every man is of the militia, according to the law of the state in which he
lives. He may be called into service. That is necessary to the security of a
free people, and it is because it is necessary for the security of a free people
that this country has never had a large standing army. We have got a very
small one, not as large as it ought to be, but always a small one. And
nobody ever proposes to make it an overwhelming force.
It was the apprehension that if we had a large regular army, officered
by men who gave their whole lives to the military service, and composed of
soldiers who were there as a business for many years to come, that it might
be that in some emergency that force might be turned against the
government to overturn it. It says in the Constitution, “Congress shall have
power . . . [t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union, suppress Insurrection, and repel Invasions.”583
Does that allow the militia to be sent out of the country into foreign
countries, Judge?
Well, I would not answer that too hastily. But to enforce the laws of
581
582
583

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Id. art. I, § 8.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 15.
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the United States they may call it. And to repel invasion. And to execute
the laws of the Union. Sometimes, the best way to repel an invasion of this
country is to go outside of it and meet the fellow where he may be found.
And I suppose—I do not go into details—I suppose that there may be a
power to employ them for the purposes indicated.
Now, how [the militia is] called out is another question. In the last
Civil War, the army of the United States was composed mostly of
volunteers, militia from the states. The President of the United States, for
instance, would call upon the state of New York for 30,000 soldiers. They
would be raised under the laws of New York, through the Governor of New
York, by that state organized into regiments, officered by the Governor of
that state, or in accordance with its laws; and then turned over to the United
States. They would be mustered then in the service of the United States.584
Being thus mustered in the service of the United States, they are under the
control of the United States from thenceforward. The particular object of
this provision, however, was to make it certain that the Congress of the
United States should never have it in its power to say to any state, “You
shall have no regular trained militia with arms in their hands.”
This militia, as contradistinguished from regular troops, are the boys at
home around their local government, attached as they ought to be to their
home and to their local government, and therefore ready if emergency
requires to defend that home government against a government outside.585
Therefore, the fathers said that is necessary to the freedom of the people, to
the security of the people. And therefore an act of Congress which should
say that no state should have any militia, should have no troops with guns
in their hands, is a nullity. It is a declaration, to put it in plain English, to
the Congress of the United States, “Now keep within the limits of your
power. Execute the laws of the union. Carry out the Constitution of the
584 See BRUCE CATTON, THE CIVIL WAR 24–26 (1960) (detailing the assembly of state
militiamen for service of the federal government).
585 It may be that the militia was only competent for such limited purposes of
defending their own “home” and “local government.” George Washington, as Adjutant
General of the Virginia militia, experienced the limitations of state and local militias:
[H]e experienced all the evils of insubordination among the troops, perverseness in
the militia, inactivity in the officers, disregard of orders, and reluctance in the civil
authorities to render a proper support. And what added to his mortification was,
that the laws gave him no power to correct these evils, either by enforcing
discipline, or compelling the indolent and refractory to do their duty . . . . The
militia system was suited only to times of peace. It provided for calling out men to
repel invasion; but the powers granted for effecting it were so limited, as to be
almost inoperative.
JARED SPARKS, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 70 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1857).
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United States. Don’t you come down here to our states to overturn our
local government, to interfere with our domestic affairs. If you do, we
have a right under this Constitution to have a militia to meet you, and
defend, if need be.” That was the provision of the Bill of Rights, and “the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”586
Well, there was a statute in the state of Kentucky which punished a
man for carrying concealed deadly weapons. A man carried a pistol, and
he was tried and fined under the statute for carrying concealed deadly
weapons. And he said, “Under the Constitution of the United States, as
well as the Constitution of Kentucky, I have a right to bear arms.” “No,”
says the court. “It is the militia that may bear arms, and you, going around
here among your peaceful neighbors, pretending to be as unprotected as
they are, but carrying a concealed deadly weapon, that is doing something
that the state may prevent.”587
Amendment III: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.”588
The President of the United States, the General of the Army, Admiral
of the Navy, and Secretary of War, all combined, have no power to quarter
a company of soldiers on my lot, or in my house, in time of peace. And
that was put in there because those men who framed the Constitution knew
what that amounted to when the military, passing through a country,
quartered a company of soldiers upon a man’s premises.589 Any man who
saw anything of the last Civil War knows what that means. It was a very
586

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Harlan seems to refer to Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822), but
misstates the facts of the case and its outcome. Bliss was charged with carrying a concealed
weapon, in violation of Kentucky law. Id. at 90. The weapon he carried was a sword-cane.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the statute prohibiting concealed weapons violated
the Kentucky Constitution, id. at 93, which provided “that the right of the citizens to bear
arms in defense of themselves and the state, shall not be questioned,” KY. CONST. art. X,
§ 23.
588 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
589 The English Bill of Rights of 1689 prohibited quartering soldiers on private land.
See An Act Declareing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the Succession
of the Crowne, 1688, 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (Eng.) (“Whereas the late King James the Second,
by the assistance of diverse evil Counsellors Judges and Ministers imployed by him did
endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant Religion and the Lawes and Liberties of
this Kingdom . . . [b]y raising and keeping a Standing Army within this Kingdome in time
of Peace without Consent of Parlyament and Quartering Soldiers contrary to Law.”). The
Declaration of Independence explicitly objected to the English practice of quartering
soldiers in private homes: “[King George III] quarter[ed] large bodies of armed troops
among us.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776).
587
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common thing to quarter a regiment upon the farm of a man that was
known to be on the other side. And when that regiment left the next day,
there were no fences to be seen for miles around. There were no chickens,
no ducks. They were quartering on this man’s farm. And this guard was
thrown in in order to protect the home, to protect the man in civil life, to
protect it against the outrages that may be committed by an armed military
force under a man who did not know anything about discipline, and who
allowed soldiers to roam over private premises as they deemed proper.
When war was upon the country, then it might be done, but in the manner
to be prescribed by law.
Now the fourth article:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.590
Well, you will ask yourselves, if you have not read up on that subject,
“Why was that necessary to be put in the Constitution?” None of us ever
heard in this country—in a time of peace at any rate—of any seizure of a
man’s house, and papers, and effects, for the purpose of finding out what
he had. The President of the United States might have good grounds today
to suspect that a particular man in this District was really an enemy to the
country, that if he could in some way get a soldier in that man’s house and
break open his drawers or presses he would find something there that
would be beneficial to the country, and would show that that man was an
enemy to the country.
Well, the President would have no right for that reason to send a
soldier there to go into that man’s house against his will and open his
presses for the purpose of searching for those papers. Two or three
hundred years ago it was a common practice in England for the Secretary
of State, when he wanted to get evidence against a particular man, to issue
a search warrant. And that search warrant would be broad enough in its
terms to authorize the officer to whom it was given to go through every
house in a given part of London, and through every house in a whole
square, without the consent of the owner, break open drawers, break open
doors, break open trunks, and search for papers.591 Papers about what?
590
591

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
This practice was put to an end in England by the King’s Bench, which determined
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The warrant did not say. Papers owned by whom? The warrant did not
say.
Now, this says that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”592 There must be
something specific and definite upon the face of it, else you cannot make
these searches. Not that you may not make a search or seizure at all, but
that they shall not be unreasonable searches.
Judge, do these apply to the state governments as well as to the federal
government?
Well, you may have stated a larger question than you apprehend,
unless you have been reading fully upon the subject. I stated to you that
these ten amendments were adopted as the National Bill of Rights; then
came the Eleventh and Twelfth, which are not involved in the question that
you put, but the ten are. Now, it was early decided, particularly in the case
of Barron against the City of Baltimore, 7 Peters, that these amendments
were restrictions only upon the federal power, upon the agencies of the
federal government, and had nothing to do with the states.593
Now comes the Fourteenth Amendment. I will not comment on it
fully now. That amendment says: “No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”594 And the question arises whether or not these privileges in the
first ten amendments are not privileges pertaining to citizenship of the
United States, and is it now, since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in the power of any state to take away from anyone the
privileges conferred by those amendments.
Now, I will not express any opinion just now upon that subject, but
only give you one thought which may aid you in considering the question.
One of these amendments, the Fifth, is “No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime.”595 An infamous crime is one
which is punishable by confinement in a penitentiary.
Amendment V: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
that the executive power did not extend to these putative investigatory raids disguised as
“general warrants.” Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 818; 2 Wils. 275,
292.
592 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
593 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights
limits the United States, but not the individual states).
594 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
595 Id. amend. V (emphasis added).
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otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”596
Now, it has been held since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment that it is competent for a state to provide for a criminal
prosecution of a man for murder otherwise than by an indictment or
presentment of a grand jury, that he may be proceeded against by an
information alone, filed by a district attorney. The Supreme Court has so
held in the case of Hurtado against the State of California.597 I could not
agree with that opinion, and I filed a dissenting opinion, but no one stood
with me. My own view was that it was not competent for a state, since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, to proceed against any man for his
life except by indictment of a grand jury.598
Now, presumably I am wrong, because I stood alone, and the law must
be held otherwise. But now let us proceed a little further with that
amendment. What would occur if the principle should be applied still
further? “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”599 That is the Fifth Amendment.
Can a state by a statute authorize a man to be put twice in jeopardy for his
life or limb? “[N]or shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . . .”600 Suppose a state passes a law that authorizes the
state in prosecuting a man for a criminal offense to call upon the criminal
himself and compel him to testify in the case. Would that be an abridgment
of the privileges that belonged to one as a citizen of the United States?
Would that be due process of law? I do not assume to answer that question
tonight, because it is likely to arise most any time, but that brings us to a
clause of that Fifth Amendment that is one of the largest possible
consequence.
“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”601 I will consider, when I come to the Fourteenth Amendment,
what that means as applied to the states. Now, consider it only in its
application to the United States. Can the Congress of the United States by
any statute deprive a man of his life, liberty, or property without due
process of law? Why, all say at once, no, it cannot. But the question is
596
597
598
599
600
601

Id.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id.
Id.
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what is due process of law, what is meant by it?
Now, those words—“due process of law”—were well understood in
the English law and in this country at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. “Due process of law” in England today, as I have had
occasion to say to you before, and I repeat it because I cannot think of any
better illustration. A great statesman of that country, the greatest they have
had probably, now nearly ninety years of age, known wherever the English
language or any other language is spoken, Mr. Gladstone. Let us suppose
that the Parliament of England tomorrow—it is now in session—should
pass an act declaring or ordering the sheriff on the country in which Mr.
Gladstone lives to advertise his estate for sale and accept the highest bid for
cash, and pay the proceeds into the treasury of England without the
compensation of a dollar to Mr. Gladstone for it.
Now, we could not imagine an act of legislation more arbitrary and
cruel than that, and yet there is no judge in England today, there is not court
in England today, that could stay the operation of that statute.602 They
would have to obey it. No writ of injunction, no other form of process
could stay the execution of that statute. It could be executed and Mr.
Gladstone could be turned out of house and home, and every dollar that he
had on Earth in that estate would be put in the English treasury without the
power of any judge of England to stop it, and that is because Parliament is
omnipotent. Whatever Parliament says is the law, is the law.
But that is not the situation here. Every judge in America, federal and
state, down to and including every justice of the peace in every state of this
union, is under the obligation of an oath to support the Constitution of the
United States. And when a man says to a court of justice, a statute of
Congress being pleaded against him as authority for what is being done that
involves either his life, or his liberty, or his property, if he says that that act
of Congress is in violation of that clause of the Constitution of the United
States, it is the duty of that court, if that be its opinion, so to declare and to
give effect to this Constitution, for it is the supreme law of the land. And
the great glory of this country of ours today is that it is the only country on
the Earth in which life, liberty, and property cannot be taken except in
accordance with due process of law. And there is a mode provided in the
organization of the courts of this country by which effect can be given to
that provision.

602

This is due to England’s recognition of parliamentary sovereignty. See supra notes
474–478 and accompanying text.
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LECTURE 25: APRIL 23, 1898
We are still engaged in considering the amendments to the
Constitution of the United States. The first amendment to which your
attention was called contains the words, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”603 I recall that to your attention in
view of a question I find upon the table addressed to me, to this effect:
would the states have the power to make laws regarding the establishment
of religion, or is that a question arising from the decision in the California
case also?
What California case is referred to in the question I do not know,
unless it be the case of Hurtado and the State of California, to which I
called your attention, in which it was held that it was competent for the
states to proceed against a man for his life by information instead of by an
indictment by a grand jury.604 I do not see that that case has any bearing
upon this subject.
At any rate, I am able to say without reference to that case that this
First Amendment of the Constitution relates only to the powers of the
United States, and there is nothing in that clause of the Constitution which
would prevent a state from establishing a religion. But there is another
clause of the Constitution of the United States that would have more direct
bearing on that, and that is the clause in the original Constitution to the
effect that the United States shall guarantee to every state in the Union a
republican form of government.605
It may very well be doubted whether a state which had an established
religion would have a republican form of government. I do not express any
decided opinion upon that, because the question has never arisen in any
state. And the question is practically of very little importance now,
because it is very certain that in this age, at this hour in the history of this
country, no state in this union could ever succeed in establishing a religion
without creating a revolution in that state. The people of no state in this
union would ever submit to a law or provision of the state constitution

603

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); see also supra Lecture 20.
605 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion;
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic Violence.”). See generally Jonathan Toren, Protecting
Republican Government from Itself: The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, 2 NYU
J.L. & LIBERTY 371 (2007).
604
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which would establish any particular religion in preference to any other.
Or that would require any man to pay respect to one religion more than to
another. Or that would tax the people to maintain any religion which their
consciences did not approve.
It is fair, however, to say that after the adoption of the Constitution of
the United States there existed what might fairly be called an established
religion. There was a religion in the State of Virginia which was
recognized by the laws of that state, and for the support of which the
statutes of the state made a provision by a tax upon all the people. But as
soon as the Constitution was adopted, Mr. Madison encouraged an
amendment in that state in favor of abolishing that provision in the
constitution of that state. He met with no very great success at the outset,
but he persisted. He was sustained in that fight by Mr. Jefferson and other
leading statesmen of Virginia, and he finally succeeded in eradicating from
the state any such statute. In no state of this union is there now an
established religion.606
606 Jefferson and Madison long opposed the establishment of religion. See Religion
and the Federal Government, LIBR. OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel062.html (last visited June 16, 2013). In 1774, Madison condemned the “diabolical, hellconceived principle of persecution” that led the state’s Anglican establishment to arrest and
imprison Baptist dissenters. Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24,
1774), in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 10, 12 (Philadelphia, J. B.
Lippinscott & Co. 1865). When Virginia adopted its first constitution in 1776, it established
Anglicanism as the state religion, but exempted dissenters from taxes to support the
Anglican clergy. See McConnell, supra note 574, at 1436. Jefferson introduced a statute to
end the establishment of religion in the Virginia General Assembly in 1779, but it was
tabled in the face of opposition from the Anglican church. John Ragosta, Virginia Statute
for
Establishing
Religious
Freedom
(1786),
ENCYCLOPEDIA
VA.,
http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Virginia_Statute_for_Establishing_Religious_Freedom_178
6 (last visited June 16, 2013). When Patrick Henry proposed a tax to support Christianity in
1784, Madison used the opportunity to build support for Jefferson’s bill. See Jon Kukla,
Patrick
Henry
(1736–1799),
ENCYCLOPEDIA
VA.,
http://encyclopediavirginia.org/Henry_Patrick_1736-1799#start_entry (last visited June 16,
2013).
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
anonymously published in 1785, argued that government should not regulate religion and
helped to defeat Henry’s tax proposal. Ragosta, supra; see also JAMES MADISON, A
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), available at
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html. On January 16,
1786, the Virginia Legislature enacted the statute Jefferson proposed in 1779, ending
established religion in Virginia. Ragosta, supra; see also Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom,
1785
Va.
Acts
26,
available
at
http://www.virginiamemory.com/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/religious_
freedom.
Connecticut had an established church until it replaced its colonial charter with the
Connecticut Constitution of 1818. See Wesley W. Horton, Connecticut Constitutional
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Coming to Article V, the last thing I talked about was that no man
“shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”607 Only one additional
thought I care to express upon that amendment—that is the meaning of an
“infamous crime.” It is now settled that any crime is to be deemed an
infamous crime in the meaning of the Constitution of the United States
which is punishable—not which is in terms punished by confinement in the
penitentiary, but which may be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary.608
In other words, when you look at the statute and find that the judge has
discretion whether, when a man is found guilty, he shall sentence him to a
jail or to the penitentiary. Whenever the law exists in that condition it is
said to be infamous, because it may be punished by imprisonment in a
penitentiary. It is true that the meaning of that word may be said to have
been enlarged by the circumstances of the country since the adoption of the
Constitution. No man disputes it that a man is infamous whenever he
passes the wall of a penitentiary, and striped clothes are put upon him, and
his head shaved. Or whether that is done or not, when a man goes into a
penitentiary, no matter what the cause is, he never gets rid of the odium
that attends that punishment, and his children never get rid of it.
Whenever he comes out, wherever he goes, anywhere in this country,
he may think that he is unknown, and that his history is unknown. But
finally somebody appears there who does know him, and starts the rumor
that the man was once in a penitentiary. That is sufficient to put a stain
upon that man which he cannot eradicate. No man would invite such a man
to his house. Ordinarily, no man would want him to sit at his table. They
do not stop to think whether he has reformed or not. He was once in the
penitentiary. Therefore, the courts rightly hold that any crime is infamous
in the meaning of the Constitution where the punishment may be
confinement in a penitentiary.

History 1776–1988, CONN. ST. LIBR. (Aug. 1988), http://www.cslib.org/cts4ch.htm; see also
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VII, § 1, in 1 FRANKLIN B. HOUGH, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
167–68 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1871). Massachusetts established religion in general
until 1833, and until 2010 the Massachusetts Constitution provided that “the legislature
shall, from time to time, authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and
other bodies politic, or religious societies, to make suitable provision, at their own expense,
for the institution of the public worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of
public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality, in all cases where such provision
shall not be made voluntarily.” MASS. CONST. art. III (amended 2010).
607 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
608 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885).
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“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb.”609 Mark you, “for the same offense.” A man
may be punished one day for one offense, a year afterwards for another, a
year afterwards for another. And they may keep him constantly in hot
water for a variety of offenses. And when he is prosecuted today for a
felony, he cannot say that he was put in the penitentiary five years ago for
another offense.
The difficulty always arises in interpreting “put in jeopardy of life or
limb.” What is it to put a man in jeopardy? A man may be prosecuted. It
may be an offense for which he may be put in a penitentiary, or only a
misdemeanor for which a fine may be imposed, and he may be put in the
county jail. Now, when is a man put in jeopardy for his life or limb?
Now, let me give you one or two cases that will illustrate. Here is a
man on indictment for his life in a court of justice. The case is called.
Both sides are ready. The court says, “Call a jury, Mr. Sheriff,” and the
jury is called. And the jury is selected after being examined as to their
qualifications. Then they are sworn. The true verdict they render
according to the law and the evidence. And the indictment is read to him.
And he pleads not guilty.
Now, that man is thus put on trial. Well, in the progress of the trial, let
me suppose that the Commonwealth’s attorney is disappointed by some
ruling of the court. He has offered evidence which he thought would be
competent and would establish the guilt. But the court rules that out. He
knew that he had another witness to a point that could be supplied in place
of that, but he thought he had sufficient, and he went to trial.
This evidence being ruled out, he sees that he cannot get along; that if
he goes along with this trial, this man will be acquitted. He don’t think he
ought to be. Well, he asks leave to dismiss the case, thinking that he can go
to another trial at the next term. The court allows the Commonwealth’s
attorney to dismiss him.
Now, that man has been put in jeopardy, and he cannot be tried again
for that offense under the circumstances which I have detailed. Suppose
the court comes to the conclusion that this trial is going all wrong. He
thinks this fellow is guilty, and that he ought to be convicted, and he is not
going to allow the public interest to suffer. And the judge says,
“Gentlemen of the jury, I discharge you from any further service in this
case. Mr. Sheriff, take the prisoner back to jail.”

609

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Well now, there would be no sort of difficulty in that prisoner—after
you get him into jail—suing out a writ of habeas corpus and getting his
discharge. He has been put in jeopardy of his life or limb: his life, if a
capital crime; his limb, if a felony. He gets out on habeas corpus, and he is
called at the next term, and he pleads that he has been put in jeopardy.
Hence, that plea would be sustained.
Now, there is a class of cases that very commonly occur, where all the
authorities agree that the man is not put twice in jeopardy in the meaning of
the Constitution. Suppose a juror, after the man is arraigned, dies. It is in a
court of the United States. Can that trial go on? No, because you cannot
try a man in federal court for a felony by a jury of less than twelve, and you
cannot summon a new man in who has not heard the former evidence, and
you cannot proceed.
Now, in that state of case the court could discharge the jury. Or
suppose a juror should get sick so that he could not stay in court. The court
in that case could discharge the jury.
Or suppose the jury disagree. Now, at common law, and under the
Constitution, it takes the unanimous verdict of twelve men to convict a man
of a crime. Well, one man holds out. He says, “Here are eleven contrary
jurors that won’t think right about this case. I don’t think this man is
guilty. On my conscience, I don’t think he is guilty. I don’t think the facts
of this case show a state of case which under the law compels me to find
him guilty, and I won’t find him guilty.”
Well, they will come into court and say that they find it impossible to
agree. Well, the court says, “I will not discharge you now. I will send you
back to discuss this thing with each other still further, and probably you
will agree.” But it turns out that they cannot agree, no possibility of their
agreeing.
Well, the court cannot hold them together after their term is over, and
as they disagree, the jury is discharged. Now, that man may be tried a
second time. Under those circumstances, it is held that he has not been put
in jeopardy.610
Now, that is an old principle of the common law, for which the
patriotic men of England fought for years, and finally got imbedded into
the fundamental law of England.

610 See Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 155 (1891) (holding that a defendant
is not twice put in jeopardy when put on trial by a second jury where the first jury was
discharged for being unable to render an impartial verdict).
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“[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”611
That is fundamental in the criminal law of this country. Sometimes
there is an attempt to evade that. They put a man a question way off
yonder that does not seem to be connected with the real charge. But the
prosecution has got possession of other facts, and knows that if I can get
just this other fact, the link in the chain of testimony will be complete. And
I can convict this man, if I can get him to testify. But this Constitution
says, no man charged with crime in a federal court can be compelled to
take the stand as a witness. And if he is called upon, he can say that “I will
not testify.” And if the court understood its business, it would protect him.
Now, in these later days, there has been quite a change in the law of
criminal procedure, in respect to the defendant testifying. In most of the
states, now a defendant can testify for himself. When this Constitution was
adopted, he could not do so. He could not do so in England.612
Sometimes there was lacking a fact or circumstance that would explain
something in the case that looked very bad for the prisoner, but he was the
only human being that could explain that unproved fact.613 He was the only
one that could explain this circumstance, but at common law his mouth was
closed, and he could not speak.
But now in most of the courts of the states, a defendant is admitted to
testify in his own behalf.614 When he takes the stand as a witness, he is
allowed to be cross-examined like any other witness. And I believe the
experience of the world, and of this last quarter or half a century, is that
was a wise change in the criminal law.
A man innocent need not fear to take the stand and tell the truth. And
many a case that looked mysterious and inexcusable came out clearly,
distinctly, when the accused himself took the stand to testify.615 And when

611

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574 (1960) (“Disqualification for interest
was thus extensive in the common law when this Nation was formed. Here, as in England,
criminal defendants were deemed incompetent as witnesses.”) (citation omitted).
613 See id. at 580–81 (“[T]he shutting out of his sworn evidence could be positively
hurtful to the accused, and . . . innocence was in fact aided, not prejudiced, by the
opportunity of the accused to testify under oath.”).
614 Id. at 577 (“The first statute was apparently that enacted by Maine in 1859 making
defendants competent witnesses in prosecutions for a few crimes. . . . Before the end of the
century every State except Georgia had abolished the disqualification.”).
615 See id. at 582 (“‘A poor and ill-advised man . . . is always liable to misapprehend
the true nature of his defence, and might in many cases be saved from the consequences of
his own ignorance or misfortune by being questioned as a witness.’”) (quoting Sir James
612
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he took the stand to testify for the purpose of bringing about his acquittal,
he was quite sure to be harmed if he was guilty.
He is a man of rare nerve and cunning who can put himself into the
witness box, and undergo cross-examination by a skillful attorney, and
keep up a well planned lie from beginning to end. Something will betray
him. Something will indicate the truth. There will be something in his eye,
or his appearance to the jurors that will indicate whether he is suppressing
something, or telling something that is untrue. We all feel by instinct, no
matter what our capacity, as we look into some men’s faces, that that man
is telling the truth. And there is a look in other faces, and we have an
instinct that the man is telling a lie. And therefore it is that the accused is
admitted to testify, and that he can be cross-examined as to all the facts and
circumstances.
Nor shall any person “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”616 There are no words in our Constitution more
important than those. That is the law in England, but it is not the law in
any other countries on the face of the Earth, except England and
America.617 And that is the glory of Anglo-Saxon civilization, that that
principle is imbedded in the fundamental law. Without it, no people can be
free, no people are free.
There is a republic across the water, the French Republic—it is called
a republic, but it is a country in which a man can be put on the stand,
charged with a crime, and question after question propounded to him by the
judge, or by some prosecutor. It is a country in which, according to their
forms of law, it is pretty nearly equal to the conviction of a man that he
should be charged with crime and believed to be guilty by the police
force.618
Now, I say, in our country, no man’s life can be touched, no man’s
property can be taken from him, except in accordance with due process of
law. I call your attention to the fact that these three words—life, liberty,
Stephen).
616 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
617 See 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354) (Eng.) (“No man of what state or condition he be, shall
be put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he
be brought to answer by due process of law.”).
618 In 1898, the French criminal justice system was based on the Code of Criminal
Instruction of 1808 and the Penal Code of 1810. The Code of Criminal Instruction created a
system of criminal procedure that blended accusatory and inquisitorial procedural systems,
and the Penal Code defined a list of criminal offenses. James W. Garner, Criminal
Procedure in France, 25 YALE L.J. 255, 255 (1916). Under the Code of Criminal
Instruction, judges could question suspects. Id.
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and property—run together all through the history of the Anglo-Saxon
race.619 And it proceeds upon the ground that unless your liberty and your
property is protected, it does not matter so much that your life is protected,
if your liberty and property are not. Nor does it matter, so far as free
institutions are concerned, that your life and liberty are protected, if your
property is not.
Now, you cannot under this Constitution, by any agency of the federal
government, through courts, the Congress, the municipal governments,
army and navy all combined. This Constitution says to all that you cannot
deprive the humblest man in this country of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
What is due process of law? There comes the difficulty. There are
some things that we know are not due process of law. There are some
things that we know are due process of law. But there is a middle ground
between these two, and you are not able to decide whether this, that, or the
other proceeding is due process of law.
Now, suppose the Congress of the United States should pass a statute
declaring—making it the duty of the Marshal of the District of Columbia to
take the life of John Jones as soon as he got a copy of that act of Congress,
take him down here to the wharf on the Potomac River, and put his head on
a block, and cut it off. That would not be due process of law, because you
cannot take a man’s life without an indictment or presentment in a federal
court; without a trial, with an opportunity for him to be heard and to have
counsel and present his case.
Or suppose an act of Congress should be passed in a time of peace that
would authorize the President of the United States to imprison any citizen
of the United States whom he believed dangerous to the peace of the
country. Suppose that was done. If the President was a good man, a pure
man, a clean man, an honest man, a humane man, he would never exercise
that authority, except in proper cases. But suppose the President was not
that sort of man. Suppose he was an ambitious man, a cruel man, or a bad
man, and he could use that power then to the oppression of everybody in
the country he did not like? Now, such a state as that would be contrary to
this Constitution. That is not due process of law.
Suppose an act of Congress should authorize the President of the
United States to seize my house and take possession of it for a

619 See 3 STORY, supra note 43, at § 1895 (“This provision seems indispensable to the
full enjoyment of the rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. It is
little more than the affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law.”).
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quartermaster’s office of the army, or to make a hospital of it for wounded
soldiers, or old soldiers, and make no provision in the act of Congress for
paying me, a case of arbitrary power. No judge anywhere in this country
would hesitate to say that that act was void. And if any man who attempted
to turn me out of my house, and I shot him down, no court in the world
would interfere with me. No court would hesitate to say that the act was
void and unconstitutional.
Now, there were certain forms and modes of procedure in the light of
the common law. Those modes were well understood. If a criminal case, it
must be by indictment or presentment. The man was entitled to be
defended by counsel. You could not take a man’s property for public use
without compensation.
Now, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there have
been a great many decisions in the country as to what constitutes due
process of law. And you will never hear the last of that phrase, as long as
this is a free country, because there are varying circumstances arising, and
the judges are put to their wits’ end to know whether this, that, or the other
act transcends the provision of the Constitution.
Article VI. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”620 Why did they say “to a speedy
and public trial?” Why, the word “speedy” was introduced there because
of the oppressions and cruelties that were introduced there—because of the
oppressions and cruelties that were to be seen and known of, all along the
track of English history, where they would seize a man that was obnoxious
and imprison him, sometimes for years, without trying him.
Then, the trial must be public. There is no secret criminal trial in this
country in the federal or state courts, as far as I know. But if the federal
court is in session and a man is being tried for crime, and the federal judge
says to the marshal, “Close that door. Admit nobody into this room except
the jury and the prisoner and the lawyers,” the judge who would do that
ought to be impeached. That is not a public trial in the true meaning of the
Constitution. The prisoner is entitled to have his friends there. He is
entitled to have the public there.
There is a great deal of value in publicity in affairs that concern the
life, liberty, and property of the people, as well as in public affairs. Many
things might be done in the course of a criminal trial if the trial was in
secret that would not be done if the public eye was upon that trial, if the
public saw all that was going on there. And then, it educates those who are
620

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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there in the criminal law. It educates them in the principles that are
involved. Therefore it is a right of the person to have a public trial and not
any Star Chamber closed-door proceeding.621
Judge, cannot witnesses be excluded?
Yes, but that is for a very obvious reason. If witnesses were all there
in the courtroom, particularly if there is a case of considerable interest, a
smart witness hearing another witness testify on the same side he was—and
seeing that the witness had left a gap in the facts or circumstances—a
smart, unscrupulous witness could make up his mind to fill that gap when
he came upon the stand to testify. There is such a thing as witnesses
conspiring, and any man who has ever witnessed a criminal trial of great
interest cannot have failed to observe that there were reasons often to
suspect that a witness—from friendship for one side or hatred to the other,
from corrupt methods, or other reasons—that he suppressed something, he
enlarged something beyond what was the actual fact, or he actually
misstated something.
Well now, all possibility of collusion is prevented when the witnesses
are separated, and do not hear each other testify, and when a man is
brought into a courtroom to testify, he does not know what they have
stated. They may have stated something about him. They may have been
asked the question, “Did you not say at a certain time and place to a certain
man this, that, and the other thing?” “No, I did not,” or “Yes, I did.” That
man is on the outside. Finally he comes in. He does not know what the
other witness has stated, and questions are put to him. Well, as he does not
know what the others have said, he will see that his only safe course is to
tell the truth, and no more than he knows. That is the object of the
exclusion of witnesses.
Professor, what is meant by the term “public” there?
Well, of course, you will understand that this article here primarily
applies to proceedings in a federal court. But your question is entirely
pertinent, because I presume you will find the same thing in the state
constitutions. Well, I can understand that you find certain limitations. The

621 The Star Chamber was an English court of law that developed out of the Privy
Council. See Daniel L. Vande Zande, Coercive Power and the Demise of the Star Chamber,
50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 337–340 (2008–2010). It consisted of privy councilors and
common law judges and heard common law and equitable actions. Id. It met in secret, with
no indictments, no right of appeal, no juries, and no witnesses. Id. Under the Stuarts, it
became a tool of oppression, and it was abolished by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640, 16
Car. 1, c. 10 (Eng.). The abuse of the Star Chamber inspired elements of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
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legislature might exclude this, that, or the other people from the courtroom
while the case was being tried.
Let me suppose that there was a divorce suit pending. In some of the
states they try a divorce suit by jury. Well, very often evidence in divorce
suits is not very agreeable to hear, and does not do anybody any good to
hear. And in some of the states, provision is made that the trial in divorce
suits, or the hearing of divorce suits where they are in equity, may be in the
judge’s chambers, or private, only the lawyers and the parties. And that is
done, in part, so as not to wound the sense of decency of the public.622
Now, I should think the state may make certain reasonable regulations
of that sort in regard to particular cases. “Public” here is to be contrasted
with those trials which used to occur in England, called Star Chamber
proceedings, where all the public, in every case, was absolutely
excluded.623 The man not even allowed to have counsel or to see his
friends.
Then it must be “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.”624 “An impartial jury of the
State”—well, what do we mean by “impartial jury”? It is a jury that does
not know anything about the case, that has formed no opinion in advance
about the case. That is substantially the rule in all the states under their
constitutions. Sometimes a little difficult to tell what is an impartial jury in
a true sense. The aim of those cases is to have a jury of twelve men whose
minds are as it were a blank about this case and they will only know about
the case as it is declared in the testimony.625
Now, in these modern days, it has become very difficult in cases that
excite much interest to get a juror that has not some impression about the
case. I was struck with the fact yesterday when riding along on one of the
streetcars, as I looked along the line of the two cars, about fifty or sixty
men in the two cars. It seemed to me every man in the cars had a
newspaper in his hands. If there was some man killed down the street, they
were reading about it. And each would say that if that account is true, that
622 Currently, eleven states allow juries to participate in some aspect of divorce
litigation: Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Right to Jury
Trial in State Court Divorce Proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955 (1987).
623 This statement is not entirely correct. See Vande Zande, supra note 621, at 337–40.
624 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
625 Harlan’s interpretation of this clause of the Sixth Amendment was rather
aggressive. At that time, the Court held that trial courts had discretion to seat jurors who
had formed an opinion of a case, so long as they expressed an ability to set aside their
opinion. See, e.g., Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 179–80 (1887).
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fellow ought to be hung. Or if another account is true, that was a case of
self-defense. And he carries home with him an impression about that case.
And the next day in the papers there are more articles about it. Whether it
is true or not, he does not know, but he assumes the body of it to be true,
and he unsuspectingly comes to a conclusion.
And the trial goes on. And one of those men who has been reading all
these accounts is brought into the courtroom and examined. And he is
asked, “Do you know anything about this case?” “No.” Or, “Did you ever
hear of it? Where did you hear? In what way?” “I read all the accounts in
the papers as they came out.” “Did you get any impression about the guilt
or innocence of this man?” “Yes, I got a pretty strong impression.” “Well,
have you got that impression now?” “More or less. I have not heard
anything about it for some time. If the facts were as stated in the papers I
have got an impression now.”
Well now, if every man is to be disqualified to sit in a criminal case
because he reads in the newspapers of these days about it, and gets that sort
of impression, why it becomes next to an impossibility to get a jury of men
that know anything. It is the intelligent, wide awake man that reads. There
is no reputable merchant, or businessman, or well-to-do farmer that does
not read the papers, and keep up with all that is going on. And if the
reading is to incapacitate him from sitting on a jury, why the result will be
that the jurors will be those who do not read the papers, who do not know
what is going on. And one of the results of juries of that sort is that men
are acquitted who ought to be convicted.
A great many people think our organization is all a failure. What is the
use of having juries? Let us abolish juries and have the case tried by a
single judge. That is the extreme some go to. “You say you have got an
impression from what you read in the papers. Have you got any such
impression upon your mind from the results of that reading as that you will
not be able, when you hear the evidence of witnesses as to the truth, to try
this case according to what the witnesses tell you, uninfluenced by what
you have read in the newspapers?”
Well, a self-respecting, conscientious man would say, unless he was
trying to dodge service on the jury, “Yes, I can do justice to the
Commonwealth and this man.” Well, another man will say, and may say
so honestly, “I have read all about that case in the papers, and I am bound
to say that I got very strong impressions upon it. And I have got them now,
and I will keep hold of those impressions, unless they are removed by
evidence.” In other words, he would start in the trial of that case with an
opinion already made up. And he would hold to that opinion, and find the
man guilty or innocent according to that opinion, unless the impression
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thus made upon him by reading in the papers was removed.
Well now, that man is not an impartial juror. That man goes into that
jury with a biased opinion, against one side or the other. Whereas, to be an
impartial juror, he ought to feel that he can decide the case according to the
evidence, uninfluenced by anything that he had read or heard. Well, the
court would be very apt to discharge that man.
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LECTURE 26: APRIL 30, 1898
I was commenting at our last meeting on the sixth article of the
amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and was about to
reach that clause which says that “the accused shall . . . be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation,” which is plain enough of itself.626 He
is informed ordinarily by the indictment or presentment that is made by the
grand jury. That indictment states what offense he had committed. And if
the indictment does not indicate to him the nature and cause of the
accusation, then he is entitled to demur to it. And if the demurrer is well
taken—that is to say, if the indictment does not sufficiently inform the
accused of the nature of the cause or accusation—the court will quash the
indictment and defer the case again to the grand jury.
He is entitled also “to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”627 There is no such thing in the courts of law of the United States as
a deposition being taken and read in a criminal cause. In one of the states,
that perhaps may be done. That is, in a criminal prosecution pending in
that state, you can take the deposition of a man in New York, upon notice
to the accused, and have it read as evidence in that cause.628
That cannot be done in the United States courts, no matter what is the
matter with the witness. If he is not at court and cannot attend the trial, that
may constitute a reason why the prosecution will be entitled to continue the
case until the next term until he can be present, but that does not entitle the
prosecution to take his deposition and read it in court. It means that the
witness who testifies in a criminal prosecution against a man in the federal
court must be in the courthouse. He must stand in front of the witness—
that is, the accused is entitled to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.629

626

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
628 See United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896) (Harlan, J.). The Supreme Court
later incorporated the Confrontation Clause against the states. See Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
629 See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The primary object of
the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits,
such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.”)
627
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Well now, it will naturally occur to you to ask what takes place if that
witness dies after he has once given his testimony. It has sometimes
occurred, as the books in the case show, that a man has been tried and the
jury were not able to agree. They were discharged. The case continued
until the next term to be tried again.
Now, at the first trial a man has testified against the accused under
oath. The accused was confronted with him and had an opportunity to
cross-examine him. Now at the second trial he is dead. Is the prosecution
to lose his testimony? No, it is well settled by a current of decisions in this
country and in England that that requirement is met where somebody who
heard the man testify under oath at the former trial, being himself put under
oath, is able to tell the jury what he swore to on that trial.630
Of course, the difficulty in the way of that lessens very much if the
statements of the witness on the former trial have been taken down by a
shorthand writer and preserved as a part of the record. Or if that shorthand
writer was alive, he could be sworn as a witness and state that he was a
shorthand writer, that he took down the testimony in that case. “What did
the witness state,” he would be asked. “Well, here it is, just as I took it
down. I took it down accurately. I intended to, and I think I did take it
down accurately.” That could then be read to the jury. That is considered a
compliance with the provision of the Constitution.
Then he is entitled “to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.”631 Let us suppose a case came up in the federal
courts where a man is tried for his life, and that the court below refused to
give him process to compel Mr. AB, a witness, to appear and testify. Well,
the judgment would be reversed if that record showed that state of fact,
because of the constitutional right of the accused to have this compulsory
process.
What about dying declarations in murder cases, Judge?
If the witness has never testified in court, they cannot be taken. Dying
declarations of a man as to what he saw at a particular time in reference to
an act of that time is not competent testimony in a criminal case.632
Suppose, Judge, it is the man who testifies just before his death, if it is
his dying statement?
Well, it is part of the res gestae.

630

See id. at 244.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
632 See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244 (holding that a dying declaration is admissible in a
criminal trial only if the witness to the declaration testifies at the trial).
631
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“[A]nd to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”633
That is a constitutional right of the man. He is too poor to employ
counsel, let me suppose, and the court will not assign him counsel. Or he is
able to employ counsel, but the court says, “You shall not have counsel.”
There was a time not a great many years ago when a man was not entitled
to counsel as a matter of right.634 That fact was known to the men who
framed the Constitution and they intended to guard against it and to make it
the fundamental law that the accused should have the benefit of counsel.635
One of the students asked you about the amendments, “Why could they
not have been just as well accomplished by statute?”
Of course it could, but not just as well. Congress could have passed a
statute about all these things I have been referring to, but the next Congress
might repeal it. These are put in here in order that they may not be wiped
out by a bare majority. Two-thirds of each house must concur in an
amendment of the Constitution, and then it must be submitted to the states,
and must be ratified by three-fourths of the several states—not threefourths of the popular representation of the several states, but three-fourths
of the states. And upon the question of an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, the voice of little Delaware is as potent as the State of
New York.
In a population of this size—70 millions of people—there are all sorts
of people. There are a great many cranks. You will hear the wildest
notions on all sides as to what ought to be the fundamental law. And you
will hear it on the floor of both branches of Congress that this, that, or the
633

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
English common law denied counsel to defendants charged with felonies, but
allowed defendants charged with misdemeanors to retain counsel. WILLIAM M. BEANEY,
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8 (1955). However, the law allowed felony
defendants to retain counsel to argue points of law, of which courts adopted a broad
definition. Id. at 9. The practice in the American colonies and states under the Articles of
Confederation ranged from adopting the English rule to guaranteeing counsel to indigent
defendants. Id. at 18–21.
635 While the original meaning of the Assistance of Counsel Clause is unclear, an early
federal statute suggests that Congress understood it to guarantee only the right to retain
counsel, as it provided for the appointment of counsel only in case of treason and other
capital crimes. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 118 (providing that every
person who is indicted for treason or other capital crime “shall also be allowed and admitted
to make his full defence by counsel learned in the law; and the court before whom such
person shall be tried, or some judge thereof, shall, and they are hereby authorized and
required immediately upon his request to assign to such person such counsel, not exceeding
two, as such person shall desire, to whom such counsel shall have free access to him at all
reasonable hours”). However, courts often appointed counsel to represent indigent
defendants accused of non-capital crimes. See BEANEY, supra note 634, at 29–30.
634
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other amendment to the Constitution ought to be made. But the mode of
amendment stands in the way of this speedy alteration of the fundamental
law of the land. It cannot be done so easily.
One of the students asked me just before I came in as to whether some
people were not in favor of the abolition of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and as to whether Congress could do that or not? Well no,
this Constitution says that we are to have one Supreme Court, and such
others as Congress may establish. Congress cannot abolish the Supreme
Court, but it may abolish the other courts. And that is one of the glories of
our Constitution, that while we are a free people—freer than any other
people anywhere on the Earth, where there is more regard paid to the rights
of man than anywhere else on the Earth—yet we are hemmed around by
our own fundamental law. We have put checks upon ourselves so that we
cannot hastily and too readily change the fundamental law.
Article VII. Here comes a provision that I think one of very great
importance. There are some people in the country that do not think much
of it. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”636
Now, you ask yourselves, why did they say or imply that Congress
might abolish the right of trial by jury where the case did not exceed twenty
dollars? Some men will argue, “Is this a rich man’s government that they
should make the distinction above twenty dollars as against those under
that?” Well, that amendment was in consideration of the rights of the poor.
Let me suppose a suit against a man for ten dollars, if a suit of that sort
could be brought in federal court, and a jury had to be summoned. Why,
the expenses of the officer in serving the process and organizing that jury
and the pay to the jurors would be two or three times more than the amount
in question. In such a case, the man would say, “I will pay this ten dollars.
I won’t run the risk of the expenses.”
What does the right of trial by jury mean? It is referred to in the
preceding section. I read to you in a former part of the Constitution that the
trial of all crimes, except in the case of impeachment, shall be by jury, and
then the accused is entitled to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury.637 What sort of jury? One of three or eight men? No, a jury of
twelve men, a common law jury of twelve men, so that is it not in the
power of the Congress of the United States to abolish the right of trial by
jury in common law cases where the amount exceeds twenty dollars. The
636
637

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Id. amend. VI.
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men who framed this Constitution regarded that right of trial by jury as a
very important one, as a very sacred one, and I entirely agree with them.
How far does that provision govern in the states? May a state in a state
court have a jury of less than twelve? Well, many of the states do, and it
has been held that that was a matter for the states, with which the federal
government could not interfere, although the question may not be finally
considered as put to rest.638 I agree with the old-fashioned notion that the
best scheme ever devised by the human intellect for the trial of facts is a
jury. And I believe in a jury of twelve men, and not in any less number.
And there is one reason why I hold on to that idea of the jury, of the right to
trial by jury. It is the one mode above all others by which the plain man—
the people, the plain people—are tied to the government under which they
live, made part and parcel of it and made interested in it.
We talk about magnificent spectacles sometimes when we think of
great political assemblages, and other assemblages, but to my mind—
speaking of secular and political matters only—one of the most interesting
sights to me, and it ought to be to any man that loves our institutions, is to
go out into the country among the plain people, walk into a country
courthouse while the court is being held. It is not a rich country. There are
no rich people about there. They are all plain people of moderate means,
but it is court time.
And you walk into that courthouse and see one man sitting on a bench,
the courthouse crowded, probably some great case being argued, some
great lawyer about to make a speech, a case interesting the public, and the
courthouse is packed. The word of that one man brings that crowd to
silence. An order from that one man to the sheriff can take a man out of
that courthouse and put him in jail for making disorder, or acting in
contempt of the authority of that court. That one man opens his mouth to
talk to that jury, instruct them as to the case, and that crowd of several
hundred people are sitting as quietly as if they were in church, listening to
what is being said. It is the majesty of the law.
And who are these twelve men sitting on the bench? What are they
there for? Most of them are men of ordinary means and ordinary station in
society, but they are part and parcel of the community. Here sit two men
before them, the plaintiff and the defendant, with their lawyers. They have
a disputed matter. Those twelve men are deciding. The decision of those
twelve men is accepted quietly and without a murmur.

638

See, e.g., Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877).
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The community accepts it, but what do those twelve men feel? Why,
they go back to their farms in the country with a recognition of the fact that
they are part and parcel of the government under which they live. That
judge alone up there cannot settle this matter. We are called in and we help
him to determine this dispute between two of our neighbors. He tells us
what the law is, we determine the facts, and we in connection with the
judge settle this dispute and keep down brawls and disturbances.
Now, that is one of the reasons why I say that that jury—the oldfashioned jury, that has the right to determine the facts of the case—is the
best mode that we have in our institutions of connecting the ordinary man
with the government of the country in which he lives. And makes him feel
that he is part and parcel of that country, and that he, as well as that judge,
participates in governing that country.
Now, I call your attention to the last clause of that amendment, it is
very interesting. “[A]nd no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.”639
Let me suppose a case in the federal courts against a railroad for
damages on account of its negligence resulting in a personal injury to the
plaintiff, and the case is tried. I will assume that no error of law was
committed by the court in admitting or rejecting evidence. That the court
in its charge to the jury laid down no principle of law that was wrong. But
the court, holding to the line of the law, said to the jury: “You determine
the facts. Was this railroad negligent? It is for you, gentlemen of the jury,
to determine under the rules that I have laid down. Was there negligence?
You are to consider the facts bearing on that. Will you believe this, that,
and the other evidence? It is for you, gentlemen of the jury, to say where
the weight of the evidence would lead your minds, because if a man says so
and so in his testimony, you are not obliged by the law to accept it
unconditionally. You may not believe that man. You have a right not to
take his statement, if you think he is not telling the truth. If his crossexamination showed that he was an unworthy witness, and you don’t
choose to found your verdict upon his testimony, you have a right not to do
so.”
Now suppose, in a case of that sort, they return a verdict for the
plaintiff for $50,000 in damage. A new trial is refused, and then it goes up
to higher federal court. What may that higher federal court do?

639

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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Now, the judges of the federal court may say, “We don’t think, upon
this evidence, there ought to have been $50,000 damages. That is
excessive.” Yet, that federal court could not reverse that case on that
ground alone, and they could not do it in the light of the clause I have just
read. “[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.”640
An appellate court could not sit in judgment on the facts. All that it
can do is to consider questions of law. If A offers certain evidence, and it
is rejected, he takes an exception, makes a bill of exceptions. That raises a
question of law as to whether or not that evidence was competent. If so,
the court erred in excluding it.641
In our court, we had a case of a woman coming to this country from
abroad, started to Saratoga on the New York Central Road, and she took
with her on the train only twenty-eight trunks, and when she opened her
trunks at Saratoga, she said some valuable laces, that were heirlooms in her
family, were abstracted between New York and Saratoga while the trunks
were in the care of the railroad. The railroad denied it.642
Well, there was a trial.643 She swore that those laces were very rare,
could not be reproduced anywhere in the world, and were worth a hundred
thousand dollars, and the jury gave her a verdict for ten thousand dollars,
which is in itself a pretty large amount for laces for one woman. The point
was made in our court that it was an excessive verdict. We said that we
had nothing to do with the amount of the verdict. That depended upon the
facts, and we could only look into the law of the case.
Eighth article of amendment. “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”644
What do you mean by bail? Well, a man is arrested. The grand jury
does not meet for four months, perhaps. If the case is ordinarily a bailable

640

Id.
See, e.g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 9 (1899); Walker v. N.M. & S.
Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
642 R.R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 25 (1879) (Harlan, J.). The plaintiff was Olga de
Maluta Fraloff, a wealthy Russian touring the United States with six trunks. Id. at 24–25.
She was traveling to Niagara with two trunks, when two hundred yards of dress-lace were
stolen from one of them. Id. at 25.
643 In fact, there were two trials. The first, in 1873, resulted in a mistrial. Id. at 26.
The second, in 1875, resulted in a verdict of $10,000. Id.
644 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
641

334

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ARGUENDO

[Vol 81

one, he does not want to go to jail, and he asks to give bail, which means a
bond with security that he will appear at the time named in the bond to
answer any indictment found against him. Or, if he has not been indicted
and the trial is not coming off for some time, he will give his recognizance
or a bond. Now, why the provision of excessive bail?
Now, there are some offenses for which bail is not always allowed.
Murder is one. But in our country, no other felony is denied bail. A man
may have robbed a bank of an enormous sum of money, and may be
charged in enough counts of that indictment to send him to the penitentiary
for a hundred years, if a judgment is rendered on all of them, but he is not
for that reason to be denied bail. Well then, what is excessive bail? It is
bail out of all proportion to the offense, and to the ability of the man to give
bail.
Give you the case of the man that has no property at all, no particular
force or standing in society, and say to that man, “I will require you to give
bail in the amount of $100,000,” is to deny him bail. He cannot give that
amount. There is nobody, anywhere, willing to risk their estate to that
extent. He cannot get any security, therefore, that bail is excessive.
I do not mean to say that bail is excessive simply because a man has no
means. The court must take into consideration the nature of the offense. If
a man in sudden heat and passion should knock a man down—bruise him
somewhat, and therefore be subject to indictment—and he were arrested,
held to bail, why, no court would think of requiring the bail in that case that
they would require of a man in whose cellar they found all the implements
of a forger, one engaged in the business of forging United States notes or
bonds. A court in the case of a forger of that sort would take care to
require bail enough to ensure his attendance at court when his trial was
called. The fact that he had no property, no friends, the court would not
give much attention to. The true rule though is to inquire how much can
this man probably give, what is the nature of his offense, strike a fair
balance, and determine what is reasonable and just in the matter.
“[N]or excessive fines imposed.”645
Fines beyond the offense. I told you, I believe, of a case of a man tried
in Vermont in a county court there under the liquor law.646 And they
proved against him 400 odd cases, and the county judge imposed a fine in
each of the cases. And the result was that if he had served his time out

645
646

case.

Id.
O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). This is Harlan’s first reference to the
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under the judgment in that case, he would have been in the house of
correction of that state 75 years. Upon appeal he got it reduced so as to
bring it down to 55 years, and they tried to get it to our court. But the
majority of our court were of the opinion that the question of jurisdiction
was not presented.647
But “excessive fine” means a fine in excess of the offense of which the
man is found guilty. What would be thought, for instance, of an act of
Congress that would authorize the police court of this city to impose upon a
man who sold liquor without a license a fine of a million of dollars? Now,
everybody would say at once that is cruelty, that belongs to a past age, that
is way out of proportion to the offense itself.
“[N]or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”648
It is not sufficient to say of an act of Congress that the punishment
imposed is cruel, it must also be unusual.
Judge, does that apply to the army and navy when the soldiers or
sailors are in actual war?
That amendment applies to every authority exercised by federal
agency. Men in the army and navy may be tried by court-martial. That is
because the Constitution authorizes it—that is, with reference to offenses
committed by them in the army or navy, a particular mode of trial before an
army court-martial or naval court-martial. But they have no more right to
impose cruel or unusual punishments than a civil tribunal has. If an act of
Congress authorized cruel and unusual punishments the courts would strike
it down. If there was any regulation in the army or navy of the United
States that authorized a court-martial to inflict such a punishment, the
courts would take hold of it and stop it.
Now, what is a cruel punishment, what is an unusual punishment is not
always easy to tell. Those things are to be determined in large measure by
the period in which we live. What may not have been cruel fifty or
seventy-five years ago might be deemed cruel now.649 I can imagine some
647

John O’Neil was convicted on 307 counts of violating Vermont’s liquor law. Id. at
327. The court assessed a fine of $6,638.72 or imprisonment for 19,914 days, about 54
years, which was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 330. The United States Supreme Court
dismissed O’Neil’s writ of error for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 336–37. Justice Field
dissented, arguing, inter alia, that the Court had jurisdiction under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the judgment violated the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 337, 359–60 (Field, J., dissenting). Harlan also dissented, agreeing with
Field on that point. Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
648 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
649 As of 1898, the basis for determining whether a punishment was “cruel and
unusual” under the Eighth Amendment was unclear. In 1878, the Court held that the Eighth
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forms of punishment that used to subsist in the Anglo-Saxon race in
England that we would not tolerate today in this country.
Suppose the Congress of the United States were to provide by statute
that for a particular offense the accused, if found guilty, should be taken out
in the public square in the town where he was and burned alive—that the
officers of the law should build a funeral pyre around him and then set it
afire and burn him to death. I do not think there would be any difficulty in
the courts of this country—at this day in this Christian era—regarding that
as not only cruel, but unusual. And the court would lay its hand upon a
proceeding of that sort and stop it.
I am inclined to think that an act of Congress today that would
authorize a man to be hung up by his thumbs, as was the form of
punishment once among our ancestors in England—we would today say
that was cruel and unusual. If the government of the United States for
some offense should provide a dungeon under the floor of some
penitentiary or public building, into which the light never entered, and
should require the court to impose for certain offenses imprisonment for
life in a dungeon of that sort, so that the man would never see the light of
day—would never see the face of a human being—I think the courts would
say that was cruel and unusual punishment.
I do not mean to say that solitary confinement might be so deemed if it
was connected with an opportunity to see the light of day. I do not know
that the court would strike that down. But where a man was put into a dark
dungeon for life, I think the courts would hold that cruel and unusual. But
of course, it is idle to conjecture what would be adjudged by the courts, for
it is certain that the tendency in this Christian era is to make punishments
too light rather than too severe.
Judge, was the question as to whether electrocution was cruel and
unusual ever considered?
Yes, case that same from the state of New York, and that case sent off
upon the idea that that was for the state, as it was in the state court, and not
Amendment only prohibited punishments that would have been considered “cruel and
unusual” in 1789. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1878). But in 1890, it held that
execution by electrocution “might be said to be unusual because it was new, but that it could
not be assumed to be cruel in the light of that common knowledge which has stamped
certain punishments as such.” In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). Eventually, in
1910, it held that the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” may change over time.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (“Legislation, both statutory and
constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language
should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken.
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.”).

2013]

JUSTICE HARLAN: LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

337

for the United States to control.650
Now, the Ninth Amendment, which you might call a glittering
generality in this: that it was perhaps unnecessary, but the people are
naturally jealous of the encroachments of power, therefore they wanted
that.651
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”652
Some of the men who opposed the adoption of the Constitution were
afraid that one of the results to come from its acceptance would be the
destruction of the rights of the people, and the concentration of all power in
this country in a central head that would destroy the rights of individual
men. Well, there was never any reason, because the Constitution is an
enumeration of power, and this government has no powers except those
granted to it. But this was put in here, and it must be understood that the
mere enumeration of certain rights of the people do not mean that they have
got no others. On the contrary, they have all the rights with any power than
the people ought to have, except what they have surrendered in this
Constitution.
Article X. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”653
These ten amendments were added at the first Congress, and that is the
closing one, and it is a declaration of what may be called “states’ rights.”
That phrase is often found in the mouths of people of this country,
politicians. You see it often in newspapers, and you are not quite certain
what a man means when he says that he is a states’ rights man. We know
650 Harlan refers to In re Kemmler, in which the Court affirmed a decision of the New
York Court of Appeals holding that execution by electrocution did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 136 U.S. at 447.
651 When James Madison submitted The Bill of Rights to the House of
Representatives, he stated:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow, by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted
it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 288, at 456.
652 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
653 Id. amend. X.
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when some men say, “I am a states’ rights man,” he means to say that the
national government has got no rights that the state is bound to respect.
That is what some men mean by it, and men who know that the
governor of every state, the judges of every state, the members of the
legislature of every state, and every public officer in every state in the
Union takes an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, which
Constitution says it is the supreme law of the land, anything in the
constitution or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. There are
men who say that, “When my state makes a declaration, I stand by it, that is
the law for me, I do not care what the Constitution of the United States
says, that is the law for me.”
Well now, that sort of a states’ rights man is a very poor sort of a
states’ rights man. That man’s notions are mischievous. They lead to
disorder, to disruption.
There is another class of men that I have said you want to watch and
guard against as much as you would that class of people. It is the fellow
that has no sort of regard for the rights of the states. It is the fellow that
wants a great government here that is to do as it pleases, to have no checks
upon its legislation, or its powers in any way. That is omnipotent. That
sort of a fellow is a crank, and a crank of a mischievous sort.
But there is a sort of a states’ rights man that ought to represent every
friend of this Constitution. It is the states’ rights man who recognizes the
fact that there is a government of the United States. That the people of the
different states have organized that government, and have invested that
government with certain power. That that government is not to be
obstructed in the execution of the powers granted to it. But at the same
time, he stands for the rights of the states, with which they have never
parted.
The states have rights that they have never surrendered. There are
some things that they are entitled to, entitled to do because they have never
agreed to surrender the power to do so. Because before this government
was established, they were sovereign, independent states. And when they
put the machinery of the national government into motion, they put it into
motion only for the accomplishment of certain objects. They are
enumerated in this Constitution, and with the exception of the powers here
granted to the national government, the states have got all the powers they
ever had.
Now, the man who says he is a states’ rights man in that sense is the
best states’ rights man. That is all that article meant to say. The power not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, or prohibited to it by the
states, is reserved to the states respectively. And in determining that, the
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disputes between political parties have been because one set of men look at
this instrument too broadly, and others too narrowly.
Article XI. This was not added until some years after the adoption of
the Constitution. Let me explain to you. Way back in 2 Wallace, I believe
it is, a man by the name of Chisholm sued the State of Georgia.654 The
State of Georgia said, “I am a sovereign state, and no man has the right to
call me to the bar of any court, federal or state. Georgia has not agreed to
be sued. She does not admit the right of any power, certainly not of any
individual, to sue her.”
That case came to the Supreme Court of the United States, reported as
Chisholm versus the State of Georgia, debated by great lawyers and
determined by great judges, several of whom were in the convention which
framed the Constitution.655 The majority of the court—I believe all except
one—said that the Constitution as it was authorized a suit of that character,
because it was a suit arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.656
Well, immediately that case was so decided, there was some
excitement in the country. Massachusetts and Virginia joined hands on the
question of opposing that decision, said that would never do. They agreed
in holding to the proposition that it was never intended by the framers of
the Constitution to authorize an individual to sue a state. And the result
was this Eleventh Amendment, so as to put that question at rest forever.
Now, let me read it to you, in the light of that explanation.
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.”657
That closed the door against suits by individuals against a state. It did
not prevent a state from suing individuals.

654

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Chisholm v. Georgia was argued for the plaintiff by Edmund Randolph, the first
Attorney General of the United States. Edmund Jennings Randolph, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistpage.php?id=0 (last visited June 16, 2013). The State of
Georgia refused to appear, contending that it was not subject to suit without its consent.
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 419–20. The case was heard by Chief Justice John Jay and Associate
Justices John Blair, James Iredell, William Cushing, and James Wilson. See id. at 419–79.
656 Harlan is correct: Jay, Blair, Cushing, and Wilson voted for the plaintiff; Iredell
voted for the defendant. See id.
657 U.S. CONST. amend XI.
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Now, many questions have arisen under that clause, and only one or
two that I will refer you to, because it illustrates probably all the balance.
Let me suppose that the State of Kentucky passes a statute relating, if you
choose, to taxation. And there is about to be imposed on the real estate in
Kentucky certain taxes, and upon certain kinds of personal property. Well,
a citizen of Massachusetts owns real estate in Kentucky, and he owns some
of this personal property, and he says that that act of the state legislature is
void, because it is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, the
supreme law of the land.
This Massachusetts man, therefore, raising this question, cannot sue
the State of Kentucky and have process served on the governor in the
federal court sitting in Kentucky. That Eleventh Amendment says the
judicial power of the United States shall not extend to a suit by a citizen of
another state against one of the states of the union.
What is the remedy therefor? It is to sue the taxing officer and set out,
“This taxing officer proposes to lay his hands upon my property and sell it,
and he proposes to do so under a statute passed by the legislature of
Kentucky, which we say is void under the Constitution of the United
States.” If the Massachusetts man had not that remedy, he would have no
remedy, because he cannot sue the state. Now, it has been held time and
again that a suit against an officer of a state to prevent him from executing
an unconstitutional law of that state is not a suit against the state, and that it
can be instituted.
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LECTURE 27: MAY 7, 1898
We reached in our examination of the Constitution the Twelfth
Amendment, relating to the election of the President and Vice-President. It
is the mode now adopted, and has been the subject of consideration before,
and I have nothing more to say.
Article XIII introduces for the first time the word slavery into the
Constitution. I have before called your attention to the fact that the
Framers of the Constitution carefully avoided the use of the word slave. 658
They probably apprehended the great troubles which were to come by
reason of the existence of slavery, especially as our Fathers had declared
that all men were created equal and free. This article abolishes slavery.
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”659
Now, we know what slavery is. The word implies the ownership by
one man of the body of another man. But this article not only prevents the
existence of slavery, but also involuntary servitude, which may exist
without being slavery. If a man is in jail, behind iron bars, he is in a
condition of involuntary servitude, but that is not prohibited if the man is
there by reason of some crime which has been committed. You cannot take
a man’s liberty, except as punishment for crime, and not simply that, but
“crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted . . . .”660
Wherever the authority of the United States extends, whether in a state,
fort, or arsenal, or district, throughout the jurisdiction of the United States,
there is this prohibition against slavery. This amendment is something
more than a negation of this condition of things. It apportions to everybody
his affirmative right of freedom that belongs to everybody.
At this day, some perhaps who think that this is not a good condition
of things. Some men who think that it is unfortunate that this institution of
African slavery went down. But you may be sure that the ideas of those
men belong to the past generation, and do not belong to our present day. It
is well for us that that it is gone, never to be restored. And whatever the
perils may be against which this country will have to contend, they will be
a less evil than was the existence of African slavery in this country.
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See supra Lecture 5.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
Id.
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It had come to this, that this institution had its hands on the throats of
this country, and this country had to perish under that institution, or that
institution had to die. It had come to pass that there was no such thing as
freedom of thought, when it bore on this institution. A man who was not
prepared to speak of this institution as of divine origin was looked upon
with distrust and suspicion. And in other parts of this country it was very
difficult with some people to treat with Christian moderation the sentiments
expressed by people about that institution, who were in favor of it. Now,
it’s gone, and we are glad of it. People of all sexes, and all states are glad
of it. If the question were submitted today to the voters of those states
where this institution had formerly existed, I have no doubt that each one of
them would vote against it.
There were horrors under it that we do not care to look at, to this day.
Even in those parts of the United States where it was under the most
modified form, there were practices that were horrible to the sight of the
Christian man. I have seen myself, standing on the steps in front of the
courthouse door in the city where I passed my earlier life, a grown man and
woman, and a half-dozen children, or more, both boys and girls of that
race, who belonged to some man who had become unfortunate in his
business—who was as we might call it at this day insolvent—and whose
property had to be sold to satisfy the demands of his creditors. I have seen
the father sold to one man and the mother to another in a distant part of the
country, and the children sold one by one, and separated, one to be sent to
one state, and one to another, according to the location of the owner, the
family divided and separated.661
That cannot occur anymore. Every human being, since the addition of
that amendment, is free to do as he pleases, to work for his own salvation,
so far as mere worldly affairs are concerned. To make their way in their
lives as far as they can. To aspire as other people have who are free. To do
what they can for themselves, and their race.
Of course, there is before us the probability of trouble, on account of
this race. Some people talk about it more than they ought to. You
occasionally meet with a man, as I did about a year ago, who never did an
honest day’s work in his life, and who never earned the salt that he ate on
661

Presumably, Harlan refers to the Cheapside Auction Block in Lexington, Kentucky,
which was next to the Fayette County Courthouse. See Slavery in Fayette Co./Cheapside
Slave
Auction
Block,
HIST.
MARKER
DATABASE,
http://www.hmdb.org/marker.asp?marker=16411 (last updated Feb. 23, 2009). When
Harlan attended law school at Transylvania University in 1853, the Cheapside Auction
Block hosted one of the largest slave markets in the country. See id.
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his food. That was his only aim in life, to live upon somebody else. This
man was greatly disturbed at the probability that that race would come into
contact with the whites in this country.
Well, the white man who has got self-respect, that has got humanity in
his nature, who has respect for a human being, because he is one, wherever
he sees him, that sort of man is not much disturbed by the fact that the
black man is bettering himself, here and there, taking an education, laying
up a little property, learning a trade, and advancing. We need not be
alarmed at that race getting ahead of us. I am ready to say that if there is a
black man who can get ahead of me, I will help him along, and rejoice.
And his progress in life does not excite my envy. And I am glad to feel and
know that it is the desire of the white people in this country that that race
shall push themselves forward in the race of this life. This world is big
enough for us all, and this country is big enough for us all. And if a man
gets along, whether he be white or black, there is room enough in this
broad free land of ours for all of us.
Now I come to the Fourteenth Amendment. “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”662
I have explained to you before what was the origin of that amendment.
I called your attention a long while ago to the contest in the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Dred Scott case, where the Court held that a man
of African descent was not one of the people of the United States, for
whom the Constitution was established, and that even if he was a citizen of
the United States, he was not a citizen of the state wherein he resided.663
And therefore a man whose parents were of African descent could not be a
citizen of a state, without the consent of that state.
Out of that decision grew the Civil War, the greatest war in modern
times. One of the results of that war was to uproot the doctrine of the Dred
Scott case, and this amendment was the expression of that result. It is
broad enough to include all persons. “All persons,” mark the words, “born
or naturalized in the United States,” and “of the State wherein they
reside.”664
Therefore, it follows that every negro in the United States, if he had
been born there or has been naturalized in the United States, when this
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
See supra Lecture 3; see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
664 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
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amendment was adopted became a citizen of the United States and of the
state wherein he resided. Therefore, if the state says, we do not intend to
recognize you, Mr. Negro, this amendment steps in and says, “You must.”
We had an illustration of the application of this amendment in the
present term of our court. It was the case about the Chinese subject, to
which I had called your attention heretofore.665 It was the case of the
Chinaman born in San Francisco, twenty-odd years ago, of Chinese
parents. Father and mother were living in San Francisco, the father
engaged in business there, but they were subjects of the Emperor of China.
And this boy was born to them in San Francisco. And the question was
whether or not this Chinaman, the son of Chinese parents—residing in the
United States, but nevertheless subjects of the Emperor of China—was a
citizen of the United States, by reason of the fact that he was born there.
The question turns upon two or three words of this amendment: “All
persons born in the United States.” Well, he was born here. But now come
the words, “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” Now, if that boy was
within the meaning of that clause, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States, then he became a citizen of the United States, and of the state
wherein he resided. The majority of the Court held that he was. The
minority held that he was not born to the jurisdiction of the United States,
as to this Constitution. He was not born subject to the political jurisdiction
of the United States. Of course, he owed allegiance to our laws, as every
man who comes here, but he was not born under the jurisdiction of the
United States, within the meaning of this article of the Constitution.
I was one of the minority, and of course I was wrong.666 Suppose an
English father and mother went down to Hot Springs to get rid of the gout,
or rheumatism, and while he is there, there is a child born.667 Now, he goes
back to England. Is that child a citizen of the United States, born to the
jurisdiction thereof, by the mere accident of his birth? My belief was never
intended to embrace everybody in our citizenship if he was the child of
parents who cannot under the law become naturalized in the United States.
I was unable to believe that when the boy’s parents could not become
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See supra Lecture 21; see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649

(1898).
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Harlan joined Justice Fuller’s dissent. See id. at 705 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
Presumably, Harlan refers to Hot Springs, Bath County, Virginia, a spa resort
renowned for the curative powers of its hot springs, especially in relation to rheumatism and
gout. See generally SAMUEL C. TARDY, HOT SPRINGS, BATH COUNTY, VIRGINIA: WITH SOME
ACCOUNT OF THEIR MEDICINAL PROPERTIES AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE WATERS (Richmond,
Gary, Clemmitt & Jones 1869).
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citizens of the United States, that it was possible for him to become a
citizen of the United States.
One of the results of the opposite view is that when that man goes back
to China, and the Emperor should conclude to cut his head off—a custom
which prevails to a very great extent among these people—we would have
to prevent it. And if we could not do this, make him pay for it afterwards.
Or, if they impress him into the Chinese army, we would have to protect
him. Of course, I am wrong, because only the Chief Justice and myself
held these views, and as the majority decided the other way, we must
believe that we were wrong.
But the last clause of that section is a very important one. “No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.”668 Now, that’s a great right,
with which we are all invested. I cannot stop to discuss what are the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. But whatever
are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, that
amendment says that no state shall lay its hands on them, and if it does he
may appeal to the law, supreme in this country.669
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”670
You will remember that in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
there was a provision similar to this.671 But this amendment of the
Constitution was construed to be applicable to federal power, or federal
adjuncts only. The state was at liberty, until this Fourteenth Amendment,
to do anything it pleased. But this is all changed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
Many of Harlan’s dissents in civil rights cases relied on the Privileges or
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Now, what is due process of law? It is not any process that the state
chooses to call due process of law, because that would make the will of the
state final and conclusive. Due process of law refers to what was due
process of law at the time when the Constitution was adopted. We cannot
well cover the whole ground of due process of law, but there are some
things which we are able to say is not due process of law.
For instance, if a man sues me on a note and does not issue a summons
against me, but nevertheless the court renders judgment on the suit, and the
sheriff orders that property sold, I can stop that sale, because I have never
been notified of that suit.672 This thing is at the very basis of Anglo-Saxon
liberty. A man’s property cannot be taken from him without notice—
personal notice—for him to appear in court, and defend against the action.
If that were not done, then there would not be due process of law.
Suppose an act of the legislature took my property for private use.
That act would be void under this clause. That would not be due process of
law, because it does not belong to any government to take private property
and apply it to private use. Nor does it belong to any government to take
private property and apply it to public use, without due process of law.
Let me suppose a man is in jail, and sends for a lawyer. The man is
behind the bars, and the lawyer comes and says to the warden, “By what
authority have you got this man here?” “Well,” says the warden, “here is
my mittimus to me.”673 Well, so far that seems to be regular, but the
lawyer goes to the court where the proceedings were had, and examines
them, and finds that the man was proceeded against by information, while
under the law he was entitled to be proceeded against by indictment only.
Well, if that is so, the man is being deprived of his liberty without due
process of law, and could regain his liberty under the Constitution.674
Here is a man in jail, and is going to be hung in ten days from this
time. “Well, Mr. Sheriff, by what authority are you going to take this
man’s life?” “Well,” says the sheriff, “here is the order from the court,
which is my authority.” Well, we go to the court, and find that the
proceedings there were conducted contrary to the recognized principles in
the country. We find that the man was tried in secret session, that the court
672

See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1877).
A mittimus is “a court order or warrant directing a jailer to detain a person until or
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did not assign him counsel. And therefore this judgment would be void,
and that man can regain his liberty, because that would not have been due
process of law.
Now, it is a great deal for every American to know, that
notwithstanding the vastness of this country, no man can be deprived of his
life, his liberty, or his property, except in accordance with due process of
law. I am under an existing statute entitled to issue a writ of habeas corpus
and order any man released from custody, who has been put there without
due process of law.675 Any man between the two oceans can come to me
and claim this protection.
“[N]or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”676
No state can make any distinction. A man is not to be legislated
against, because he is of a certain race or color. When here, he is entitled
to the equal protection of the law. There underlies our institutions the
thought of “equality” before the law. The law condemns no man because
of his race or color. The blackest man ever seen, when in the courthouse, is
entitled to the same protection as the man who is white. It is this
amendment that says to the states, take care that you do not apply class
legislation.677
When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, there was an
apprehension that this amendment would overthrow some of the states, but
we have lived long enough under that amendment to satisfy ourselves that
there is no provision in the Federal Constitution to which we should cling
harder than the Fourteenth Amendment. It puts it in the power of the
United States to protect local interests against the power of vast interests,
which are so powerful that they have the state governments by the throat
and can do just as they please.
In the remaining amendment, “[t]he right of the citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”678
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This amendment does not confer the right of suffrage. That right is
regulated by the states.679 It only says that, as to citizens of the United
States, their right to vote shall not be abridged on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. Or, in other words, no state can deny a
black man—a citizen of the United States—the right to vote, because he is
a black man. Since that gentleman from China was adjudged to be a citizen
of the United States, this amendment says you shan’t deny him the right to
vote. So that this gentleman is not only entitled to vote, but he is entitled to
become President of the United States, so far as his citizenship is
concerned. And that, too, in the face of the fact that the race itself is
excluded from naturalization by the laws of the United States.
I am asked the question whether or not a woman can be President of
the United States. Yes, if the men are willing that this should occur, she
may. There is no prohibition against this in the Constitution. Then there
often occurs the question, may a state discriminate against a woman on
account of her sex, as far as her right to vote is concerned? Yes, this
amendment only says that the right to vote shall not be abridged “on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The word sex is
not there.
Sometimes the question is propounded, may a state make education a
test for the qualification of voters? Yes, it may. The state may say that no
man shall be allowed to vote unless he has a certain amount of education or
a certain amount of property, provided that it is not so put together that it
reaches a certain race, as a race.680
Now, a word or two more, and then I will end. I cannot convey to you
in words the pleasure which I have had during this term in meeting you for
the purpose of examining into this instrument. A great deal more might
have been said, if time had permitted. My object has not been to cover
every question and every phase that might arise under it, but it has been, in
the first place, to make you acquainted with the greatness of this
instrument, and to bring about, if I could, a desire in you to know more
about it than you do. To induce you to study the history of this instrument,
and read the lives of the men who laid the foundation of this government.
Read their letters, and their speeches, from which light will come on the
words of this instrument. If the result of these lectures has been to make
the study of this instrument so instructing to you, I shall be amply repaid.
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How little the people at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
thought of it is well expressed by the celebrated historian, McCauley, who
wrote that our Constitution was “all sail and no anchor.”681 And he
continues by saying that the republic which was established under this
Constitution will be laid waste in the twentieth century, just as Rome was
laid waste to in the fifth. But only with this difference, that whereas the
Huns and Vandals who destroyed Rome came from without, our Huns and
Vandals will come from our own institutions.682
But time has shown how idle and senseless have been these
prophesies. And time has shown that instead of being divided, we are
today more closely united than ever before in our past history. And that
today the principles of law and order, as they rest upon a written
Constitution, are stronger than ever before. And that today, more than ever
before, the people respect all the rights of the states, as well as of the
United States.
And as we stand at the close of this century, and think as to what will
be our condition in the next century, there is nothing to disturb our vision.
If the world never knew so before, they have been convinced within the last
fortnight that this great republic of ours, in all the future destinies of the
world, is to be reckoned with in the government of European affairs.683
And that the power on this Earth today that is likely to shape the destinies
of Europe and the Far Eastern countries, and of the whole human race in
the next century, are the United States of America.

681 Letter from Thomas Babington Macaulay to Henry S. Randall (May 23, 1857), in
WHAT DID MACAULAY SAY ABOUT AMERICA?: TEXT OF FOUR LETTERS TO HENRY S.
RANDALL 23, 25 (1925).
682 Id. (“As I said before, when a society has entered on this downward progress, either
civilisation or liberty must perish. Either some Caesar or Napoleon will seize the reins of
government with a strong hand; or your republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid
waste by barbarians in the twentieth Century as the Roman Empire was in the fifth; with this
difference, that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman Empire came from without,
and that your Huns and Vandals will have been engendered within your own country by
your own institutions.”).
683 Presumably, Harlan refers to the declaration of war against Spain. On April 20,
1898, President McKinley signed a joint resolution of Congress demanding that Spain
withdraw from Cuba and authorizing the use of military force. See Milestones: 1866–1898,
The Spanish-American War, 1898, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/Spanish_american_war (last visited June 16,
2013). On April 21, Spain suspended diplomatic relations with the United States and the
U.S. Navy blockaded Havana. See id. Spain declared war on April 23, and on April 25,
Congress declared that a state of war had existed since April 21. See id.

